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CORRIGENDA
Lines Omitted or Repeated
On p.80. after the third line of the section summary, insert:
"order predicative cycle and a higher"
On p. 219 insert section summary as follows:
"The mind appears to weight the alternatives with which it is faced 
with a positive or negative charge of emotion and to balance these 
weightings against each other*"
On p. 337. after "it comes to the" at the beginning of the fourth line of the 
first paragraph, insert the following:
"conscious processes of decision, a man may find in the nature of 
Ghrist and the"
On p. 402 delete line 23, beginning "space and time", also lines 24? 25? 26, 
27 and 28 up to and including "trajectory in".
Other Corrections
On p. 384 the short paragraph of one sentence beginning "Having made this
classification..." should form the last paragraph of the preceding 
section instead of being the first paragraph of the section headed 
"Our Idea of the Natural World", which begins on this page.
On p. 404 delete the first seventeed words of the paragraph beginning "Having
said this...", which should now start with the words "Let me now begin 
by taking..."
On p. 161 at the end of the first sentence of the paragraph beginning at the 
bottom of the page delete the words ", considered as an object11.
On p. 16A. in the fourth line from the bottom of the page delete the words "or
anthropology1* and insert at the end of the line the words "including
anthropology,”•
On p. 180 in the fourth line from the bottom of the page delete the words
’‘external measurements” and substitute ’different types of behavioural 
output".
On p, £15 amend the sentence beginning "It may therefore.,." in the fourth line
from the bottom of the page to read: "It may therefore be called a
face or, as I have suggested earlier, a profile."
On p. k16 in the first line of the page delete the words "personality like a 
new mask" and substitute "Profile as an accretion to the shape it 
presents,".
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ADDENDA
On p. 96 insert the following footnote to the paragraph ending in the middle 
of the page (replacing the deleted footnote):
"1. Of. Michel Foucault "Les Mots et les Choses" (Gallimard 1966) 
pp. 96 ff., including the statement on p.97 that: "General grammar is 
the study of verbal order in its relationship to the simultaneity 
Which it has the task of representing. Its proper object is therefore 
neither thought nor language: but discourse understood as a succession 
of verbal signs. This succession is artificial in relation to the 
simultaneity of representations and to this extent language is to 
thought as that which has been the object of reflection is to that 
which is immediate."
On p. 107 insert the following footnote to the central paragraph:
”2. There is a link here to the arguments of Wittgenstein in the 
"Philosophical Investigations", for example his dictum: "Uttering a 
word is like striking a note on the keyboard of the imagination" 5 or 
again "... you can elucidate all the ramified associations struck by 
each of the words." ("Philosophical Investigations", Blackwell 1953, 
p. A &&d p.219.) A detailed examination and critique of Wittgensteins 
views on language would however go beyond the scope of this study.”
On p. 117 insert the following addition to the existing footnote:
"There is some experimental evidence that learning can take place at an 
unconscious level: for example the eye can be conditioned to blink at a 
light signal without any intervention of consciousness; similarly we can 
learn motor skills like playing a piano or riding a bicycle without 
necessarily being aware at any time of the precies details of what we are 
doing. (The evidence is cited and discussed in e.g. Julian Jaynes "The 
Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind": 1976, 
U.K. edition Penguin Books 1979 pp. 31-36.) These cases are however 
covered, in my view, by the theory of focal attention and subordinate 
complexity developed in the section beginning on p. 122 below of this 
study. The learning does not take place without consciousness, though the 
consciousness is not isolated and explicit: our awareness of the relevant 
elements of the relevant predications of consciousness, as with all our 
awareness of qualities, involves a sense of the simultaneous precipitate 
of many contributing elements, none of which however are individually 
identified and brought to the focus of attention. ¥e learn new skills by 
habituating ourselves to what "feels right", without any consciousness of 
the many details of our behaviour which contribute to the rightness or 
wrongness of a given "feel" in a given purposive situation."
On p. 130 insert the following at the end of the section, after "logical space.":
"In effect it is round this metaphor that the space itself is 
synthesized and the number of its dimensions determined."
On p. 16A insert the following as a footnote to the sentence ending "... of 
reflection." on the ninth line from the bottom of the page:
"1. Of. the definitions given by Sir Edmund Leach in the field of social 
anthropology. "In the language of social anthropology person is sharply 
distinguished from individual. The individual is a living biological 
animal who is born, develops to maturity, grow3 old and dies; the person
is the set of offices and roles which attach to the individual at any
particular stage in his life career." ("Social Anthropology", Fontana 
1982, p.U9.)n
On p. 219 insert the words "or behaviour" at the end of the sentence at present 
ending with "... and inf ormation’J on the eighth line of the page •
On p. A38 insert the following as a footnote to the first sentence ending on
the page:
"1. The following sentences by Dr. John Polkinghorne (a particle 
physicist and F.E.S.) are relevant: "In very general terms it is not 
difficult to imagine that pattern recreated (the body resurrected) in 
some other world. If you like, the mathematical apparatus of projection 
from one space to another provides a logical basis for such a thought. In 
this way we perceive the possibility of continuity without material 
identity. Of course there are a great many puzzles of detail about this 
blithe suggestion... One might begin to grope at speculative notions 
which might provide some shadowy clues to surmounting these difficulties.
I think that activity would almost certainly be a waste of time because 
we do not have enough knowledge on which to ground it Jr ("The 'Way the 
World Is: The Christian Perspective of a Scientist", Triangle SPGK, 1983 
p. 93.)"
After p. 1MB insert the following paragraph:
"The basic weakness in Meadfs theory that the Self becomes "an individual 
reflection of the general system" is, I suggest, that he confuses the n 
medium with the message. We take in from our social environment not only 
a verbal language, but also a macro-language, a whole set of ideas in 
terms of which we divide up the world and put together our understandings 
and intentions. Indeed strictly we take in not merely one macro-language 
- or thought currency - but many partially overlapping thought currencies, 
which correspond to the set of differentiated thought communities to which 
the individual happens to belong. These provide the terms in which an 
individual will think, plan and choose, creating himself in some sense 
as he does so. But they do not determine what he becomes. They help to 
define the range of what is conceivable and hence possible to him when he 
is faced with a decision in a given situation; but,;the decision and the 
resulting actuality is his. They provide the medium; he writes the 
message. Mead himself says that "all selves are constituted by or in 
terms of the social process"; but he seems to run these two alternatives
together: it seems to have escaped him that there is an immense 
difference between them."
On p. 6. after the twelfth line from the bottom of the page, ending "... its 
input is" insert the words "matter/energy and".
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A THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SELF
Preface
My chief purpose In this study is to reach a clear view of what 
we mean by the Self* There are many ambiguities in our ordinary uses 
of this word, and it might therefore seem appropriate to begin the 
study with definitions and philosophical argument. However the 
approach I have adopted is rather that of a descriptive, phenomenalist 
psychology, an attempt to describe in as coherent and comprehensive a 
way as possible what happens in consciousness and where and how the 
Self emerges*
In practice this means that I have to begin with a description of 
the organism in Its environment in order to provide a framework for the 
subsequent analysis of consciousness, and in particular to establish 
the key concepts of information, coding, behaviour and consciousness 
itself. Next I try to provide a broadly comprehensive account of the 
processes of conscious life —  otherwise of the mind - including the 
central processes of purposive thought, decision and action. In the 
course of this exploration it becomes clear that a determining part in 
these processes is played by the idea which each of us forms of himself 
or herself* The three central chapters of the study are therefore taken 
up with a closer examination of this feature. The first of them deals 
with how it is built up and works, while the second and third deal with 
the question of how we can establish when it is working well or not* 
These two chapters represent an examination of the concept of coherence 
and wholeness in the idea of the Self, of how it is created and 
sustained, of the imperfections of this wholeness and of what can be 
done about them. This leads into the area of ethics, of healing, and 
of the psychological aspect of religion.
Finally, in the last chapter, "The Idea and the Reality”, I try, 
on the basis of the preceding analysis, to deal with some of the 
philosophical problems which inevitably arise when any comprehensive
account of the Self is attempted* Can we equate the mind’s idea of 
the Self, which is the subject of the central analysis of this study, 
with the true Self? If not, what is the true Self? In what sense, 
if any, can the Self be said to be free? If the Self ie free, what 
can ue say about the use of freedom, which is responsibility? And
what ultimately becomes of the Self? I cannot claim to provide
, ■ ■ ' '■/ ■
definitive answers7to these profound and perennial questions, nor to 
review all of the immense literature which has gathered round them.
But I try to present them in a framework derived from the preceding 
enquiry, and to suggest a possible approach to them which is coherent 
with the rest of the study.
Some of these questions go beyond science and natural philosophy 
into the field of religion* Insofar as I touch upon the psychology 
of religion, I do so from the inside as a believing Christian. I do 
not apologise therefore for the fact that in some of the later sections 
of the study I include some suggestions about a possible Christian 
interpretation of the nature and destiny of the Self. In doing so 
I am not deporting from the rational and objective purpose of the 
study; rather I am trying to show how a Christian view can be seen 
to fit on to the preceding argument and, in its own fashion, to 
reinforce and complete it. .
iii
INTRODUCTION 
A Comment on Theories and Models of Man
One of the most striking contributions to a recent symposium on 
1
"Models of Wan" was a paper by D.E. Broadbent in which he attacked all 
attempts to build up wide-ranging models of human nature* Complex and 
detailed theories* he argued* do not get tested at the really crucial 
points; and if data are found that contradict them it is too easy to 
add yet a further complexity and to go on believing in the theory.
Anyone who tries to set up a detailed model at the present day is like 
a Babylonian trying to guess the details of Einstein*s relativity theory 
in advance of the millennia of observations which have eliminated all 
kinds of other types of theory. Before setting up a highly complex 
model incorporating a large number of assumptions* it is better first 
to test simpler antitheses and see which class of model is more probable# 
The state of knowledge at any one time is consistent with some models 
and inconsistent with others. The rate of reduction of the unknown set 
is fastest if every experiment decides between equally probable sets of 
models. "If the experiment can have only two outcomes* which is often 
true in psychology, this means that one can only test between two broad 
classes of theory* and this means that the theories are going to be 
very simple indeed. Such a procedure may look less sophisticated than 
the writing of a highly speculative model* it is however a quicker way 
to get to the truth in the end." It is on essential part of Broadbent*e 
sceptical approach that we should expect to use different frameworks 
for different purposes so long as they are not contradictory. Admittedly 
each of us needs a wide-ranging philosophy of life; but in Broadbent*s 
view "any claim to base a philosophy of life on current psychological 
knowledge is fraudulent, because our knowledge is still consistent with 
many models. We should look outside psychology for a viable philosophy.?
Broadbent*s view is powerfully expressed and it is one that must 
be faced if I am to justify the present enterprise, which is nothing if 
not an attempt to build up one part of a wide-ranging but unified theory
1. British Psychological Society I960. (Ed. A.3. Chapman and D.fi.
3ones). pp. 121, 127.
of man. In defending a contrary position my first step must be a directv
denial of Broadbent*s suggestion that it is possible to have a viable
philosophy of life which is outside psychology. Any viable and
relevant philosophy must include important assumptions concerning human
nature; and while it may well be impossible to derive such assumptions
confidently from the body of knowledge that psychologists have^acGumulated
so far* it remains essential, first of all, to reject assumptions which
are inconsistent with carefully established facts, and, secondly, to be
aware of the important constraining effect which any seriously held
philosophy of life must have on the ways in which human nature can be
conceived at all. It does not follow from this that a true scientist*s
philosophy is to have no philosophy; for as T.S. Eliot said - and I
have used his argument in the opening paragraph of this study - "to
understand anything is to understand from a point of view”. As Martin
Hollis puts it more controversially in his book also called "Models of 
1Man” , "we must know what is rational a priori before we can know what 
is actual’. As Michael Polanyi says in the course of his exhaustive
discussion of personal knowledge, "the formalisation of meaning relies...
2*
from the start on the practice of unformalised meaning". * The 
scientist must have the humility to accept the facts when they seem to 
disprove his theory. But he cannot begin without a theory at all, 
since without soma theoretical perspective he cannot identify the facts 
he is talking about; nor can he limit himself to mini-theories about 
relatively trivial problems; for even his mini-theories can only have 
their being in some wider intellectual perspective. The scientist ^ Iso 
is a human being.
There is another fallacy, I would suggest, to be identified in 
Broadbent*s argument, specifically in his view that a wide-ranging 
model is of little use because our knowledge is consistent with so 
many different broad models. It follows from this, he suggests, that 
only on the smallest scale is it possible to conduct a proper 
elimination contest between theories. Certainly there is weight in 
this view, particularly in the point that when a complex theory is 
confronted with unwelcome facts it Is all too easy to keep it going 
simply by adding some further complexity to make it fit the new facts.
1. Cambridge 1977, p. 164.
2. "Personal Knowledge” (Routledge & Kegan Paul) corrected edition
1962, p. 250.
But Broadbent ignore a significant counter-argument, namely that a 
truly wide-ranging model must touch reality at a whole series of 
different points and the very fact that it can bring a whole range 
of disparate phenomena into a single, coherent eet of relationships is 
evidence that it meets an important criterion of viability. If it proves 
possible to construct a general theory of grammar which, with appropriate 
adjustments, can cover both perception and thought on the one hand 
and music on the other, as well as language itself, the achievement is 
likely to be rather mors than a trivial contrivance. When new facts 
are discovered, a model may indeed have to be adjusted, but even a 
major adjustment is not necessarily totally destructive. Einstein 
did not destroy the validity and practical usefulness of Newton’s 
conclusions, at least over a very wide range of their applicability; 
instead he produced a totally new perspective which effectively 
Included the Newtonian scheme of things, though with a new understanding 
of it and a new delimitation of its range. It is of course fair to 
point out that the state of our know&edge in the field of psychology 
ie far different from what it is in the field of the physical sciences, 
but, as I have argued already, even os relative Babylonians we still 
cannot simply do without any broad perspectives.
In effect I believe Broadbent would be right to argue that it is 
delusive to try to create a single, highly elaborated model on a 
single level, capable of explaining all the phenomena of human nature; 
but what he fails to bring out ie that in practice we use a hierarchy 
of models working on different levels but related together. Thus we 
can have a set of disparate models at the detailed level so long as 
they fit into more generalised models at higher levels. This goes 
beyond saying that they must be non-contradictory. Georges Thinbs, 
one of the contributors to the same symposium, remarks that "models 
may equally concern general frameworks and specific subfields within 
them”; but the link between the subfield model and the generalised, 
higher level model can be quite loose, while there need be no direct 
linkage at all between the models we use for different subfields.
This idea of a loasely integrated hierarchy of models is 
developed, though not quite in the terms I have used, by P.8. Wsrr
in one of his contri buttons to "Models of Man”. UJarr points out that 
"conceptual frameworks”, "paradigms", "theories” and "models" (he 
could have added "hypotheses" as well) all act as conceptual sieves or 
moulds, excluding from theought a large number of options and at the 
same time guiding thought about the material that is allowed to pass.
Ule tend, however, to reserve "conceptual framework" and similar phrases 
for the widest and most general principles of interpretation, while 
"paradigms”, "theories” and "models” tend to represent conceptual 
sieves and moulds at descending levels of generality. (I have some 
reservations about lilarr’s use of "sieves and moulds" as the generic 
termj I prefer "models" in that role, since I would argue that to 
understand anything, including a sentence, involves bringing forms 
together in such a way that they construct a more complex form; but 
in the present context this is no more than a matter of terminology.)
Although the existence of these different words with different 
shades of meaning, particularly in specific contexts, does not imply 
that there is any sharp difference of kind between their referents, the 
fact that we possess such distinctions reflects, I believe, the fact 
that in any specific case, for good practical reasons, we tend to use 
conceptual tools of this kind in hierarchical linkage at different 
levels of generality. This is uhat LJarr implies when he distinguishes 
theories from metatheoretical positions and notes that two limited 
theories within different metatheoretical structures (which are 
therefore, as I would suggest, not unified in a single hierarchy of 
generalisation) "can be quite incapable of interbreeding”. He questions 
"how far one can generate comprehensive theoretical accounts merely by 
attempting to expand miniature theories... The gradual expansion of 
a restricted model changes its nature in ways which point up the 
wider inadequacy of both the original and the expanded modal" (pp. 302-3). 
He notes that conceptual frameworks in science are generally not in 
themselves predictive and "this suggests that there is a gap between 
the miniature theory and the wide-ranging conceptualisation which 
cannot be bridged by ever-broadening inductive reasoning or empirical 
study" (p.304). Comprehensive metatheoretical structures "are not 
usually articulated”, he says, "as potential explanatory systems in 
their own right. Such an articulation requires more detailed consideration
of the nature of wide-ranging frameworks and how they might be extended 
in top-down fashion to embrace miniature theories and their empirical 
referents” (p. 304).
This analysis suggests, I believe, the lines on which an adequate 
answer to Broadbent1s challenge could be developed* I shall not 
attempt to develop it in detail here; but more relevant to my immediate 
purpose is the fact that such an analysis may also help to explain the 
pattern and nature of the present study* In the first chapter, ”The 
Organism and its Environment”, I present what Uarr might call a 
conceptual framework, based on the general theory of living systems as 
developed by LUR. Ashby and Games G. Miller, among others* In the 
second chapter, ”A Model of the Mind”, I develop what Idarr would 
probably call a theory of the mind* This fits into the wider 
conceptual framework insofar as it is based on the idea of the mind 
as the regulator of a living system; but it is essentially an independent 
scheme at a much more detailed and specific level of generalisation. The 
third chapter, ”The Idea of the Self in Construction and Action”, 
develops yet a further model at a more detailed and specific level 
still, again taking one element of the theory established in the 
preceding chapter, namely the idea of the Self, and working out a 
scheme which fits into the higher level structure but is itself largely 
independent of it* It is significant that the model at the lower, 
more detailed level can in each case be abandoned without affecting 
the viability of the model at the level above; but the higher level 
theory or conceptual framework cannot be abandoned without destroying 
what has been constructed at the lower level — though no doubt something 
can always be salvaged from the wreck by reconstructing it to fit into 
some different metatheeretical structure.
These considerations will, I hope, serve to clarify the status of 
the theories developed in this study and to indicate the lines on which 
I would justify the value and relevance of attempting so elaborate and, 
in a sense, so speculative a task. As it happens, the ideas of the 
mind and the Self set forth in this study form part of a still wider- 
ranging enterprise, which consists of six related studies dealing
respectively with perception, thought, language, personality, social 
interaction and the just society, in a scheme designed to bring the 
phenomena of human nature into one unified perspective# Such an under­
taking can make sense to me because, unlike Broadbent, I believe that 
it is possible to construct a rational, coherent philosophy of life 
which, while it is more than a theory of psychology, yet has deep 
roots in psychologies! reality.
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To understand something and so to form a clear and distinct idea 
of it in the Cartesian sense\ we need to know what it is made of, 
how it works, and how it fits in with other things. That is to say, we 
are concerned to establish its structure, its internal processes and its 
input and output. If we are dealing with something located but unknown, 
a black box, we need logically to begin with its input and output, 
the third of these requisites. Ue are concerned in this study with an 
organism in an environment and we need to establish first the terms in 
which we are to conceive of these two entities and the relationship
between them. Uhat kind of world are we dealing with and, within that
world, what is an organism, a living system? These are the preliminary 
questions to be considered in this opening chapter.
As the foregoing suggests, this chapter is not part of my central 
argument, but rather a preliminary statement of assumptions, a necessary 
clearing of the ground; and this must be my defence if it seems to 
contain a high proportion of general statements without much detailed 
disucssion of alternative views. It is not my intention to go into 
these matters in great detail, but I believe it is essential to establish 
the ultimate perspective within which we are working if later confusion 
is to be avoided. For we have to choose a perspective. In T.S. Eliotfs 
words "to understand anything is to understand from a point of view”. 
Beyond this, if we are to investigate how an adapting organism comes 
to be possessed of information about the world and to make use of it in 
purposeful behaviour, we have a requirement to establish the broad terms 
in which the world can be known and operated upon.
Regulation and Self-Regulation
An exploration of what we mean by rule and law in nature,
by a regulated system, by possibility and actuality, by
ideas, complexity, coherence, organisation, wholeness.
In the normal perspective of science the world that we see is that 
of nature under law, an objective world which is there for discovery.
1. R. Descartes: "Discours de la Methods" (l®3tf) Part II*
/
Within that world we discover objects end events and we can recognise 
objects and events precisely because they are defined by continuities, 
which we can also call regularities — that is, examples of the operation 
of a rule or a law*
What, then, do we mean by these words? 1 suggest that a rule or 
a law is a restriction of the possibilities of transition in time from 
one value, otherwise one state of a system, to another. The same 
definition is valid for both words, though we tend to use "rule" where 
the ostensible regulating agent is an individual and "law" where it 
is a political organisation or Mature herself. To put it another way, 
the world that we observe is one of limited possibility and of 
actuality (very approximately, I will suggest of space and of form - or 
information). But it is not an environment of "all possibility", it is 
one in which, to adopt the cyberneticists term, there is a vast amount 
of constraint, otherwise necessity, otherwise restriction upon the 
possibilities of transition in time, otherwise law. To quote U. Ross 
Ashby, "As every law of nature implies the existence of an invariant, 
every law of nature is a constraint. Thus the Newtonian law says that, 
of the vectors of planetary positions and velocities which might occur 
e.g. written on paper (the larger set) only a smaller set will actually 
occur in the heavens... Science looks for laws; it is therefore much 
concerned with looking for constraints* (Here the larger set is com­
posed of what might happen if the behaviour were free end chaotic, 
and the smaller set is concerned with what actually does happen.) ...
A chair is a thing because it has coherence Zwhicjj? corresponds to the 
presence of constraint.«* A world without constraints would be totally 
chaotic. The turbulent river below Niagara might be such a world 
(though the physicist would still find some constraint here) ... the 
organism can adapt just so far as the real world is constrained, end 
no further."**
An important point which is implicit, though not explicit, in 
what Ashby says is that on any particular occasion we are dealing 
simultaneously both with a tightly constrained actuality (the smaller
1. U. Rose Ashby "An Introduction to Cybernetics" (Chapman and
Hall 1956), sections 7/15 - 7/17.
set) and with a more loosely constrained range of possibility (the 
larger set)* as I have already suggested, we are not dealing at any 
time with "all possibility”, since this would be inconceivable^*
This point is central to the idea of information, which we shall have 
to consider later in relation to the processes by which the organism 
adapts itself to the environment# And in this connection it may be 
worth drawing attention straight away to a related point which emerges 
here, namely, that the actuality with which we deal can be either a 
thino# which is spatio-temporally unique, because it is located in 
one trajectory across a unique cognitive map of the universe in time; 
or else an idea# which is logically unique - because it represents a 
definite class of possibilities or of organised (constrained, coherent) 
complexes of possibilities related together in a particular way# To 
put it in other words, our awareness is of facts of existence or facts 
of classification* Often these are combined, for wo do not recognise 
a located object without classifying it; but the ability to process 
ideas in separation from things is one of the most distinctive of 
human capacities*
Any object in nature is a form insofar as it exhibits the 
coherence and continuity of a whole: but it is also a system or complex 
insofar as it can be analysed (and every form can be so analysed) into 
elements which stand in a relationship to one another* These elements 
are themselves subordinate wholes, which can in turn be analysed into 
further component elements; for hierarchical organisation appears, 
together with spatial and temporal extension* to be a ubiquitous 
characteristic of the constraints which we discover in nature.
As this implies, any object in nature that persists long enough 
to be observed is necessarily a regulated system, that is, a system 
constrained by law; the balance of physical forces (to use a different 
terminology, reflecting a slightly different perspective on the world) 
operates to maintain a particular object in being, typically as a 
closed system composed of the same atoms, sometimes with specific
1. He can conceive of random variation within a restricted set 
of possibilities (for example the series of whole numbers 
below a certain figure such as 10) but we cannot conceive of 
a totally random variation of everything, if only because the 
"things” which we can observe or of which we can think are 
themselves constrained by the limitations of our perceptual 
end conceptual apparatus* They have to be constrained to be 
recognised as things#
4additions or subtractions, from the beginning to the end of its 
identifiable existence. When change does take place in it, the 
objectvs form as a whole is altered, usually irreversibly# Heat will 
crack a stone, wind-blown sand jiiill erode it, deposition will add to 
it; but these are once for all changes — the content changes and so 
the form changes with it. But an organism, by contrast, is an open 
system engaged in a process of continual exchange with its environment.
Its body has a form with a continuous existence or trajectory in space 
time, but its chemical constituents, the components into which it can 
ultimately be analysed, do not share its continuity, they wander in and 
out. Only at death does this cease to be true; only at that point can 
the body be said to become fully analogous to a stone. To put it more 
briefly, if more roughly, in an inanimate object form and content are 
continuous over time, in a living organism form alone is continuous, 
content is not.
There is admittedly a class of inanimate systems, with large gaseous 
or liquid components, to which this statement does not apply without 
qualification. An example might be the basin which remains brimming 
at a fixed level even through considerable variations in the volume 
of spray falling from the fountain; or a geyser which thbows up a 
regularly shaped body of spray and steam at intervals; or a whirlpools^ 
or a meteorological system like a cyclone. These are all systems in 
which a form is preserved with a changing content and they can perhaps 
be said to represent a step beyond ths entirely closed system. The 
geyser even shows a certain capacity for replication. But the forms 
they preserve are the unstable forms of liquids or gases, not the 
solid forms which plants and animals can perpetuate* They have neither 
the durability nor the capacity for transmitting mechanical force of 
solid forms; and evolution, at any rate on this planet, has passed them 
by.
Turning to animate objects, if we imagine a plant-like single­
celled organism in a liquid environment, we can see that the development 
and maintenance of its form as a whole involves a complex interaction 
between the body and its environment, as a variety of molecules and
larger wholes pass by or through the organism. Some, have no effect upon it
5but_others are taken irto it and • f uither interaction takes place within 
the organism, as a result of which molecules may be broken up or combined 
with others, and some or all of the components into which they arc 
broken may be recombined. Part of what is initially taken in may be 
incorporated in the body itself, helping to renew or extend it, and a 
remaining part is expelled. The whole process is essentially one of 
selection, combination, disintegration and recombination, in other words 
of making and breaking connections.
Every step in the process is a step of regulation, an occurrence 
according to the rules imposed by natural laws of physics and chemistry. 
These restrict the possible making and breaking of connections which 
follow particular types of juxtaposition, and the particular types of 
juxtaposition possible are themselves dictated by the nature of the 
environment and the nature of the genetic material in the cell. The 
nature of the genetic material, in the presence of the right environf 
mental conditions and materials, ensures that a certain limited range 
of interactions takes place in certain sequences, with the effect that 
the cell grows and maintains itself to certain limits and in a certain 
specific form, and that it proceeds in due course to divide in two in 
such a way as to reproduce itself.
This cell system is an open system end the regulatrwhich applies 
the rules that ensure its growth, maintenance and reproduction is the 
genetic material operating in accordance with natural laws. A raany- 
celled organism can arise from a single coll through continued division 
and coordination of growth which is mads possible by the replication of 
the same genetic material in every cell; but this of course can happen 
only if the genetic material itself is such as to dictate thie eo** 
ordinated growth, operating in one call differently from another 
because the cells mutually establish for each other different, though 
controlled, environments.
Idhat has been said so far refers to a passive, plant-like organism 
which reacts to conditions and objects in ita environment as they impact 
upon it, but does nothing except through these reactions to alter tho
environment. (Whether an organism of such passivity actually exists 
in nature is not relevant to the present theoretical argument.) A 
different situation arises however with an organism which is actively 
self-regulating and, therefore, instead of relying on chance to pro­
vide the right materials and conditions for its growth and reproduction, 
actively sets out to find them or bring them about. This immediately 
implies, first, that it must have some means of getting information 
about objects or conditions around itself before interacting with them 
and, secondly, that it must have means of moving or changing either the 
whole or parts of itself in order to secure what it needs or to avoid 
what it finds harmful. The efficiency of the regulation achieved may 
then in an appropriate environment be greatly increased? but the 
complication of the process is greatly increased also.
Information
An examination of information as the resolution of 
possibility into actuality, of ideas as schemata, of 
our perceptual apparatus as yielding values in limited 
registers of possibility, of the hierarchies of knowledge, 
of the designated instance as the counterpart of the 
schema or class.
In order to make further progress we need now to consider the 
nature of information? for if an organism is a black box its input is 
information and its output ie behaviour.
Information in the scientific perspective is the same as knowledge, 
in other words it consists of facts of existence (which include events) 
or facts of classification (which include classifications of events).
In either case we are concerned with a range of possibility and an 
actuality. The actuality has no significance, no reality, except in 
relation to the range of possibility - indeed without this it is 
unperceivable and inconceivable.
Another way of putting this is to say that our knowledge of reality 
is always a communication in a code. The perceptual apparatus of the 
human organism ie a highly complex, hierarchically integrated system,
of which the basic units may be considered as individual values in 
restricted ranges or registers of possibility, such as hue/ brightness, 
pitch, sound timbre, loudness, quality of taste, intensity of taste, 
cold, warmth, roughness, weight, three-dimensional space, two-dimensional 
space, melodic space (with dimensions of pitch and time) and a con­
siderable number of others. Each register represents a quite restricted 
range of possibility in which only values of appropriate types can be 
recognised; only colours can be recognised in the register of hue, only:; 
melodic forms in melodic space, only three-dimensional forms in three- 
dimensional space, only trajectories (like the path of an aircraft 
across the sky or the static presence of an armGhair in a room over time) 
in a continuum of four-dimensional space-time. We do not at any time 
perceive such basic values in isolation; they are always combined in 
elbborate ways; but these combinations are themselves constrained by 
elaborate rules of combination and integration, or hierarchical 
organisation. Fpr example hue and brightness must always be combined 
together, but hue and loudness can never be directly combined - though 
they may be integrated in a higher level perception, e.g. of a noisy 
red motor-cycle. Basic forms from a given register can be combined 
sequentially, as in the cumulative complexity of a ragged outline or a 
kbobbly shape, but always subject to the stringent cbnstraints of 
continuity; for a continuous complex form cannot break off here and 
start again there without losing its single identity.■*'*
So far as hierarchical organisation is concerned, it would appear . 
that all perceptions are built up from basic cells, in each of which a 
container value for form is infused with a particular value for quality 
and a particular value for intensity; and that these cells in turn are 
integrated as components in higher level complexes. But there are
1. If we are to take perceptual cognisance of anything, it must
exhibit either the same values for long enough for us to observe 
it, or change only to values continuous with the preceding ones 
in the same registers. Continuity itself may be movement £o an 
adjacent step in an ordered scale, or a shift of one or more 
values in an ordered complex while the rest remain as before.
Thus change with continuity in any dimension of three-dimensional 
space or of time is change to an adjacent value at whatever 
degree of resolution - whatever "grain" - the apparatus of 
discrimination can yield; while change with continuity in two 
successive musical notes, although it does not involve adjacency 
in pitch, does require instead (if it is to be a melodic 
continuity) that the two notes should be tuned to a common scale 
and consequently should have Overtones in common; and similarly 
if one hue is to shade continuously into another this implies 
that dot all the values in the underlying mix of primary colours 
change at the same time.
further constraints; not more than about seven discriminated components 
can be integrated in any one uhole^j and the number of levels of hierarchy# 
i.s. of component and whole, which the mind can grasp at once seems to 
be limited to no more than four* Finally we can basically only become 
aware of one unified complex at a time and we do so by relating a 
subject complex to a predicate complex in one predication over time at 
the focus of consciousness.
This is of course an almost absurdly compressed# and inevitably 
controversial, account of an exceedingly complicated process* But for 
present purposes it should be sufficient in order to indicate the way in 
which I propose that our perceptual apparatus should be regarded as 
fundamentally a coding apparatus. The basic values on basic registers 
represent the vocabulary of the code and the complex rules of com­
bination and integration represent its grammar. In saying this I am 
not using a metaphor. For it is my contention that the continuous 
stream of consciousness is always built out of successive integrations 
of discrete experiences, whether of perception, thought or speech, and 
that the manner in which these “predications” are built up is always 
determined, literally and precisely, by rules of grammar. These are 
closely comparable for each of the three modes of experience, and in
combination they form a single system, bringing all three modes of
2.experience together in one consciousness.
The basis of my theory in this respect is that the fundamental 
category of experience is the category of ideas, or logical forms, which
1. See G.A. Hiller ”The Hagic Number Seven” in ”The Psychology of 
Communication” (Penguin 1968). This does not exclude an undis­
criminated plurality (e.g. ”several” or ”many”) which may retro­
spectively be shown to have more than seven components.
2. These ideas have been developed at length in three unpublished 
studies, ”The Grammar of Perception” (1973), ”The Grammar of 
Thought” (1973) and ”The Grammar of Language” (1974 revised 1982).
The idea that there must be some correspondence between the 
structures of thought and of language is of course far from new,
£*ufc I do not think any comparably detailed and comprehensive 
theoretical model, bringing all three modes of experience 
together has been developed elsewhere*
corresponds to our classifications of the world. The continuous series 
of experiences of which we are aware during our waking life is 
essentially a series of predications built up of ideas. Those predi­
cations are hierarchically complex systems, but at the highest leyel of 
the hierarchy each represents a diachronic* step of the attention from the
subject to the predicate, relating the two together into a synchronic
2whole, before the attention moves on to the next subject. ’ They 
occur in space over time, but the ideas from which they era built are 
non-perceptual and the space itself is quasi-topological, which means 
that it is variable, it is a space of possibility rather than actuality. 
This corresponds to the fact that ideas are classifications, they 
represent ranges of possibility, not particular actualities. But then 
how do we grasp them, given that they are not perceivable and that any­
way to receive information we need the message as well as the coda, 
the actuality as well ©s the possibility?
The answer to this question is in two parts. Let us begin with 
perception. The answer here is simply that while the idea complex 
defines the possibilities in contemplation at a given moment, tho input 
of tha senses defines the perceived actuality. This interpretation is 
very close to that of Ulric Meisser in "Cognition and Reality”.
1. I borrow the useful words diachrony and diachronic from Levi- 
Strauss and the vocabulary of fetructuralism.
2. I should make it clear that I do not use the word predicate to
mean eimply an attribute which is "ascribed" to a subject. In
the grammar of thought, perception and language alike a
predicate represents the ground against which the subject 
emerges, the object in relation to which it moves (or remains 
still), the agent which moves (or remains still) in relation to 
tho passive subject, or the complement which is absorbed as an
elaboration of the subject. The predication includes a relation­
ship between subject and predicate (a copula in the terminology 
of some writers including, I understand, Frege), which is not 
always the same relationship but can take a number of different
^ forms. In contrast to this usage "By the subject - predicate
form Russell and most of his successors mean what could less^ , 
misleadingly bo described as ‘the substance - attribute form ?
(3ohn Passmore, "A Hundred Years of Philosophy", Penguin 
Edition 1968, p. 215).
3. Freeman, San Francisco 1976.
Following Bartlett and others, he describes what I call idoas or idea
complexes as anticipatory schemata. ^Reading, listening, feeling,
looking depend on pro—existing structures here called schemata which
direct perceptual activity and are modified as it occurs.♦* Remembering,
imagining, speaking, thinking end every other form of cognition... are
best understood as applications of the ©am© cognitive structures1’ (p.14).
Neisser suggests that all perception involves a cycle in which first
a schema directs the exploratory focus of the senses, then sensory
exploration samples the objective environment, then the results of the
exploration modify the schema. ’’The function of the anantieipated
stimulus”, he says, ”is to initiate the cycle of perception proper”.
”A schema is that portion of the entire perceptual cycle which is
internal to the perceiver, modifiable by experience and somehow specific
to whet is being perceived. The schema accepts information es it
becomes available at sensory surfaces and is changed by that informations
it directs movements end exploratory activities that mako more
information available by which it is further modified” (p. 54).
Neisser*© views in turn aro dose to those of Piagot, as set forth for
example in his ”£pist^mologie G^n^tique” of 197Q.*4 Piaget also uses 
2the word schema and describes the process of ’’the Integration of the 
data (of the senses) into an anterior structure or even the constitution  ^
of a new structure under the elementary form of a schema” as one of 
’’assimilation”.
Broadly 1 can accept these ideas of Neisser and Piaget, though I 
would wish to develop them in two uayss by accommodating them to my 
elaborated theory of predications, and by insisting on the difference 
betweon the stored idea complex and the evoked ideas it is the evoked 
idea which provides the anticipatory schema used on e given occasion, 
but it is the sfeored idea complex which is modified after the event by 
the effect of experience (and from which in consequence a different 
evoked idea may be derived on a similar occasion in the future). I 
should also wish to demur et phraseology which appears to attribute a 
sort of will or power of direction to a ochemaj this issue, which 
touchas on the nature of the Self, will be discussed on later pages.
1. Presses Universitaires de France, 1970. pp. 16—17.
2. The use of the word in this sense appears to go beck at least
ao far as Kant (seiohn Kemp ’’The Philosophy of Kanit”, Oxford
1968, pp. 30-31).
For present purposes, however, what ie essential is Neisser’e 
distinction between the anticipatory schema (which deals with a 
relatively generalised possibility) and what he calls the information 
pickup. ’’Information can b© picked up only if there is a developed 
format ready to accept it. Information that does not fit such a format 
goes unused. Perception is Inherently selective.” (p.55). On the 
other hand "the cycle of anticipation and pickup links the perceiver 
to the world and can only develop along avenues that the world offers”
(p. 66). Any attempt to measure quantities of information communicated 
is a dubious enterprise in the field of psychology and not necessarily 
usefulf but in theory and principle I see no reason to doubt that ths 
amount of information communicated by the completion of a given predication 
is a function of the number or range of possibilities which it resolves 
and thus quantifiable in ”bits”. I would argue that unless a predication 
is completed somehow by the mind no information passes at all5 you have 
to construe what you see or hear in some way or other before you can 
understand anything - before indeed you can even identify William 3smee,5 
’’blooming, buzzing confusion”.
This reflects the fact, as I see it, that conscious understanding, 
even of a strictly perceptual kind, is always the understanding of an 
instance of an ideas if X look up at the sun and see sheer brightness 
end effectively nothing else, my consciousness of the ©vent still 
involves the idea* the class, ths possibility, as well as the sensory 
pickup, the Instance, the actuality. This point relates to Bruner’s 
emphasis on perception as a process of categorisation. ’’Inferring the 
categorial identity of a perceived object” is ”©e much a feature of 
perception as the sensory stuff from which percepts are made”.2,* But 
hero we come to the second part of the question raised earlier. When 
what I realise is itself an idea, not a sensory input, how can the idea 
become an actuality, how can information pass? This is a puzzle which 
caused some difficulty to Bishop Berkeley. ’’Likewise the idea of a man 
that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a 
tawny, a straight or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or 0 middls—sizod man.
1. 3.S. Bruner, 1957, quoted in Eleanor 3. Gibson ’’Principles of
Perceptual Learning and Development”, Appleton-Century-Crofts
1969.
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I cannot by any effort of thought conceive tho abstract idea abovei. - -.-
described.”" But Berkeley’s sentence gives us the clues in Ashby’s 
terms information is passed when a larger set of possibilities is 
resolved into a smaller set* We pick up tho idea of a tawny man against 
the background of the wider range of possibility set by the idea of man 
in general, and we need the wider range of possibility before we can 
recognise the narrower. This procedure ie itself possible becaise of 
the hierarchical nature of the constraints of the terrestrial environment 
and the consequent fact that all our classifications fall into hierarchies 
until, in Locke’s words, ”the mind proceeds to body» substance, and at 
last to being, thing and such universal terms which stand for any of 
our ideas whatsoever*’1 *
This is not in fact the whole story* To identify precisely what 
instance or plural set of instances of a class we ere talking about wo 
have to pick it out, and we do so in one of two ways? either by locating 
it definitely on a ’’cognitive map” of tho world in time, or by locating 
it indefinitely, that is to cay, numerically. In perception we us© the 
first method automatically (our perception always has some directional 
focus), but in thinking ue can also use it moro indirectly by referring 
to some past context - what we were talking about yesterday morning, 
for example - which ie itself located by an event in the world. The 
second method is adopted when ue use the indefinite article or a word 
like nsome”, ’’many” or ’’seventeen”, indeed whenever wo distinguish 
singular or plural. Significantly we cannot think of anything without 
distinguishing whether it it singular or plural} for although an 
indefinite designation can be used on its own, a definite designation 
cannot. That is* to say, a designation of number always underlies every 
definite designation of location. To go deeper into this raat&r we would 
have to enter into the complexities of the theory of language, which 
would be out of place in this context. But the thrust of the argument 
I havejbean presenting is that a process of designating - picking out 
the instance - is characteristic of all thought and perception os well 
as of lenguage. It is tho counterpart of the process of generating the 
schema. While the schema defines the range of classification or 
possibility, the instance defines the form in which actuality, information,
1. ”A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge” (I710)s 
t ; Introduction.
2* ”An Essay Concerning Human Understanding” (1689), 0k. 3, Ch.III.
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creation emerges into our consciousness.
Information and Space
A discussion of the hierarchy of geometries and the way 
■ it is used by the mind to relate instances to classes, 
actualities to possibilities.
One further point remains to be made in this connection. I have 
suggested that ideas are to be regarded as non-perceptual forms or 
complexes of forms, emerging in a quasi-topological space, while our 
perceptions emerge in a normal metric space, and the two are somehow 
brought together in the process of perception. This may seem a clumsy 
and complicated model; and it may^scem still more so when I add that~*^J 
the images of visual memory or imagination aro recognised in a Euclidean 
space in which magnification and diminution are possible, whil© melodic 
and many other types of perceptual form ora recognised in affine spaces, 
of which the distinguishing characteristic is that units msasurcd in one 
dimension are incommensurable with those measured in another (units of 
time and of pitch, for example, aro incommensurable). X think however 
that such a criticism would bs misplaced. For, as it seams to me, the 
conception of the euperimposition of forms expressed in different 
geometries in fact provides us with an admirably simple way of under­
standing how the pickup of information con be related to the schema, tho 
perception to the idea, the actuality to the possibility. The one is in 
©very instancs a special case of the other.
In these matters I have to tread carefully since I arn no
mathematician. But to explain whet I mean I will quote from what seems
to me a very clear account in layman*s terms of Klein*s theory of the
hierarchy of geomtries, which is given by Sir Peter Medawar in his book
1.
♦'Induction and Intuition in Scientific Thought”. ”In this scheme of 
codification metric, Euclidean and affine geometries and topology may 
be said to form a hierarchy: we can pass from one to the other by 
progressively relaxing the conditions imposed by the rules of trans­
formation, or (in tho other direction) by making them progressively 
stricter. Metric geometry is the most highly restricted: the group of
1. Methuen 1969. Quotations from pp. 17-19.
operations that it defines consists only of translations, rotations and 
inversions. Tho invariant theory of this group of operations is the 
richest in geometric concepts: it will contain a superabundance of 
theorems to do with isosceles triangles, regular polygons end with degrees 
of curvature and angularity; it can make use of the idea of scalar 
distance also, for the distance between two points is invariant under 
the transformations of the metric group - transformations which conserve 
all properties associated with size and shape.
"The Euclidean group of transformations is a little more permissive: 
symmetrical magnification is allowed and the concepts of sizo and metric 
distance therefore disappear, though the notions of (far example) square 
and circle are retained, and indeed all properties to do with shapo, 
which is invariant.
"Affine geometry is specified by a group of transformations which 
(in geometrical terras) allows for uniform magnification, but to different 
degrees in the three dimonsions of space. The concepts of square and 
circle and size of angle are now meaningless, since the properties that 
define them are not invariant undor transformation, but linearity and 
parallelism remain...
♦'Topology Is the most permissive of the four geometries, for 
nothing is required of the transformations that define it except that 
they should be continuous and should bring the transformed points into 
a one-to-one correspondence with the points they replace. A topological 
transformation may be represented geometrically by an arbitrary plastic 
deformation, such as a geometric figure would undergo if it were drawn 
upon a sheet of rubber which was thereupon stretched or twisted in any 
way that did not tear it... Obviously all simple geometric notions have 
now lost their meaning, but certain very elementary properties remain, 
e.g. the order of points on a line, relationships of insidsness and 
outsidenees of closed figures, the nsidQdnees,, of surfaces...
"As us pass down tho series, topology - affine geometry - Euclidean 
geometry - metric geometry ©e may note that: (a) each geometry is a 
special case of its predecessor. I.e. is derivod by imposing special 
rostrictions upon or defining a subgroup within the one preceding it;
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(b) all theorems of one geometry are also theorems in its successors5
(c) new concepts (e.g. of parallelism, circularity Gr shape) ."emerge"
at each level which have no meaning and cannot bo envisaged at an earlier 
level? end (d) there is a progressive enrichment in the number and variety 
of concepts end the particularity end degree of detail of the theorems."
If I am not mistaken, this superimpoeition of geometries, or, 
perhaps better, this inclusion of one geometry within another more 
permissive one, not only suggests to us a way of understanding how the 
mind, takes up information, but also helps to suggest how information 
taken up in one mode can be related to information taken up in another.
Ue cannot translate sounds into sights or sights into tastes; but we can 
and do translate them all into ideas - even if the ideas are somehow less 
detailed end precise than tho full impact of the senses which they 
focus into consciousness. The arena of ideas (or schemata) articulated 
into successive predications is the arena of consciousness. To recall
1. Discussion about spaces in psychology seems generally to have 
revolved round the question whether there is a phenomenal space 
separate from physicel space end perhaps of a somewhat different 
geometry. (See in this connection "The Two Spaces" by Michael 
Morgan in Weil Bolton ed. "Philosophical Problems in Psychology", 
Methuen 1979.) These arguments have little direct bearing on the 
suggestions made here. Uilliam Demos observed that "in reasoning 
I find that X am apt to have a kind of vaguely localised diagram 
in my mind, with the various fractional objects of the thought 
disposed at particular points thereof." (Principles of Psychology", 
Vol. 1, Macmillan 1891, p.390). But he does not seem to have 
developed the implications of thie idea in regard to tho connection 
between thinking and space. Much more relevant are Piaget’s 
interesting discussion in his book "Le Structuralisms" (PUF 1968 
• pjs, - '20-21) and his occasional references to spaces in his 
"Epistemologie Genetique" (PUF 1970). I suspect that Piaget’s 
analysis could be accommodated without much strain to the scheme 
I have here described, though to chow this in detailuould take us 
well beyond the scope of the present study. It is of Interests 
to note Piaget’s view that "elementary topological structures... 
aro from the pcychogenetic point of view anterior to metrical 
and projective structures, in a way which is contrary to ths 
historical order of the geometries but conforms to the order of 
their theoretical filiation". ("Le Structuralisms" p. 24.) In 
"Le Structuralisms" he discusses tho group - defined os e set of 
displacements in space and corresponding in effect to what I have 
called a complex whole - and describes how through successive 
transformations into different spaces each group becomes a sub­
group, e special case, of the more general group in tho space 
beyond.
Weisser*s words again, "Information can be picked up only if there is a 
developed format ready to accept it.” The idea, the generalised 
anticipation, is a quasi—topSlogical form, while the perceptual input is 
a metrical or affine form, but one which can be translated as a specie! 
case of the topological f o r m i n  other words as an instance of the class 
which the idea defines*^* (I shell refer later to the view, which I have 
argued in detail elsewhere, that classification depends upon generalisation.) 
The perception in all its detail shines through the idea, so to speak, 
but it is the less detailed idea which is consciously grasped and made 
our own as an instance of a still more generalised class of possibilities*
As many psychologists have observed, ws notice and grasp only a fraction 
of the information presented through our senses at a given moment - that 
part which fits into the format ue have ready.
The translation involved in such cases may be radical. For values 
which in the perceptual scheme are recognised as qualities - such as 
colour or taste - become logical forms once they reach the arena of ideas.
It is my contention that our mental predications are built up, like those 
of perception, from cells which consist of container forms infused with 
qualities and intensities of experience, but that the qualities and 
intensities which infuse our thought are emotions not sensations. In 
the present context it is not necessary to develop the detailed arguments 
for these ideas, nor to explore the interesting question of how it is 
that thoughts which are highly complex can nevertheless be expressed
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in the relatively impoverished quasi-topological space of consciousness.
But one question which it is essential for us to consider is that of how
us translate from one code to another* To this I will shortly turn. In 
order to do so it will be necessary first to develop a preliminary frame­
work of ideas about the nature and causation of events.
1. An example of topological form is what Berbeley called "the
general inconsistent idea of a triangle”. It cannot be perceived
or imagined as such, but it is still c form emerging in a space.
Any actual triangle - or the idea of any more limited class of 
triangles such as that of equilateral triangles - is a special
case accepted by the more general format of the "general
inconsistent idea”.
2* Hy thoughts on these points are developed in some detail in "ThB 
Grammar of Thought” end "The Grammar of Language”.
Trajectories
A discussion of the different typos of trajectories, 
otherwise of tho forms ue recognise as extended in 
space-time.
Here-Now is not a point but a place. It takes in a certain volume 
of space and a certain span of time, it represents a continuum of 
possibility within which actuality is encountered. Uhat the actuality 
turns out to be, literally what form it takes, is constrained, as ue 
have seen, by the registers of information available to us. But it is 
also constrained by tha need for continuity in the Here-Mow. The reality 
which our senses register is not random, things either exist continuously, 
or they change in a continuous way, otherwise ws could not identify them 
at all. By definition form is a union of values on different registers; 
and in the Hers-Now we take cognizance of forms which, as we have seen, 
may include forms in different kinds of spaces. Now the continuity of 
a perceptual coll or complex in time wo may describe as a trajectory; 
and it will be necessary to distinguish a number of different types of 
trajectory.
Consider first the trajectory of a form which is continuous in three- 
dimensional space but also continuous (otherwise we could not recognise 
it) in time. If it does not move or change over time, u?e may call it 
a trajectory of no change. If it moves or changes in some constant way, 
for example by movement in a fixed direction at a constant speed, we may 
call it a trajectory of constant change. If it moves or changes 
erratically, like the trajectory of the fly on the windowpane or of tha 
blush on the chsek, we may call it a trajectory of inconstant change.
Ue need also to consider the trajectory of a form, such as a melody, 
which is continuous in an "analogical1’ space with time itself as a 
dimension. I have argued that we recognise such a form in on abstracted, 
and, as it were, synchronic time dimension (since both beginning and end 
aro held together at the focus of attention bofore the form itself can 
be discerned), but with the form as a whole having a continuous trajectory 
in the further dimension of diachronic time. The true trajectory is 
therefore one of no change, since, although change does take place, it 
is encapsulated in a synchronic form which is recognised as a completed 
whole before it is recognised as having a trajectory of existence in
diachronic time.
It is to be noted that with separate stops of the attention ue can 
divide a trajectory of no change or of constant change cognitively Into 
sections, but the sections have a continuity such that when put together
the joins between them disappear, as with successive moments in the
existence of this armchair. A trajectory of inconstant change is
however a different matter. Ths sections of the fly’s trajectory on tho
window pane are linked by what wa may call existential continuity - tho 
same that links the different episodes in tho lives of our own bodies*
This is akin to the continuity achieved when wo put together ths eoctions 
of a trajectory of no change or of inconstant change; but whereas in 
those cases once they are put together the joins between them disappear, 
in this case the joins remain to mark changes of speed or direction or 
rats of change, though continuity across time is not broken.
So far we have considered only the trajectories of individual forms. 
But e conjuncture of forms in epece time not only has its own form as a 
whole, it also has a trajectory as a whole. The car is standing in front 
of the house. The cup is standing in the saucer. And in each case wo 
recognise the whole as a contingency or situation in which the two 
existential trajectories of car and house or of cup and saucer are 
conjoined in a spatio-temporal complex. In such a case the whole 
complex has a trajectory as a whole extending in diachronic time; and this 
trajectory in its turn may be one of no change, or one of constant
indivisible change (as with a boat floating down a river) or one of
inconstant change* The trajectory of inconstant change in such a case can 
again be one like that of the fly on the window pane - as for example 
whon all the people and things encapsulated in a nt^ tor car move togethar 
in unison but do so at varying speeds and in varying directions as the 
car itself changes spsed and direction. But it con also bo one in which 
the individual trajectories making up the trajectory as a whole move 
or change separately, even to the extent that some may leave the complex
as observed and others may be added to it. As the car stands in front
of the house, for example, the clock may strike four and another car 
may arrive; then the first car may drivG off. Each of these elements 
are individual trajectories of inconstant change? but they can all be
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accommodated within the continuous trajectory of the conjuncture or 
situation as a whole, provided always that not all values change at 
once? some have to remain constant at each stage if continuity is to 
be maintained* (If, for example, quite apart from the movement of the 
cars, ths house began to move and collapse, the ground to quake, the 
cars to chango shape and the sky to fluctuate, continuity would be lost 
and information would be replaced by its opposite, which is randomness*)
More generally us can say that this case, where some elements in 
the trajectory as a whole can change, but all do not change at once, is 
comparable to the trajectory of the blush on the cheek as distinct from 
that of the fly on the windowpsne? for the changing value of the blush can 
be seen on analysis to be fundamentally a change in the blend of the 
elements that make it up. There are in fact two kinds of continuity, 
that of sequence and that of blend, though leacir is^  here emerging at a 
different level of hierarchy, corresponding to a different focus of 
observation. It is a matter of importance that the mind is able in this 
way to generalise a prolonged and complex trajectory as a whole, so as 
to grasp it as a single form, or even a single variable? and conversely 
in appropriate circumstances to analyse a trajectory grappqd (like the 
blush) as a single form or variable into a much more complex system of 
forms related together in superposition or sequence or structure, or a 
mixture of these#
It is to be noticed however that we have yet to deal with a further 
type of trajectory as a whole. This is one in which the individual 
trajectories that make it up are linked not merely by the continuity of 
spatio-temporal contingency but by that of causal necessity. I push this 
domino so that ths next ons falls, end the next, and the next. This is 
a trajectory as a whole of inconstant change, but it is one which is also
a trajectory of causal necessity, otherwise a change of cause and effect;
and in order to deal with such trajectories ue shall need to consider
more closely tho nature of causation.
Events end Reactions; Causation
A theory of causation expressed in terms of the preceding
analysis.
Causation is concerned with events, end an event is a change or 
transition within e system from one state to another. In the case of a 
single variable each of its possible values is one state of its given 
register of possibilities* In the case of a form each discriminable 
combination of values for the variables which it unites is reflected 
in a change in the form itself from one value to another in the range 
of discriminable forms of its type — two dimensional, three dimensional, 
melodic or whatever* (The actual range available of a given type 
depends on the discrimination available and may vary from one occasion 
to another*) In the case of a perceptual cell or of a composite or 
disposite complex of such cells, any change in the state of any one of 
the values it embodies, including any discriminable feature of the pattern 
of relationships in which the cells of s camp lex arc agglomerated or 
disposed, is an event; and as such it signals a new state of the cell 
or complex*
It is an assumption of common sense, and also of science, at least 
at the atomic level and above, that no event is without a cause, which is 
a preceding event linked to it, as a matter of natural law, in the special 
relationship of cause to effect. The prototype of such a link between 
events is a push in which movement is transmitted from one thing to 
another through contact* In every case spatio-temporal contact is necessary 
for causation to take place* Every event, that is to say, is a reaction 
in a contingency* The causal event (itself in another framework the 
effect of other causal events) is the occurrence of the contingency 
itself, a bringing together of two or more systems in space time. The 
effect event is the reaction* The causal event takes place in a system 
which is external, environmental, to the system in which the change 
under consideration takes place, it is a change in value in its para­
meters. The effect event is internal to it. New contingencies or 
juxtapositions are always arising because physical objects ore in motion 
in relation to other objects. When one thing encounters another, move­
ment may be transmitted from the one to the other, but this is not the
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only possible reaction* Some of the movement may for example be converted 
to heat* the boundary or structural form of one or other of the objects 
may be dented or fractured* or chemical or nuclear reactions may ensue* 
which in turn may involve the release of new energy* Broadly us may say=a 
that reactions — effect events — always involve the conjunction of 
trajectories and take the form of changes in trajectories, though always * 
with a degree of continuity maintained across the change.
The world could thus be described ®s a network of complexes pursuing v* 
their trajectories in constant states* like roadways following straight 
lines or constant curves* but encountering each other at contingencies, 
like road crossings — which may be multiple crossings. Roadways lead out 
of each crossing, so that there is always continuity* which is sometimes 
that of the same road pursuing its way unaffected and in the same con­
stant direction* but ie sometimes only continuity through transformation* 
as when one main road splays into three different smaller ones. What 
is more* the kind of continuity that is found depends on which road the 
traveller is following end the angle from which he approaches the con­
tingency* At one crossing the continuity of the main road may bo in no 
way disturbed* but at tho same crossing the side road irrupting into it 
may, in one perspective* lose its separate identity altogether.
Whether at any time wa think of the trajectories of single elements 
encountering others* or of the trajectory as a whole of a complex within 
which elements are subject to conjunctures and changes of trajectory, is 
largely a matter of perspective - whether for example ue are following 
out an individual road or considering an area of the road network as 
such*
flora abstractly we can say that reactions may consist* first, of 
changes in the trajectorios of tho forms involved in a conjuncture without 
destruction of the forms themselves — os when one thing is pushed or 
pulled or deflected or accelerated or deformed by another. (This applies 
to any trajectory of inconstant change like that of a leaf pursuing on 
irregular course across the lawn under the wind.) Or, secondly, they may 
involve the aggregation or redisposition of forms, leading in each case 
to the emergence of new composite or disposite forms as a whole. Or* 
thirdly* they may involve the disintegration of forms into component 
forms* with the accompanying destruction of the original form as a ^iole
and sometimes the emergence of new combined forms. But there will always 
be some degree of continuity through the reaction.
The forms themselves may be three dimensional boundary forms (surfaces) 
for example the forms of a piston or a catalysing molecule. Or they 
may be forms of structural or systemic order - for example the lattice 
of a geodesic dome or the relative disposition of electrons in motion 
round the nucleus of an atom. Or they may be repetitive unbounded wave 
forms. The nature of a reaction in accordance with natural lay depends 
largely on the forms of the things concerned, the way in which they are 
juxtaposed (that is, the structural form of the conjuncture) and on the 
energy or mass with which they are invested. The reaction will often 
involve change in the shape or size or heat or mass or velocity or 
direction of movement of the forms concerned, but it is to be noted that 
g reaction is always an event, a step change of no definable duration, 
at which one state of equilibrium Of natural forms is broken and another 
is found. A process of change, if analysed, can be broken into a series ~ 
of micro-events with states between them, but there is never an iden­
tifiable gap during which change takes place between states: this is the 
paradox originally set forth by Zeno the Eleatic. The well-known fact 
that the position and velocity of an electron can never both be deter­
mined simultaneously may berhaps ultimately be another reflection of this 
same characteristic of our apprehension of reality.
It is possible for us to grasp any continuous chain of cause and 
effect building up a macro-event as a single process over time, a 
trajectory of trajectories, rather than a step; but this is analogous to 
the way in which we can realise a series of short outlines as a single 
outline provided one fits on to the next in the series? ue are recognising 
a form as a whole at a higher level of hierarchy - in fact the form of a 
process, which is a causal form. Broadly when wb can recognise a 
continuous process over time linking an earlier event with a later one, 
we can say that we think the first event causes the second? when we break 
the process down into a series of steps from one state to another - each 
transition taking place at a conjuncture of trajectories - wa can say 
that we have explained, given reasons, why the first event causes the 
second. If ws then try to explain each step we find that there is an
endless regress? but it is striking that we da have the capacity to 
recognise a series of steps with states between as a process having a form 
of its own? and this is important, first, because by giving an event some 
extension it enables us to think of change as a fact instead of leaving 
it as a durationless gap between facts? secondly, because it is this that 
establishes causal continuity which would otherwise be inconceivable? 
and thirdly because the fact which it establishes, namely a sequential 
form as a whole, is a new fact, different, as any form as a whole is 
different, from the components which build it up. (There is a parallel 
here with the way in which in language the mind can establish a great 
variety of discriminable verb forms reflecting transitions, even though 
the variety of discriminable transitions as such is comparatively small. 
This happens because the mind includes in the verb form some indication 
of the subject, object or agent of the verb. The effect of these 
selection restrictions is to create a generalised sentence form? and the 
form as a whole of a sentence depends on the nouns related as well as 
the kinds of link established between them. ' These paints are discussed 
in detail in "The Grammar of Language".)
It has already been suggested that if we try to go to the root of 
our own conception of causation it seems to lie in our experience of our 
own voluntary movements. If I push a small loose object, it usually 
moves? and if it moves against something else, this is likely to move 
too. I seem in this way to transmit movement? and this transmission 
of movement joins two events into one macro-event. Although this original 
paradigm of causality is a succession which begins with a voluntary 
movement, wo can by analogy classify recurrent classes of successive 
events as causally connected even when the first in the succession is 
not a voluntary movement, for example, when we recognise that the melting 
of the snow in the mountains is followed by the swelling of the rivers 
in the plain. But if we do this ue etill have to assume some ultimate, 
unanalysable source of movement or change, whether it takes the form of 
a river god or of an abstraction like the scientists "energy"; and we 
have to assume some physical contact, even if only that of light or 
sound waves, through which the movement or change is transmitted or by 
which it is triggered. But 6ew, in the complex confusion of life, do
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we pick out particular causal chains? This is the question to which 
we turn next.
Prediction end Inference
A theory of prediction and inference growing out of
the theory of causation in the preceding section.
The world we have just described is one of reactive steps or 
transitions arising out of contingencies; and when we define a rule 
(or a natural law) as a restriction of the possibilities of transition 
in time, these are the transitions we are talking about. Every 
transition, everything that happens, is in a certain sense information, 
the creation of new fact in time - creation not out of nothing but out 
of possibility restricted by natural law and past fact. Each new fact 
however itself creates a restriction of possibility for the future, 
that is to say, it is a potential cause of possible effects; it 
identifies one or more possible future transitions of restricted 
possible outcome, or it further narrows the possible outcome of a future 
transition or transitions already identified. If the world is a network 
of 6ausal continuities, the past network is definitely established, ihoubh , 
only part of it is known to any observer; and it projects into the future 
indefinitely. The determinist would say that the future network is 
already definitely established also; the creation is over. However that 
may be, the future is known to consciousness only as a continuation of 
certain past causal chains which encroach upon the randomness of 
possibilities to come by narrowing the range of what may happen - strongly 
and clearly in some cases for some limited distance into the future, more 
vaguely in other cases, but ultimately always dwindling into total 
unpredictability.
Wow in any given situation, as we have already noted, the mind 
is usually capable of identifying an enormous number of variables. UJe 
can assume that none of them is without a cause or without some 
potential effect in the world; but we cannot take cognisance of more than 
a small fraction of all that is available to us, let alone try to follow 
out all the chains of cause and effect in which they may be involved.
If we take any one thing or system of things, there will usually be a 
vast number of variables in Its immediate environment which can be des­
cribed as its pprameterc; but of these usually only a few are effective 
parameters, that is, variables in which changes of value can lead causally 
to changes in the state of the system itself*^* It follows from this that 
in any situation where we wish to identify a series of smaller events 
that build up a larger one through a chain of cause and effect, we will 
hove to be able to apply some method of selection to sift out the events 
which ore port of the causal chain in which we ere interested from others 
linked to it merely by spatio-temporal conjuncture. / In this respect 
causal forms are no different from other forms whose recognition out of 
a welter of sensory data always involves a process of selection: this 
patch of colour is part of the whole I see as a house, while that is 
part of the sky beyond; this note is pert of the melody, while that is 
accompaniment and that is the sound of a member of the audience coughing.
Tho fundamental criterion we use in this case is that of succession 
In time; when change in a parameter variable is followed by change in one 
or more variables in the system undort consideration, the first event may 
be causally connected to the second. If we have never observed such a 
succession before, we may be doubtful about the connection; but if we have 
observed a connection like this one many times before, we shall be much 
more sure that it is a causal link. This implies two things: first that 
our recognition of causality requires some kind of memory; and secondly 
that it requires some means of classifying events and sequences of 
events as like or unlike.
As far as the processes of classification and comparison are concerned,
in the present context I need only to observe that classification depends
on generalisation: © class consists of instances of forms which on
2.generalisation coincide with a paradigm form. * Tho process of simple 
comparison is one by which one form A is "tuned" to another form B and 
pronounced to be identical with it, or like it (i.e. identical at a higher 
level of generalisation for either A or B or bottDs? or unlike it. The
1. I am here using Ashby’s terminology. See W. Ross Ashby "Design 
for a Brain" (Chapman and Hall 1960), Ch. 6.
2. I have set forth detailed arguments on these points in "The 
Grammar of Perception" and "The Grammar of Thought". Here I only
ask the reader to accept this analysis on a provisional basis as 
an assumption for immediate descriptive purposes*
process of analyticalcomparison involves analysing both A and 8 into 
constituent forms, pair by pair, to establish whether they are the same 
or not. The constituent forms may fas compared by simple "tuning”, or 
may themselves be the subject of further analytical comparison at a 
lower level of hierarchy. Thus wa might compare two chords by 
identifying whether they consist of the same notes!ior not, and then 
analyse the notes to see whether or to what extent they share the 
same overtones. Each analysis yields a series of answers to binary 
"whether or not", "yes or no" questions. In order to ask the questions 
rightly, however, it is necessary to enumerate the forms and order them 
in appropriate pairs - or establish where the appropriate pair does not 
exist. .
We have seen that when e number of recurrent successions of events . 
have been classified as like each other, the very fact of their 
recurrence and similarity makes us inclined to assume that each succession 
involves a causal connection and therefor© that each succession is an 
instance of a class of which the defining paradigm is a generalised 
causal form. Any such form, once identified, can be used (whothar or 
not with success) os a predictive or inferential rule, a restriction of 
the possibilities of transition.
A predictive rule applies when us recogniee a conjuncture or series 
of conjunctures which exemplifies the first section of bur causal 
succession end we predict that an instance of the rest of the succession 
is likely to follow. The inferential rule applies when we recognise an 
instance of the latter section and infer that an instance of tho earlier 
section has already taken place; or when we recognise an instance of the 
whole and infer an Instance of the part, or vice verso. Uhat is 
unalterably past, insofar as it con be brought before the mind by memory 
or history, is already complete and so in a sense synchronic. Thus any 
conclusions we may drau about the past ere inferences in the same way 
as conclusions drawn from analytic comparisons of synchronic forms.
If I see part of a rainbow in the sky, I can "predict" where the arc 
should be continued and I can search for a fainter continuation in the 
predicted region. Similarly, I can "predict" that there may be a second 
rainbow concentric with the first and search for it — perhaps with 
success.
Strictly the "predictions” are acts of analytic classification.
Tho general class of rainbows includes relatively long and relatively 
short rainbows, and also double rainbows. Having recognised an instance 
of the more general class, I can try to see whether it falls into one 
of these more particularised sub-classes. But much the same can be said 
of true predictions which are themselves acts of analytic classification. 
Having recognised ©n instance of the more general class of conjuncture .; 
"pressing the starter button", I may consider whether it is in fact an 
instance of the more particularised class of conjunctures in which 
"pressing the starter button" is followed by "the engine fires". There 
is a certain probability that an instance of the first class is in fact 
an instance of the second, but it is not a certainty. If the engine 
does not fire, ue may ask why. And the answer to "why" is always a 
more precise analysis. The conjuncture "pressing the starter button" 
may be of the type which includes a particular further trajectory in 
the conjuncture, namely "ignition switched off"; and experience shows 
that thorc is an extremely low probability that such a conjuncture is 
followsd by "tho engine fires". Why so? 8ecauac the battery will 
not bo connected to the starter motor and the causal succession required 
for the transmission of change or movement will not be established.
There is no limit to the further particularisation which could ensue 
in ths attempt to particularise a conjuncture "pressing the starter 
button" in such a way that "tho engine fires" would invariably follow.
The button must be attached to a car or at least to some kind of 
internal combustion engine; there roust be fuel in the tank; the ignition 
system must be in working order; and so on and so on. Ws can never 
achieve absolute comprehensiveness and so absolute certainty.'*’*
Basically causation involves sequence in time whereas explanation, 
in the sense of giving a reason why, does not necessarily do so.
1. In a somewhat different cense wo use "reason" to explain why 
a purposive agent such as a person or organisation takes a 
particular action. Ue do this by stating the purpose in mind 
and giving an account of the mentol processes through which the 
intention is linked to the achievement of the action. Because 
such on account involves unobservable processes it can never be 
absolutely objective; as Harre points out, it is always subject 
to negotiation.
"Uhy does this drink taste different?" "Because it contains sugar."
There is no sequence of events here. Yet ue use the word "because" 
to introduce our explanation; and clearly reason and cause are much 
Ibss sharply distinct than might at first be expected. In Bffect a 
reason is why something is like this and not like that, whereas a 
cause is why something is followed by this and not that; consequently 
it could be held that every cause is a reason but not ^uery reason is a 
cause. In both cases fundamentally we are comparing trajectories and 
identifying differences between them, though in the first case each 
trajectory Is that of a synchronic form in diachronic time, a single 
existence or state, while in the second case each is a trajectory of 
trajectories, a sequence of states with transitions between. The second 
case includes much greater potential complexity because the sequence may 
project from the past into the future. A predictive rule is recognised 
as a model of a trajectory in which one kind of event is followed in 
sequence by another kind of event with a varying degree of probability: 
fundamentally the more often a given sequence has been exemplified in 
our experience and the less often it has been falsified, the more
subjectively probable it is- that is to say (as I sh^I ar-guevlatefeln this 
study) the greater its conductivity to purposive thought.
Causal situations are complicated by the fact that causal forms can 
intersect. Uhen several different causal forms meet in a contingency, 
like several billiard ball trajectories converging eta point, it may 
not be clear how the outcome is determined. Explanation in such 
circumstances involves what happens when several components of change 
operate, not individually, but in simultaneous superimposition, one 
upon the other; and this in turn may require recourse to some additional, 
more generalised causal form - a wider hypothesis - which makes it 
possible.to order their interactions.
I do not propose in this context to elaborate a detailed theory of 
causation, predici-ticj] and inference, or to enter into the current 
controversies of philosophers in this field. My present need is to 
propose a method of description which fits into the conceptual framework 
developed in this chapter, and I hope that these two sections will be 
sufficient for that purpose. It may be worth adding, however, that the
account given here* although it is presented from a different angle and
in terms of a different model* sesms to me to be generally compatible
with Sir Karl Popper’s account as summarised* for example, in Section
28 of nThe Poverty of Historicism”.^ * His "specific initial conditions"
correspond to what I call the causal event (or contingency), his
"specific prognosis” to what I call the effect event, his "universal
statements” to what I call predictive or inferential rules. The
corresponding terms used by Hilary Putnam are "auxiliary statements”,
"prediction” and "theory”. As Putnam points out, we may be concerned
in one context to arrive at a prediction from a given theory and given
auxiliary statements (and then check whether it is true); in a second
context to move from a given theory and a given fact which is to be
explained to appropriate auxiliary statements; in a third context to
move from a given theory, a given fact to be explained and givan but
insufficient auxiliary statements to additional auxiliary statements
which complete the explanation. (His example here is the postulttion
in 1846 of a further unknown planet whoso existence would complete the
2,
explanation of the known orbit of Uranus.) ' If a prediction 'is false,
it is not necessarily the theory which ,is abandoned, and most "normal
3
science" in T.S. Kuhn’s sense ie concerned not with discovering new 
general "paradigm” theories, but with "puzzle-solving" within the field 
defined by an accepted paradigm. If predictions fail, the paradigm 
itself is not abandoned, but a search is made for now auxiliary statements, 
which may include either supplementary contingent facts or supplementary 
theories or rules, that will have the effect of reconciling the facts 
with the paradigm. Such ideas as these can, I believe, be accommodated 
in my terminology of causal events (defined by what Putnam calls auxiliary 
statements), effect events and predictive or inferential rules.
1. Second Edition with corrections, Routledge 1961.
2. "The Corroboration of Theories", 1974, reprinted in Honderich 
and Burnyeat ed. "Philosophy as it is" (Penguin 1979).
3. "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (2nd Edition Enlarged, 
Chicago 1970).
Behaviour
An account of behaviour as the counterpart and response
to information.
When one natural system encounters another in a contingency, the 
first system may be left unaffected, or it may bo shifted in space, or 
it may be deformed (by mechanical or chemical or other action), or it 
may be informed. An act of deformation is a molar event ~ as it were 
a breaking of the rules, an overcoming of the balance of forces, through 
which the system maintains the form by which it is identified. 
Characteristically an act of deformation is irreversible. An act of 
information, by contrast, is a molecular event, a change in the form 
of a part or subsystem of the main system which of its nature, that 
isfby its own rules, can accommodate a range of possible forms. 
Characteristically thi9 range of possibility can either be a repertoire 
of mutually exclusive alternatives, or a store of considerable, or even 
virtually unlimited, capacity, from which one form can be drawn at a 
time. In the case of a store new information can be added to the 
store (sometimes up to a limit) without affecting the retention of 
earlier information - though older information may decay, i.e. become 
gradually more generalised, over time.
The fact thet a system is capable of absorbing an input of 
information characteristically means that it is also capable of an 
output of behaviour in response to the information. Behaviour is a 
second or reactive event, a change in the stats of the system which 
again is characteristically a change of form within a range accommodated 
by the system's own rules. Correspondingly behaviour is often drawn 
from a limited repertoire of possible actions or sequences of action 
(possible roles or. perhaps bettor, routines)« but may also be drawn 
from a store of possible actions or sequences of action which is 
developed during the life of thB system and may be virtually unlimited 
in extent.
Thus the behaviour of a mimosa leaf which closes down when it is 
touched and opens up again when it is left untouched reflects the 
adoption of one of two possible actions in response to one of two
possible states of information. That is to say, the set of rules which 
governs the behaviour of the mimosa leaf, while totally dependent on 
the lows of physics and chemistry, is embodied in a particular con­
figuration of molecules and atoms forming the mimosa leaf and 
characteristically capable of assuming alternative states of information 
that in turn load to the appropriate behaviour. On the other hand the
fact that a metal rod expands when it is hot and shrinks when it is cool
is not an example of behaviour, because the changes to which the 
expansion and contraction are a response are external to the system,, 
not informational changes within it. Because there are two alternative 
states here forming a repertoire us can say that the state of the rod 
on a given occasion represents potential information derived from the 
environment; but it is not actual information unless it is capable 
of being used - as in certain control systems it may be used - to govern 
as a subsystem an output of behaviour in a larger system. In short
behaviour that is not in response to information is not strictly
behaviour; while information that has no potential use in governing 
behaviour is not strictly information. Us could put it another way - 
by saying that information is a form assumed by a part or subsystem of 
a whole which becomes effective (or potentially effective) as an 
internal rule determining the output or behaviour of the whole by 
restricting the possibilities of transition in time.
With an inanimate object every encounter in a contingency leads 
either to movement or to deformation or to no change at all. With a 
passively regulated organism like a plant or trea the samo is also 
generally true (the mimosa's capacity for behaviour is not common among 
plants), but with the important difference that when its form has been 
altered by an encounter the organism may react by growth (determined 
by genetic information) in such a way as to restore and heal in some 
degree and over a considerable period of time what has been altered, 
fin actively self-regulating organism however can react by movement or 
change of one part of itself in relation to the whole without any 
permanent change in its form; and this is what constitutes behaviour 
proper.
Certain types of behaviour lead to locomotion of the whole organism,
while others lead to the initiation of chains of cause and effect outside 
the organism, as when a man pushes a stons with his foot and causes a 
landslide• While a tree will, encounter the fire and get burnt, an animal 
may encounter the warmth before it gets burnt and react by retreating to 
safety. Such a response to the stimulus of warmth need not imply any
i
knowledge of the possibility of fire. It may be a simple reflex , a 
result of the laws of physics operating in e direct sequence of causal 
transitions linking, for instance, sense receptors end muscles, within 
a particular biological form evolved by a process of natural selection 
so that it exhibits precisely this response. When it comes to a learned 
response, however, we are faced with something different. Here selection 
works by the elimination or non-reproduction, of the less well-adapted 
response without any elimination of the organism itself. This means, 
however, that selection of the response for elimination must occur before 
it has taken place and so caused or facilitated the disappearance of 
the whole organism. This in turn means that the response must be 
selected in some fashion which identifies whether its potential 
consequences are good or ill for the organism, that is, ultimately for 
the organism’s survival ond reproduction. The process must therefore 
include some model of the potentiel consequences - a modol of the 
possible future, of what is not - and some method of assessing this for 
good or ill. Irrespective of whether the process is mechanically deter­
ministic or not, and of whether it involves consciousness or not, the 
learning of even the simplest conditioned response must involve a model 
of the future growing out of the present and a means of selecting for 
or against that model.
Models and Codes
A discussion of models and codings and their relationship 
to reality. Models of the possible future ss a pre­
requisite of behaviour based on learning.
Uhat, then, is a modol? It must be a separate representation of the 
form which an actuality might take without being that actuality - and
1. More precisely perhaps a feedback loop of the type described by 
Miller, Galanter and Pribram as a TOTE (Test-Operato-Tost-Exit) 
unit. Cf. '’Plans end the Structure of Behaviour” (Holt,
Rinehart and Uinston I960), p. 24 ff.
indeed without being a formal reproduction of it in all respects. We 
may describe it as a coding, that is, a re-expression in a code of the 
actuali.ty which it represents - or, better, a recoding, since we cannot 
take cognizance of reality except as already expressed in some code or 
other, whether of the senses or of thought.
Uhst, then, is a code? It is a limited set of possibilities, 
ordered at least to the extent of being grouped or segregated; an 
example would be a sensory register or dimension. What is a message?
An Instance, or an ordered set of instances, of the possibilities in 
a code; thus space is a code, while anything recognised as exhibiting 
spatial form is a message in that code. In other words a message is 
itself a model* Wo have alroad soon that a material object can often 
yield messages - information - In a more or less endless variety of 
registers (codes); but that when we perceive or otherwise take cognizance 
of an object wo actually take in only a limited amount of information in 
a limited number of registers which happen to be available and are 
relevant to our interests at tho time. We unify those registers by 
recognising them as hierarchically subsumed in a single language or 
supercoo'o; thus we recognise the information received through different 
senses as forming part of a single perceptual message about a single 
perceived world expressed in a single, though complex, perceptual 
language. (In passing we may emphasise again that the amount of 
discrimination, the number of possibilities available in any one register 
may vary according to the conditions, e.g. of light or environmental 
noise.).
What happens when a message is recoded, or decoded, is that a 
different .instance or ordered set of instances drawn from a different 
ordered set of possibilities is substituted for the first. How does 
this happen? Through causal reactive transitions such as we have been 
examining; pressure on a key, for example, in a particular contingency 
results in the production of a sound. What then is meant by order in o 
set of possibilities? Fundamentally order is equivalent to rule, a 
restriction in tho possibilities of transition in time. At tho lowest, 
as X amusing tho word, it means that a number of possibilities are 
grouped together in a simple repertoire in such a way that each is a
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mutually exclusive alternative to all the others. Three lights, one 
green saying go, one yellow saying caution and one red saying stop, 
constitute such a repertoire; but if ye introduce rules of internal 
grouping and sequence, as in the British traffic light code, ye are 
already bringing in a higher level of organisation and creating a super­
code.
In the case of perceptual registers, while it is arguable that the 
basic elements of spatial form in two or three dimension^ such as 
straight line and curve, build up simple repertoires, there are higher 
level rules of continuity governing the ways in which they can be put 
together t-n sequence to form complicated shapes. (My understanding, 
drawn from Ashby, is that these rules have to do with the mathematics 
of Markov chains, but I am not mathematician enough to make assertions 
in such matters.) for the rest perceptual registers seam to fall into 
three groups:
a) scales, where values are ordered in a particular sequence in a 
dimension;
b) spread repertoires, where values are identifiably different and 
mutually exclusive, yet shade into one another (though each does 
not necessarily shade into every other). Examples are the registers 
of colour, taste or sound timbre. Analysis suggests that in 
spread ropertoirss we recognise values at two levels: micro- 
values which form ranges of sequential possibilities and macro- 
values like red or sweet which build up a simple repertoire for 
each register*V
1* At the lower level we distinguish limited ranges of values ordered 
in sequence from zero to maximum, as when we distinguish shades of 
red or green by their degree of saturation. Mo individual range of 
micro-values covers tho whole spread of a repertoire such as that 
of colour or taste, but each range overlaps whth its neighbour go 
that a given shade of purple, for example, can be recognised 
simultaneously on two ranges, both as reddish and as bluish. Each 
range itself represents a macro-value, such os green, brown, blue, 
sweet or salt; but it appears to be partly a matter of acculturation 
or of the arbitrary direction and focus of attention whibh segment 
of the whole spread is taken os a range on any particular occasion - 
for example what we regard as brown or savoury may vary somewhat 
on different occasions* (There is evidence that the accepted values 
for colour vary from one culture to another. According to Berlin and 
Kay, as summarised in "Semantics” by Geoffrey Leech, 1974, there are 
11 basic categories of colour, from which each language takes only a 
subset.) Tho macro-values are not ordered in relation to each other,
c) polar spreads# which are in effect spread repertoires that contain 
two macro-values only* such as hot:cold, wettdry, or roughs smooth*
Broadly5 the more complex the register, the greater the amount of 
information conveyed by the recognition of a single value in it- A 
continuum of space or space-time is an ordered union of two or more 
scalar sets of possibilities in which combined messages uniting values 
in each register simultaneously can be recognised. An idea, which is 
a classification, represents a register of abstract cognition affording 
a repertoire of two possibilities only, yes and no, though we may also 
identify logical dimensions which are abstract pblar spreads (braves 
cowardly, prouds humble, etc.) corresponding to the-ip'olar constructs*
George Kelly*s personal construct theory} while at a higher level complex 
rules of grammar make it possible to build up abstract, predications or 
asntsncos which convey a considerable amount of information*.
What, next, is meant by order in a set of instances of ordered 
sets of possibilities? Hero we are dealing with tha message rather than 
tho codo, that is, tho order of tho individual values put together to 
form a complex message. The basic requirement is Continuity: the values 
must follow each other in at least ono dimension of time or space - for 
example the words in a sentence, or, at a different level, all the 
different values of form and colour that build up the picture I see 
through my window, which are unified by the continuity of one. spacsv^*-ais
Now what happens, in more specific detail, when a message is 
recoded? In the simple one-to-one case a message consists of a.value 
or a continuous sst of values in one register such as that of spatial 
length, which is replaced, as the result of a series of causal transitions, 
by a value or a set of values in another register, such as that of 
temporal length} a set of continuous dots, dashe^ and short gaps 
paper, for example, is replaced by a continuous sot of short and long
at least as phenomena of consciousness, whatever physical 
science may say} but they are nonetheless mutually exclusive 
values on e unified register. The micro-values, in contrast, 
ere ordered together in a range which is a kind of scale, but 
one with a difference: the steps in it are not mathematically 
predetermined, but tend to be established ad hoc for each 
discrimination, according to tho degree of resolution afforded 
by the sensory apparatus at a given focus of attention.
buzzes and short silences in time, in accordance with a definite rule or 
rules of transformation.
It has bean noted earlier that wo cannot in fact perceive anything 
in one register alone; there has to be a continuum uniting at least two.
Thus we cannot perceive a line, or dash, of no width; nor a temporal 
length unsustei.ned by any value in ariy other register than time - such 
as that of sound. This amounts to saying, that a .message has to be 
embodied in a form, which is Its physical ^marker”, to borrow a term 
from Or. 3ames G« Miller , before we can take cognizance of it. But we 
can nonetheless extract a uni-dimensioml message from a two dimensional 
form if the code we are using is itself uni-dimensional, as with the dots 
and dashes where it is the variable length which is significant. This 
exemplifies again the feet that the information us absorb on a given 
occasion is often derived from only a few out of the variables which affect 
our senses directly, let alone those which are theoretically identifiable 
through instruments or calculations or other means, it is easier to 
express a massage in e code if we restrict the number of registers to 
be used, and hence the variables to be controlled, leaving aside as 
•’noise” any variables transmitted to us in other registers; and 
similarly, though tho world happening around us in time represents the 
continuous emergence of information - of actuality out of possibility - 
we can make sense of it only by identifying at any time relatively few 
variables in relatively feu registers forcing one system in one conttfMSf. 
Our consciousness is of a succession of predicative systems which we can 
realise only one at a time. But this Is to run ahead of our argument.
If we return to our example of the recoding of a message, ws can 
say that the series of buzzes becomes a model of the series of dots and 
dashes insofar as it becomes a re-exprossion of the Information, the 
values in certain particular registerswhich wo drew from it - a re- 
exprassioh in a different series of physical markers. If the number of 
possibilities in tho new register matches exactly the number in the original 
register of dots and dashes, ws have a direct one-for-ona re-coding.
1. ’’Living Systems: Basic Concepts” (Behavioural Science Vol.10
No. 3, 1965). Millor appears here to be following von
Neumann (1958).
If however it has fewer possibilities, then the message may have to be 
generalised; the model may for example translate both dots and dashes 
as the same value, with a different one (silence) for the gaps* It is 
still possible in such circumstances to translate the whole message 
accurately into the new form, but no longer by a direct one-for-one 
coding; it would be necessary to adopt some different cods9 such as 
that of equating a dash to two successive buzzes separated by one unit 
of silence, a dot to a single buzz and a gap to two successive units of 
silence* Characteristically however the transmission of the message 
into a register of fewer possibilities - a channel of lower capacity - 
involves more individual events and hence (other things being equal) a 
longer time*
As this argument makes clear, recodings can be of two different 
kinds* The first kind is a recoding on to different physical markers, 
but with a one-to-one reproduction of the original code* The second is 
a transformation, according to a given rule, of the code itself* (Some 
writers would reserve the word "recoding” to transformations of the 
second type*) Miller draws a further distinction between alpha, beta 
and gamma codes. An alpha code is one in which the ensemble of markers 
is composed of different spatial patterns of structural arrangements of 
physical artifacts; "these are lock and key codes like those of DMA and 
RMA"» A beta code is one based on variations in process, such as 
different temporal patterns of signals or different patterns of intensity 
of signals; "such are codes used by neurons"* A gamma code is "a 
symbolic language" which involves "comparing the input to a stored 
thesaurus of information end selecting the output from it. The relations 
between the symbols and the input and output markers in such codes are 
entirely arbitrary*"1* Ue shall be considering in more detail later 
how the mind uses codes of this kind*
If we are to achieve full control and the maximum of accuracy in 
our model-making, it will often be worth while, or even unavoidable, to 
transmit all the required information in digital values, that is, in u 
messages in uni—dimensional scalar registers, in which the total number
1. 3ames G. Miller; "Living Systems: Structure and Process"
(Behavioural Science Vol* 10 Mo. 4, 1965).
of possibilities in the register can be expressed as a cardinal number
and each actual value can be expressed as an ordinal number. This is
the normal procedure of science. As Eddington said in a famous remarkt
nThs whole subject matter of exact science consists of pointer readings
1.and similar indications”* * However, the conscious mind has only a 
limited capacity to grasp pointer readings directly. If a ruler is 
marked in equal divisions of more than five or so at a time the mind 
finds it difficult to grasp ordinal positions at a glance. The maximum 
it can grasp is probably about seven; if there are more possibilities 
than that in thB register we have to begin to count. On the other 
hand the mind has a remarkable capacity for absorbing information in 
terms of forms which unite sequences of values in different registers 
but themselves emerge in new registers of their own, each appropriate 
to its own continuum. Ue normally think of a model as having a three 
dimensional shape, and indeed three dimensional shapes can resume a ' :- ;T 
vast amount of digital information. But information coded in forms 
(”analogue forms”) cannot by definition be quantified without recording,
for to quantify it is to code it in digits.
Now I have suggested that we cannot know anything that is not expressed 
in a code. In other words we can only know information, that is facts, 
models, messages about the world. But if the same message can be ex­
pressed in different codes, is there not something underlying every 
such encoding of the same message which we can draw out as the true 
reality? I have already touched on this question in relation to facts 
of existence and facts of classification. It represents one of the 
abiding puzzles of philosophy, though it seems to me less a true problem, 
to which an intellectually satisfying answer can be found, than one 
expression of the inevitable finitude of the human mind. For what it is 
worth, my own position is broadly the Kantian one: I do not think we 
can know, at least with the clear and distinct force of a Caresian idea,
reality in itself, ”das Ding an sich"; even to speak or think of it we
2.
have to make it singular or plural which ie already to encode it. * All 
we can know is facts about reality.
1. A.S. Eddington ”The Nature of the Physical World" (Cambridge 1330)
p. 252.
2* According to Gregory Bateson, it was Alfred Korzybski who "made 
^  famous” the principle "that in all thought or perception or com­
munication about perception there is a transformation, a coding, 
between the report and the thing reported, the Ding an sich.
Above all the relation between the report and the mysterious thing 
reported tends to have the nature of a classification..." (G. Bateson. 
"Hind and Nature", Fontana 1980, p. 37).
Piaget expresses a similar view with precisions "Indeed the object 
exists and objective structures exist themselves before one discovers 
them* But one does not discover them at the end of an operational 
voyage (in Bridgman's., sense) in the way in which Columbus discovered 
America in the course of his voyage; one only discovers them by re­
constructing them, that is to say, one can get nearer end nearer to
1
them but without the certitude of ever eimply touching them*” *
Against this we may set, as a resounding utterance of quasi-religious 
faith, Morgan's statement that "No believing scientist can base
a theory of perception on the proposal that the causes of perception ©re 
unintelligible 'things in themselves**”^#
The argument becomes one of whether we perceive real objects in 
a real space or we perceive representations of an ultimately unattainable 
reality in a represented space* The issue comes so sharply in our 
present context that I have not felt able to ignore it; but in practical 
terms the answer makes no difference, and in theoretical terms the question 
is doubtfully intelligible* Underlying two different models or encodings 
of the same message there ie a particular non-randomness, a particular 
set of regularities (Instances of rules), a particular form, a 
particular information, a particular creation, a particular reality; 
these words are here virtually interchangeable, and what they refer to, 
being ultimate, is beyond us*
To return to more practical matters, we have noted that the 
capacity to behave in a way that is related to past experience must 
involve the capacity to form a model of the possible future# We can 
now perhaps say a little more about the processes involved* First 
the organism must take cognizance of the present contingency — 
otherwise encode it* But that doss not get us very far* Next it has 
to find a model of a past sequence of events, or a model derived from 
many past sequences of events, in which the earlier port in time 
matches the present contingency and the later parts therefore correspond 
to a possible future* This Implies a model in which the time dimension 
is recoded in some synchronic register; and further it implies a
1* "L'Epistemologie Gehetique”, PUF 1970, p. 109*
2* "The Two Spaces” in Neil Bolton ed. "Philosophical Problems in
Psychology” (Methuen 1979)*
process of matching by which the model of the present - recoded in the 
same register — is matched against part of the model of the past and 
found either to fit or not to fit* Not only this: a single model 
predicting a single possible future event is of no value for regulation*
At least two models are needed, each including a movement or action or 
abstention from action of some kind which is within the possible range 
of behaviour of the organism* There must be some means of evaluating 
one against the other, of adopting the one preferred, and of actualising 
the appropriate behaviour at the appropriate time* All this within the 
frame of the network of contingencies described earlier; every step in 
the procsss as a whole must flow as a reaction arising out of the 
preceding contingencies through the operation of natural laws.
Attastion should be drawn to two points in particular* First, 
the model need not be a mere reproduction, albeit in generalised form, 
of evsnts which have taken place in the past. Several such models or 
predictive rules may be brought together in a modelled conjuncture, in 
such a way as to create a model trajoctory as a whole which, taken as 
a whole, is a new creation; It does not reflect anything in the organism's 
past experience, although Its component elements will have their 
own roots in the past* Secondly, when it comes to the matching ofaone 
model against another - or part of another - we find ourselves dealing 
with a remarkable process of which tho importance may need to be 
elucidated and stressed* Wc can describe matching more precisely as 
comparison leading to equation* It involves the juxtaposition of one 
form with another end the recognition that the one fits in to the other
as the head fits into the §ap, as the more particular fits into the
more general, as the instance fits into the class, as the actual fits 
into the possible.
Equation is a form of classification and it always has a direction: 
x « 3 means that x is a member of the class of triads, it does not
necessarily mean that 3 = x. Only in the special case of identity is
the equation reversible, when not only Is x an instance of the class of 
which y is the paradigm, but y is an instance of the class of which x 
is the paradigm — at the level of discrimination, and hence of 
generalisation, which is available in the circumstances* The establishment
of an equation is the passing of information, and if the equation is 
between the encoded present actuality and a model derived from the past, 
it is the passing of information about the actual world into the organism 
information which remains there if in some recoded form it is fixed by 
memory* This is effectively the process to which Piaget refers as 
"adaptation", with its two components of "assimilation" and 
"accommodation"* The particular is assimilated to the general, the 
general is accommodated to the particular* In a successful adaptation 
equilibrium (whiihllhave called aquation) is achieved. "It is by 
adapting to things that thought organises itself; and it is by 
organising itself that it structures things."1* In Piaget's view 
adaptation is always accompanied by organisation, and It will be seen 
that the scheme that I am proposing is in accordance with this Idea; 
indeed this study Is essentially concerned with examining how the 
organism organises its Self to cope with the world* *
In same cases the model derived from the past is in fact derived 
from the evolutionary past, as when an insect is programmed to recognise 
the fragrance of a particular flower it has never met before in its own 
brief experience; but this is no more than to say that the passing of 
information is required for a reflex response as well as for a learned 
response. For practical purposes the need is for a yes:no reaction in 
the particular type of contingency which the juxtaposition of the two 
forms in the same code represents. The result is either connection or 
no connection* As we have noted, the process of comparison may be either 
simple or analytic, that is, made up of an ordered sequence of simple 
comparisons* It can sometimes y?^ld a value which is not yes or no 
(instance or not instance of the class in question), but like or unlike; 
and this indicates that the subject is an instance (or not, as the case 
may be) of a further class with a paradigm form which is more general 
than that with which the original comparison was made*
1. Piaget (1952), quoted in 3*M. Flavell "The Developmental
Psychology of 3ean Piaget" (Van Norstrand, Princeton 1963).
2* Ue ©re not far here from the concept of analysis-by-synthesis 
used by Ulric Neisser in his "Cognitive Psychology" (1967), 
following Eden (1962). Nor, as Flavell points out, are wefbr 
from Kelly's (1955) idea that to adapt intellectually to 
reality is to construe that reality, and to construe it in terms 
of some enduring construct within oneself* UNat I am perhaps
Our argument so far has brought us to a point at which we have
enumerated some of the essential elements of any mechanism which could
make it possible for any organism to achieve the more efficient type
of regulation which involves learned responses and active, purposeful 
. 1*behaviour* The enumeration is far from complete, but it may be 
sufficient to indicate something of the framework of basic categories 
of randomness, regularity and possibility, information, causation, 
coding and equation within which any study of such a mechanism needs 
to be conducted* I do not propose now to attempt to follow out this 
argument with a progressive elucidation of the conditions and mechanisms 
needed for progressively more complicated degrees of regulation, from 
those of the simplest organisms onwards* I propose instead to make a 
leap to a rough but relatively comprehensive model of the working of 
the human mind. My ideas on this subject have been developed in some 
detail elsewhere, but for present purposes a single chapter may be 
sufficient, as my aim is no more than to provide a conceptual frame 
within which a coherent study of the Self can be undertaken.
adding is the idea of the relationship being one between the 
general and the particular, the idea that classification itself 
depends upon generalisation, and the idea that in the same 
process we recognise limited possibility (expressed as a more 
generalised form) resolved into actuality (experessed in a 
more particular form), so that information is passed in a 
sense strictly conformable to the theories of communication 
engineers.
1. So far as the respectability of the concept of purpose in
scientific discourse,is concerned, I would say only that I agree 
with 3.M. Brener when he says that "the intentionality of 
purposiveness of behaviour is implicit in the evolutionary 
assumption that behaviour serves adaptive functions”. (In 
Chapman and 3ones ed. "Models of Man”, British Psychological 
Society 1980.) Such a view is also implicit in the work of 
Ross Ashby, the "bio-mathematician”, on living systems.
H r  A MODEL. OF THE RIND
Miller's Analysis of Mental Functions
Oemes G. Miller's account of the organism as an open 
system of 19 information processing and matter/energy 
processing subsystems. A consideration of mind 
conceived as the central regulating processes of such 
a system.
The mind is a regulator. It applies rules. By means of rules 
apparent randomness is construed* predictions are made* possibilities 
are narrowed down, choices are faced, action is taken. "‘
We tend to think of our lives as journeys or pilgrimages across 
a landscape of historic time and universal space, in which it is we who 
move, while the world and its history are set in array around us. But 
it would perhaps be closer to the reality if we thought of ourselves, not 
the world, as set and fixed in an eternal Here Now, while the unceasing 
flow of the future comes at us and streams through and by us, changing 
as it goes into a past that hurries away from us again. It is only the 
Here Wow which is directly real to our consciousness. The past 
influences us through our memories or through the facts that we have 
learned, but the effect is not that of any direct transmission from the 
pest, like the light from a receding galaxy, it is something in our­
selves Here Now which affects us, the present memory not the past evept 
itself, even though it will have been originated by the past event when 
it took place. Still more is this true of our imaginations of the future; 
these may powerfully affect our minds, but it is the present 
prognostication that exerts the influence, not the future event.
These facts, memories, prognosticatione, effect us because they 
operate ae rules reetricting the possibilities of transition through 
ourselves. Ue are self-rogulating systems whoso activity is a series 
of steps of regulation which take the possibilities of the future os 
they come at us and reduce them to a narrower but more sharply formed 
actuality moving into the past. The general effect of the steps of
regulation is to enable us to survive* to keep us in being as persistent 
forms.
So far* perhaps, tie may be carried by the analysis of Chapter I.
But our next task is to come to closer grips with the notion of the 
mind as the part or subsystem of the organism that is responsible for 
these steps of regulation# It is curiously difficult to find a guide 
which might be relevant to this enquiry in the form of a reasonably 
detailed account of what the mind is and what it does. The philosophers, 
for their part, are nearly always concerned with the mind in relation 
to broad problems of knowledge, existence, the body, will, consciousness 
and so on# They are facing towards these general problems, not towards 
a description of the specific structures and processes of tho mind.
There is a chapter, for example, in Spinoza*a "Ethics" called "The 
Nature and Origin of the Mind11, but despite its promising title it is 
of no service at all to us here. Even Kant, though he does show a 
remarkable power to get down to psychological processes, is in effect 
looking in other directions; and so, for that matter, is Gilbert Ryle 
in "The Concept of Rind”, a book which is concerned, to use Ryle’s own 
words, with the examination of "the logical behaviour” of "msntal- 
conduct concepts”. "What is in dispute”, he says, "is not how to apply 
them, but how to classify thorn, or in what categories to put them"#*’* 
That, certainly, is not what I am concerned wifcb here. Wittgenstein 
criticises, perhaps with justice, the "conceptual confusion” of 
psychology, but, as this indicates, his interest is in elucidating 
concepts, not in building any coherent model of ths mind. It could 
be said that in making these comments I am merely complaining unfairly 
at the philosophers for not being psychologists. But not many 
psychologists, either, seem to concern themselves with this subject.
Rost of them are reluctant to use the word "mind” at all, possibly to 
avoid any suggestion of the heresy of mind-body dualism; while modern 
experimental psychology is almost inevitably concerned with ths 
relatively narrower and more specific aspects of the mind’s functioning, 
rather than with broad constructions which are not so easily susceptible 
to the experimental approach# One exception to this generalisation,
1# G# Ryle "The Concept of Rind" (Hutchinson 1949) p. 62#
however, is Games G. Riller, whose massive study "Living Systems"*’ 
includes e consistent analysis of mental functions and a detailed review 
of the relevant research; and it may be helpful to consider this 
analysis briefly as one way into the subject#
According to filler’s general theory all living systems are opert^ 
systems composed of subsystems which process inputs, throughputs and 
outputs of matter, energy and information. He identifies 19 critical 
subsystems whose processes are essential for life? of these, eight 
process matter/energy, nine process Information, and two (the reproducer 
and the boundary subsystems) process both# The list of information- 
processing subsystems is the following? input transducer (i.e. external 
sensory receptors), internal transducer (i#e# mechanisms sensing the 
internal state of the organism), channel and net (i#e# internal message 
distribution system), decoder, associetor, msmory, decider, encoder and 
output transducer# He identifies the 19 subsystems at seven hierarchical 
levels from the cell to the supranational system? but for our purposes . 
we are concerned only with the level of the organism. Miller' himself 
is one of those psychologists who avoid the use of the word mind#
For our purposes it would be possible to consider all the information- 
processing subsystems as together building up the organism’s mind, 
but this would, I think, stretch the word too far# It seems to me 
that in the terms of this analysis the mind, as we normally understand 
it, relates only to the three central subsystems, the decider, the 
associator and the msmory. This at least gives us a starting point 
for our examination#
The decider is defined as "the executive subsystem which receives 
information inputs from all other subsystems and transmits to them 
information inputs that control the entire organism". "The decider is 
the only essential critical subsystem and it cannot be parasitically or 
symbiotically dispersed to any other system. The reason for this is 
that, if another system carried out the deciding functions everything
1. RcGrau-Hill 1978
' » 'it controlled would, by definition, bo a subsystem or component of it." *
(This point becomes directly relevant only in the case of certain
lower organisms or in the case of higher level systems such as human
organisations; but it nevertheless is of theoretical importance.)
Furthermore "a decider differs from a node in a channel or net in the
following ways The number of alternatives or degrees of freedom in the
information output of the decider is smaller than in its information
input." Here we identify the critical test of a regulator, that it
applies rules, it restricts the possibilities of transition in time.
Decision, on Miller’s account, is a problem-solving process which has
four stages? (a) establishing purposes or goals (always related to
reducing "strains" within the organism); (b) analysis of the situation;
(c) synthesis of a course of action (essentially by the use of logical
processes to reduce the number of alternatives where possible to a
0
single choice); and (d) implementing the decision. *
According to this theory the associator subsystem, as distinct 
from tho decider, has the function of "carrying out the first stage cf 
the learning process, forming enduring associations among items of 
information in the system. It synthesises a set of bonds or inter­
relationships among them so that at some future time inputting item A 
into the system will elicit items 8... N as outputs, each with its 
own probability which will be greater than 0 and less than or equal ,.to 
1. The synthesis formed is at least somewhat different for each 
individual system... consequently it constitutes a private organisation 
of knowledge... Evidence that the stochastic process of associating is 
occurring is obtained when the probability increases that one item of 
information will elicit another item." * The theory is clearly shaped
1. "Living Systems" p. 67. According to this theory free-living 
cells, as distinct from aggregated cells (which form part of 
organisms or organs) possess all 19 subsystems; but aggregated 
cells and organs may lack certain subsystems "such as the 
associator or the memory or the decider which are ’upwardly dis­
persed* to tho organ or organism which exercises control over 
them in hierarchical fashion from the higher level.
2* These stages may be compared to the four phases of the heuristic 
process distinguished by Polya, as reported in "Plans end the 
Structure of Behaviour" by G.A. Miller, Galanter and Pribram 
(Holt, Reinhart and Winston 1960). These aroi (I) Understanding 
the problem; (2) Devising a plan that will guide the solution and 
connect the data to tho unknown; (3) Carrying out the plan; and 
(4) Looking back at the completed solution, reviewing, checking 
and possibly improving it.
3. "Living Systems" pp. 65-66.
to accommodate behaviourist ideas of learning, to which in his review 
Miller gives a good deal of attention; but it does not exclude others 
and allows specifically for varying assumptions about "what processes 
(or intervening variables) relate inputs to outputs" - that is, for 
cognitive maps, schemata, Gestalten, Randier*s "central analogic structure" 
and so oh.
Memory, the third of the central subsystems, is described as 
carrying out the second stage of the learning process, specifically 
the reading of information into storage, its maintenance in storage, 
its loss or alteration in storage, and Its retrieval. Because some 
stored information comes from the environment the memory is conceived 
as including a cognitive map of the environment which is constantly being 
updated; but it also includes inputs from inside the system, in particular 
the organisation of knowledge resulting from the processes of 
association.
Thus broadly, as Miller sees it, information from the environment 
and from within the organism, transmitted in various uays and in various 
codes, is eventually "decoded" into a "private" code used for the central 
processes of the system. These central processes consist of 
association, otherwise primary learning, which builds up an organisation 
of knowledge; of memory which stores knowledge; and of decision which uses 
it to establish goals, to select courses of action and to implement the 
chosen courses* Each of these three processes is the work or function 
of a specific subsystem within the whole. Finally the implementing 
signals are translated out of the central private code by the "encoder" 
subsystem into codes appropriate for the action to be taken.
Can we accept this account of the central processes of regulation 
as a first approximation to describing what we mean by the mind? I 
suggest that we can take it os broadly delimiting the subject matter 
and identifying its main elements in such a way es to establish what it 
Is that we are talking about; but not as an altogether satisfactory 
approach to describing what happens. I have much respect for Miller*s 
work and I share his estimate of the value of a systems approach.
Moreover so bald a summary as I have given cannot begin to do justice
48.
to thB complexities of his treatment of the issues. Nevertheless in 
this field the mein value of his theory seems to me its usefulness as 
a tidy receptaclet a means of ordering and relating in a coherent manner 
the vast amount of research which has been done on various aspects of 
animal and human information-processing capabilities* As a dynamic 
model of the system working as a whole it is still vague and 
unsatisfying. In criticism I would mention two points. In the first 
place the theory finds virtually no place for consciousness (which does 
not figure in the 30 page subject index of "(Living Systems”) and 
consequently no place for a del’Imited sphere of mind, or mental 
functionj nor for any consideration, as such, of what is the characte­
ristic activity of the mind, namely thinking. In the second place the 
division of the central processes among three separate subsystems, while 
it tends to fit conveniently with the usual compartmentalisations of 
experimental psychology, is I believe unsatisfactory as it stands, for 
reasons which I hope to bring out during the course of this chapter.
The first of these criticisms is from one point of view unfair.
It arises because Miller sticks closely to theories which can be supported 
by the results of research, and there is still a wide gap between the 
models that can bs useful in the laboratory and the intuitive categories 
in which we tend to think about our mental li€e. In a sense I era 
calling for a more speculative theory that comes closer to our intuitive 
understandings and I shall try shortly to meet that call. As a first 
step, however, It may be illuminating to pursue this criticism e little 
further. In Miller's terms the decider is a subsystem with many 
"echelons” or subsystems - some located in the endocrine system, some in 
the autonomic nervous system, some in the spinal cord, some at various 
levels In the brain. All of them take "decisions" in accordance with 
genetic or other rules affecting the various functions which they control. 
"Decisions are made at thB level of the retinal cell when it either does 
or does not respond to the light rays that bombard it; at the level of 
organ when the optic pathways either do or do not transmit an image, at 
the level of the organism when the sentry decides whether friend or foe 
is approaching.”1* Although the echelons are hierarchically integrated,
1. "Living Systems" p. 68.
"characteristically information is abstracted or made more general as it 
proceeds upward from echelon to echelon and is made more specific and 
detailed as it proceeds downward... In some cases of decentralised 
decision-making certain types of decisions are made at lower echelons 
and not transmitted to higher echelons in any form."1* All this arises 
because every functional unit in the body from the cell upwards is 
itself a partly self-regulating system, though it is subject, at every 
level except the highest, to certain controls from tho next level above.
In this way the functioning of an organism of almost incredible complexity 
is effectively coordinated.
1 would not wish to quarrel in any way with this admirably clear 
exposition; but it seems to me important to note that there is a 
distinction between decisions at the highest level and all others, not 
only because the former alone are not shared or controlled by a further 
echelon at a higher level, but also because the former alone are taken 
consciously. To introduce the concept of consciousness raises a 
difficulty because there is no current consensus about how it should be 
defined. Although we bll know in our subjective experience what it is, 
we do not find it easy to say|iwhat it does; there is surely significance 
in the fact that Miller fails to Identify any subsystem serving con- ^  
sciousness as a process* I suggest however that in the present context 
it is possible for us to recognise a straightforward and far from 
mysterious function which is connected with the process of self—regulation 
and belongs to consciousness* This is the function of ensuring that we 
think of one thing at a time and consequently are able to avoid the 
confusion of taking simultaneous but incompatible, uncoordinated 
decisions. Provisionally I propose to define consciousness by this 
function.
I shall not argue the case for this any further at the present 
stage, but I shall be returning to it later when I attempt to put together 
a general model of my awn. In the meantime, before I make that attempt,
X think it may help to establish a due perspective if I set against my 
discussion of Miller's ideas e brief consideretion of the very 
different theoretical ideas of ,Clean Piaget and George Kelly about the„^? 
working of the mind.
1. "Living Systems" p. 29.
Piaget*s Theory of Psychological Structures
Thought as a quasi—dialectical process* based on sensori­
motor schemata* which enables the subject to arrive at 
logical structures* necessary and timeless of their
nature, that become the mediators between him and the
objects around him,
3.H. Flavell in his book on Piaget^ complains that one has to
work hard to understand what Piaget is trying to say in his theoretical
writings! and in this respoect his work is sharply contrasted with the 
careful clarity of Miller*©. But Piaget’s theories reflect a 
remarkably constructive imagination. It is perhaps fair to say that 
they corns closer in some ways to our intuitive understandings than 
those of most Anglo-Saxon psychologists. Yet from the point of view 
of this study their usefulness is limited because they seem to stop 
short just whon they should be getting interesting; and it may be of 
value to try to sort out why this should be.
In this enterprise I shall make use primarily of the two books 
of theory, "Le Structuralisms” of 1968 and nL*Epist^mologie Genetique" 
of 1970, to which I have referred already, together with Flavell’s 
exposition dating from 1963. For Piagat, as we saw in Chapter I, the 
basis of perception is a series of encounters between elements of the ,, 
perceptual apparatus and elements Sfofhb environment, resulting in ' 
assimilation, which is "the integration of the data into an anterior 
structure” (as with the baby applying his innate capacity to suck) or 
"the constitution of a new structure under the elementary form of a 
schema" (as with the baby learning to grab an object hanging on a 
string). Piaget’s main interest is twofold: to trace out the stages 
of the development of mental capacity, and to draw out the implications 
of the processes and capacities ho describes for the theory of 
knowledge. He is opposed both to the traditional empiricist who argues 
that "cognitive information emanates from objects" and to the "apriorist" 
or "inneiot" who argues that the subject is equipped from the outset 
with Endogenous structures" which he imposes on objects. On the
1. "The Developmental Psychology of Dean Piaget" (Van Worstrand
1963).
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contrary what we know is derived, he says, from interactions half way 
between tho two, originating in ”a complete lack of differentiation”* 
Consequently the initial problem is to construct ”mediators” which, 
starting from the zone of contact between the body end the things around 
it, are progressively developed in both directions, inwardly and 
outwardly* From this ’progressive double construction” grows our 
elaboration of both subject and objects*^*
The initial instrument of exchange, Piaget argues^ is not 
perception but action itself* Perceptions play an essential role, but 
they are partially dependent on the action as a whole, with its much 
greater plasticity| in general ”every perception ends in imbuing the 
perceived elements with significations relative to action”.**’* The 
process of construction itself can only begin because the subject pos­
sesses from the outset the necessary minimum of ”instruments of 
assimilation”, which are iheJJekagos common to all sensori-cnotor;^  
coordination* ”In all these activities, of which the roots are innate
and tho differentiations acquired, one finds certain common functional
2 'factors and certain common structural elements*” The functional 
factors we recognise as our old acquaintances assimilation and 
accommodation* The structural elements ere certain relations of order 
(e*g* in the movements of a reflex); embeddings (as grasping is 
embedded in the more complex schema of pulling); and correspondences 
(as in cognitive assimilations)* These are essentially logical 
relationships used in the building of structures*
The concept of structures is central to Piaget’s thinking, for 
logico-mathematical structures are the mediators between the subject 
and the objects round him* The progressive elaboration of conceptual 
structures in the subject makes possible a progressively more refined 
construction of the physical world. . Even in perception the subject is 
”the actor and often even the author of these ’’structurations” which he 
adjusts in the course of their unfolding by means of an active 
equilibration, made up of compensations opposed to the external 
perturbations, and hence through a continual self-regulation.”
/ / / f
1, ’’L'Epistemologie Genetique” pp. 11-12.
2* ”Le Structuralisme” pp. 51, 54-55.
3. ”Le Structuralisme” p* 51*
Piaget1s somewhat unfamiliar use of the word structure is founded 
on the mathematical concept of the group end for a non-mathematician
. ■ . i
it is far from easy to grasp. * Perhaps the key is that it is a whole
involving not only relationships between elements but possibilities of
transformation over time. The related ideas of equilibration end
reversibility are also mathematically derived. “Every form of
equilibrium*1* he says* “consists of a system of virtual transformations
which constitutes a group”. * Equilibration is defined as ”a process
tending towards states of equilibrium* a process which, takes account
not only of the steps of regulation which mark its stages* but also of
^  -
its’final form which is operational reversibility.”^ ’* Examples given . 
of equilibrated structures at the sensori-motor stage of development 
are the permanence of objects through displacements and the "objectivised, 
spatialised causality” involved in the use of objects as tools. One 
could say that structures are schemata of actions (including the actions 
of perception and thought). Reversibility, as Piaget uses the concept, 
is central to any idea of a whole extended in time, which can only be 
recognised as a whole by virtue of the fact that ”in my end is my 
beginning”.
The development of mental capacity is effectively the development 
and clarification, through continual steps of regulation, of structures 
appropriate to coping with tha world. After the initial stage of 
sensori-motor coordinations comes a second stage in which the powers of 
speech and imagination are developed; these permit the evocation of what 
is not perceived, "that is to say, representation or thought”.
Relationships of order integral to the sensori-motor schemata are  ^
abstracted to make possible © specific procedure of arranging or 
ordering; embeddings implicit in the schemata are abstracted to give 
risa to the procedure of classification; and correspondences are 
abstracted in such a way as to mako possible systematic comparisons,
1. It may be helpful to have Piaget's own definition (from ”Le 
Structuralisms" p. 7): "A structure is at a first approximation 
a system of transformations which possesses lews of its own as 
a system (in contrast to tha properties of its elements) and 
which conserves or enriches itself by means of the very action of 
its transformations without their having effects beyond their 
boundaries and without any appeal to external elements. In a 
word, a structure thus comprehends the three characteristics of 
totality, of transformations, and of self-regulation."
2. "L© Structuralisme" p. 96. Ue era close here to what I call 
equation.
element by element. Here, Piaget says, are the beginnings of logical 
thought, leading at a third stage to concrete operations which embody 
order recognised as fully reversible, transitivity, quantity and 
number. Finally comes a fourth stage of formal operations, of which the 
essential characteristic is that they set the real against the possible 
(a suggestion which clearly has affinities with the ideas about 
information discussed in Chapter I of this study). “What is astonishing", 
Piaget says, "is that the real is only effectively reached, not merely 
in its objectivity but also and above all in its intelligibility, whsrv. 
inserted in this way between the possible and the necessary, that is to 
say when it is intercal4|^^L: L between possibilities bound together by 
links of deductive necessity."'*’* Thus formal operations are 
characterised by a hypothetico-deductive cognitive strategy. They 
represent propositions! thinking, in which the results of concrete 
operations are cast in the form of propositions and various kinds of 
logical connection are established between ths propositions. Thus they 
are "operations to the second power"; and this in turn makes possible 
a combinatorial analysis, th.at io, an analysis which isolates for„,„ 
consideration possible combinations of propositions, otherwise 
hypotheses, which can then be empirically tested to arrive at the 
real. The logical connections established are identified as deriving 
from cognitive structures corresponding technically to a lattice of 
possibilities or a qroup of four transformations (IBentity, Negation, 
Reciprocal and Correlative). ^
In epistemological terms the implication of this complex analysis 
is that a quasi—dialectical process based on sensori-motor coordin­
ations enables the subject to arrive at a repertoire of logical structures 
which are necessary (though not pre-existing or predetermined) and 
timeless (insofar as they are reversible). In a sense the subject 
could b8 said to have arrived at Platonic structures "existing 
virtually from all eternity"; but Piaget is not prepared to accept 
this conclusion. Why, he asks, should it not be reasonable to think
t ^ / ' S
1. "L'Epistemologie Genetique" p. 107.
should it not be reasonable to think "that the final nature of reality 
is to be in a state of permanent construction instead of consisting of 
an accumulation of completed structures?'11* And this is the episterao- 
logical conclusion to which he continually returns.
It remains to consider Piaget*s views about the nature of the 
"subject". A large proportion of his extensive oeuvre is devoted to 
the development of mental capabilities and his approach to reality 
requires thfet this is conceived In terms of a reciprocal elaboration 
of known physical structures in the world and cognitive structures in 
the subject. But we do not learn progressively more about what the 
individual subject is, or what distinguishes one subject from others.
On the contrary the structures with which Piaget is concerned are by 
definition public, necessary, timeless. They are to be found, he says, 
not in the consciousness of individuals but in their behaviour. The 
subject is explicitly dissociated from the ego and what the ego 
experiences, but he does not develop a corresponding theory of the ego 
(the "moi"). From his point of view the structures of the subject 
cannot be dissociated from his functioning, "and if the facts oblige 
us to attribute the structures to a subject, we are content to define 
this subject as a centre of functioning”. * And this is as far as he 
is prepared to go. The organism in its continual interaction with the 
environment is continually assimilating elements of the world about it 
as It accommodates itself to situations* but "on the plane of 
conceptual representation" this merely brings us back to "those general 
schemata which are structures". The subject remains a neutral and anonym 
mous centre of functioning. This curiously empty conclusion perhaps 
owes something to Piaget’s dogmatic opposition to any theory of innate 
characteristics that goes beyond the most rudimentary "instruments of
•3
assimilation". But it is also a reminder that the remarkable body 
of J which Piaget and his associates have achieved Is nevertheless
1. "Le Structuralisme" p. 58.
2. "Le Structuralisme" p. 59. Cf. the views of Koffka and Chein
discussed on p. /jiT? below.
3. In "Le Structuralisme" Piaget discusses linguistic structures in 
terms of a Chomskian transformational grammar, which indeed grows 
from mathematical roots similar to those of his own theory; but 
characteristically his chief concern is to replace Chomsky’s 
hypothesis of the innate nature of certain grammatical structures 
with a hypothesis of progressive construction deriving ultimately 
from the coordination of sensori-motor schemata.
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decidedly limited in its scope* There ere risks in making such an 
assertion when the work is so voluminous and there is so much that I 
cannot claim to have read. But I do not think it is mere coincidence, 
for example* that there is no entry for memory or for emotion in the 
exhaustive index to Flavell’s book.
George Kelly*s Theory of Personal Constructs
A critical account of Kelly’s general theory? a fresh and 
unified perspective over a broad fields but a view 
decidedly blurred at the edges*
"flan looks at hi© world through transparent patterns or templets 
which he creates and then attempts to fit over the realities of which 
the world is composed*.# Let us give the name constructs to these 
fc&tterns that are tentatively tried on for size. They are ways of 
construing the world..* In general man seeks to improve his constructs
by increasing his repertory* by altering them to provide better fits
and by subsuming them with superordinate constructs or systems*"'*'*.,
Ue recognise once more something very lifise the anticipatory schemata 
of Bartlett or Noisssr or Piaget. But George Kelly, who wrote these 
words, was a different kind of thinker, not least because he was explicitly 
trying to develop a comprehensive general theory. He recognised that 
every theory had only a limited "range of convenience" and emphasised that
"all our present interpretations of the universe are subject to revision
2 3
and replacement" f"the events do not belong to any system" • But he
was deliberately seeking generality: "The psychology of personal
constructs ... is a theory of man".
For Kelly constructs are not merely ways of construing the
realities of the world, they are means of prediction* "Since the 
universe is essentially a course of evants, the testing of a construct 
is a testing against subsequent evants. In other words a construct is 
tested in terms of ito predictive efficiency." * Henco the "fundamental 
postulate" of Kelly*3 theory, which is formulated as follows: "A
1. George A. Kelly "A Theory of Personality" (Norton 1963) p. 9.
2. Ib. p«15* 3* lb* p#12. 4* Ib. p. lBo# 5. Ib# p*16*
person’s processes are psychologically channelised by the ways in which
he anticipates events"* This does not mean that 3ome kind of energy
flows through the channels thus provided, for Kelly rejects any concept
of either "stimulus energy" or "need energy", he discards both "push
theories" and "pull theories", which in hie view treat the person as an
inert psychological object animated in some way from outside* On the
contrary he regards man himself as a of motion, and in this no
different from the universe* For "the world is not an abandoned
monument* It is an event of tremendous proportions, the conclusion of
which is not yet apparent* The theories that men employ to construe
the event are themselves incidents in the mammoth procession* The
truths the theories attempt to fix are successive approximations to the
larger scheme of things which slowly they help to unfold.** A theory
is bound only by the constructive system of which it is a part - and
of course the binding is only temporary, lasting only as long as that
t
particular superordinate system ie employed*" Within this Heraclitean 
flux, of which he himself ie part, what man does is to apply constructs 
to predict and control events* This is indeed the characteristic function 
of the scientist? but it is also characteristic of all men; this is a 
theory of man-the-scientist.
Kelly elaborates his fundamental postulate with eleven "corollaries"* 
We anticipate events, he says, by identifying patterns of likeness in 
the world, which are "constructs of similarity and contrast"* All 
constructs are thus bipolar, with a like end and a contrast end*
Each embraces "elements" which fall within its range of convenience 
either as like or as contrasting• Everybody builds his own system of 
constructs which are ordered together through the subsuming of one 
construct by another as one of its elements* A person makes choices 
by placing different values on the alternatives represented by these 
dIchotomieQ aiming always in affect to extend and clarify the 
capacity of his system to anticipate events. Actual experience tests 
the system and leads to constant development and change within it. 
Constructs may vary in their "permeability", that is, their capacity
1. "A Theory of Personality", p* 19
to be stretched to accommodate new elements; and it is significant that 
unless a person's superordinate constructs have a considerable degree 
of permeability it is extremely difficult for him to accept major 
changes of outlook. Some inconsistency however can be tolerated 
between subsystems and, more specifically, the successive use of 
mutually inconsistent subsystems can be tolerated* Lastly* people 
in the same cultural group are likely to construe their experience in 
similar ways, but what is required for the social process is not that 
people should construe things in the same way, rather that one 
participant should effectively construe the other's outlooks the orderly 
weaving of traffic is an example of people successfully predicting each 
other*a behaviour in this manner*
This ie a therapist*s theory* Kelly himself recognises that its 
"focus of convenience11 is in the psychotherapeutic encounter* Its 
signal merit is that it provides a method by which we can attempt a 
rational and systematic exploration of the patterns of an individual's 
mind on its own terms, and without trying to force it into any 
standardised framework of traits or deives* Uith the aid of repertory. 
grid and other techniques it has proved a useful practical instrument' in 
therapeutic situations* Moreover its claim to be a general theory, 
reaching comprehensively across the spectrum of the human psyche, is 
not false* In this aspect it has a simplicity and straightforwardness 
which ©re attractive features* But as a general theory of the mind its 
simplicity is bought at a price. Difficulties are not so much ignored, 
as might be the case with a more partial and limited theory, rather they 
are elided or wrapped up in generalisation* Personal construct theory, 
for all the resourcefulness with which it has been developed, remains 
a systematization of 'the practical working assumptions of a gifted 
therapist* In this it bears some resemblance to the general theoretical 
views of Freud - though Freud never worked out his views in so formal 
a fashion*1* As a general theory it has important virtues, but it is 
open to the criticism that it simplifies too much* In Kelly's own
1. In his younger days* admittedly, Freud did attempt a major 
theoretical work, now known as the "Project for a Scientific 
Psychology"; but he was unable to bring it to completion.
The ideas of the "Project" nevertheless exercised a lasting 
hold over hi© thinking* An account of it is given in Chapter 
2 of Richard Wollheim's "Freud" (Collins/Fontana 1971)*
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terminology, its constructs tend to be over-loose. To develop this 
criticism in detail would take more space than is available hersj but 
to give soma substance to what I have said I will now add a feu comments — 
necessarily brief and bald - on a series of particular issues.
Kelly commended Heraclitus, at the expanse of Aristotle, for 
making ”a pretty good start at construing an active universe”
He is unusual in raCdgnising the importance of the problem of what I 
would call structure (or form) and process, or synchrony and diachrony, 
in any analysis of human consciousness; but he deals with it by simply 
assimilating form to motion - an elision of the problem, rather than a 
solution of it. A construct is a synchronic entity, not a process, 
even if it is extended in a dimension of time (and it does not always 
have to be so extended). There is more to this problem than Kelly 
recognised.
Ue are left with a certain sense of vagueness, even of fudging? > 
and the same is true when we examine his account of the construct 
itself and of construing. "A construct”, he says, ”is a single 
formulation of a likeness and a difference.” Kelly insists on the 
bipolar nature of constructs - for example black versus white.
"Conventional logic”, he maintains, "would say that black and white should 
be treated as separate concepts. Moreover it would say that the 
opposite of black can only ba stated as not black.” But this 
conventional logic, he argues, is not the only way of seeing things? 
he regards his own assumption as more plausible than the conventional 
one, because it seems ”to crrespond more closely to observation of how 
persons actually think”. 8ut is Kellyfs assertion about conventional 
logic correct? I am no logician, but my elementary textbook suggests 
that nob-black is a negation or contradictory of black because if one 
is true the other must be false, while white is a contrary of black because 
it is possible for both to be false (the truth may be green). What seems 
on reflection to be clear is that, when people think, they are liable 
to use both negation and contrariety* both unipolar and bipolar
1. ”A Theory of Personality”, p. 154.
2. Ibid. p. 133.
constructs. Even with a unipolar construct there is a distinction 
between X and not-X, but you cannot establish a scale of shados of 
grey between X and not-X as you can between X and Y* This criticism 
is not fatal because Kelly in practice applies his ideas with common 
sense. Moreover he is right to point out that we make our discriminations 
in context, by reference to the other things around rather than by 
reference to all the not-X in the world. Nevertheless it is fair to 
say that Kelly hardly sorts out the nature of constructs with the 
precision which might be possible.**
Again with regard to the process of construing he gives no detail 
about how it is thought to take place. How do we build up, or invent, 
new constructs? How do wo "try them on; for siz#? "The events of oni'h 
construing111 he says, "march single file along the path of time." A
1* It may be recalled that Chapter I of this study offers what is in 
effect an alternative analysis, of which the main features are:
(i) every idea represents a clas3, which divides the world into 
two, the instances and the non-instances of the class| (ii) our 
focal awareness is never of the class (except as an instance of 
another class) but always of the instance, singular or plural, or 
the non-instance as the case may bej (iii) beyond the focal 
awareness however wo always have a peripheral awareness of the class 
itself as representing the range of possibility against which the 
actuality of the instance or non-instance emerges! (iv) in this 
aspect the class or idea may be described as a register of 
possibility — a yes/no register containing two possibilities only;
(c) instances of ideas can also be recognissd on other types of^  
register (without losing their identity on their/substantive 
class-register): these’ Include u/hafe ri -describees simple 'repertoires, 
scales, spread repertpires .and, polar spreads.-' y.;.
On this account polar spreads correspond to the dichotomous 
constructs of Kelly. The fact that we are not normally conscious 
of the register of possibility when w© recognise the actuality 
corresponds to Kelly's idea that often the "emergent" pole of a 
construct is the only ons of which we are directly aware, while 
the other remains "submerged". I would contend that what I have 
provided represents a more precise and useful analysis than Kelli's, 
one which recognises and accounts for the Kellian construct, but 
gives it a more accurate definition and location. It also brings 
in the concept of actuality emerging out of limited possibility 
which is important because of it© relevance to the transmission of 
information. I should perhaps add that there are certain further 
complexities to be taken into account when we consider how ideas 
which ©re grammatically related together in predications mutually 
define a field of possibility for the predication as a wholes these 
issues are discussed in "The Grammar of Language".
good phrase, and I think a true one; put for me what it brings out ie * 
that a construing event is equivalent to what I call a predication, an 
event in which a number of ideas are brought together in a complex way 
to build up a new idea* Construing, as the word itself indicates, is 
fundamentally a grammatical process (even when words are not involved); 
but here no hint is given that there is a whole grammar of construing 
to be elucidated* tele learn how one construct can subsume another in 
an "ordinal relationship" (which X would call a hierarchical relationship); 
but we do not learn of other possible spatio-temporal, classificatory, 
logical or grammatical relationships between constructs* The reality 
is more complicated than the theory allows*
A construct system may enable us to predict events, but how do we 
make choices, take decisions and act? Kelly's answer is that, within 
a system of dichotomies, "the person builds his life upon one or tha 
other of the alternatives represented in each of the dichotomies* This 
is to say that he places relative values upon the ends of his dichotomies".* 
Thereby "he involves himself in the selection". But what, in this 
context, is "himself"? Kelly sayc that the Self is a construct* "It 
refers to a group of events which ©re alike in a certain way#** The
way in which the ©vents ere alike is the Self"* By what process .does-
the Self get involved in choices? The answer is that "when the person 
begins to use himself as a datum in forming constructs ... he finds that
2*
the constructs he forms operate as rigorous controls upon his behaviour". * 
Emotion is conceived not as a psychological push or pull but as an aware­
ness that construct systems are in transitional states; thus the 
distinction between cognition and amotion is deliberately elided* Re­
defining emotion in terras of transition, process and change, Kelly
develops the idea of a sequence of constructions involving successively
3 •circumspection, preeemption and control, leading to choice. * This
comes close to the notion of a purposive cycle, but of course the idea
of purpose (implying a pull theory), as distinct from anticipation, 
can find no place in Kelly's system. According to his theory, when a
1* "A Theory of Personality" p* 65*
2* Ibid. p. 131.
3* D* Bannister & F* Fransella "Inquiring Man" (Penguin 1971) p.39.
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person feces a choice he chooses the alternative "through which he 
anticipates the greater possibility for extension and definition of 
his system" — a suggestion on which one can only comment that this is 
certainly not the way it feels#
Similarly with free will# "That which is subsumed by a construct 
may be seen as determined by it? that which subsumes the construct is 
free with respect to it*" Thus a man may control his own destiny "to 
the extent that he can develop a construction system with which he 
identifies himself and which is sufficiently comprehensive to subsume 
the world around him."^* This is a position reminiscent of Spinoza’s 
and philosophically not easy to dismiss? but it is not of much 
assistance when it comes to dissecting out the processes by which men 
not only forecast events but make decisions and take purposive action 
in the light of their forecasts* It is, Kelly argues, a person’s 
"seeking to anticipate the whole world of events and thus relate him­
self to them that best explains his psychological processes* If he 
acts to preserve the system (of constructs) it is because the system 
is an essential chart for his personal adventures, not because it is 
a self-contained island of meaning in an ocean of inconssquentialities." * 
Perhaps so* But then what are his personal adventures? Do they involve 
purposes? What does make him tick? These are difficult issues* Kelly 
may have a grasp of some important ideas? but his position is not 
convincingly worked out*
Finally, while personal construct theory, as I have suggested 
earlier* has ithe great merit of providing a means of exploring an 
individual’s thought system on its own terms, it cannot be said to dsvelop 
clear and distinct theoretical concepts of what we mean by such words as 
person, self or personality* So far as the formal statement of the 
theory is concerned, "person" is a given, defined merely as "the 
individual person rather than any part of the person, any group of persons 
or any particular process manifested in the person’s behaviour"* "Self" 
is used consistently to refer to a person’s idea or construct of himself, 
but the nature of this construct is not developed in any depth# The
i* "A Theory of Personality", p* 126.
2# Xb# p* 59#
same could be said of the concept of a person’s "bore constructs"*
In thie context on the other hand the study of personality, as 
Bannister and Frsnsslla put it* "would seem to be inescapably the 
study of the person", and so it is not to be separated from the theory 
as a whole# Some emphasis is placed on the idea of a person’s "role"? 
but this is conceived as essentially a part of the social process* a 
pattern of behaviour that follows from a person’s understanding of how 
the others who are associated with him in his task think? it ie a way 
in which one person subsumes another person’s way of seeing things.
This is a valuable idea, but clearly a role in this sense ie only one 
aspect of a wider unity*
In the upshot, over an impressively broad field George Kelly, as 
it seems to me, saw things An a fresh end unified perspective. But his 
theory is decidedly blurred at the edges and his fundamental concepts 
lack the firmness and interlocking precision they need to support the 
weight of a comprehensive system. He is always a stimulating thinker, 
but seldom a conclusive one. Personal construct theory is still e 
long way from providing an adequate general account of the way the 
mind works.'*'*
U* Ross Ashby’s "Design for a Brain"
A bio-mathematician’s theory of how an organism, as 
a "machine with input" can learn from experience end 
adapt to its environment.
A strong contrast to the ideas of George Kelly, the therapist, 
is provided by those of U. Ross Ashby, who is perhaps best described
1. There have been some significant developments in the personal 
construct field since Kelly first propounded feis theory, but 
I think it would bo fair to cay - as, for example, with 
Hinkle’s "laddering" procedure - that they ©re developments 
in the application of the theory rather than in the basic 
theory itself. We may note that "laddering", which can be 
regarded as a development of Kelly's organisation corollary, 
makes use of the natural hierarchies of classification to 
which reference is made on p. ^  above, as these In turn are 
used by the individual’s personal system of constructs.
by a word of his own coinage, "bio-mathematician". "Having experienced", 
he says in the introduction to his "Design for a Brain"1, "the confusion 
that tends to arise when we try to relate cerebral mechanisms to 
observed behaviour, I made it my aim to accept nothing that could not 
be stated in mathematical form... The aim proved achievable. The 
concepts of organisation, behaviour, change of behaviour, part, whole, 
dynamic system, coordination etc. — notoriously elusivo but essential — 
were successfully given rigorous definition and welded into a coherent 
whole. But the rigour and coherence depended on the mathematical form." 
Mercifully however for a non-mathematician like myself, Ashby goes on 
to say that "as the basic thesis... rests on essentially commonsense 
reasoning, I have been able to divide the account into two parts. The 
main account ie nan-mathematical and is complete in itself." ■
The mathematics may be relegated to an appendix, but the economy
and rigour of the argument, expressed in an admirably clear prose style,
remain. I do not propose to describe the Ideas of "Design for a Brain"
in any detail, partly because many features of the system developed in
2
thie book and its companion "An Introduction to Cybernetics" lie more 
or lass submerged in my own approach to the definition and understanding 
of the world, as reflected, for example, in the first chapter of this 
study. But some brief reference at this point may still be appropriate*
"Design for a Brain" does not aspire to quite such heights as Its 
title might suggest. Its aim is the limited, but still ambitious, on© 
of establishing in strictly theoretical terms how ©n organism, an open 
system, existing in a particular environment can learn from experience 
and consequently adapt to that environment. It is a theory of the 
organism as a "machine with input". Adaptation In Ashby’s terms is 
the maintenance of stability through changes in the environmental input? 
a form of behaviour is adaptive if it maintains certain "essential 
variables" "within physiological limits". An "ultrestable" system is 
one in which a primary feedback from the environment through sensory and 
motor channels is supplemented by a slowar, second-order feedback which 
affects the values of the seential variables, with the result that if 
these pass beyond given limits they set off step-mechanisms which
1. Second Edition (Revised), Chapman and Hall, 1960.
2. Chapman and Hall, 1956. Methuen University Paperbacks 1964.
produce a change in behaviour.
Ashby built an adaptive machine, the "homeostat", to demonstrate 
this basic mechanism for adapting to changes in the environment. His 
work goes on to examine the implications of applying such conceptions 
In the immensely more complex case of an organism in the real world.
Of the gene pattern he argues that it provides one determinant of the 
living organism’s mechanism for adaptation, but that the rest is 
supplied by the environment itself* Thus in the case of a kitten the 
genes provide "a learning nechanism and a tendency to play", but "it 
is the mouse which teaches the kitten tho finer points of how to catch 
mice". *He deals with recurrent situations and learning from trial and 
error? with the effects, particularly in terms of the time required 
for adaptation, of the degree of connectedness (and conversely the 
degree of isolation) between one variable or subsystem and another, 
both in the organism and in the environment to which It adapts? with 
local stabilities and "multi-stable" systems? with habituation? with 
the accumulation and the retroactive inhibition of adaptations; with 
problems of coordination, with sub-essential variables and sub- 
adaptations; and with the concept of learning as the amplification of 
adaptation*
Ashby develops his ideas within strictly detorminist and 
behaviourist assumptions, but in context those are acceptable end 
useful because he does not pretend that they are more than assumptions. 
Throughout the book "consciousness end its related subjective elem^ts 
are not used for the simple reason that at no point have I found their 
introduction necessary." But, as he himself says, this is not 
surprising, given that "the book deals with only one of the properties of 
the brain, and with a property - learning - that has long been recognised 
to have no necessary dependence on consciousness."1
bJhat Ashby’s theories offer, taking the two books together, is 
essentially a comprehensive, coherent and economical way of describing 
the world, including the living systems within it. Philosophically I 
believe that thoy have a good deal more importance than philosophers
1. "Design for a Brain" p. 11. He cites the way in which we
unconsciously learn to make certain corrective movements when
riding a bicycle as on axample.
This point is put more precisely in the chapter on "Amplifying 
Regulation" in "An Introduction to Cybernetics". In mammals,
Ashby says, "the gene pattern is used, in its action on the embryo 
brain, to determine the development at birth of some fundamental 
regulators (Rx) whose action is not immediately to the organism’s 
advantage. From birth onwards, however, they act towards the 
cerebral cortex so as to develop in it a vast regulatory mechanism 
(R2)”, which Is of much greater capacity than could have been 
produced by the-gene pattern directly. "Whence comes the 
supplementation? From random sources and from the environment 
itself... The quantity of design supplied by the gens pattern is 
supplemented by design (as variety and information) coming from 
the environment." These ideas show some interesting affinities 
with Piaget’s theory of the development of cognitive structures 
through activities "of which the roots ore innate and the 
differentiations acquired"? such developments culminate, on 
Piaget's account, in "formal operations", which are "operations 
to the second power".
have generally realised — or indeed than Ashby himself probably thought. 
But in our present context the importance of hie "Design for a Brain" 
is primarily that of a rigorous feasibility study, showing how a self— 
regulating, and hence purposive, mechanism is possible, and thus 
establishing and defining the concept of the mind as a regulator*
The Computational Metaphor
An account of Sloman’s model of the mind as a computing 
.system.- ■
Ashby was one of the pioneers of a movement, growing largely out 
of military work In the Second World War, which lett) to remarkable 
developments in the new fields of cybernetics, information theory and 
systems theory, associated with such names as Shannon and Wiener.
Closely linked in some respects with this work ware the beginnings of 
research into artificial or machine intelligence, associated with the 
names of Newell, Simon, Shaw and later of Minsky, Boden and many others. 
As representative of general theories of the mind, to which thie work 
has given rise, I propose to consider Aaron Sloman’s "The Computer 
Revolution in Philosophy"1. As it happens, one of the themes of this 
book, subtitled "Philosophy, Science and Models of Mind", is that a 
major aim of science is to find out what sorts of things are and are 
not possible in the world, and to explain how and why - as distinct from 
seeking to discover and establish natural laws (though that is of course 
also a legitimate aim). Slaman’e book is itself an exploration of the 
possibilities of what he calls the computational metaphor as a model for 
the mind. "A programmed computer", he says, "may include representations 
of itself, its actions, possible futures, reasons for choosing, and 
methods of inference, end can therefore sometimes contain purposes which 
generate behaviour". * His work examines in impressive detail the 
ways in which mental structures can be represented in computer programs 
and mental processes represented in the execution of such programs* It 
is essentially a preliminary exploration of a potentially vast field 
of possibility, not a rigorous demonstration of any kind of theorem*
1. Harvester, 1978.
2. "The Computer Revolution in Philosophy", p. 7.
In Part I of the book there is a good deal of discussion of various 
philosophical issuesj but what Is mo8t relevant in our context is Part 
II, consisting of a chapter entitled "Sketch of an Intelligent 
Mechanism”, followed by further chapters on "Intuition and Analogical 
Reasoning”, "Learning about Numbers” and "Perception as a Computational 
Process”. In a final chapter he returns again to "Artificial 
Intelligence end Philosophical Problems”.
Sloman distinguishes between structures, procedures (or programs) 
snc* processes which are generated when ths procedures are executed. He 
also speaks of the computing system which uses end in some cases 
modifies the structures*^* The intelligent mechanism is specifically 
a mechanism to simulate purposivsness, flexibility and creativity. It 
is conceived as involving interactions between the following structures? 
an environment, a store of factual beliefs and knowledge, a 3tore of 
resources (e.g. previously learnt procedures), a catalogue of resources, 
a motivational store, a process-purpose (or action-motive) index, and 
temporary structures associated with ongoing information-processing.
These structures generate more or leoo temporary internal and external 
processes (an external process being an action)f but there are also 
more permanent processes that link actions to current motives and make 
sure that relevant previous knowledge and new information are brought 
into play. These are (i) central administrative processes, (ii) 
monitoring processes and (iii) a process of retrospective analysis. 
Although the structures build up a mechanism, they are not conceived 
as interlocking parts which could exist separately! normal concepts of 
part and whole do not apply, since, for example, In a computer "list- 
structure" A may be an element in list-structura B, while conversely 
8 may be an element of ft. A program may even contain an instruction 
to run itself "recursively", provided some way of eventual escape 
from recursion is included in it. Correspondingly the relevant 
environment is part of the mechanism (a point which is more systematically 
developed by Ashby). The structures are not physically separate
1. A structure is defined as "a complex whole with parts standing 
in various kinds of relationship”. This happens to correspond 
exactly to what Games G. Miller, following von Bertalonffy, 
defines as a system, namely “A set of units with relationships 
among them". The computer scientists go their own way over 
terminology and a degree of vigilance io needed to avoid 
possible sources of misunderstanding.
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components* they are essentially "data structures" consisting of patterns 
of connections between data. Moreover in the last analysis "the dis­
tinction between data structures end programs hes to be rejected in a 
system which can treat program steps as objects which aro related to 
one another and can be changed.” *^
What kinds of factual information are stared will depend not only 
on what stimuli reach the sense organs but on what codes and what kinds 
of perceptual analysis and monitoring procedures are available. If 
the store is to be usable it needs to have soma form of catalogue 
(though this may be implicit in tha organisation of the store rather than 
take the form of a separate sub-structure)• Apart from the factual 
information store there has to be a store in which are coded and located 
all sorts of current purposes, nogative purposes (i.e. situations to be 
avoided), sub-purposes, preferencos, constraints and plans. The 
processes produced by the mechanism, that is, its internal and external 
behaviour, will be generated end controlled by reference to the moti­
vational store* Effectively it is by means of such processes that 
decisions ore taken, end on this point Sloman interestingly remarks that 
"in a complex world there may have to be e very large set of ’rules of 
thumb’| including rules for deciding which rule to use and rules for 
resolving conflicts* This is almost certainly incompatible with 
assumptions mads by economists and some moral philosophers about how 
(rational) people take decisions. For instance there need not be any 
overall tendency for the rules to optimise some abstraction called 
•utility*.”2'
In order to implement decisions it is necessary to have a store 
of resources, which can include tools and sources of information in 
the environment (e.g. books), as well as linguistic or symbolic 
abilities and established procedures (programs) for formulating 
problems, purposes, procedures and factual information* There has also 
to be a catalogue not merely listing these resources but identifying 
details about them so that they can be accurately matched to situations.
1. Ibid. p. 201.
2. Ibid. p* 120*
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This catalogue may once more be partly implicit in the organisation of 
the store, and partly also in the searching and matching procedures*
Beyond this again a more rapidly changing process—purpose index 
is needGd to store information about the reasons for various on­
going processes, and so to make it possible intelligently to plan, 
control and coordinate their interactions# Also there may bo a need 
for temporary data structures associated with ongoing processes - 
storing information about partial results, current values of variables, 
next procedure step, where to send results, end so on*
The coordination of all these processes requires a central
administrative process which "will at various times survey the
motivational base and process-purpose index and sBlect from the unful-
1*filled purposes a subset for generating further planning and action**1 
The selection may be governed by previously identified purposes, as 
related to current information about possibilities, opportunities and 
resourcos* At other times in a given situation a new purpose may have 
to be identified and other purposes may have to be modified. The new 
purpose can in some circumstances be simply to find a way of achieving 
a given purpose to which at present no appropriate procedure can be 
matched*
The "central administrator", that is, the program or programs 
governing the central administrative processes, must be able to interrupt, 
terminate, modify or restart current processes? and it must have in­
formation from monitors on which to decide when such action is needed# 
These monitors include sense organs, which inspect the environment, 
and perceptual procedures for analysing and interpreting in various 
contexts the structural arrays they produce. The limits of these 
structures, together with the limits of the sense organs and the current 
store of information about the environment will define what the system 
is capable of perceiving* In this respect Sloman is a good Kantian*
"Thera cannot be any such thing as perceiving things 1directly• or fao 
they are in themselves1* As flax Clowes once put it, we inhabit our 
data structures*"2* Human powers of discrimination are vast and it 
seems necessary to postulate that only a selection of available
1» Ibid* p* 125 2. Ibid. p.128.
perceptual programs is usad at a time; but Sloman comments, in relation 
to the computer analogy, that'there are serious problems in explaining 
how appropriate programs are selected* The mind uould seem to have at 
its command a large number of monitoring programs, some general purpose 
and some specialised; and the one can trigger the activity of the other* 
Wot all newly monitored information can be stored because there is so 
much of it, but often new information can be stored temporarily — 
usually in a *ray* or only partly processed state - in case it turns 
out to be useful in some different context, perhaps processed in some 
different way* Monitors are needed not only to notice and interpret 
what is happening, Internally and externally, but also to establish 
what progress is being made towards the achievement of current purposes, 
whether incompatibilities are developing, where success has been achieved 
and where failure must be registered*
finally, for effective learning, the system will need to have a 
fairly detailed record of events, including Information which is not 
obviously relevant to current purposes, and programs for searching the 
past, making all sorts of comparisons, relating new information, old 
information, current motives and possible future motives* This 
retrospective analysis will have to be done both in a general way and 
In a specialised way, to identify unsolved problems and relevant 
questions, together with ways of investigating them and drawing relevant 
conclusions. Without curiosity and a generalised drive to identify 
problems and look for answers the ultimate capacity and adaptability 
of the system would bo much restricted* ’
By accepting the discipline of working out e system which In 
principle - if not yet in practice - could be applied in the 
programming of a digital computer, Sloman has made a beginning of a 
"systems analysis" of the human mind. He has produced, as it seems to 
me, a most useful dissection of the functions which any modal'of the 
mind must reflect. Hie model is developed in much more detail than my 
brief summary can indicate and his discussion brings out o' number of 
significant features and problems. Hera I can do no more than draw 
attention to two or three points of interest and in particular take up 
one fundamental Issue, which relates to the adequacy of any digital
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model of mental functioning and the possibility of finding an alternative*
The first point that I should like to stress is that Sloman*s work,
far from suggesting that the mind’s capabilities ore at least in
principle easy to match and understand, continually runs up against the
quite remarkable ’’computing” capabilities even of very young children*
”1 do not believe that anybody has even the beginnings of explanations
for most of the things me know they can (sometimes) do: all we find is
£
new jargon for labelling the phenomena.*1 * He argues that work like 
his in Aritifidal Intelligence shows up the inadequacy of many philo­
sophical ideas ©bout such matters as the nature of concepts and knowledge, 
varieties of inference, and the nature of numbers; and he suggests that 
it will be helpful to think of mathematical discovery by analogy with 
a program which discovers new facts ©bout itself by a combination of
executing parts of itself and examining some of its instructions. A
program which builds its own programs can be a means of elaborating 
and generalising from existing procedures.
In regard to perception Sloman stresses the importance of being 
able to grasp a ’Gestalt* in a complex of noisy data; this ability is 
constantly needed, even for the understanding of speech; in this field 
it is difficult with a computer to do more than begin to match the most 
ordinary human, or even animal, capacities. The use of relatively 
unambiguous fragments, he says, nto activate prior knowledge which then 
directs attention fruitfully at more ambiguous fragments seems to be 
required at all levels in the visual system”; but then how is it decided 
what prior knowledge to store; how, ones stored, is it retrieved; and 
how do you stop too many things being retrieved? One process of 
particular importance and value here appears to be that of ’’mutual 
disambiguation” whereby ”diffGront ambiguous fragments somehow all
2
’communicate* with another in parallel, to disambiguate one another” -
a process which it has proved possible in a limited way to reproduce
on a computer.
Recent work on vision in the field of Artificial Intelligence has
1. Ibid. p. 213. 2. Ibid. p. 227
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achieved some success but perhaps its chief value so far has neverthe­
less been to show up the inadequacies of existing theories and the 
need for better ones. The discrepancies "arise mainly because of huge 
differences in the amount and organisation of practical and theoretical 
knowledge end the presence in people of a whole variety of computational 
processes to do with motives and emotions which have so far hardly been 
explored.11^* However, in principle# it is clear to Sloman that 
"sensory input is like a complex computer program which activates all 
sorts of different kinds of stored knowledge and abilities# which then 
interact to generate a process of interpretation itfhich, in turn, may
generate other processes.•• That is, we are programmed by whatever 
2.
impinges on us.1* * Here, we may note, Sloman reflects in a somewhat 
different context one of the most important of the principles which 
Ashby sought to establish.
Unlike many philosophers end psychologists, Sloman does not side­
step the problem of consciousness, though it is fair to say that he 
does not get very far with it. His main thesis here is that "what the 
system is currently conscious of includes all the information available 
to the central decision-making processes, whether or not decisions are 
actually influenced as a result. The system would be self-conscious 
to the extent that the information available to these processes included 
information about the system itself — e.g. information about its
location, its current actions, its unfulfilled purposes, or even about
3*what it is currently conscious of.” * He emphasises that there would
be no need for centralised processes if there were no possibility of
conflict between purposes, but that there ere many processes which can
and do carry on without any interference from the centre. He discusses
the reasons why some processes should be accessible to the "central
administrator” end others not, but he is no more successful than anyone
else has been in coming up with a theory to explain what consciousness
is end precisely what it does* He concedes frankly that l!wo are at
present nowhere near an adequate analysis of the concept of conscious
4.
experience, and related concepts.”
1. Ibid. p. 240.
3. Ibid. p. 244.
2. Ibid. p. 259
4. Ibid* p. 252
.■7,2.
Limitations of the Computational Metaphor
An argument suggesting that the computer can only reflect 
reasoning without consciousness, focal without subsidiary 
thinking. It cannot reflect forms in space, it can only 
specify them by means of coordinates5 and this limits its 
capacity to match the flexibility and learning power of 
the mind.
I turn now to Sloman’s chapter on "Intuition and Analogical 
Reasoning”, in which he raises in one aspect what I believe to bs a 
crucial issue for the understanding of the way in which the mind works. 
First he points out that there is a distinction between what he calls 
”Fregean” (or "applicative”) and "analogical” ways of making inferences 
by manipulating symbols of "representations”. In the former the basic 
method of constructing complex symbols is by applying function signs 
to argument signs. It rests on a propositions! logic in which all 
propositions are expressed in a subject-predicate form (which, as 
Passmore has suggested, is more accurately described as a substance- 
attribute form). In this type of language relations are reduced to 
properties of the terms between which they hold, and the logical 
compatibilities and incompatibilities between them. Ruch mathematical 
and logical notation and many of the constructions of natural language 
are Fregean. But Sloean'e argument is that valid reasoning is not 
restricted to Fregean methods? it can also be undertaken by manipulating 
representations that reflect relationships which are not logical in the 
narrow sense, but "analogical” — and by that term I think it is fair 
to say that he means pictorial or diagrammatic. It is entirely possible, 
he saye, to give a computer program the ability to reason in that way, 
though to do so it is necessary to formulate precise specifications of 
the significant properties and relations in the diagram and the rules 
for interpreting them. "Unlike a Fregean symbol an analogical . 
representation has a structure which gives information about the 
structure of the thing denoted, depicted or represented.”'*’ — though, as 
he makes clear, the two are not precisely isomorphic. Often there are 
good reasons for preferring the analogical to the Fregean representation? 
it Is more specialised, but it can often, for example, store information 
in a more economical way.
1. Ibid. p. 165.
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In all this it is important to note that Sloman is still referring 
digital representations of analogical relationships* He specifically 
rejects the suggestion that analogical representations are continuous# 
labile others are discrete* Although it is possible# he says# for 
analogical reasoning to take place entirely in the mind "when we 
imagine manipulating a diagram Instead of actually manipulating one”f 
it is not at all clear what actually happens in such cases* On the 
other hand "we can understand what is going on in the mind of a computer*9 
end by that he means a digital computer* He refers in this connection 
to the use of "two-dimensional arrays** to represent two-dimensional 
images in a computers but, as he points out, "there Is not really any 
two-dimensional object accessed by the program, rather a linear chunk of 
the computer*s memory is organised in such a way that with the aid of 
suitable programs the user can treat it as if it were a two-dimensional 
configuration addressable by a pair of coordinates* (Actually the 
physical memory of the computer is not really linear - but it is 
interpreted as a linear sequence of locations by mechanisms in the 
computer*)”**
Here we face the critical issue. Ry analysis of consciousness 
identifies the basic elements of awareness as forms emerging in a 
space* Sloman*s analysis leads him to find a place for “analogical” 
representations derived from spatial diagrams, but it is significant 
that they have to be digitalised by the formulation of “quite precise 
specifications of the significant properties and relations in the 
diagrams and the rules for interpreting them” before they can bo 
“manipulated59* And the manipulation is essentially a digital process, 
a kind of sequential or programmatic application of rules which 
"generate” appropriate transformations step by step. This sort of 
digital process ic basic not merely to Sloman*s thinking, but in some 
sense, as Eddington saw, to the modern scientific view of the world, 
based as it is on measurement, quantification, "pointer readings”, 
floreover the same is true of the philosophy which, since the 
seventeenth century, has grown up with modern science. In come 
curious way the requirement for clear and distinct ideas, to which 
Descartes gave such memorable expression, has led men to substitute
1* Ibid. p. 175.
numbers for forms# The ancient concept of form seems to have 
disappeared from the modern philosophical vocabulary (though not from 
everyday language or experience)$ and similarly modern psychology, 
though it will talk of elements and structures and processes, drives, 
patterns, configurations# constructs, even Gestalten (hiding the word 
"form" in German) not to mention the lexical entries and semantic 
components of theorists in linguistics# seems to have lost sight of* 
the idea as the basic unit of thought.
Why should this be? After all forms, not numbers*-vara what you 
sea and feel end hear. They come first. Digits, which# as I would 
describe them# are instances of classes of forms# come second. An 
adequate answer to this question might well require a separate study; 
but I believe that the elements of an answer are already implicit in 
my earlier study# “The Grammar of Language"; while many of the relevant 
argurnento have been developed in the opening chapter of this work or 
will be developed in subsequent chapters. Here I will attempt no more 
than a brief summary of what I think X am talking about.
All consciousness, oil thinking# is predicative, and every 
predication involves both a number of synchronic relations between the 
elements which build up the subject and the predicate and one diachronic 
transition between the two. The former howeoer are implicit# in a 
sense indeterminate# they represent tacit knowledge as Richael Polanyi 
defined it* for what we recognise in this implicit way are forms* 
comprehensive synchronic wholes# which are unified# notvdiyided. What 
defines a form is the old motto "in my end is my beginning": it unites 
in one valua what we can only retrospectively analyse as several values 
with relationships between them; and it exists in a space which unifies 
two or three or mare dimensions or registers of possibility. Now we 
cannot effectively go behind space and form to something more 
elementary; for when we try to do so wo merely embark upon an endless 
regress: if X observe my end end my beginning separately, as elements
1. It is true that Sloman writes of the "form" of the world, as 
distinct from its "contents”? but on examination it emerges 
that he is making here the same distinction as I make between "facts 
of existence" and "facts of classification” (see p. 4 above). He 
is not using the word form In a way which corresponds to its 
ordinary language meaning. Incidentally our word "idea" comes 
from a Greek word meaning# according to "The Oxford Dictionary 
of Etymology"; "look* semblance, form...”.
with a relationship between them, the end and the beginning simply 
themselves become forms uniting their own ends and beginnings. As 
Polanyi puts it, "the-focal observation of the workings of someonefs 
m^nc* dissolves our knowledge of his mind so that in this sense these 
workings are certainly not his mind. On the other hand a comprehensive 
awareness of these workings constitutes an observation (or reading) 
of the mind, which may appear to/vindicate Professor Ryle, but does 
not in fact do so. For Ryle does not have the concept of subsidiary 
awareness and his identification of the mind with its workings can 
therefore only mean that the two are identical in the usual sense, i.e. 
as focally observed facts, which is false.
It is true that it takes a measurable time to recognise a form; if 
the wheel is revolved beyond a certain spped, I will cease to recognise 
the spokes. But this does not mean that we can dissolve the object of 
conscious awareness into more primitive elements which have a mors basic 
reality. So far as conciousness is concerned, forms are primitive; and 
we must not forget that even the most remote and abstract constructions 
of the human mind, such as the theories of particle physics, ultimately 
derive from the data of consciousness; we have no other access to 
reality.
Predications, however, are not a matter 6f forms only, the synchronic 
element. There is also the diachronic element, a step or transition in 
time by means of which we relate one form (usually a complex form—as-a-
tuhole/built up from other forms) to a second form, and so end up uith a
1. "Personal Knowledge" (Routledge & Kagan Paul 1956, corrected
edition 1962, p. 372. The italics are Polanyi*s.) "Subsidiary 
or instrumental knowledge", as Polanyi points out elsewhere,
"is not known in itself but is known in terms of something
focally known, to the quality of which it contributes, and to 
this extent it is unspecifiable.” Polanyi, unfortunately to 
my mind, did not use the concept of form in this precise 
context, nor did he establish the distinction of synchrony and 
diachrony in the process of the mind*s working. In a sense he 
lacked the terminology to make his arguments as sharp and clear 
as they might have been. He does howaver refer, in the context 
of biological morphogenesis, to "the unspecifiable knowledge of 
true shapes" and mentions in a footnote the "powers of morpho­
genetic integration have long since besn acknowledged by some 
investigators as essentially akin to the powers of comprehension 
to which Gestalt psychology has drawn our attention." (p. 338).
His book is an important one; he had a firm grasp of some 
original and vital ideas*
third. And whereas our synchronic knowledge of the relations between 
the elements of a synchronic form-as-a-whole is implicit and tacit, 
our diachronic awareness of the step of predication is explicit and 
sharply focussed? it is concerned with one binary relationship only, 
and that one expressed in a sequence over time. There can be no 
explicit diachronic awareness without an implicit synchronic awareness, 
nor, conversely, can ihere be any synchronic awareness of forms without 
a diachronic transition. In other uards there is no consciousness 
without a completed predication. By a change of the mind’s focus we 
can bring what was an implicit relationship to sharp awareness as an 
explicit relationship at the centre of attention (as we saw with the 
end and the beginning); but we cannot do so without a certain sea- 
changes what was implicit and synchronic and bound up with other 
relationships here becomes explicit, diachronic and isolated at the apox 
of e predicative hierarchy.
Now the relationships of which we become aware, either explicitly 
or implicitly, ore relationships between forms; and it is my contention 
that these are either spatio-temporal relationships (of which there is 
a finite and relatively restricted range of discriminable types) or 
logical relationships (which again fall into a relatively restricted 
range of typos). Logical relationships depend on classification which 
in turn depends on the mind’s capacity for the generalisation of forms; 
and a class automatically represents a yes/no register of possibility - 
instance or non-instance, 1 or 0. Logical relationships include those 
of equation and resemblance (fundamentally links of classification or 
reclassification), of grouping (e.g. addition;and subtraction, ways of 
taking two numerical classes and arriving at a third) and even causality 
(which in some sense depends on the classification of cause events and 
effects events under a ’beusal form" or hypothesis). A digital computer 
proceeds by steps in time and what it can do is essentially to simulate 
the diachronic steps of mental attention. Sloman has made it clear 
that it is not restricted to simulating logical relationships in the 
narrow sense; by moans of careful specification it can also simulate what 
he calls analogical or diagrammatic, and I call spatio-temporal, 
relationships. But It still proceeds by sequence and rule - a rule, 
it will be recalled, is a restriction on the possibilities of transition -
even though it may be able to accommodate many sequential processes 
going on simultaneously but separately* It can build up a great store 
of information and can handle very complex ideas; but the "idea” at the 
focus of its attention is always the latest transformation "generated" 
by the sequential application of the program of rules to the store of 
digital data? it is the cumulated answer expressed in a digital code, 
not a synchronic complex expressed in a code of forms in space* As 
Sloman points out in a passage already quoted, it may represent images 
in a “two-dimensional" array, but there is no "real” two-dimensional 
object in the computer*
In passing it may be worth emphasising that it is no help to turn 
our attention to an analogue computer, based on the continuous 
fluctuation of a given variable, rather than the alternative of a 
digital computer* In both cases we have two dimensions of possibility, 
that of time and that of the fluctuating or alternating variable? but 
in neither case is there any scope for recognising a complex 
synchronic form in a space? and this is because you need a space of 
more than two dimensions in which to recognise a two-dimensional form.
I have to be distanced from a diagram in a third dimension of depth 
before . ;I can cos it? and I have argued elsewhere that even to hear a 
sound in time we need to bo able to distance it from ourselves In'what 
is effectively a dimension of temporal depth.
On the other hand this "cumulated” answer is very much what the 
conscious mind is left with after a predication is complete. A space 
or a spatio-temporal continuum is essential to predication and hence 
to consciousness (though of course I have taken the view that it is 
a quasi-topological, not a Euclidean or metric space); but as a 
predication is completed the whole complex of the subject elaborated 
by its predicate is collapsed, as it were, into a single complex form, 
which we can best imagine as a superposed wave form, a virtually 
extensionless Fregreen representation of the eubstence-attribute type,
1* In saying that it is virtually extensionless I mean that, like 
a wave, it is defined by sequential change in the value of one 
variable in time? it loses the synchronic nature of a form 
uniting different values simultaneously in a three-dimensional 
space.
but one which is already slipping beyond consciousness into the 
inaccessible store of memory. For consciousnoss cannot reach into 
memory, it can only retrieve a copy, an ’’evoked idea”, from the memory 
store, which is then fitted into a new predication in a new logical 
space.'
As these arguments imply, the complexity of complex forms can bs 
of two types, (i) the superposed (or Fregean) kind, in which attributes 
are superposed without extension on a substantive form, as in a musical 
note overtones are superposed on a fundamental tone; and (ii) the 
organised (or in Sloman’s sense ’’analogical”) kind, in which elements 
©re related in spatio-temporal ways. In consciousness both ere always 
present, in language this is mirrored by the structure of grammar, 
which includes both adjectival superpositions and prepositional clusters. 
In language the central transition between subject and predicate is 
always spread out diachronically to form a sort of binary spatio- 
temporal link; but it can nevertheless represent either a relationship 
of superposition linking substentive and attribute, or a relationship 
of spatio-temporal organisation linking substantives in space and time. 
Once completed, on the other hand, as I have indicated, the predication 
becomes a Fregean complex, superposed but without observable extension, 
like a complex sound wave; and the possibilities or impossibilities of 
further superposition between such complexes are the possibilities and 
impossibilities of propositional logic.
Fundamentally uhat X am saying is that at present the computer 
appears only to be able to reflect reasoning without consciousness; it 
cannot reflect forms in space, it can only specify them by means of 
coordinates. Mo computer can yet create a spatial arena;-; but the 
conscious mind does create such an arena, specifically it thinks in 
space, even if no one can yet understand how this happens. A computer 
thinks diachronically, sequentially, not synchronically, spatially; 
while the mind does both at once. And this relative limitation of tho 
computer, as it seems to me, is one reason why computer scientists find 
it difficult to match the immense flexibility and learning power of the 
mind of even the youngest baby. For by means of forms the mind can 
assemble and present synchronically an astonishing amount of implicit
or "subsidiary” information in a single space of possibility. Only those 
details which are relevant and useful in the context are actually extracted 
nevertheless they are all to hand if needed. Somehow the operation seems 
to remain remarkably economical of effort, since what is not needed is 
not taken out of its implicit, "tacit” state. The computer, on the 
other hand, is tied to diachronic generative processes. It has to 
perform a serial plod around its world, even if it does so at fantastic 
speeds; and it runs into extreme complications over the serial indexing* 
cataloguing and retrieval of information. For all its ultimate power 
and capacity, I do not think that the processes of the digital com­
puter in its present form are likely to be able to model in more then 
partial ways the working of the human/mind. Mor, incidentally, for 
closely related reasons, do I think that Chamskian generative- 
transformational grammars, which are also based on the sequential 
processes of the digital computer, will ever model effectively our use 
of language. But in saying this I am far from donigating the usefulness 
of work on Artificial Intelligence or the value of Aaron Sloman’s book, 
which seems to me of importance not only for the significant degree of
success in explanation which it achieves, but also for the difficulties
1.it encounters and the questions and possibilities which it opens up.
Uhat I think is shown by our consideration of the ideas of FJiller, 
Piaget, Kelly and Sloman, selected somewhat arbitrarily as widely 
contrasting thinkers notable for their interest in constructing broad 
theoretical models of the mind, is that every psychological thinker builds 
or adapts his own tower of theory from which he can survey the terrain 
of interest to him. The areas of interest to different thinkers may 
overlap, but they are seen from different angles and the map that each
1. It is necessary to add hero that recent work on "alternative 
architectures" by Igor Aleksander and others, as reported in 
three articles by Piers Burnett in the "Times" of September 5,
6 and 7, 1903, has resulted in the production of machines based 
on the principle of an artificial "neural net", which have no 
program as such and are/not tied to,the-serial plod.of conventional
machines. Because they can operate in a sense synchronically
they have remarkable powers of pattern recognition ard - perhaps 
still more important by ray criteria - they can identify 
relative degrees of likeness between patterns. This is clearly 
a promising avenue of research which may prove of great value for
the exploration of the mechanisms of the human mind.
man draws is on a somewhat different projection. As a result, even 
when the areas overlap - and often they do not - the maps do not 
closely interlock* The time may come when all these maps will be 
reconciled on a single projections, but that time is still far off. 
Meanwhile here and there patches of experimental rock, precisely 
triangulated by the surveyors* emerge and grow* and are sometimes 
linked up with each other? but there is no way yet of fitting them 
together into a wider* all-embracing frame, We could now proceed to 
climb further towers - Freud’s, or Skinner’s, or Gibson’s or Goffman’ 
or Laing’s or Eysenck’es the list could be indefinitely long. But we 
would not thereby attain to any coherent totality. It is noticeable 
that some of the highest towers with the broadest views are those of 
psychologists of an older generation - a Games or a McDougell - or 
else those of maverick thinkers such as Gregory Bateson, or perhaps 
Arthur Koestler* But the broadest views are not necessarily the most 
relevant. Fly conclusion has to be that I must use my own tower, with 
its own perspective over the terrain in which I em interested, and 
from it I must draw my own map, recognising from the outset its 
inevitable and inherent limitations. In doing so I shall crib-jbyba 
of map from Miller, Piaget and anyone else who seems able to help; 
but if one thing is clear it is that I do not find to my hand any 
suitable product ready-made,
A First Sketch of the Mechanism of Mind
The outline of a model (to be developed further in 
subsequent sections) consisting of a structure, in 
Lihlchwhlohgpgocesses take place in two cycles, a lower- 
order purposive cycle, together carrying out the 
function of regulation on behalf of the organism.
My field of interest is consciousness and the idea of the Self, 
My chief purpose is to arrive, if I can, at clear and distinct ideas 
about them. The tower from which I propose to look over this 
terrain is the general theory of the grammatical structuring of
X* See “Steps to an Ecology of Mind” (1972) and ”Mind and 
Nature” (1979).
conscious life in perception* thought and language developed in the 
three earlier studies to which I have alreedy referred. I will make 
no attempt in the present context to present the steps and arguments 
by which the theory is built up, or even to describe it 6n any detail*
But I will use it as a vantage point from which to set forth in very 
general terms a speculative account of how the mind works. This will 
be ray own idiosyncratic account and much of the area that it covers 
does not seem to be systematically covered by anyone else? but I will 
try to tie it in, so far as I can, to the work of Miller, Piaget, Kelly, 
Neisser, Slotnan and others, and so to connect it with existing maps 
of more familiar territory.
I share with Miller a strong predilection for “concrete systems”, 
that is, systems with units located in space and functioning in time, 
as against “abstracted systems”, which are essentially systematisations 
of abstract classifications (such as traits, instincts, drives or roles)*^ 
This might suggest that I ought to adopt a strictly physiological model; 
but in spite of the remarkable advances achieved by physiological 
psychologists in recent years and the considerable amount of physio­
logical detail into which Miller, for example, goes, it seems to raa still 
entirely impossible to construct s model of the mind in physiological 
terms that is adequate for my present purposes. For the basic elements 
of consciousness that I want to put together are the forms, patterns, 
structures, qualities and intensities of perceptual life and of the 
life of thought end feeling; I want to bring into focus our desires and 
aversions, our purposes, decisions and actions. These are the materials 
of experience Here Wow; and X think it is clear that, although any 
account of them that we construct must take account of what the physio­
logists can tell us, we are not yet in a position to identify precise 
physiological correlates for such elements or for the processes by which 
they are woven together into the stuff of conscious life. At the ©am© 
time X do not want to go in for an exercise in mere classification; I 
era not particularly interested, for example, as Piagot is, in the 
development of intellectual capacities; I want rather to describe mental
1. See the discussion of concrete and abstracted systems in the 
chapter on "Basic Concepts” in Miller’s "Living Systems”. I 
think this distinction probably corresponds at the root to a 
distinction between systems based on what Aaron Sloman would 
call "analogical” and "Fregean" relationships respectively*
actualities* what happens from moment to moment; and to do this I need 
to establish a model with structures consisting of elements at least 
notionally separated and related in space* and serving processes that 
go on within the structure and are related to changes of state in the 
system and subsystems that build it up* Finally the process as a 
whole must be seen to provide for the execution of a specific function 
(that of regulation) on behalf of the organism as a whole.
The model that I propose has three main structural elements*
(i) the sensory apparatus (with receptor and processing subsystems); 
(Xi) the arena of attention or consciousness; and (iii) the memory 
store of mind-manifold* The process (which I identify as the process 
of thinking) consists of two cycles; (I) a lower order predicative cy&e 
and (ii) a higher order purposive cycle* Every completed predicative 
cycle* or predication* finds its place within a purposive cycle of 
predications at a higher level* The predicative cycle consists in the 
first place of information from the environment, including an input of 
information about the internal state of the organism; the recodino and 
integration of this information; and its transmission into the mind- 
manifold; the selective evocation from the manifold of reflections or 
echoes derived from its record of the organism’s previous experience 
(and these include echoes of echoes, producing together a complex 
resonance); and a further procedure of selection and organisation, 
which draws on this resonance and on the recoded sensory input to 
produce a recognition in consciousness of a succession of subjects of 
attention* These subjects are related in space over time to predicates 
Now after Now after Now throughout the organism’s waking (or dreaming) 
life. The predicate in each case represents the ground against which 
the subject* as figure* emerges, the object in relation to which it 
moves (or remains still), the agent which moves (or remains still) 
in relation to the subject* or the complement which is absorbed as an 
elaboration of it* In a grammatically intransitive transition ("the 
blush fades", "the strike continues") the predicate coincides with 
the subject itself at a later stage in time. Both subjects and 
predicates are recognised as forms emerging in various alternative 
kinds of space and infused with qualities and intensities of sensation 
or emotion*
As this suggests, a subject or a predicate, even at its simplest, 
has the complexity of what I have called a "cell" of thought* But in 
practice both subjects and predicates are as a rule much more 
complex than this, consisting of many cells organised together in 
subsystems\and/.sub-sUbjsystems of components” and wholes, while the 
substantive forms at ®ach level may also be elaborated by the super­
position of other forms* The analysis of the different roles and 
relationships involved in this process is the study of accidence 
and syntax* otherwise grammar* It includes not only the roles of 
subjects and predicates themselves, and the relationships of 
predication holding between them, but also the complicated roles and 
relationships that emerge at lower levels* Grammar, as I have argued, 
reflects the structuring of consciousness, both in our use of language 
and also in the processes of perception and thought*
The purposive or regulative cycle is one through jjhich the 
organism idsntifjap goal images, elaborates possible courses for A 
attaining them, chooses between these courses, takes action accordingly, 
and finally monitors the result and assimilates it into thB memory 
store* Every predication forms part of some phase of some purposive 
cycle* The progress of each is related to the progress of the other? 
for the nature and atate of the purposive cycle affects the procedures 
of evocation, selection and organisation that help to determine the nature 
and shape of each predication, while the nature and shape of each 
predication affects the course of the purposive cycle and may lead to 
a switch to a different purposive cycle*
This description may seem complicated, but it gives no more 
than the briefest and sketchiest preliminary account of what is a 
formidably complex process* It purports to do noimore than say very 
crudely what happens in you and me from moment to moment. I may not 
have got it all right, but something roughly on these lines, and 
something certainly not less complicated, is necessary to describe 
what goes on* I shall proceed now to elaborate thB model in some 
degree; but before I do so it may be relevant to make two points, 
first, it is clear that, although there are similarities, a model 
on these lines cannot easily be accommodated to Miller’s three
subsystems of the associator, the memory and the decider, each 
responsible for separate sub-processes? and this is why I think his 
analysis in this respect is inadequate* Secondly, while we may 
tentatively identify physiological structures and processes which 
correspond to certain elements in this description, we are in no 
position to match it all in physiological terms, least of all the arena 
of consciousness where forms infused with qualities and intensities 
emerge in space over time Here Now* How to represent this in any 
model which is itself a formal structure in some kind of space-time 
is © puzzle to which, I suspect, no swift solution is to be found*
Structure and Process (1)
My aim in this section is to establish the terms in 
which I propose to deal with experience, and in 
particular to establish how the mind translates 
continuous diachronic processes into discrete syn­
chronic forms which it can then proceed to store and 
manipulate in various ways*
I shall now try to describe more closely what actually happens 
in the process of experience, as possibilities are evoked, information 
is assembled, courses of action are hypothesised and action is taken*
A living system is constituted by a set of rules or constraints - 
what Miller calls its template, genetic input or charter - which 
largely determines the substantive values of its elements and the 
syntactical values for the relationships between them* (Aft example 
of such e syntactical value Is the relationship of time sequence 
between two musical notes* The counterpart of any syntactical value 
is a pair of values of accidence — in this example ’earlier* and ’later’ 
These rules can however allow for variations between limits of value, 
and all elements and relationships to which this applies can be 
called variables* The variable elements may themselves be subsystems 
which may in turn be composed of sub-subsystems, and so on. The value 
yielded by a variable which is a subsystem, like for example a man’s 
heart, is determined by the state of the subsystem, which is itself a
combination or vector^* of the values of its own variables* Any change 
of value at any level constitutes a change of state at that level end 
at all levels above, including the system level* All values are drawn 
from limited ranges of possibility, and in the case of living systems 
the constitutive rules of each system impose major constraints upon 
the values or combinations of values that are acceptable if the system 
itself is to remain stable* i.e. is not to fall into dissolution.
To put the central point another way, any organism is a living 
self-regulating system, a homeostatic machine which operates in 
interaction with its environment, through behaviour determined by 
information feedback loops, in such a way as to'keep what Ashby calls 
the essential variables between certain critical values* These are the 
values which must not be overstepped if the organism is to grow in 
accordance with its genetic rules to a broadly predetermined form, and 
to maintain this form, within narrow limits of variation, continuously 
in being.
The structure of a system is constituted by the internal spatial 
relationships between its elements at a given time* (Here 1 am using 
the word structure in filler's sense, which corresponds to that of 
ordinary language, not in Piaget*s more esoteric senses) A structure 
must emerge in some kind of space, even if it consists of no more than 
a sequence of dots or dashes* Therefore the values which specify a 
structure at a given time include, as we have seen, syntactical as well 
as substantive values* As Eddington once remarked, ”Ws take as 
building materials relations and relata* The relations unite the 
relata; the relata are the meeting points of the relations. The one 
is unthinkable without the other.n # By definition a particular 
structure is unchanging? if the spatial organisation of the elements 
of a system changes, then we have a new structure. In other words 
the structure of a system reflects the state of the system so far as 
its spatial values are concerned. Any change of state in a system over 
time (affecting any of its variables, not merely spatial ones) 
represents a transformation of that system, tha new state being a transform 
of the old; and any sequence of such transformations is a process.
1. Defined by Ashby as ”a compound entity having a definite number
of components... A vector is essentially a sort of variable, but
more complex than the ordinary numerical variable...*1
2. A.S. Eddington **The Nature of the Piryeacal World” (Cambridge
1930) p. 230.
To examine further what we mean by process let us begin by 
considering an extremely simple system consisting of a lamp post 
carrying three lampholders, one above the other, equipped respectively 
with red, amber and green glasses, and with one lamp in each* The 
spatial distribution of these elements constitutes the structure of 
the system, which is unchanging during the period under consideration* 
The only elements which change in value are the lamps, each of which 
has a repertoire of two alternative values, on and off* Any change 
in the value of any lamp constitutes a change in the state of the 
system, and any series of changes results in a succession of states 
of the system, otherwise a process*
from one point of view every shift in value is a unique event, 
and the process consists of a unique, irreversible succession of 
transformations, which cannot be characterised just because it is 
unique* From another point of view it is possible to detect repeating 
patterns* At the subsystem level the lamps change value in the 
sequence on - off - on - off ad infinitum* There are only two values 
and logical necessity compels this eequence and no other* At the 
system level, even if the lamps change volue at random, the combinations 
of states possible are otill i^ uite restricted in number (eight in all) 
and these eight possible combinations together form a closed repertoire* 
We find ourselves with a structure in Piaget*s sense, na system of 
transformations which possesses laws of its own as a system (in 
contrast to the properties of its elements) and which conserves or 
enriches itself by means of the very action of its transformations***
This system is reversible in the eense that it is always possible to 
go back to one of its earlier states, drawn as they are from a small 
repertoire* Again at the system level, however, we may find that 
the transformations in fact take place under greater constraint* If 
they are British traffic lights, they will use only four of the 
possible eight combinations and they will use them in a fixed 
sequence forming a loop* * The process is repeatable and so in a 
eense reversible*
1* See fcJ. Rose Ashby **An Introduction to Cybernetics” (Methuen
reprint 1964) p* 127#
An important point to notico is that when wo detect repeating 
patterns, we are only able to do so because we are able to break the 
basic irreversible process up into sections which we then consider aa 
wholes, bringing both earlier and later elements into relation 
simultaneously. In other words, as was argued in Chapter I, wo 
extract a limited span of the process as it develops in irreversible 
diachronic time and extend this extract at right angles as it were to 
the diachronic flow, so that it forms a span in a synchronic time 
dimension, recognised as one of the dimensions of an analogical ^ jjaca 
in which we see the patterns as trajectories# The sequence in time 
becomes a configuration or form in a synchronic space-time# Without 
this wa should be buried in the diachronic flow, we should not be able 
to look either backwards or forwards, and therefore we should not be 
able to recognise anything at all as extended in time# Apart from 
this it remains true that every new state is unique# It is the same 
as a previous state only as a matter of classifications because it is 
an instance, though a different instance, of the same class as the 
previous state# Without classification there would be no link, and 
no sense in dividing up the irreversible flow or effective means of 
doing so#^*
In the present context what is significant is that in order to 
recognise anything of what is going on we have to take a copy of it 
and develop it, as it were, in the analogical space. It is not the 
original process, for that is irreversible and still goes on 
diachronically as we look at our synchronic patterns# Once more we 
are back with the schemata which, according to Neieser and Piaget, have 
to be matched to the input and are then modified in the process of 
assimilation/accommodation, otherwise adaptation# The original process 
is in a wider perspective the trajectory of the system (here the lamp 
standard) in physical space-time# Uhat then is the copy? In soma 
sense a series of transformations occurring temporally has been trans­
lated into a form. But to what structure in physical terms does this 
form correspond? If we regard it as information, what is its marker?
1# Kelly refers to this point in his Construction Corollarys ”A person 
anticipates event© by construing their replications.” He goes 
on to remark thats ”only when a man attunes his ear to recurrent 
themes in the monotonous flow does his universe begin to make 
sense for him#" (”A Theory of Personality” p. 52).
A transformation has to be of something; at least in our normal 
experience that is so and the principle of parsimony requires that 
we stay with that assumption unless and until we are pushed off it*
I shall not try to deal with this question conclusively at the 
present stage; but I shall assert provisionally that wa are dealing 
with a form, which 1 shall call a logical form or idea, emerging in a 
flexible, multi-dimensional space* We can also say that it is more 
generalised then the actual diachronic process, to wiich it Is 
accommodated in what I have called a cap-fitting relationship; and we 
can say further, though perhaps more tentatively, that it must be a 
negative, a reversal of the positive initial form, as the concave form 
of the cap reverses the convex form of the head. (But in this 
connection we have to note that if we use the alternative image of 
tuning one wave form to another, this necessity can be avoided.) It 
is a synchronic form, a recoding of a span of the process of experience 
in time as a generalised configuration in space.^* Uhat is most 
important about it is that it can be stored and brought out again to 
make possible the identification of a second instance of the form, 
otherwise of the class which as a generalised paradigm the form defines 
end identifies# This brings ue to the threshold of the phenomenon of 
memory| but, before we try to deal with memory, we need to develop a 
little further our ideas about what it is that we remember. The model 
of the traffic lights has been useful in helping us to establish necessary 
definitions and distinctions, but it Is too simple to reflect adequately 
the process of experience which we have In mind#
The Hierarchies of Process
An attempt to chow how we come to grasp the unique 
unrepeatable process of living by matching it with 
models built from repeatable elements which are 
essentially classifications derived from past experience.
Let us now go back a few steps# Any morganism possesses in store,
1. Cf. the phrase ”a flattening of the past into the present” used 
by D#R# Hofstadter end D#C. Dennett in ”The Mind's I”
(Harvester 1981#).
through genetic inheritance or learning or a combination of the two, 
a number of repeatable processes ouch as digesting, breathing, grasping, 
pulling, talking and so on, which are reversible in the sense that they 
are built into loops such that the organism, after completing a given 
process, can return by another process to the state in which it was 
before it started* Some of these processes, like those which control 
the digestion or the level of blood sugar, are not perceptible to a 
normal observer; but many others are perceptible to observers, including 
in appropriate cases, the conscious organism itself; and these we 
normally call acts or, with longer sequences, routines of behaviour. 
However, as us have just seen, no act of speech or locomotion or even 
digestion is quite identical with any previous act, and no state of the 
organism is quite identical with any previous state, if only because It 
happens at a different time from its predecessor. As Heraclitus 
remarked, KYou cannot step twice into the same river; for fresh waters 
are ever flowing In upon you”. When wa say that the state of an organism 
is the same as it was before, we mean more precisely that its new state 
is an instance of the seme class of states as the preceding one. Thus 
from one point of view all the successive states of an organism are 
aspects of one unique sequence, even though many of Its states will be 
similar to preceding states.
Next we may note that the states of the matter-energy processing 
subsystems of the organism, together with the information feedbacks 
which specifically control them, are typically always instances of a 
quite limited number of possible classes of states. Our repertoire 
of classes?of arm movements is considerable but nevertheless far from 
infinite, and all our arm movements, in whatever context at whatever 
time they occur, fall within this repertoire. Even our repertoire of 
words and idioms is limited, and much more so our repertoire of patterns 
of grammatical construction; so that ell our utterances can be said to 
be examples of repeatable processes. So again, a Piaget would argue, 
with the basic logico-mathemetical structures uhich we apply to the 
codification of experience and to the logical transformation and 
interrelation of the coded messages which result.
On the other hand individual instencss of repeatable processes are
in reality, as ye have already seen, not exietentially identical with 
other instances of the classes to which they belong? each actual 
instance is in fact unique and part of a unique irreversible process 
which is the unfolding of the lifetime; of the organism as it interacts 
with the unfolding of the environment around it* We can register this 
uniqueness by saying that it occurs at one time and place and no 
other? but this is another way of saying that it fits at a particular 
point into a wider spatio-temporal sequence,'*’ which in turn we take to 
be part of the unique sequence of nature or creation in universal space 
and historic time* We take all nature to be one sequence basically as 
a corollary of the feet that we have ell acquired as one of the 
interpretative structures, the logical constraints, with which we order 
our experience the rule that two things cannot be in the same place at 
once? or more precisely that any two observed things or events can always 
be related to each other in space or time or both* This recognition 
leads to the establishment by each of us bf a cognitive map of the 
world in time on which all things and events can potentially be 
mutually related* Significantly it is a quasi-topological map on 
which I can relate today with 1066 A.D* as easily as with yesterday,
2.
and this house to a house in China as well as to the house next door.
Here we can make a connection with our earlier discussion of 
information and behaviour in Chapter I, where we noted that the 
acquisition of information was always the acquisition of a particular 
form drawn from a limited range of possibilities? and that this range 
would characteristically consist either of a restricted repertoire or 
of a store to which forms learned in the course of experience could 
be added successively, without any practical limit of store capacity* 
Correspondingly behaviour consisted of actions or sequences of actions 
(routines) drawn in every case from a similar repertoire or store, life 
can now see that this earlier account was incomplete, since it deelt 
essentially with the repeatable processes, and not with the 
irreversible ones# And we can also see now that the link between the 
two kinds of process appears to be hierarchical* In effect we use 
instances of repeatable processes (like the sound of an oboe) as
1* X am using the word sequence here to cover spatial ©s well as 
temporal ordering and neighbourhood.
2. The acquisition of such a mop appears to be of great importance 
in the development of the individual human mind, since a location 
on this map would seem to be what distinguishes the real from the 
imaginary.
building blocks of information with which to construct our one-off 
models of unique actuality (like the sound of this particular 
performance of Beethovens Fifth Symphony)? and correspondingly we use 
instances of repeatable processes (like the walking movements of our 
bodies) as building blocks with which to construct efbique, one-off 
instances of behaviour (like ray walk to the station this morning)*
There can be several levels in this hierarchy* When I look out 
of the window, every cell of ray complex perception consists of an 
area of colour enclosed by a container form. (Whenever I distinguish 
two different colours I am dealing with two different cells.) There 
is nothing unique about these colours which are drawn from a com­
paratively small repertoire? nor is there anything unique about the 
basic shapes or outlines that I perceive? indeed it is arguable that 
the basic elements of form in visual perception are only (i) straight 
lines and planes at various angles of tilt, and (ii) curved outlines 
or surfaces - i.e. segments of circles or spheres - at various levels 
of magnification and resolution* But even at the cell level the 
container forms of cells are much more complex than this, because they 
consist of basic forms fitted together in continuous sequence to build 
up cumulative forms of greater particularity - like, for example, the 
shape of an oak leaf. Yet, as this example shows, we can learn and 
classify these cumulated shapes, just as we can learn and classify 
melodies, which are cumulated shapes of e particular kind extended in 
time? and when we recognise them ws identify them as instances of 
classes, not (or not merely) as unique, one-off forms encountered for 
the first and only time in our lives.
At a higher level still, however, we reach forms constructed 
uniquely for this occasion of perception. I may have the capacity to 
recognise tiger lilies and oak trees and oeveral different varieties 
of rose? and particular different components of my perception as I 
look out of the window may be identified as instances of these classes; 
but there is no doubt in ray mind that the whole complex system in frnt 
of ray eyes is a unique garden recognised on a unique occasion in time.
I may still recognise it as an instance of the class of gardens, but
it is a unique instance anchored in a unique feature of the cognitive 
map extending in both space and time. Grammatically, to recall a 
point made in Chapter I, it is definitely, not indefinitely, designated* 
Although my recognition is of synchronic values in space, it must occur 
over a span of time, and consequently it is the recognition of a process, 
not of mere form end colour, even if there is no wind and every leaf is 
still? and as a process it is in the irreversible category.
A similar analysis could be made of the way in which ue compose 
or understand a sentence* We take standard, re-usable words, idioms 
and grammatical structures — sometimes even standardised sentences — 
which are not unique, to build up particular sentences or sequences of 
sentences which are unique to an occasion and part of the irreversible 
process of the unfolding of life* Or rather, as I would prefer to say, 
wo take the already learned and standardised logical forms which are 
the correlates of words or word-groupo and put them together, with 
the aid of standardised templates that correlate with the cues of 
accidence and syntax, to build up new and unique complex logical forms 
which are the correlates of sentences*
The uniqueness in both cases, we may note, lies not only in the 
fact that the process in question is anchored in the wider process of 
the irreversible unfolding of life, but also in the fact that repeatable 
processes, whether innate or learned, are always relatively short or 
spatially simple* Western music, for example, does not ordinarily 
use tunes more than 16, or at most 32, bars long; and even then the 
longer tunes usually incorporate several repetitive features which aid 
our memory* But our simpler cognitions, like our simpler actions, are 
usually part of much longer, or spatially more extensive or complex, 
sequences. As soon os we take the longer or wider span we end up with 
a process which is unrepeatably unique as a combination of elements, 
even when the elements themselves are familiar*There may be
1. Uilliem 3ames drew attention to this point, making a comparison 
with wave-crests in the sea. ^Uhat can hardly come twice is an 
identical combination of wave forms with all their crests and 
Hollows reoccupying identical places, for such a total com­
bination as this Is the analogue of the brain-state to which 
our consciousness at any moment is due.” (,}The Principles of 
Psychology”, ffiacmillan 1891, Vol.1, p. 235).
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nothing unique about uhat I see when I glance briefly out of my window 
at a familiar view. But as soon as I spend half a minute looking 
carefully at the various elements in my field of vision as they are 
related together, or as soon as I link what I saw in that glance with 
what was at the focus of my consciousness over a brief span before 
and afterwards, I arrive quickly enough at an unrepeatably complex 
combination, a process which I have never experienced before end will 
never experience again. Characteristically my mind is using classi­
fications to construe, once off, the unclassifiable.
that what we are talking about is the very process of thinking, the basic 
activity of the mind, process within process, repeatable within 
unrepeatable. But in describing it thus, merely as a sequence of events, 
we have still not dealt with the aspect of information as actuality
Process and Possibility
In this section I examine how our grasp of experience 
reflects thB passing of information and thus the 
resolution of limited possibility into actuality.
We have said that from one point of view all of a men*8 life is a 
single unrepeatable, essentially indivisible process. But if we look
at it in this way, or indeed if we look at a single day*s or “hour’s 
experience in this way, we gain little information. For, aa we have 
already seen, to receive information requires more than a mere input of 
experience, it requires the mind to produce some format of limited 
possibility within which the specific actuality can be caught; and even 
then we never quite catch the actuality in itself} rather we select, 
organise and construe from the input coded representations or models of 
reality; we build facts.V- literally ’made things’ - about reality. It 
is in a sense artificial to ’’carve timen - or space — “at ths joints". 
Yet our argument has suggested that it is essential if we are to grasp 
anything of the world. I can think of a day’s or a life’s experience 
as a whole, but only by delimiting its beginning and end, vastly 
generalising all the detail in between , building a vague model out of
asked, do I labour these matters so? The reason is
emerging from possibility. To this I now turn
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uhat remains, and recognising the form—as—a—uihole that results against 
the background of an even more general, but still limited range of 
possible similarity# I cannot catch the continuous input to the life,
I have to break it up in order to reconstruct it. And the same is 
true even of my experience Here Now# After all, my realisation a 
moment ago, such as it uas, of a lifetime*e experience as a whole, was 
itself a realisation Here How#
Insofaraas the mind is able to grasp highly complex perceptions
. ■  - V  ■
or ideas it does so by following a progression of perceptions or a train 
of thoughts which is continuous in space or time; it generalises the 
earlier parts of the experience as it goes, building them into the later, 
until the final experience reflects a unified grasp of the whole# Thus 
I can walk round a cathedral, taking in a series of visual perspectives, 
until finally I grasp a unified impression of the whole, fitting 
generalised recollections of what I saw at each step into a generalised 
spatial framework built up from the superimposition and logical 
reconciliation of groups of preceding impressions. So too I can read 
a book, building up and generalising logical forms, sentence by sentence, 
paragraph by paragraph, chapter by chapter, until I arrive at a final 
impression of what I have read. Igain, in listening to a symphony, I 
follow a similar procedure until the whole experience is somehow 
resumed in the final cadence* The process is certainly hierarchical, 
as we can see if us imagine reading a book with no paragraph or chapter 
divisionss this is a daunting prospect, because we get no help in 
creating the hierarchical structure that is necessary if we are to 
grasp the whole, and we have therefore to face the task of establishing 
it for ourselves as we go along#
It is significant that generalisation is an important factor at 
every step in this process; for the mind’o capacity to absorb 
information in any one gulp, or predication, remains limited; we have 
to generalise if we are to grasp very complicated uholes and the mind's 
capacity and flexibility in generalising is one of its most remarkable 
attributes. At the same time memory may enable us to track back and 
recall individual "frames'* of a prolonged experience with a good deal 
of particularity, all the more so if there is a permanent record in
the shape of a book or tape-recording or picture to help us.
3ust as the actuality of our experience has to be divided up and 
reconstructed before we can grasp it, so too with the moving penumbra 
of possibility against which the actuality emerges, Ue recognise 
successive actualities (or rather our ouin representations of them) 
without any conscious awareness of the successive ranges of 
possibility within which they emerge. Yet both are needed if we are 
to move from blind, endless process towards information and meaning.
And just as the actualities are structured in hierarchy and 
extension, so too are the ranges of possibility.
Ue can think of the latter as falling broadly into four categories: 
first those basic registers of possible discrimination (for example: 
the registers of colour end taste) which are innate in us as part of 
our sensory apparatus, though they may perhaps be in some degree 
adjusted and calibrated through experience; secondly, those more 
complex patterns of sensory values extended sequentially in space or 
time which we have learnt to know through experience (for example 
familiar movements of the body, or tunes, or familiar shapes like 
those of spoons or oakleaves or Rolls Royce radiators); thirdly, 
more abstract ideas or procedures which we have learnt to know through 
experience and which we normally identify through individual signs 
or symbols, in particular through words (for example =,
forgetfulness, chaos, insofar as, politics, exploration?; and fourthly 
the complex unrepeatable ranges of possibility evoked as the 
accompaniment of complex unrepeatable sequences of experience. Ue may 
note that the first three categories are all relatively simple 
classifications - which is what we would expect if, as was suggested 
on an earlier page, the actuality is to the possibility as the instance 
is to the class. The fourth category is one of complex ad hoc 
combinations of possibility against which we recognise complex ad hoc 
combinations of elements of actuality.
All combinations of possibility are subject to the constraints 
of general necessity: and these take three forms: the rules of general 
grammar (as distinct from the additional grammatical rules idiosyncratic
to particular languages), the rules of logic and the laws of nature.
To begin with the rules of general grammar, these, as I see the 
matter, are the rules by which we put together - and must put 
together - the predicative systems through which we assimilate or 
express reality# Traditionally grammar is divided into accidence 
and syntax, the former specifying the roles which components can play 
in different possible relationships, while the latter specifies the 
relationships themselves# The role is the relationship as it affects 
the component - it is the accidence of the component# Correspondingly 
the relationship is the pair of roles as they fit together — the 
distinctive syntax of their conjunction. Every predication hinges 
upon the relationship between subject and predicate which is a 
transition recognised in real time, while other subordinate relation­
ships between the subcomponents build up the subject and predicate 
themselves. On this view the logical forms which are built up through 
the process of predication are multi-dimensional and much of the 
diverse complexity of the grammars of our languages is due to the 
fact that words are spoken and written in c one-dimensional, linear 
order; the grammar has to be capable of specifying how components
delivered in a linear order are to be reassembled in a multi-dimensional 
1#syntactical order.
The rules of general grammar are those by which;we build up 
complex forms, not merely with words but in other ways# They could 
be said to include the grammar or logic of perception, by which I 
mean the rules of category and combination under which we perceive 
the world; for example the limitation of the number of channels of 
sense perception and of the scope of each; the necessity for hue and 
brightness to occur together; the impossibility of perceiving a 
pitched note as having a taste, but the necessity that it must have 
e certain timbre; thB fact that attention cannot move backwards in 
perceived (as distinct from remembered) time, though it can move 
both left and right in perceived space; and co on. These constraints, 
to which I have referred already in Chapter I, are so obvious that we 
take them for granted in spite of their arbitrary nature, end hardly
1. This is to some extent a controversial view of grammar. I
have argued the case for it In detail in "The Grammar of
Language".
give them a thought* Beyond the logic of perception, however* there 
is the deductive logic of classification, grounded in what Locke 
called ”the similitude of things”, defining the ways in which ue can 
classify the features of the world, identify instances of the classes 
ue thus create, and link classes or instances together by processes of 
re-classification and redesignation*finally there is the logic of 
cause and effect, by which we recognise how possibility is pre-empted 
by historic and present actuality, and how this both creates and 
constrains the scope of future possibility*
These various constraints define the total envelope of possibility 
within which, by a process that ue have yet to analyse in detail, a 
moving penumbra of possibility is evoked during consciousness, to 
provide the background against which actuality can be recognised, 
information can be passed. I shall not attempt to discuss or argua these 
complex matters in any detail here; it is sufficient in the present 
context to indicate broadly what I mean by combinations of possibility, 
without attempting to set forth and justify a particular account of 
their nature and ramifications. At this point, having given some 
initial account of the process of experience, we can return to the 
question of how knowledge that has been gained from past experience 
is stored, retrieved and used in the present.
The flind-Hanifold
In this section I attempt to identify some of the 
characteristics of the mind’s memory store.
We begin with Ideas, which we have identified as forms "equilibrated”, 
to use Piaget’s word, through the interactions of input and schema.
They are images of bits of the irreversible diachronic flow of 
experience which are floated off, as it were, into a kind of limbo 
where ue build thsm into predications, and so become conscious of 
them. Ue have not identified the physical markers on which they are 
borne, but our provisional assumption is that there must be such
1. The characteristic step of reclassification is a link of
resemblance, the characteristic step of redosignation is a 
link of addition or subtraction. The issue of the relation­
ship betosen grammar and logic is d&scuased in considerably 
more detail in the opening chapter of ”The Grammar of Language”.
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markers.
It is reasonable to assume that the central events described take 
place in the brain. The external experience of the organism, however, 
is monitored by sense receptors elsewhere in the body and translated 
into the on-off digital signal codes of innumerable neurones feeding 
ultimately into the brain. The whole central nervous system represents 
a vastly complex process of sub-procsssos and sub-sub-processes and so 
on, going on simultaneously, so that to describe the state of the 
system at one time by the state of its variables would be a task of 
fantastic immensity. Over time the whole is a j|nique procession of 
multitudinous unique events in an irreversible complex flow. As 
Sehrodinger emphasised* nThe world is given only once. Nothing is 
mirrored.*^* But the relation and classification of bits of tti^ 
flow begins at the sensory receptors themselves and continues at many 
intermediary processing levels. Every neurone firing is in Miller’s 
sense a decision, and every decision, as we have seen, requires the 
matching of an input to a schema end of the schema to an output? that 
is to say, it links information to behaviour, as in the case of the 
mimosa leaf.
In a sense this might seem already to involve memory, the storage 
of the schema as one state of the system, a state which is part of a 
closed repertoire, a loop of possible states? but this is memory locally 
inbuilt into the system itself, it follows from the constitutive rules 
of the system which is (for example) the mimosa leaf; nothing is 
copied and floated off elsewhere, nothing is retrieved. In fact it 
is not memory as we think of the word, since there is no link between 
one repetition and the next. So far as the system is concerned, each 
event is a unique succession of unique states? and this is true even 
of highly complicated activities so long as they are genetically, 
determined and involve no learning. They draw on a memory encapsulated 
in the gene pattern, but it is a race memory (if such a ptorase is 
permissible), it is nothing to do with memory of the organism’s own 
life.
1* ”0n the Peculiarity of the Scientific World View® in MU!hat is Life?
and Other Scientific Essarys*1 (New York: Ooubleday Anchor Books
1956, p. 225).
As soon as wo come to learning, however, it ie clearly necessary 
in some way to float off images of bits of experience (or patterns in 
some way derived from them), to store these somehow and to retro, ©ys them 
somehow when they become relevant# These are the processes ue now have 
to investigate, the reading of information into memory and its subsequent 
retrieval#
To begin with, can we say anything more about uhat these ideas 
are? My suggestion is that we roust assume they arc synchronic forms 
of a quasi-topological nature - that is, forms accommodating a certain 
amount of flexibility, a certain range of generalisation, like 
Berkeley’s general inconsistent idea of e triangle — emerging in a 
quasi-topological space which is flexible even as to the number of 
dimensions it uses (for we can think alternatively in two, three or 
four dimensions)# It follows that they are entirely non-parceptual 
and that they represent classes rather than instances of anything.
The idea is the schema not the actuality, though it is the schema as 
modified by accommodation to the actuality. Moreover, being a quasi- 
topological schema, it is normally more general, less detailed, than 
the actuality it reflects. This still leaves us with formidable 
qusstion marks. How are ideas physically embodied? Where is this 
topological space to be located? How can ue think of anything which 
is a class, not an instance? But for the moment I shall leave these 
questions aside. Let us consider first what us do with such ideas.
One thing us do with them is to choose them. Before indeed 
they are even formed or conceived, there has to be a severe process of 
selection. If every step of the process of experience and every 
possible span ("chunk”) or combination of these same steps was copied 
and recorded as a detachable unit, the amount of information in ©tore 
would rise rapidly towards infinity. Basically however we remember 
only the ideas to which wa pay attention; we pay attention only to 
those ideas which are built into predications; and wo build into 
predications only ideas which are relevant to one stage or another 
of the purposive cycles of our thinking* But once an idea is built 
into a predication, as the form of the completed predication as a 
whole, or of the subject, or of the predicate, or of identified components
of either, then it seems that it will bo remembered. Even after this, 
however, there is a further severe process of selection, because there 
is no lack of evidence for a short term memory which is relatively 
comprehensive but soon fades, while only an excerpt from it eventually 
reaches a longer term memory store.
A great deal of experimental work has been done on the physio­
logical and other aspects of memory, which is reviewed in some detail 
by Miller in "Living Systems". It has been suggested that short term 
memory involves storage in large protein molecules; but the field is 
still controversial and speculative. My aim here is not to begin from 
the experimental end, but rather, with a due awareness of the 
experimental evidence, from the functional end; that is, to establish 
a view of the way in which the mind works as a whole in regulating the 
organism, and to derive the structure of a model of the mind from the 
functions to ba performed.
How then are idoas, which I conceive as synchronic logical forms, 
likely to be stored? Clearly in ouch a way that they can be identified 
and retrieved. How then do ue identify particular things or events in 
the real world (i.e. anchored, definitely designated ideas)? The 
answer is by locating them uniquely in a physical space and historic 
time by reference to other uniquely located things and events. How 
do we identify general ideas (i.e. those which are not uniquely located, 
those which are indefinitely designated)? The answer is by classifying 
them, saying what they are like, identifying classes of which they 
©re instances. The grammatical rules of definite and indefinite 
designation mentioned in Chapter I seem in fact to be connected with 
the two basic ways in which we identify ideas in order to think about 
them..
The possibility of definite designation seems to imply that forms 
corresponding to all uniquely located things and events are spread out 
in a single quasi-topological cognitive map extending in time as well 
as space. Uo cannot envisage tho map as a whole except perhaps when 
we are thinking on a cosmic scale, but when we locate any individual 
thing or event, like the French Revolution or the nearest service station
or New York or my child’s birthday or the apple tree in the garden, we 
do so by reference to other located things or events, including always 
the eventual reference point Me Here Now; and the relationships involved 
are those of sequential order or neighbourhood; directions and relative 
distance in space or time.
To identify even a particularl located thing however we need to 
know not only where it is, but uhat it is; we have to classify it as 
well. So if the memory must include a cognitive map, it must also 
include some way of registering classes or ideas. Indeed, as we saw 
earlier, every definite designation has to be superimposed on an 
indefinite numerical designation, even if it is no more than the 
classification of what ue are thinking about as either singular or 
plural. The difficulty here is that any one thing that we think about 
may be classified in several different ways - often, as in the case of 
an idea like ’’man” or "city” or "complication”, in an inmense variety of 
different ways. Ue can discover a principle of order in this field of 
classification in the fact that every class can be recognised as 
belonging to a wider, more general clas3, and that again to a still 
wider class, in a hierarchy extending, in Locke’s phrase quoted earlier, 
"body, substance and at last to being, thing and such universal terms 
which stand for any of our ideas whatsoever." "Object”, "idea”, "event", 
"relationship", "singular”, "plural”, "form”, "quality", "intensity”; 
these are perhaps the most general categories under which all ideas can 
ultimately be subsumed. Nevertheless the hierarchies of generality1 are 
not sufficient as a means of ordering our ideas, mainly because the 
substantive ideas which are the elements from which wa start in any 
occasion of thought are normally themselves classifiable in several 
different ways simultaneously,. t .
To investigate these phenomena in detail would lead us deep into 
grammar. But for present purposes it may be sufficient to say that an 
idea can be complex because it is a superposition or because it is an 
organisation of different forms. The first type we can describe as
an adjectival superposition, because if we dissect it in words we end
1. These are the "ladders" of Hinkle’s development of Kelly's
theory of personal constructs.
up with a series of adjectives qualifying a noun - qualifying it, not 
composing together with it, as parts, some larger whole. It is 
reflected in music by any tuned note, which is always a superposition 
of overtones from the harmonic series upon a fundamental tone. The 
second type we can describe as an organisation or configuration of 
different forms. It is represented,for example, in music by a melodic 
phrase, and in language by any cluster of words linked by a preposition, 
a conjunction or a verb. It is of the nature of any form that from one 
view (as it were from above) it is an undivided synchronic unity, while 
from another view (as it were from below) it is analysable into 
constituent forms — at least until we reach the very highest level of 
generality already mentioned. It is analysable, as we have suggested, 
sometimes into a superposition of other forms, sometimes into an 
organisation of other forms. Every predication in our experience is 
by definition an organised form or configuration; but some of the 
elements from which it is organised will themselves be analysable as 
superpositions or subordinate organisations; and the predication itself, 
when it is onee completed, will be recognised as a single complex form. 
The process of predication is essentially that of assembling such a 
form, which can then be remembered as a single whole. For example if 
you read the sentence "You can lead a horse to the water but you cannot 
make him drink", you can in retrospect hold it in mind as a single form, 
and you can then refer to it at the beginning of the next sentence with 
a single pronoun: "This...".
We do not remember all the predications of our experience, owing 
to the mechanisms of selection which we considered earlier. But what 
we do remember often consists characteristically of complex forms 
representing organisations and superpositions of experience - the events 
we live through, the actions we take or are taken by others, bits of 
the panorama of the world. And my proposal is that fundamentally the 
way in which our indefinitely designated ideas are ordered in the 
mental storehouse is that they form idaa-complexes built up by the 
accretion of ideas derived from experience which fit on to each other 
because they are similar to each other.
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Now ideas can be similar to each other in three different ways.
0n8 idea as a whole may be similar to another as a whole - in the way 
in which a football is similar to an orggge or to the round earth. Or 
{aart of one idea may correspond to a part of another idea, as all 
houses with flat roofs, or all conditional clauses, are similar to each 
other. Or part of one idea may correspond to the whole of another 
idGas as part of the idea of a university corresponds to the idea of 
teaching. What this means is that the ideas brought together by 
accretion in one idea complex may themselves be very different from 
one another, and some of them may import a whole variety of apparently 
extraneous ideas as components into the mixture. Any one idea added 
to the accretion will always be similar in a significant way to at 
least one of the ideas already there, but the effect of this process 
is that the same idea-complex may include widely different component 
ideas within its family - even though ultimately some indirect link 
can always in principle be traced between them. Thus the idea of 
running, which is rooted in the reciprocal motion of a man’s legs, can 
without difficulty be made to accommodate within its complex the rapid 
rotary motion of a steam turbine, completely different though this 
motion is.
It follows thfct as a result of this effect the number of idea 
complexes iddntifiable as separate main features of the mental store- 
house can be kept relatively within bounds, but each individual-4dea- 
complex is liable to be of a seemingly unmanageable complication and 
heterogeneity. How, then, can such complexes ba ordered? Fly 
suggestion at this point is that broadly the idea-complexes in any 
human being’s mind correspond to the separately identifiable signs and 
symbols - especially words and standardised constructions or word 
groups - in every symbolic language or code known to him.1. They are
1. As so often, we find that William Dames has been here ahead of us,
though, again as so often, without developing the implications of 
his insight in detailed ways. "In short, the only things which we 
commonly see are those which we prepsrceive", (He is referring 
here to ’anticipatory schemata', though he did not use this 
terminology) "and the only things we preperceive are those which
have been labelled forms, end the labels stamped on our mind*
If we lost our stock of labels we should be intellectually lost 
in the midst of the world." (Principles of Psychology",
Flacmillan 1891, Vol. 1, p.444).
ordered by means of this vocabulary; indeed the vocabulary exists for the 
purpose of ordering them and so making ideas retrievable.
In the upshot therefore I find myself envisaging the mental store- 
house as an immense manifold (to use a Kantian word ), a terrain shaped 
by the impact of experience throughout our entire life, with identifiable 
main features which are themselves complex agglomerations of lesser 
features. Our knowledge is ordered on this manifold in two ways; under 
known markers in a sort of internalised map of universal space and time, 
which is topological in the sense that distances and angles, though 
represented, are adjustable to the relativities of the occasion; and 
under known signs and symbols in the codes or langugges with which we 
are acquainted. Thus our knowledge (as we saw in ah earlier context) 
consists of facts of existence and facts of classification. Without 
jumping to misleading physiological conclusions it is fair to draw 
attention to the analogy of the extensive, many-folded cerebral 
cortex, divided as it is into two hemispheres, one predominantly 
concerned with abstract linguistic cognitions and coordinations, and 
one predominantly concerned with physical cognitions and coordinations.
This picture of the mind-manifold brings together, I believe, some 
of the elements which must find a place in any model of the way in 
which the mind makes use of memory. But it is still a long way from 
explaining how the model can work, how this more or less static 
structure can be involved in the living process of thought. In the 
next section I will turn from structure to process and try to suggest 
how this may happen.
1. There are certain limits to the number of symbols the mind can 
store, which may bear some relation to the number of words in a 
normal person's vocabulary. So far as particular hierarchical 
groupings or ranges of classifications are concerned, Levi—
Strauss comments that "in the present state of knowledge the 
figure 2000 seems to correspond, as an order of magnitude, to
a sort of limit in the neighbourhood of which are located the 
capacity of memory and the power of definition ofthB ethno- 
zoologies and ethno-botanies" (i.e. the numbers of known r/ 
animals and plants) "founded on oral tradition". ("La Pensee 
Sauvage", Plan 1960, p. 203).
2. See the opening section "Of the Possibility of the Manifold 
Representations given by Sense" in Section II of Part 2 of 
"The Critique of Pure Reason”.
The Resonance of Association
A discussion of the way in which items may be added to
memory and recalled from it.
According to our model discrete logical forms or ideas, derived 
from predicative systems at the focus of consciousness, are in soma 
way transmitted so that they make an impact on the mind-manifold and, 
in at least a proportion of cases, make a lasting change In it by adding 
new features or by adding accretions to existing features* Conversely, 
when further predications are being constructed at the focus of 
consciousness logical forms or ideas are evoked in some way from the 
manifold to contribute to the new predications. How can we describe 
this process of accretion and evocation? The most obvious analogy is 
that of some kind of resonance. Uhat I am suggesting is that as we 
move through our waking life the ideas floated off from our experience 
sweep across the manifold and awaken a multitude of reflections, the 
resonance of association.
The manifold can perhaps broadly be compared to a holographic 
fixation of wave-forms in a complex superposition; thus the reflections 
evoked from it are themselves forme, ideas. As the original form - 
itself a copy of experience floated off from the irreversible flow - 
crosses the manifold, it wakes into sympathetic vibration ell sorts 
of forms in the manifold which are similar to it, in whole or in 
part? thereby it stimulates the features (whether of the cognitive 
map or of the symbolic ordering) to which these forms belong, and 
consequently evokes a response — a new form added to the resonance — 
from all these features. Thus to the reflections floated off from 
the input of experience are added reflections from the manifold,and 
then reflections of reflections in an immensely complicated synchronic 
resonance, constantly changing its character and intensity, not by steps 
jDut by an endless shifting in the blend, as new strands are added 
and old ones die away. (Anyone who has heard Tallis's prodigy, the 
40-part motet ”Spem in Alium”, will perhaps understand the analogy 
that I am invoking.) Meanwhile the features of the manifold them­
selves that have been affected by the impact of new or reflected forms
are liable to permanent change as a result, whether through the 
addition of something new, or through the reinforcement or negation 
of something already there.
This picture does not result in any model of coherent thinking 
processes, rather it is a model of a confused shifting roar. To deal 
with coherent thinking we need to undertake some further construction. 
But before coming to that it may be helpful to draw out a few 
additional points about this initial process of retrieval or 
association. First we may note that there are two kinds of links 
between ideas, those of direct similarity of form, and those of 
association in some past conjuncture: links of resemblance and links 
of organisation. ’ I am reminded of the moon by this bicycle wheel 
because there is a formal similarity between them, they are alike in 
being round. But the moon in turn reminds me of Cape Canaveral, not 
because they are like each other, but because they have been associated 
in past conjunctures in my mind. To put it more precisely, there is a 
link of organisation between them because the geographical feature 
Cape Canaveral has been associated previously in my mind with rocket 
flights to the moon, and is thus indirectly linked with the idea of 
the moon itself because both are components of another idea-complex 
concerning rocket flights.
This example also illustrates the close relationship between the 
ideas located on the cognitive map (which are themselves classifications) 
and the idea-complexes of the symbolic ordering. The ideas on the 
cognitive map are made unique by their location; but as ws grasp them 
they are not unique in themselves, for we float off copies of them, 
images, when we need to do so. Ue cannot know anything by its space- 
time location alone; we still want to know what it is, how it is to be 
classified. Even proper names are uniqus only in a special sense; as 
Levi-Strauss has argued, they define a class beyond which "on ne fait 
plus rien que montrer" , a class which in this context has only one
1. These correspond to what Levi-Strauss calls relationships of 
homology and relationships of contiguity (e.g. "La Pensee 
Sauvage", p.288). Correspondingly William 3ames speaks of 
association by similarity and association by contiguity.
2. See the chapter "L*Individu comme Espsce" in "La Pensee 
Sauvage" (Plon 1962).
passible instance. Thus the resonance between the located forms and 
the classifying idea-complexes is crucial to our understanding of the 
world.
A further point uhich should be emphasised here is that the form
evoked from an idea-complex on a given occasion - what I call the
evoked idea — is normally a simple affair by comparison with the
virtually unlimited potential of the complex itself. Consider the
following quotation from Erwin
"There is of course an infinite variety of ways of striking 
a given body, say a bell, by a hard or soft, 3harp or blunt 
instrument at different points or at several points at a time.
This produces an infinite variety of initial deformations and ' 
accordingly a truly infinite variety of shapes of the ensuing 
vibration... But in every case, however complicated the 
actual motion is, it can be mathematically analysed as being 
a superposition of a discrete series of comparatively simple 
'proper vibrations', each of which goes with a quite 
definite frequency.
It is important to avoid an over-literal translation of this metaphor
of the evocation of sounds from a bell into the association of ideas
from a hypothetical idea-complex, the physical form of which I cannot
begin to describe. Nevertheless the comparison may help to convey the
point that there is no question of grasping all at once the full
potential content of any one idea-complex, particularly one which
represents a prolonged trajectory across the map of my own life (for
example ray.idea of myself or my wife or my country), or one which
represents the family of ideas unified round one of the major symbols
of human language (for example, man, city, life, mathematics,
organisation, plant).
hJhat is evoked depends on the nature of the surrounding stimuli 
in the particular conjuncture of the moment; although in practice a 
succession of differing forms may be evoked from one idea complex, no 
one evoked form can be of very great complication. The process may be 
compared with the way in which ws evoke the shaps of a mountain when we 
look at it. There can be no question of taking in all the variations
1. "Are there QuantunuDumps?" from "What is Life and Other 
Scientific Essays" (Doubleday Anchor 11956) p. 137.
with nature has defined the total shape of the mountain, down to
the grains of sand upon its face, all the way round in three dimensions^ 
What we see or recall depends on the distance and angle from which we 
view it, on the visual conditions and also on what we are interested 
in at the time — though what we see still stands in our minds for the 
mountain as a whole. It is important that a single glance can take 
in only a limited amount of information; the limiting number of 
variables unified in any one form is perhaps connected with George A. 
Hiller's "magic number seven", to which reference has been made earlier.^ * 
.The mind can indeed rapidly discriminate very subtle differences between 
complex visual forms, as it does every time it recognises a face; but 
then, I suspect, it is scanning for difference, moving down from the 
broader scale to precise discriminations in a narrowly circumscribed 
field; moreover much of the discrimination is a matter-of automatic 
processes below the level of consciousness, the details of which do not 
load the field of attention. When in speech we use a word like "man" 
or "city" comparable constraints apply; what is evoked is a relatively 
simple form, the face, as it were, which the idea-complex offers in 
this particular perspective, one which depends enormously on the 
character of the surrounding resonance generated by the other ideas 
in stimulation at the time.
The form evoked from an idea-complex does not have to be one of 
those which by successive accretions built it up in the first place.
Nor, so far as I can judge, does it have to be built up by a super­
position of a relatively small number of "proper vibrations" as in the 
case of Schrodinger's bell - though here there may be some room for 
doubt. There is little direct evidence that idea complexes have 
constituent "proper" forms of this kind, but it could be argued that 
every definition of a general idea seeks to pin it down by producing
1. Cf. the experiment reported by Kaufman, Lord, Reese and
Volkman in which subjects were asked to report on the number 
of dots varying from 1 to 200 in flash displays: above seven 
they began to estimate rather than count and errors increased.
There is room for argument whether even below seven they counted 
dots successively in time or, as I believe, grasped synchronic 
configurations of up to seven elements. (Amer. Journal of 
Psychology 1949, 62, 498-525, cited by James G. Miller in 
"Living Systems" p. 137).
a list of essential attributes which, when put together in super­
position, produce a complex paradigm form to which the idea as evoked 
in any particular context can be accommodated by generalisation.
However that may be, any major feature of the mind-manifold is such 
that in any number of different perspectives, of wide and narrow 
focus, from different angles, at different levels of generalisation, it 
can yield any number of different "reflected" forms; and few of these 
will correspond exactly to any particular one of the accretions and 
mouldings by which the feature was built up in the first place. Yet, 
having used a pictorial image, I have to emphasise at once that the 
world of these forms is non-perceptual, its space is quasi-topological, 
and the forms are capable of superposition like wave forms as well as 
of organisation in space, tie have to use images to grope after the 
processes of thought, but that does not mean they can be clearly 
visualised. There has to be an element of the paradoxical about thBse 
constructions - as indeed there has to be about the paradoxical images 
of modern physics.
Finally we have to note that in this resonance, if every 
conceivable association were evoked on every possible occasion, we 
should have not a confused roar but a total uproar. The subject 
would be in permanent epileptic fits. There is a large amount of 
selectivity in the response fcem the manifold to the st5.muli of the 
passing moment; and this appears to be determined by a series of 
cumulative constraints which I call the constraining rules of 
association. Some of these can be identified, though we cannot 
exhaustively enumerate them all or quantify their effects.^  ^The 
fallowing is a partial and tentative list of them:
a. Idea complexes seem to be associated with thresholds of 
stimulation which have to be exceeded before any response 
is evoked. (Exactly what should constitute an idea complex 
in this context is arguable, since it will be recalled that 
these features are agglomerations of lesser features which 
are in turn composed of lesser still. The most convincing 
interpretation seems to be that the manifold itself is to 
be regarded as a single continuous "surface" like, for
example, the surface of the earth, and that the scale and 
nature of the features which emerge as relevant in a given 
context depend on the scale and nature of the forms which 
provide the stimulus.)
The threshold is lower for idea-complexes frequently or 
recently stimulated, and in the case of links of resemblance 
when the resemblance is simple and close.
The threshold is lower for an idea-complex on which several 
active lines of association may converge more or less 
simultaneously.
Nevertheless, once stimulation has taken place, the threshold 
of resistance begins to rise again. The mind is impelled to 
move on from the first idea even though it may come back 
again after a short delay.
The threshold is lowered for ideas of what is pleasurable 
and raised for ideas of what is painful. This is Fraud's 
pleasure/pain principle.
Nevertheless it is lowered for associations predicting future 
events that will affect the subject, even if they are 
unpleasant. This applies particularly to predictions of 
movement. If any objects, including the thinker's own body, 
are moving in the field of vision, the brain automatically 
plots their relative courses, and as a result reflex actions 
may be triggered off before the conscious mind has taken note 
of the situation at all. This constraint is close to Freud's 
reality principle.
General states of body or mind (whether I am hungry, for 
example, or panic-stricken, or depressed) can lower the 
thresholds of association in some directions and raise them 
in others.
The same is true of the purposes of the mind. Ue are inclined 
to be reminded of things which are relevant to the current
activities of our conscious minds* Indeed this is where 
pleasure, pain and reality come into the equation* Intense 
sensation appears to raise the barriers in all directions
other than that of the sensation itself and of any purposive
thoughts to which it may lead; and much the same is true of
intense emotion.
Such constraints as these affect the mind's selection from the 
sensory input which pours continuously through the sense receptors 
of the body, and still more to its selection of the associations which
the sensory input will bring to mind, and so the ways in which it is
interpreted. Highly elaborate automatic procedures for encoding, 
comparing, selecting, integrating and recoding the input of the senses 
and the associations of the mind take place below the level of conscious 
ness and these may include procedures acquired by learning which have 
subsequently become matters of habit. But the general resonance of 
which we have been speaking in this section is a sounding of many ideas 
together and so a consciousness of none. It represents in Freudian 
terminology the unconscious mind. It may powerfully affect the quality 
and intensity of our conscious experience - of that I shall have more 
to say shortly - but it is. to be distinguished from the ^ recognition of 
specific forms in specific relationships to other forms, which is the 
hallmark of consciousness and of the mind itself. To this process of 
conscious predication we now turn.
Attention and Predication
An attempt to show how from the input of the senses 
and the resonance of association is condensed the 
series of particular cognitions which emerge at the 
focus of consciousness.
The process of predication is the means through which the organism 
regulates itself; and this includes even steps of regulation which are 
reflex or habitual responses, taking place below the level of 
consciousness. The core of predication is recognising something and 
relating it over a span of real time to something else. This process
creates a new contingency (a "touching together” of things). The new 
contingency in turn may be stable, in which case nothing further
happens? or it may be unstable, in which case its creation becomes the
cause event of a sequence of one or more further events which are
effects of the cause event* Even in the case of a reflex response*,
or of an act of cognition which has no consequences in behaviour, we 
still have to do with a predication, because we are still concerned with 
biting off as it were a finite span of time within which a synchronic 
contingency can be recognised as existing or changing. No sensing 
apparatus can take cognizance of even a spatially synchronic form in 
zero time? there must always be a span, though its length may vary from 
that of a flash of light to that in which continental drift may be 
observed* This applies to the response of instruments as much as of 
organisms* A thermostat cannot register and react to a change of
temperature that does not occur over finite time. The recording pen
of an instrument like a barograph may draw a continuous line? the 
strength of the current in a river or a wire may vary continuously? 
but neither a man nor another instrument can respond to such 
identifications except by biting off a discrete finite span of the 
continuous trace and relating it to something? in other words without 
making a predication.
We can distinguish however between the reflex or habitual responses
in which the interlock of cause and effect is no more than the
activation of a given switch (often below the level of consciousness) 
and the step of decision or choice* In the latter case the mind moves 
from a set of comparable possibilities to one out of the set - one which 
includes the behaviour that actually follows. This is the creation of 
a new constraint or rule (i.e. a restriction of the possibilities of 
transition in time), not the exemplification of an old one? for the 
pattern of behaviour which is adopted may be entirely new, even though 
it must be built ultimately of known component ideas? it represents 
the arrangement of a pattern of switches ad hoc to match the pattern 
of the possibility selected.
1. Or a TOTE unit. See note on page 32 above.
It is important in this connection that there are limits on the 
amount of information that the human mind can handle at one time*
The argument that the human mind is a limited capacity channel was 
elaborated by Broadbent in 1958 and in general terms it is hardly 
to be disputed* All attention involves selection* Beyond this, how­
ever, as I have argued earlier, the limitation is not a simple quantity! 
the subjects of the predications at the focus of attention are usually 
themselves complex, that is, built of related component parts, and the 
complexity may involve more than one subordinate lebel of hierarchy*
The number of separately recognised components at the first level of 
subordination appears to be limited to about seven, while the number 
of subordinate levels of hierarchy seems to be no more than three? 
moreover there are trade-offs between hierarchical and associative 
(component) complexity. Although it seems likely that components can 
be numerically identified only at the primary level of subordination 
(the level of the direct components of the subject and predicate), a 
complex which has been recognised at that level can be integrated again, 
with the aid of short term memory, at a lower level in an immediately 
subsequent predication (as when the house which I see with separately 
identified doors and windows is next seen as one in a whole street of 
houses)* The mind, we may note, is able to bring together as ideas 
at the focus of consciousness the complexities of synchronic three- 
dimensional shapes with four-dimensional trajectories of movement and 
patterns of sound in time, as well as logical equations and causal 
predictions? but broadly the more disparate elements have to be 
integrated, the greater the strain on the mind’s limited capacity.
The experimental analysis of these processes would be an enormous 
task, so far hardly even begun. However, for our present purposes the 
details are not significant, so long as it is accepted that complex 
constraints of this general kind e x i s t . U e  need perhaps to make 
three points* First it is easier to integrate in a complex way 
perceptions recognised in the same space through the same sensory 
channel; here it is relevant that much of the selection and organisation 
of the visual input may well be carried out before the result is
1. These matters are discussed in considerably greater detail in
"The Grammar of Perception" and "The Grammar of Thought".
translated into the logical forms built into predications at the focus 
of consciousness! the integrated outcome of prior processes enters as 
a single element into the field of consciousness. Correspondingly it 
is more difficult to integrate disparate things, for example to carry 
on a conversation while trying to watch television. Thirdly* however, 
just as a complex perception grasped at the focus of attention can 
subsequently be integrated at a lower level of hierarchy (though the 
individual will no longer have the same distinct and determinate aware­
ness of it), so a complex procedure, once made familiar and habitual, 
can be integrated into a wider procedure (with a similar loss of 
determinate awareness); thus gear-changing, once learnt, can be 
integrated into the process of driving a car. All hierarchically 
complex perception or thinking involves a primary or determinate level 
of componency - which extends normally to the major components of the 
subject and predicate as well as to the subject and predicate themselves 
and lower indeterminate levels (like that of the bricks which we 
recognise only in a gen ral way as we look at the main features of a 
housa); and this process of integrating a procedure into a wider 
procedure means in effect pushing it down a level in the hierarchy 
of consciousness. What I am referring to here is the process of 
"modularisation" as discussed by Derome S. Bruner.^-* As ha seys,
"Given modularisation and the reduction in attention necessary to 
regulate an act, that act can thBn be incorporated into a higher-order, 
longer—sequence act without requiring so much attention as to disrupt 
regulation of the higher-order act.”
Whereas one reflsx or habitual response is independent of others 
and various such responses can take place simultaneously or overlap 
with one another in the same organism, the same is not, on the face 
of it, true of responses involving choice or potential choice*
These seem to take place one at a time as part of the continuous series 
of conscious predications at the focus of attention. The ordered 
series also includes many predications which do not involve active 
response, but even these involve the response of noticing, with a
1. In nThe Organisation of Early Skilled Action" in Pl.P.M. Richards
ed. "The Integration of a Child into a Social World" (Cambridge
1974) p. 172.
potentiality for consequent action, and it seems to be inescapable 
that we can notice or pay attention to only one thought at a time 
embodied in one predication (though it will normally itself be a 
complex thought built up of many component ideas). Ue cannot for 
example read two sentences at once. Ue may be able to take in both 
the sentence we are reading and a spoken sentence which we hear at the 
same time, but only with difficulty and only, as Broadbent has suggested, 
with the aid of short term memory which preserves one coding long 
enough to enable us to hold it and turn back to it when we have 
finished with part or all of the other. At the end of the process we 
reach our actual ©nderstanding of the two in series and not simultaneously.
This assertion is admittedly open to question. Neisser, after 
reviewing experimental evidence about what he calls "dual attent5.on 
tasks", concludes that the performance of such tasks depends on the 
skill of the observer; practised subjects, he says, can do what seems 
impossible to the notice. The skilled driver of a car pays attention 
to several different things at once; the practised typist can talk 
while she goes on typing. Up to a point these facts can be 
accommodated by reference to the mind's capacity, which we have just 
considered, to integrate a habitual response, once learned, at a lower 
level of consciousness. Uhen this happens, the amount of information 
processing involved is, I suggest, reduced because what was first 
learned as a configuration of successive steps can later be integrated 
as a single complex form, one item of information, not several. But 
this can hardly apply to the case of the typist carrying on a 
conversation while she types, since here the two activities do not seem 
to be integrated except in the sense that they go on simultaneously.
To understand this case we have to take account of a wider process of 
regulation, that of the purposive cycle, and to this I shall turn 
shortly.^’ Meanwhile however I would emphasise that, although it is 
possible, with prolonged practice, to acquire special skills of this
1. While I accept that the mind can, with special practice, perform 
limited dual attention tasks, I would argue that they must involve 
separate purposive cycles, themselves integrated under an over­
arching purposive cycle, of which the purpose is specifically to 
pursue the two subordinate cycles - at least over certain 
portions of their length - simultaneously.
type, they are quite rare accomplishments and this possibility does not 
affect our general conclusion that the mind has a strong propensity to 
think of only one thing at a time.
Conscious Thought
A section in which I develop further ideas on the 
nature and function of consciousness, making use of 
an analogy drawn from music.
Why should this be? One possible answer might be that consciousness,
o
which always seems obscurely to involve some participation of the Self , 
is properly an aspect of purposeful or potentially purposeful thinking; 
that purposes and the personal roles, the plans (to use Miller, Galantar 
and Pribram's term) which are associated with them must be coordinated 
if confusion, with consequent ill adaptation for survival, is to be 
avoided; that this requires that no new plan be adopted without 
comparison and coordination with other still uncompleted plans already 
adopted in the past; and that this cannot be done for two new plans at 
once since they would not then be coordinated with each other, even if 
each was coordinated with past decisions. Thus the practical function 
of attention end consciousness is to ensure the proper coordination of 
our decisions. (Basically attention and consciousness seem to refer 
to the same phenomenon linking the Self with the world; but we talk of 
attention when ue face towards the world and consciousness when 
we face towards the Self.)
In passing it may be worth interpolating the comment that if this 
interpretation is correct we might expect the same function of
1. Cf. William Barnes's conclusion: "If, then, by the original 
question, how many ideas or things can we attend to at once, 
be meant how many entirely disconnected systems or processes 
of conception can go on simultaneously, the answer is, not 
easily more than one, unless the processes are very habitual; 
but thGn two, or even three, without very much oscillation of 
the attention. ^Principles of Psychology", Vol. 1, p.409).
2. Cf. Hume's remark: "For my part, when I enter most intimately 
into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular 
perception or other... I never can catch myself at any time 
without a perception, and never can observe anything but the 
perception." ("A Treatise on Human Mature" Bk. I, Part IV,
Sec. 6).
coordination to be reflected in any animals which can formulate
alternative possibilities and choose between them, instead of simply
responding in a reflex manner to the environment. This raises in
turn the question whether reflex responses derived from experience can
be acquired in any way other than that with which, as humans, we are
familiar, namely the habituation of a response which was originally
a conscious choice. On a first impression there is no reason to add
gratuitous complication by postulating some different process, even
if such an alternative can be conceived; and this suggests that on a
speculative basis we should accept that any animal which can learn
from experience - as distinct from letting experience trigger off some
genetically programmed reaction - must have the capacity to make
choices in the first place between previously unformulated possibilities,
and hence that it must also possess some capacity analogous to that of
human consciousness, which organises a man’s noticing, non-automatic
experience into a single series of predications at the focus of the
mind. Perhaps we could suggest that every animal that has periods of
sleep and wakefulness is likely to possess a capacity of this kind to
organise experience ihto o series of steps; for when we are conscious,
that is what we do (and dreaming is a kind of consciousness), whereas
when we are unconscious there is no reason to believe that this
function continues, though reflex responses of various kinds may still 
1.occur.
These are no more than speculative thoughts. To carry our 
enquiry further, let us consider more closely what a man does when he 
is awake. Effectively he is always either perceiving or thinking, 
following progressions of perceptions or trains of thought. These are 
the natural units of attention. Any one series may be very short - it 
may even consist of a single predication - or it may be relatively
1. A person in a hypnotic trance may have coherent experiences 
of which he is afterwards entirely oblivious until his 
controller instructs him to bring them back to mind. I see 
no reason to say that these experiences were not Conscious, 
even though there may have been some interference with the 
process of storing and recalling them. Correspondingly if 
under hypnosis I undergo an operation without feBling pain, 
unless that pain can subsequently be recalled, I would argue 
that it was probably never an element in consciousness; but if 
it can subsequently be recalled, then it was.
prolonged; but at the end of it the mind switches abruptly when attention 
is diverted to something else - as when the door bell rings - and 
another siries is begun. The question that arises is what kind of 
links exist between the predications internal to a progression or a 
train of thought.
ye can give a partial answer immediately. A link is always either 
one of organisation (spatial, temporal or spatio-temporal) or one of 
similarity. These are the two types of linkage which we have already 
mentioned in discussing ths resonance of association, fly mind moves 
from this tree to the next, or to the sky between, or (shifting across 
a level of hierarchy) from the tree to the leaf or to the apple 
hanging on a branch; then it may notice many apples, joining them by 
a link of similarity, then leap to the garden of Eden across another 
link of similarity plus one of organisation - and so on. This partial 
answer however does not say why our attention moves across one link 
rather than another out of the housands of possibilities present.
Again we can perhaps find a partial answer in the relativities of the 
different thresholds to be crossed, of which we took notice in 
considering the resonance of association. But this reminds us of 
another dimension of the complexity with which we are faced. The 
resonance of association, according to our hypothesis, is going on all 
the time, and so is a massive unceasing input of sensory data from all 
our sensory channels. We are concerned hers with two processes going 
on simultaneously: the shifting, blending, indefinitely vast 
multiplicity of the synchronic resonance of sensation and association; 
and the identification out of this resonance, through some process of 
drastic selection and coherent organisation, of particular notes 
organised in particular ways to form particular predications. A 
second process is superimposed upon the first.
The analogy of music can perhaps give us some further help here*
When I hear a tuned note my mind is faced with a multiplicity of 
superimposed frequencies; but what I hear is a single frequency — that 
of the fundamental or lowest note, the one with the longest wavelength.
I tear no other frequency individually, but I recognise the precipitate, 
as it were, of them all together in the timbre and intensity with which
ths fundamental note is heard* The fundamental wavelength provides the 
container form, as I would call it, of a cell of perceptual 
consciousness, while the synchronic impact of all the frequences 
involved provides the quality and intensity of the perception. All 
three are integral to the cell, for a I cannot perceive a note unless 
I perceive it as infused with a certain quality and intensity of tone; 
nor can I perceive tonal quality and intensity without perceiving a 
note* Even with untuned sounds^, though our discrimination is much 
more coarsely set, ue do discriminate roars, rumbles, whistles, rushes, 
shrieks and so on* I suggest that the uay in which the mind deals with 
logical forms in consciousness is fairly closely analogous to the way 
in which it deals with the impact of sound and other senses. An 
initial process of automatic segregation and association of the sensory 
input into cells organised together in complexes in appropriate spaces, 
which takes place below the level of consciousness, provides, when 
recoded, the raw material of the sensory input to consciousness* It 
also provides a starting point, or rather (as the process is continuous) 
a datum line, from which the resonance of association across the mind- 
manifold is continually re-energised* Out of this mental resonance the 
mind selects individual ideas as the container forms of the cells of 
thought and organises them into predications at the focus of 
consciousness. In the resulting experience an intellectual grasp of 
form is infused with the qualities and intensities of emotional life.
The experience can be simply one of tracking the body’s given perceptual 
input - though always subject to a drastic narrowing of focus on to one 
part of the input. But it can also be an abstract tracking of ideas 
drawn from the total resonance of the manifold. These idea—components 
are then constructed into predications, and each predication builds up a 
new form—as-a-whole, infused with a quality—as—a-whole and an intensity— 
as-a-whole. This is the life of the free, or apparently free, intellect*
At this point ue come up against an apparent limitation of the 
musical analogy* How does the mind select the forms to be directly 
grasped, as distinct from those which contribute only indirectly to the
1. These are sounds in which the overtones are not restricted 
to the harmonic series of wavelengths related to each other 
in simple mathematical ways.
quality and intensity of the experience? There does not seem to be any 
automatic physical process comparable to the way in which my mind picks 
on the fundamsntdlfreqqency as the note it will hear, as distinct from 
the frequencies which merely contribute indirectly to the loudness 
and timbre of experience. If we take a group of ideas superposed 
adjectivally, there is no rule which indicates automatically which one 
must be the substantive (if you leave words aside). I can speak 
without contradiction either of a female pianist or of a piano-playing 
The strongs"selection restrictions” inherent''in ttite vocabulary 
of any particular human language will normally in such a case predispose 
the mind sharply towards one attribute rather than another; but there 
is no rule obviously inherent in the mental process to identify which 
must be the substantive. Yet it may make a considerable difference to 
the sense: "fat man” is not the same as "human fatness”.
As an approach to this problem let us imagine what happens if I 
wake up to find myself unexpectedly in a totally unfamiliar place, 
surrounded by inexplicable objects in a strange inexplicable space.
First I start to construe a physical image or understanding of my 
surroundings. To do so I begin from given values or data, which are 
sensations - primarily colour, light and dark - and various 
differentiations and relationships between them • All these values, as 
us saw in Chapter I, emerge within limited registers of possibility which 
in a sense they bring along with them. To elaborate the image of my 
surroundings I walk about, looking at things from different viewpoints, 
judging distances, shapes and angles; I touch and feel; I sniff; I 
listen. In this process I do not merely collect new data, but I test, 
confirm falsify and extend different aspects of my first construings; 
for the process of perception (as 3ames 3. Gibson shows, for example, 
in his book ”The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems” ) often involves 
a complicated marshalling together of different ”cues”. Given the known 
constraints of what I have called the logic of perception, otherwise 
the framework of natural necessity, the possibilities evoked are 
narrowed down by the correlation of different values which reinforce or 
cancel particular possibilities until a firm construction is established.
1. 1966, U.K. Edition published by Allen and Unwin 1968.
Resnwhile my mind has simultaneously been exploring every sort of more 
abstract association evoked by these unfamiliar objects, or parts of 
them, or groups of them; and again a similar process of classification, 
matching, reinforcement, cancelling, evocation, and construction 
ensues1, through which I try to establish what these objects are, what 
kind of a place this is, where I am, how I could have got here*
Although the initial data are given, the process of understanding is 
essentially one of evoking a myriad possibilities and shrinking them 
down, in the light of constraining necessity, through mutual reinforce­
ment and cancelling, to one particular combination of possibilities Which 
is the actuality before ms. Yet at the same time the resonance of 
possibility continues, just as the overtones of melody notes continue 
to sound while the melody is heard, and the collective impact of these 
resonating ideas makes itself felt through the shifting emotional 
qualities and intensities with which my understanding of the focussed 
ideas is infused.
The precise blend of resonating ideas will be different at every
different moment of consciousness, but we can supply broad classifications
to identify particular types of emotional experience - fear, anger,
relief, anxiety and so on - just as in visual perception we can apply
broad classifications to identify recognisable colours such as red,
blua;/or green, even though every occasion of perception is unique and
the range of discriminable shades is vastly greater than our basic
repertoire of colour words. Similarly again it seems a plausible hypothesis
that the intensity of emotion varies directly with the quantity of 7/
resonating ideas in stimulation, just as the brightness of our perception
of light or the loudness of our perception of sound waves varies with
: ■ 2.the number of the appropriate neurons in stimulation. At the same 
time, as we shall see shortly, intensity of emotion reflects a massive 
shifting of the thresholds of association in the mind-manifold, and 
consequently a strong impetus towards particular types of purpose 
and towards action related to achieving such purposes.
1. This is the process to which Sloman refers as "disambiguation”.
2. "When the same note is sounded more loudly more and more nerve
fibres are brought into activity.” (Peter Nathan "The Nervous
SystenP, Penguin 1969, p. 50).
Focal Attention and Subordinate Complexity
In this section I begin a closer examination of the 
process by which thoughts are articulated - essentially 
a process of grammatical construction.
The process of understanding or trying to understand, which I 
have described in Chapter II of this study takes the form of a series 
of predications. To begin with, let us say, I direct my perceptual 
attention at a particular located object. This becomes the grammatical 
subject of a predication. Ac such it is definitely designated by the 
cone of the perspective of my attention, which locates it on a cognitive 
map in relation to Me-fiere-Now. I recognise certain things which 
define the subject - its particular overall shape, its colour, smell, 
size and so forth, together with its construction (where appropriate) 
from component elements having their own shape, colour, size, etc., 
and all related in specific ways to each other and to the whole. 
Characteristically all these attributes, components and relationships 
are not recognised pair by pair as separate predicates of the subject, 
or of components which are themselves recognised as predicates of the 
subject. Such a process is what a strict logical analysis would in fact 
undertake, reducing the whole to a series of binary predications between 
simple elements; but this, while theoretically possible, would be an 
exceedingly prolonged and tedious procedure - just what a computer 
might undertake. Characteristically what the mind does is to recognise 
the subject from the outsst as a synchronically complex whole. It does 
not become separately, determinately, aware of each of these attributes, 
components and relationships, but it does become aware of them 
simultaneously, in a more indeterminate way, recognising the subject 
from the outset as embodying subordinate complexity.1*
This implies that the form-as-a-whole is recognised as the 
container form of a complex involving subordinate elements that are 
related together, in some cases by superposition (as with overtones 
on a fundamental tone), in some cases by sequential continuity (as
1. As I have mentioned earlier, this point is developed from a
slightly different angle by Michael Polanyi in his book 
"Personal Knowledge” (Routledga & Kegan Paul, 1962). Cf* the
remark on p. 88s "Subsidiary or instrumental knowledge... is
not known in itself but is known in terms of something 
focally known, to the quality of which it contributes, and to 
this extent it is unspecifiable."
the discriminable peculiarities of a complicated shape or outline are 
linked together in sequence), and in some cases by structural organisation 
(as thB components of a structure are related in space to each other and 
to the whole)*"*’* It is this highly complex whole, determinately grasped 
as a whole but not in detail, that the mind then relates in a predication 
at the focus of consciousness to a predicate, which is again a whole 
and may be just as complex as the subject* In this context we note 
particularly that it is the container form-as-a-whole of the subject 
which is related by a transition in space over time to the container 
form-as-a-whole of the predicate* The synchronic complexities of the 
subject and predicate are absorbed, as it were* within their container 
forms*^*
1. We may note in passing that the superposition of wave forms, as 
of adjective ideas on a noun idea, is (to consciousness if not to 
the physicist) a relationship not involving extension; while the 
sequential elaboration of a visual or tactile form does involve 
extension.
2. It should bo noted that the forms which are organised in these 
ways include what Piaget would call sensori-motor schemata.
Thus learning to ride a bicycle can be laborious, but as my skill 
in bicycle riding increases I can integrate moee and more of the 
process into forms of wide span - such as "I shall now ride right 
round the block" — and when this is done the subordinate 
complexity of the process, including responses to events unfore­
seen in detail, continues below the level of consciousness. This 
phenomenon, which Bruner calls modularisation, is associated with 
the practice of skills of many kinds, including, for example, 
musical skills. There are strict limits to the number of forms 
which the mind can grasp determinately in a single predication, 
but by practice and habituation we can learn to integrate highly 
complex schemata of any kind as single unified forms; and this in 
turn makes it possible for the mind to think creatively, 
predicatively, across wider spans, at a higher level of the 
hierarchy of ideas. In such cases, as might be expected, 
becoming consciously aware of the detail of what is integrated at 
the lower level can effectively inhibit the full performance, 
precisely because it breaks up unified forms of wide span into 
smaller determinate forms which are then too numerous to be brought 
together in single predications. These matters are discussed 
at greater length in my studies on "The Grammar of Perception”,
"The Grammar of Thought” and "The Grammar of Language”.
It has been suggested, e.g. by Bohn Shotter, that the capacity 
to perform in the way I have been describing reflects a kind of 
split in the mind between two selves, one conscious and inhibited 
while the second is freely creative. But if it is once recognised
For the sake of simplicity we have been presupposing a strictly 
perceptual experience with no abstract classifying or interpretation 
of what we perceive# In practice however experience is never restricted 
in this way. In trying to perceive what something is, we are constantly 
exploring what it is like. In the terms of the model developed in this 
study all the discriminable features of the perceptual experience, 
whether determinately grasped or not, set off a simultaneous resonance 
from similar features of the mind-manifold. The question which is 
crucial at this point is how this chaotic resonance is reduced to 
order, just as the apparent chaos of perceptual data is reduced to 
order by the focussing of attention on a subject form (or schema) to 
which all the complexity of components and attributes is then related 
in an ordered way.
Two Simultaneous Processes of Association
The processes of association are here seen as operating 
on two levels! first in the mechanism by which the 
attention shifts from one subject to the next, and 
secondly in the simultaneous impacting of a cloud of 
associations which provide the emotional colouring of 
experience.
In the case of perceptual experience, where we are trying to "make 
sense" of a perception, the initial ordering of classification is 
facilitated by the focus of perceptual attention^ If the subject of 
our perception is a certain form—as—a—whole, we may jump very quickly 
to the identification that this form is, say, a tree. That is to say, 
the perception wakes an echo — an "evoked idea" — from the idea—complex
that all consciousness is to be conceived as grammatically
structured, with hierarchical distinctions of level between 
the pfcedipative system, the subject and predicate, the determinate 
components of the subject and the predicate, and the elements 
of indeterminate pluralities, there is no need to turn to such 
uninviting hypotheses.
The following piece of anonymous wisdom quoted by Alan U.
Watts is relevant:
The centipede was happy quite,
Until a toad in fun
Said *Pray which leg goes after which?*
This worked his mind to such a pitch,
He lay distracted in a ditch,
Considering how to run.
in the mind-manifold labelled by the symbol "tree". This is not 
necessarily the only idea it could evoke; it could for example (if 
it was a fir tree) evoke the idea of a geometrical cone, or the idea 
of a plant, or (if it was a monkey-puzzle tree) the idea of a puzzle 
for monkeys, or the idea of a particular shade of dark green. But the 
choice will be relatively limited and, in context, the strength of one 
association is almost certain to be much greater than any other*s. So 
we are likely thereafter to make the subject of our thinking not "this 
particular form-as-a-whole" but more specifically ‘'this particular tree", 
this definitely designated instance of the class tree* And my argument 
is that once the subject is thus classified it effectively establishes 
the logical space within which other ideas incorporated into the 
predication are recognised.
I need to give some explanation of what this means. Before I do 
so, however, let us take cognizance of the further case in which a 
subject for predication is selected which is nothing to do with a 
person*s immediate perceptual experience. Say I see a fir tree, and 
that reminds me of a Christmas tree, and then I start thinking about 
Christmas. As the example shows, the mind can move from one subject 
to the next by steps of association - sometimes with intervening steps 
which direct the movement of attention without necessarily themsl&ves 
becoming the subjects of predications. I do not think we need to 
postulate any other mechanism of selection than this: the mind, guided 
by the input of the senses combined with the thresholds of association 
is the mind-manifold, normally moves from one subject to another across 
a bridge of association or resonance, that is, a link of resemblance or 
of past organisation. This does not affect the fact that a thousand 
other associations may simultaneously be in stimulation in the mind, 
some dying away while others continue and evoke new reverberations.
The two associative processes are simultaneous but different* Something 
analogous happens, after all, when I shift my perceptual attention from 
the fir tree to the sky behind it, then to a bush in front, to a flower, 
to a dewdrop on the grass, to the sound of an aeroplane overhead.
While the object of attention (the grammatical subject of the predication 
at the focus of the mind) shifts from one whole to another in what I 
have called a progression, the myriad constituent details of each
predication - forms, colours, intensities, relationships of which I 
am not specifically aware - shift in a different, more continuous, 
process, some falling away as my attention moves, but others continuing 
to contribute to successive predications. Even when I focus on the 
sound of the aeroplane, my eyes will probably turn upwards to search 
the sky for it, and some of the features of my preceding perceptions — 
trees, sky and so on — may continue to contribute peripherally to my 
new perception. Still more obviously is this true when ue set aside 
the artificial segregation of perception from thought; in practice i 
all sorts of associations from the preceding progression will still be 
sounding in my mind as I begin to look for the aeroplane. On the 
other hand if there now takes place a sudden violent explosion behind 
me, it is true that my total attention will be switched - after 
(significantly) a moment of disorientation - to some quite different 
focus. How in that case does the mind pick on a new subject for 
predication?
It seems fairly clear from this example that a sufficiently intense 
sensation, even if it comes unexpectedly, without relation to the 
current focus of perception or thought, will always of itself command 
attention as a subject of a predication, and that it will then 
immediately set off an almost entirely new resonance of association 
which will extinguish the old and determine a new series of thoughts. 
Roreover the new sensation does not have to bubst upon us like an 
explosions I may suddenly become aware that there is a faint smell 
of burning in the room, and as I do so I will realise that the smell has 
in fact been infiltrating my peripheral consciousness for a little.time 
past, though I have only now become sharply aware of it. And 
immediately it will set my thoughts off on a new track.
Apart from the shifting input of sensation, however, we do not 
need to look further than the mechanism of steps of association, 
already discussed, as providing the links by which the mind moves 
from one subject to another. At any moment a large number of 
associations are being explored subconsciously, and it is the state 
of the thresholds in the manifold which dictates the one which will 
come next to the focus of attention. If I am sufficiently hungry,
for example, almost anything will remind me of some form of food. If 
I am sufficiently possessed by an emotion such as love or fear, my 
mind will continually return to the subject of its emotion. But one 
point ue have to note is that if, as I have suggested, there are two 
different associative processes going on simultaneously (though, as 
it were, on different levels), this implies that there are two 
threshold levels for associations one for associations contributing to 
the collective background resonance of the mind, and a second for 
associations brought to the focus of attention as the specific elements 
of conscious thought, whether as subjects or predicates or as what I 
have called features of subordinate complexity.
The Nature of Logical Spaoe
An examination of the nature of the quasi-topological, 
non-perceptual space in which we think, and of the 
relationships ue recognise in it.
I referred earlier to the question of logical space and its 
relationship to the subject idea of a predication. To this we must now 
return. I gave reasons in Chapter I of this study why I think ue have 
to conceive of ideas as forms emerging in a quasi-topological but non- 
perceptual space. I believe this is inescapable, if only because 
thought is inconceivable without the differentiation and relation of 
ideas; and differentiation and relation are already spatial metaphors; 
without some sense of space they are meaningless. * The closest we 
can come to describing logical space is perhaps to say that it is a
1. The idea of logical space is not of course a new one. Wittgenstein, 
for one, used the idea in his "Tractatus". "The proposition", 
be begins, "determines a place in logical space. The propositions! 
sign /""defined earlier as the "sensibly perceptible" sign "through 
uhich ws express the thought]^ and the logical coordinates? that 
is the logical place. The geometrical and the logical place 
agree in that each is a possibility of existence." For 
Wittgenstein this is equivalent to saying that each is a form; 
for a farm in the sense of what I have called a container value 
itself creates a possibility. "The form", he says, "is the 
possibility of the structure"; and "the structure of the atomic 
fact" is "the configuration of the objects", "the way in which 
the objects hang together in the atomic fact." But this does not 
get us much further. What Wittgenstein means by logical space 
or logical form is not elucidated. (The quotations are from 
sections 2.0272, 2.03, 2.032, 2.033, 3.4, 3.41 and 3.42 of the 
"Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus": London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1933).
metaphor of Euclidean space, a transformation of it, different, 
flexible, topological and yet in significant respects analogous with 
it. And the root of the analogy lies not so much in the forms, for these 
we cannot strictly imagine (as was noted earlier, even "the general 
inconsistent idea of a triangle" is impossible to imagine in Euclidean 
space), but in the relationships.
I have argued elsewhere in some detail^ that the basic relationships 
which can be established between ideas in thought are fundamentally the ...
same as we can recognise in perceptual space or analogical space-time - 
apart from a limited number of additional logical relationships. The
perceptual relationships include those of orientation (up and down, 
left and right, etc., with a number of discriminable degrees between), 
of sequence (or "neighbourhood”) in time or space, of inclusion and 
exclusion, of distance, angle, impact, relative speed and so on. The
additional logical relationships establish links of equation or 
resemblance (fundamentally links of classification or reclassification, 
including comparative and superlative reclassification), links of 
grouping (e.g. addition and subtraction), and links of causality.
Even these logical relationships, however, involve perceptual mefcaphotg**^ 
such as a picture of lengths laid parallel and compared, or a picture 
of a "cap-fitting" link between a more general and a more particular ^  
form, or the schema of component and whole, or the images of aggregation 
and segregation where the idea of a flock (Latin "grex”) plus a 
preposition is not far to seek. It is no coincidence that in language 
we use the same basically perceptual prepositions ("in", "before",
"beyond”, "towards” and so on) for abstract as well as perceptual thought 
constructions. We say "it follows" for logical as well as physical 
succession. I have already argued that the number of repeatable forms 
that a mind can remember is finite, though large. I now suggest that 
the number of relationships which the mind can conceive and use is 
not only finite but quite limited. On the other hand the variety of 
differentiations of form which the mind can build up through combination, 
by putting together repeatable forms in predicative structures, with 
linkages drawn from its repertoire of known relationships, is virtually
1. In "The Grammar of Thought" and "The Grammar of Language”.
See also page 76 above.
infinite.
Effectively a relationship drawn from this repertoire can be used 
in two different ways; synchronically when it relates "features of 
subordinate complexity" within a subject or predicate; and 
diachronically when it relates subject and predicate in a transition 
over time at the hinge of a predication. In language subordinate, and 
hence synchronic, relationships are expressed, for example, by pre­
positional links, or genitive or dative links of case, or by links of 
adjectival superposition; while diachronic links are expressed by 
verbs. Subordinating conjunctions are used in a variety of ways to embed, 
one predication as a whole within another by assigning it a noun role, 
an adjective role or an adverb role within the second predication. It 
is my contention that, although the vocabulary of any normal language 
includes a great variety of verbs, their differentiations are largely 
a matter of so-called "selection restrictions” which make a given verb 
opt only for a particular type of subject or object - as "kick”, for 
instance, tends to require a foot, or a person with a foot, as its 
subject. The number of basic relationships which verbs can convey is 
much more restricted. I will not argue the case for this here, but it „ 
may be worth mentioning, as evidence tending to support my thesis, 
that Basic English, evolved as a simple universal language by O.K. .
Ogden and I.A. Richards in the 1930s, was able to make do with no more 
than 18 verbs, eked out by prepositions used as verb elaborators or, as 
German grammars call them, separable prefixes. According to Lincoln 
Barnett^, "The critical discovery made by Richards and Ogden was that 
their stripped-down lexicon required only eighteen verbs - as against 
four to ten thousand that may be available in the vocabulary of a 
college-educated man... The ability of these verbs to do the work of 
all the others stems from their gift of being able to enter into an 
astonishing number of mergers with prepositions... each one substitutes 
for hundreds of bigger, if subtler, words."
How then is the logical space itself created? Physical space 
is a union of dimensions of possibility growing from our sense of the
1. "History of the English Language" 1962 (Sphere Books Edition
1970, p. 32).
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vertical dimension established primarily by thB vestibular apparatus 
in the inner ear, the horizontal dimension derived from it, and our 
sense of the "facing” dimension of depth by which the Self is 
distanced from what it observes. By contrast the analogical space 
in which we recognise a melody is a union of dimensions of pitch and 
time, again distanced from the Self in a dimension of depth (which, I 
have argued elsewhere, is a dimension of temporal depth, a second 
dimension of time without which we could never recognise a span of time 
any more than we could recognise a spatial span if we were not 
distanced from it in a further dimension of space). Correspondingly,
1 suggest, the logical space in which we grasp an idea - always by 
means of a predication -is a union of dimensions of possibility which 
are supplied by (i) what I will call the axis of generalisation of the 
subject idea, together with (ii) a dimension of time in which the 
transition at the centre of the predication can be recognised, and 
(iii) a dimension of depth which may again be a second dimension of 
time. (This last is the dimension by means of which the mind has to 
distance itself from what it recognises, even from its own headache, if 
it is to make it the focus of attention.) Within the space of 
possibility so created the subject form and predicate form are 
brought together in a relationship which always expresses in some sort 
a perceptual metaphor - though in the case of an intransitive relationship, 
it will be recollected, my argument is that the predicate is the samer 
as the subject, but the subject at a later moment, related to its earlier, 
self by an existential link in time. It is the central perceptual 
metaphor which establishes the orientation of subject and predicate to.: ^  
each other and to the axes of this metaphorical logical space.
Reta-Classification and the Focussing of Possibility
How the range of possibility to be opened up in a given 
context is narrowed and focussed by the process of 
"logical typing".
In saying so much I have raised, but not answered, the question 
of what one can mean by the axis of generalisation of an idea. This 
is a problem of some depth and ramification, but a solution to it can
perhaps be found in the idea of what Gregory Bateson called logical 
typing.1* Bateson derived the idea foam "Principia Mathematics", 
but his version, worked out in cybernetic and psychological terms, 
is perhaps more relevant to our discussion than the more mathematical 
original. It rests on.a distinction between messages and meta­
messages. The higher level meta-message has the function of indicating 
the context of possibility, and hence the code, in which the message 
itself is to be understood; whether for instance a sign of anger means 
a real threat or is intended only in play. The meta-message provides 
a higher level classification within which the idea conveyed by the 
message itself is to be grasped. (We may note in passing that George 
Kelly, too, was concerned with this problem, offering a solution in 
terms of his own theory of dichotomous constructs, but clearly 
involving the hypothesis of a metaphorical space. "One needs", he says, 
"to be aware of the two-ended nature of the construct and the possibility 
that one person’s "gentle" may have quite a different continuum 
stretching away from it than does another person's "gentle"... The con­
trast aspects of an expressed personal construct must not be overlooked . 
in interpretation." *) As this suggests, the whole language of 
implicit meanings conveyed in social intercourse by patterns of behaviour 
which signal the presentation of the Self and the recognition of role 
and status in the other is relevant to the determination of meta- 
classifications. This "implicit language", as I call it, which has been 
the subject of much subtle analysis by Erving Goffraan and has been more 
theoretically elaborated by Rom Harr© in his "Social Being"3, is 
discussed in some detail in "The Grammar of Social Interaction".
fly own version of this theory grows out of the earlier arguments 
of this study. We recognise an instance of anything against the
1. This idea was one of Bateson's major preoccupations and under­
lies some of his most fruitful achievements, in particular his 
analysis of "double bind" situations. It is well explained in 
Chapter IV of his "Hind and Mature" (Fontana/Collins 1979; see 
in particular pp. 127 - 141.).
2. "A Theory of Personality", p. 116.
3* Blockusll, 1979
background of an appropriate class of things* The class* defined as 
consisting of those forms which on generalisation coincide with a 
paradigm form, provides the limited range of possibility against which 
actuality emerges, information takes shape. Correspondingly, I have 
suggested, we can focally recognise a class or idea as such only 
against the background of some wider class in which it is identified 
as an instance! for it is always the instance of which we are directly 
aware, while the classification, although it has in some way to be 
present to the mind, is always submerged out of Ciocal consciousness.^* 
Thus when I examine a particular rose just picked from the bush I will 
be aware of its colour and shape and fragrance, while the fact that it 
is a rose remains submerged (though present). As soon as I think of 
it specifically as a rose, however, I have to realise the idea rose 
against the background of a wider classification, say the idea flower.
Here we encounter a complication! for all ideas can be generalised,
2
and hence classified, in a variety of different ways. * To put the
1. I note that the view ascribed to Frege that ‘'concepts cannot 
be referred to (as concepts)." (R. Nofcick "Philosophical 
Explanations", Harvard 1981, p. 111).
2. It may be objected that there are some ideas, such as "object", 
"quality" or "intensity", which are already at the limit of 
generalisation. I doubt however whether even these can properly 
be regarded as exceptions. If the idea "object" is directly 
generalised, it merely disappears. But in fact we use the word 
object in different contexts, e.g. physical, grammatical and 
logical contexts, and in practice these provide alternative back­
grounds against which it can be realised. The basis for this 
phenomenon is that, as I have suggested earlier, the links of 
association through which the accretion of the features of the 
mind-manifold is governed are not merely links of direct resemblance 
but also links of organisation, that is of past contingency, 
otherwise of indirect resemblance. For.in. a certain sense, all
the discriminable features of a contingency resemble each other; 
every past contingency can be seen in a certain perspective to 
establish the class of discriminable features, of'that 'contingency; 
and the same applies at a higher level of generalisation to classes 
of contingencies. All links of organisation can be seen in this 
light as links of indirect resemblance, and the same principle can 
bo seen to underlie all cases of definite designation, by which 
an iretance is located on a cognitive map or context, as opposed 
to indefinite designation, by which it is located numerically as 
a singular or plural instance of a class. Finally we may note that, 
on this hypothesis, although it is true that the more general the 
idea vthe less scope there is for further generalisation, conversely 
the more general the idea the greater the scope for applying it to 
diverse contexts.
point in reverse, it is of the essence of a form that it is both a 
unity and a complexity! from above, as it were, it is one thing! from 
below it can always be analysed into elements related by organisation 
or superposition. And in consequence a form does not evoke just one 
kind, one class, of associations across the manifold, but many; and 
the more features of subordinate complexity there are, the more of 
these classifications are potentially there to be evoked - not merely 
one but probably several for each discriminable feature, and further 
associations for various possible combinations of features. Each of 
these classifications can be regarded as establishing a cone of 
generalisation with a paradigm form at its apex, defining, as it ware, 
an axis of generalisation or possibility. We end up, therefore, not 
with a limited range of possibilities against which information can 
emerge, but with a multitudinous dissipation of possibility in all 
directions.
bihat is more, wa reach the same situation If, instead of starting 
from an idea, such as a visual perception, which is clearly full of 
complexity from the outset, we take a predication built up of words 
delivered in sequence (or, for that matter, of notes and chords 
delivered in sequence). Each word element in a sentence, that is, each 
word, inflexion, or significant element of word order, conveys an idea - 
either a substantive idea, or a relationship, or a role in a relation- ...
ship - which is in itself a simple dement in the articulation of our 
thought. It may be evoked from an extensive idea-complex in the mind-, 
manifold, but the idea evoked on any one occasion is a single, relatively 
simple form and one which, as It occurs, is recognised as a whole, not 
analysed. But even a short sentence includes many word elements and if 
each evokes its own associations across the manifold we end up with the 
same scattering or dissipation of possibility.
In fact however this does not happen. Possibility is brought to a . 
focus, not dissipated. And this occurs because one of the component 
ideas is recognised as the subject, it is recognised in one particular 
cone of wider generalisation, and all subsequent elaboration of the 
subject takes place within this perspective. There is a close parallel 
with the way in which, when we hear the first two or three notes of a
melody* we establish automatically (end in gonaral subconsciously) a 
”key”, otherwise an appropriate but limited sot of note possibilities 
based on a tonic note* which is literally a keynote* Even the predicate, 
though it may be built up separately, is eventually recognised as an 
elaboration of the subject and shorn in the process of any irrelevant 
associations* The crucial point is that one or moro ideas out of those 
presented must be designated as substantive, and then of all the 
substantives present one must be identified as subject* The process 
thus has two stages? indeed it has three if we bring in the further 
step by which a completed predication may be embedded as a subordinate
clause uithin a wider predication, acting within it the part of a sub­
stantive, or an adjective, or an adverb (a form which strictly is 
superposed not on a verb but on the form of the predication as a whole)*
A diagram may help to elucidate the first stage, which is that of 
the designation of substantive ideas and the accommodation of adjectival 
ideas as superpositions upon them* In this X
diagram two cones of generalisation intersect.
Ue designate for attention (with the aid of ^
cone D, a third cone representing the axis of 
depth) one instance of the idea X for attention.
It is the grammatical function of designation
to identify a substantive in this way. If this -J!
instance of X lies in the region of inter­
section, we see that it has the additional 
characteristic 05 but in this perspective X 
is substantive and 0 is adjectival, incidental,
so that when ths instance is fully generalised to cajncide with the 
paradigm form X, it loses its characteristic 0. (This presupposss that, 
the form of 0 is not contrary to the form X or any part of it, or to 
the paradigm form of the mors general class of possibility against which 
it is set. Thus an object cannot ba both groon and colourless, since 
t!colourless" is a contradictory of green.)
Wow we can also produce an alternative version of this diagram.
Here all that is changed is that 0 provides the axis of generalisation.
We pick out an instance of 0 : this.time which happens to have the
additional characteristic X* in this X D
altered perspective the compatibilities
between X and 0 do not change,, but the
logical space establishing the field of
relevant possibility is altered. Say X
Is the class dog* 0 is the class brown* 0
and the instance designated is in the one
perspective a brown dog and in the
alternative perspective an Instance of the
colour brown evidenced in a dog. The mind
is then orientated in the first case towards
dogs (or* in a wider perspective* animals) and in the second case 
towards the class of brown things (or in a wider perspective coloured 
things). These distinctions have a practical importance because the 
orientation establishes the context and the actual form evoked by a word 
may vary according to the context (the value evoked by the word “red" in 
the context of red setters Is somewhat different from the value evoked 
in the context of British pillar boxes); and this is not all* for the 
possibilities relevant in the surrounding logical specs are alternatively 
either animal possibilities or colour possibilities} and this may have a 
critical effect on what themmind thinks of next.
Within a predication ideas ere not merely superposed adjectivally ^ 
on one emong them which has the base or substantive role; in addition 
designated substantive ideas* whether or not elaborated adjectivally* 
are related to each other through relationships of organisation. Those 
are the relationships which always involve some sort of perceptual 
metaphor. For relationships of superposition* i.e. adjectival elaboration* 
although we may dig them out retrospectively} are in a certain sense 
absorbed in the unified* idiosyncratic form which they build up together* 
as the overtones are absorbed in the tone we hear, or constituent notes 
are absorbed in the chord wa hear. The eventual superposed form, as 
we recognise it* is internally undifferentiated, and so its idiosyncraoy 
involves no spatial metaphor. But such a form still has to be designated* 
and so located, in some kind of space before we can take cognisance of 
it. And in the second stage of the elaboration of o predicative system
designated substantive ideas* whether or not elaborated adjectivally* 
are linked to each other in ways which do, as us have seen, involve 
perceptual matephors. When these are synchronic relationships, 
referring to features of subordinate complexity* they characteristically 
take a core and satellite form* in which the core substantive (but not 
the satellite) may have in addition the higher level role of subject or 
predicate. (Ih more complicated cases one core substantive can itself 
be the satellite of anothers in the sentence ,3He painted the wart on 
the chin of Oliver Cromwell”, Cromwell is grammatically satellite to 
his chin and the chin is satellite to its warts the wart is the predicate.) 
When the relationships are diachronic, they are characteristically 
expressed by verbs rather than by propositions or case endings and they 
must in every case link a subject and a predicate. Such predications, . 
as wo havo seen, can also be embedded, acting as substantives, adjectives 
or adverbs, within wider predications.
In all these cases each substantive idea is strictly a designated 
instance of the class indicated by an identifying word-symbol; and thstH 
class itself represents once instance of a wider classification, of 
which we are not consciously aware, but which provides the more 
extensive cone of generalisation in which the class is recognised.
But when a number of substantive ideas are fitted together grammatically 
in a predication* it remains true that the cone of generalisation J.n 
which the subject idea is recognised still provides the unifying 
perspective or •‘key” in which all the others are ”seen”, and within 
which they are effectively confined. This provides a restriction of 
context or possibility which is progressively established and clarified 
as the sentence is completed and finally the predicate is linked to the 
subject. For convenience I have been referring to predications expressed 
in language, but the seme would apply to thought which is not expressed 
in words.
In this way every predication builds up a form which is the 
subject form elaborated, but the subject still recognised in the per­
spective of the wider classification or meta-message which identifies 
its "logical type”. It is however possible for the same elaborated idea
to be built up in different ways, different initial ideas being taken 
as the subjects of the predications concerned* If I say ”ths bat struck 
the ball” I build up the same idea as if I say wthe ball was struck by 
the bat”; but the first sentence establishes a bat context and the second 
sentence a ball context, and the two contexts are subtly different in 
the possibilities they open up, the unconscious expectations which they 
evoke. To take another example (drawn from ”The Grammar of Language”), 
the following three sentences, which say the same thing, build up the 
same form on the basis of different subjects?
(!) ”0ur notation provides us with a way of representing the ’ ' £*>
synchronic complexity which may be useful here.”
(2) ”A way of representing the synchronic complexity which may 
prove useful here is provided by our notation.”
(3) ”The synchronic complexity may be represented, in a way which 
day prove useful here, by means of our notation.”
The same form is constructed in each case, but in (l) the perspective is 
provided by the way in which we see ”our notation”, in (2) by the way in 
which we see ”a way of representing somothing” and in (3) by the way in 
which we see ”the synchronic complexity”. Each looks forward, as it 
were, in a slightly different fashion, depending not on the substantive 
word itself, but on the perspective in which us find ourselves looking 
at it. .
Ue may note that sentence (3), in which the subject is definitely 
designated, places the subject form explicitly in the context of some 
implied prior discussion of an instance of synchronic complexity. As 
this suggests, each new predication, establishing a new subject, sets 
up a new logical space, but it is often a spacs which is continuous with 
that of the preceding object of attention and grows out of it. In a 
progression of predications, such as a paragraph, one sentence is in 
effect superposed upon another until at the end the uholo is grasped 
in a very generalised way as a sort of meta-sentence; and when there is 
continuity of thought, this generalised meta-sentence itself provides a 
context, a perspective, a constraining limitation, within which the meta- 
classification of the subject of the next sentence is placed.
The Articuletion of Thoughts A Summary
A summary of the conclusions reached in the preceding four
sections.
In conclusion* to go back to the nature of the logical space 
involved, what I have suggested is that we can see it as a space of 
possibility established by the meta-classification which the subject . 
idea evokes in the broader context of the occasion, combined with a 
dimension of real time and a third, distancing dimension representing 
the perspective of attention. This is a vague, flexible, metaphorical 
space, but it is stabilised by the perspective of attention, which 
establishes not only a metaphorical depth but also, by derivation from 
it, a metaphorical height and width* Across these dimensions the mete- 
classification of the subject provides an intersecting array of possible 
forms, comparable perhaps to the array that ue subconsciously recognise 
in front of us, in the case of physical perception, before we actually 
pick out specific objects of attention.
Within this space there emerge the forms of designated substantive 
ideas picked out of the general resonance by the operation of successive 
superimposed constraints which are directly comparable to the focussing 
mechanisms of percpption. The process of focussing centres down on 
to one form in particular as the subject of the predication, a specific? 
instance of the subject idea or class, which is itself an instance in 
the wider meta-classification that sets the context. Each substantive^ 
idea that emerges represents an instance of a different class, bringing 
its own cone of generalisation; and each may also incorporate further 
adjectivally superposed ideas.
These substantive ideas are now related together in logical space 
by means of relationships which are all perceptual metaphors - 
differentiation, relation, orientation, direction, transition, inclusion, 
exclusion, classification, comparison, equation, contrast, aggregation 
and so on. The binary clusters so formed are themselves ordered 
hierarchically in relationships of core and satellite or component and 
whole, until a single organised system is established, consisting of
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subject and predicate complexes joined at the apex by a relationship 
which is not synchronic like the others, but diachronic, involving a 
dimension of real time. This central transition is the focus of the 
axis of attention relating the thinker, who is fls-Hore—ftJou, to what is 
thought; and it is for this reason that the verb includes indications 
of parson and tense. Person indicates whether Fle-Here-Mow is 
identified with the subject, or is involved in dialogue with the subject, 
or is not directly involved with it. Tense indicates the relationship 
of past, present, or future between FlG-Here-?\iau and the time of tha 
predicative transition.
The elaborated construction which results from all this is a form-, 
as-a-whole built of component substantive forms fitted together in 
complex, grammatically specified ways. But it has a particular 
orientation in its logical space based on a particular axis of 
generalisation In which one form, the subject form, emerges as the 
basis or container form of the whole construction. And this axis of 
gonoralisation conversely establishes a perspective which constrains 
the way in which we recognise all the idea components and their relation­
ships. The form uhich we grasp as a result is thus always still the 
subject form, but the subject elaborated in highly complicated ways and 
orientated in a particular abstract perspective.
The model of the articulation of thought in logical space which 
1 have tried to elaborate here may seem a needlessly detailed attempt 
to analyse the processes of the mind in terms of crudely physical 
images. Crude I fear it may be in relation to the incredible complexity 
of the processes to which it addresses itself. But I would strongly 
defend the need to attempt a model of this kind, which is designed not 
merely to describe mental processes, but to bring out and systematise 
the assumptions on which the description rests. The alternative is to 
avoid being specific about what it is that you are talking about, and 
so to proceed upon assumptions concerning the nature of Ideas and the 
ways in uhich they are related together uhich are never fully brought 
into consciousness and never coherently articulated. I am conscious 
of the rough epproximativeness of this model, of its speculative nature, 
of the fact thbt it is probably ©stray at many points. But the moral 
is that it needs improvement, not that we can do without it.
In any case we have to note that this description is incomplete 
insofar as it fails to bring out one of the most important constraining 
factors. Ue have described two processes superimposed one upon the 
other, the evocation of a shifting resonance and the identification of 
particular thoughts out of it; but we need to remember that they both 
occur within the frame of a third process, the true regulative process.
This, which I call the purposive cycle, is one through which the mind 
identifies purposes, thinks out strategies, takes decisions and acts.
Note; Certain Ideas expressed by C.H. Usddington in his "Concluding
Remarks" to the volume "Evolution and Consciousness" (E. Dantsch and
C.H. Waddington eds., Addison-Wesley, 1976) are obliquely, but interestingly,
relevant to our discussion of meta-classification. He emphasises that
the concept of information, as defined by Shannon and Weaver, is not
adequate for dealing with the development of biological organisms.
It is necessary to express the specificities of, for example, a developing
embryo, not as statements or information, but rather as instructions or
algorithms. Thus "a system containing quite a few instructions,
including instructions to repeat an action, can produce results which
appear to be of fantastic complexity in terms of information." He is
giving new expression here to a point made by Ashby when he argued that
in mammals the gene pattern is used as a regulator, R^ , to develop
indirectly in the cerebral cortex a second regulator, Rg, of vastly
greater capacity than the gene pattern itself. The additional "quantity
of design", according to Ashby, is derived from the environment (See
"An Introduction to Cybernetics", 1956, Methuen reprint 1965, p. 271).
Waddington suggests that;
"Instructions are necessarily instructions to behave in 
certain manners, that is, to alter things in some way or 
other. Any alteration of a situation must always have a 
characteristic corresponding to a "value" for some system 
of assessment; for instance, a genetic change of 
instructions for the synthesis of a particular protein, 
or for carrying out a particular type of behaviour, will 
have a value from the point of view of natural selection.
This leads to the conclusion that the expression of 
specificities in terms of instructions necessarily involves 
us in normative thinking.•• Since all biological systems 
contain a multiplicity of instructions, it seems natural, 
if not inevitable, that they will be involved in a multiplicity 
of value systems."
In making these remairks Waddington was discussing the capacity for 
"self-transcendence" of certain organisms. In the present context'*1**^  
am not concerned with this aspect (though I make some reference to 
the issue in a later sections see p. below). But I would wish 
to re-express Waddington's point in more general terms by suggesting 
that information acquires meaning only insofar as it is recognised as 
related to some purpose - in Waddington's terms as having a value in 
some wider system. Without a meta-message the message itself has no 
meaning; for meaning* as I would define it, is use in relation to a 
purpose; to understand anything is to understand its function in a 
context.
The Purposive Cycle (l)
In this section I enumerate and describe the phases of
the mind's purposive or regulative cycle.
We associate qualities and intensities of emotion and sensation 
with loadings - second order classifications - of desire or aversion, 
and these reflect the mind's tendency to focus on imaginations of 
things we want to achieve or to avoid and of possible means of 
achieving or avoiding them. It has already been remarked that -such^^, " 
loadings of desire or aversion lead to a lowering of the thresholds . 
of association towards what ue may call goal images or aversion images. 
This does not happen in exactly the same way for each, since in the 
first case we tend to focus not only on the image but on ways of 
achieving it, while in the second case we tend to focus not only on 
the image but on ways of escaping from it; and the emotional "taste" 
of the experience is very different in the two cases. In these 
complementary tendencies lie the roots of the purposive activity of 
the mind, fly contention is that when the mind is following progressions 
of perceptions or trains of thought, these activities always form part, 
in one way or another, of purposive cycles. In consciousness, hioreover, 
it never not following progressions or trains of thought, and so it 
follows that the whole of our conscious life is related to such 
purposive cycles; the function of conscious life is to serve the
identification and achievement of purposes.
What then is a cycle of purposive thinking? The simplest way to 
explain what I mean is to enumerate and describe the phases of the 
cycle. I suggest that they are as follows:
1. Exploring and Orientation. The mind is constantly construing in­
coming sensory impressions, together with the associations which they 
immediately call to minds while at the same time it is following trains 
of free association in the directions in which the threshold resistance 
is lowest, and these in turn interact constantly with the continuing 
input of the senses* Much of this process is below the level of 
consciousness and, as many tracks can be followed at once by means of 
resonance, it often develops at great speed. The tendency is for a 
polarity to be established between images of uish-fulfilment, to which 
the lowest threshold settings lead, and impressions of the Self in its 
current environment - between fle-There drinking a glass of beer and 
Me-Here hot and thirsty. But there is a continuous interaction of 
association between these poles. The form which the uish-fulfilment 
images will take is affected by uhat is currently going on at the other 
pole and vice versa: ue tend to construe our perceptions in ways 
related to what is uppermost elsewhere in our mind at the time.
There is.however one important qualification to make: the mind, 
as we have noted, cannot resist easy links of predictive inference from 
the immediate environment; if I see a bus bearing down on me, I cannot 
avoid the thought that it is going to hit me; and this will arouse in 
me feelings of fear and aversion. In following the tracks of 
association, therefore, the mind is naturally led to focus not only 
on objects of love and desire, but also on objects of fear and aversion*
1* Certain forms of contemplative meditation are explicitly
intended to achieve a state in which the mind is conscious yet 
emptied of all content. I believe that, taken literally, this is 
a logical imppssibility: you cannot be both conscious end 
without awareness of anything at all. But I would accept that 
these practices can lead to a state of consciousness in which 
the attention rests only on the current input of the moment to 
the senses (and perhaps only, a restricted aspect of that input 
such as the visual patterns that form behind closed eyelids), 
without any awareness extending beyond the immediate perceptual 
span in time or space, and - most important and unnatural of all - 
without any interpretation or classification of what is going on, 
drawing upon the resonance of memory.
As ws have seen, it cannot rest on one fixation* it always has to move 
on; but once it is brought to a focus of desire or aversion, it tends 
to move round a basin, as it were, of related thoughts and images, 
constantly coming back to the focus image and possibly in the process 
defining it more and more clearly.^*
This is the process we can describe as orientation, the way in 
which the mind establishes its goal and aversion images and so defines 
the directions in which it wants to go. Subjectively, as the mind 
identifies an object of desire or aversion, we tend to recognise an 
access of emotion. A high level of emotion always characterises a new 
orientation of the mind, which is accompanied necessarily by a sweeping 
change in the threshold settings of the mind manifold; but it usually ' 
does not last for long, if only because the mind is constantly taking 
action to change the environment in a favourable direction and particularly 
so when it is in a state of high emotion.
In establishing its orientations the mind is often seizing on
practical aims and objects for its plans; but we need to remember, beyond 
this, that a great deal of its activity is concerned, not so much with 
achieving practical ends, as with presenting an appropriate Self or 
persona which will achieve the respect and understanding of others.
In Harre*s words, "the major human preoccupation in the complex inter­
weaving of practical and expressive activities is the presentation of
an acceptable persona appropriate to the scene and the part in the
2.action... associated with a sense of worth end dignity." * Much of... 
this activity is however implicit, if not unconscious; it often shapes
or colours the things we want, and perhaps especially the ways in which
we set about achieving them; it can affect the explicit goals we adopt 
without our being explicitly conscious of our motivation in preferring 
one thing to another.
1. See U. Ross Ashby "Design for a Brain", 2nd edition Revised.
(Chapman & Hall 1960), Sections 7/20 to 7/24.
2. "Social Being", p. 207.
2* Purposive flodel Building. The next stage is that of purposive 
model building. Insofar as I forecast the likely trajectory of the bus 
bearing down on me, I am already constructing a mental model of possible 
future events. If the course of association leads ms to an imagined 
impact of the bus on myself, this creates an aversion image and I 
therefore purposively develop alternative scenarios in which, for 
example, I turn smartly to left or right and the bus goes by without 
hitting ms. The models I create are spatio-temporal scenarios normally 
imagined in vary generalised form and built of predictive inferences 
which are of*«varying degrees of subjective probability, or conductivity 
to purposive thought.** Within them I imagine alternative models of 
myself pursuing alternative but predictivsly possible courses of action 
relatedm * achieving goal images or to evading aversion images. 
These courses of action are possible roles for the Saif to play. To 
avoid confusion over the definition of "rale", however, and in order 
to conform to an already established usage, I will use the word "plan", 
as adopted by Hiller, Galanter and Pribram in their well-known work 
"Plans and the Structure of Behaviour" though I will frequently qualify 
it with the word "personal", to emphasise what is, I believe, an 
important aspect of the matter and to keep distinct the personal'plS 
and the scenario within which It is unfolded.
The separation of the two functions of orientation and model 
building is not absolute, for as the scenarios are developed so the 
goal images and aversion images become more precisely defined. A given 
situation may offer several alternative plans, depending either on 
alternative goals or on alternative scenarios. The scenarios may vary 
in probability, the goal images or aversion images may vary in the 
strength of the emotion and hence the purpose uhich they generate. But
1. Every predictive inference is based on a predictive rule or 
hypothesis which has its own degree of probability (conductivity) 
and on deductions linking the situation to the hypothesis, each 
of which again has its own degree of subjective probability.
Thus I take the rule that thunder follows lightning, uhich has
a high degree of probability; I clasoify (deductively) the flash 
I have just seen with greater or less confidence as lightning; 
and I infer with greater or less assurance that I will probably 
soon hear a rumbling sound which I will classify as thunder.
2. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960.
purposive (nodal building is always directed towards achieving a purpose 
by raaans of a role or plan uhich links fle-Hers-Now with the end 1 have 
in view. Predictive necessity may in some circumstances lead unavoidably 
to extremely unpleasant situations, as when ue realise that the ship 
ie sinking beneath usf but the mind will always seek auayout; beyond 
the shipwreck it will look for the raft or lifeboat ~ some means of 
salvation for the "essential variables” somehow* Significantly, as 
the model building proceeds, the mind may begin to organise its plans 
in hierarchical fashions in pursuit of a longer span personal plan 
directed towards a longer term objective (like getting across a city 
street) X may identify a sub-plan directed towards an intermediate 
objective (like reaching the safety of a traffic island).
3* OsglQion. The next stage is that of decision - effectively the 
adoption of a particular personal plan in a particular scenario. In 
the model building stage I may try out alternative scenarios and 
alternative plans within the scenarios, testing their desirability and 
probability. But at the decision stage I adopt one personal plan to 
the exclusion of others. The final decision is determined by the relative 
emotional pull and practical feasibility of the different options. At 
this stage, particularly, considerations of the presentation of the 
Self and of the need to establish and reinforce social roles, both those 
of the Self and those of others, will often affect the decision that is 
made* This applies to decisions about the performance of appropriate 
"face work", as Coffman calls it >  saving the "face" of one party or 
another in potentially embarrassing situations — and it applies perhaps 
most of all where the choice of particular forms of address and particular 
tones of voice are concerned.
Having tried on a succession of garments I decide on this one and 
pull it firmly over me. This one becomes thereafter part of myself, 
bringing the scenario with it; any action which it requires of me in 
given circumstances follows automatically. A role cannot be played in 
a vacuum and so every role or plan, as ue hove seen, presupposes 
a scenario - though it may be one imagined in extremely general terms 
and consequently it may cover many different possibilities. Personal 
plans may vary widely in the spans they cover. They may bo very short,
as when I decide to switch on the light, or very long, as when 1 decide 
to get married or to become a doctor; and broadly the longer the span, 
the more generalised the plan and the scenario*
tie do not in practice have to taka a constant stream of conscious 
minor decisions, since a great many of our actions flow from general 
personal plans already adopted, which emerge into relevance when 
external circumstances appropriate to their scenarios materialise or 
seem likely to materialise* Even when tie bus bears down on me, the 
odds ©re that I will not have to take any conscious decision, because 
I /already have a generalised self-preserving plan in which 1 move out 
of the path of all large oncoming objects# A conscious decision becomes 
necessary, however, when more than one desirable option comas into 
focus* I may make the predictive Inference that the bus driver is almost 
certain to put his foot on the brake, and if this prediction is strong 
enough, then I may find that the alternative personal plan of con­
tinuing on my way will prove to be of higher conductivity to my 
purposive thought than the role of jumping aside#
4* Actualisation (fiction and Ftonitorlnq)* Throughout our waking lives 
what might be called the cone of possibility which we see before us 
with the headlamps of predictive Imagination is being constantly 
converted into actuality*^Imagined potentialities are being sealed^ 
into actuality and made part of the irrevocable paet by all the 
detailed particularity of perceived happening Here How* Personal 
plans previously entertained hypothetically, then adopted by decision, 
are sealed by physical action into the continuing Self# The reality 
as it reaches ue ie far more particular and detailed than the prior 
imagination, but most of the time it fits into the generalised patterns 
of our foreseeing# The world would be extremely difficult to live in 
if this were not so. Our censes are constantly monitoring at a sub­
conscious level the incoming flow of reality, scanning for difference 
from what is expected; and broadly it Is the things which ore different 
that coma to our conscious notice — the door left open, the itch on the 
shoulder blade, the strange noise under the bonnet of the car# Our own 
actions moreover are part of this incoming flow of reality# Once the 
decision to adopt a particular personal plan has been taken, the action
follows automatically, either at one© or at a later stage, depending on 
the realisation of the scenario and the requirements of the plan# Once 
I have decided to walk to the station, all the necessary action flows 
without the need for any new posing of options, so long os the scenario 
continues to unroll according to prediction# Only if, for example, I 
find that the river at the bottom of the hill has flooded end blocked the 
road, do I have to stop, consider new options, and take a new decision* 
Action itself Is not conscious unless consciously monitored by our 
senses, including our sense of touch and what 0.3*Gibson calls pur 
"haptic" sense of the state of our body* flonitoring is thus 
simultaneous with action, not successive with it. Plonitoring and action 
both characterise a single phase, which in one word can be described as 
that of equalisation#
The incoming flow of sense impressions never ceasas and it is bound 
to the steady flow of real irreversible diachronic time Her© How# Whan 
wa follow trains of thought, we are organising ideas in an imagined time 
and space, post or future, near or far, real or unreal# By definition 
when our minds ere exploring, focussing or model building, they are not 
in the narrowly limited span of the Here How, but are moving in a sort 
of arabesque around it in imagined time. When our conscious attention 
is concentrated on the process of perception, the two streams coalesce! 
consciousness is bound to diachronic time and inhabits the Here How.
For most of our lives, however, wa are not Inhabiting tha Here How, our 
consciousness i§ off exploring, focussing and model building. Even when 
we are using our senses — as in watching a television set, listening 
to a speech or reading o book - our conscious attention will often be 
Interpreting tha sense impressions symbolically, and so using them 
merely as a bridge into an imagined world# It is true that in such 
wandering moments we are still located in a particular place at a 
particular time; but us can only become aware of this by recognising our 
mental activities of the moment as part of the action phase of some 
wider purposive cycle, the acting out of a wider role. Ordinarily, 
that is to cay, the objects of our consciousness are external ideas end 
things, including on occasion parts of our own bodies; but it is possible 
also for us to make the object our consciousness our own Self carrying 
out some activity; and then we are not merely conscious but self-conscious.
5# Readjustment# Our monitoring of reality brings us some information 
which is in accordance with prediction - though it will almost always 
be much more particular than the generalised prediction, and will conse­
quently tell us much more than we foresaw# It may also bring us some 
information which conflicts with our prediction; and it may bring soma 
which was entirely unforeseen# y© carry in our minds a model of the 
real world and this has to be continually modified end extended by in­
coming information# (This is Heiss©r*s "cycle of perception", writ 
somewhat larger*) The total volume pouring in is far too great to be 
incorporated and most of it simply goes straight into oblivioh; but a 
process of selection takes place which has the effect that we remember 
especially the things that are relevant to our desires and aversions.
We do not remember at all tha things which may have been monitored but 
were not brought to the focus of the perceiving and interpreting . - 
consciousness at the time when they were experienced. All this new 
relevant information, especially where it differs from previous forecasts, 
ic liable to change our predictive expectations* Thereby it can alter 
the feasibility of personal plans and the probabilities involved In 
scenarios wo have previously imagined; it can bring new ones into the 
field of Imagination; and it can bring altogether new goal images or 
aversion images Into focus. The unending process of assimilating 
information about the real world as it flows past Fie Here How consequently 
involves a corresponding process of adjustment to our system of 
objectives, plans and scenarios as It is registered on the mind-manifold* 
This last phase of the purposive cycle links on directly again to the 
first phase, that of orientation, in a new cycle.
This completes our review of the phases of the purposive cycle.
The concept of the cycle is itself a relatively familiar one, though 
it has perhaps been developed here in somewhat unfamiliar ways. The 
reader will notice that, although it has been worked out i rdependently, 
it corresponds fairly closely to Hiller*s analysis of the four stages 
of decision-making, a process uhich he examines in some detail at the 
levels of the cell, the organ, the organism, the group, the organisation, 
the society and the supranational system. For convenience of comparison 
it may be worth repeating here what these stages ares (a) establishing 
purposes or goals, (b) analysis of the situation, (c) synthesis of a
course of action, essentially by reducing a number of options to a single 
choice, and (d) Implementing the decision# Fly phase 2 combines (b) 
and most of (c), but X separate out the act of decision as a separate 
phase 3. Hie stage (d) corresponds to my phase 4, but he has no final 
stage of readjustment or assimilation corresponding to my phase 5#
Heisser, on the other hand, in his (admittedly narrower) concept of 
the perceptual cycle, does explicitly include a phase of assimilation 
and adjustment, and X doubt whether Hiller would in practice have any 
objection to © reformulation of his analysis to include a fifth phase 
of this kind* Hy segregation of decision as a separate phase is perhaps 
open to question, because it is difficult - indeed arguably impossible - 
to identify any measurable span of time over which decision takes place; 
but on the other hand it represents ths most critical transition of all 
and needs to be identified ©a such# However that may be, It is evident 
that we are talking about the same cycle and that others - for s^jple, 
Polya, to whom reference ie made in the footnote on page - have 
also In different contexts identified what is fundamentally the same 
phenomenon#
The Purposive Cycle (2)
A discussion of tho wayc in which tha mind fits the . 
predications of the conscious moment into the cycles 
of purposive thought.
The argument that what we are doing as we think, perceive and act 
always forms part of a cycle of purposive thought does not imply that 
our conscious life is simply an endless sequence of completed cycles 
following on© after the other. The effective unit of conscious attention,
as ws sow earlier, Is the perceptual progression or the train of thought;
1
but the mind can follow only ons such at a time; Indeed it can be
1# Very occasionally and with prolonged practice we can learn to 
follow two cycles at once, but this is possible only when we 
have learnt to simplify the task, making the maximum use of 
habituation# Even then it is more of a trick than a normal 
phenomenon of conscious life. But it is through this process'- 
the simultaneous following of two different cycles subsumed, as 
I suspect, under a third cycle of which the purpose is to do 
both together - that we can explain the mind’s capacity to deal 
with dual attention tasks discussed on page 135 above.
conscious of only one predication within it at any one moment. On the 
Ether hand, although every progression or train of thought is part of 
a purposive cycle, it can be only a very small part; and, having 
followed a small part of one cycle, the mind can switch suddenly to a 
quite different cycle and then back again* tlhen it returns,mbif©over, 
to the first one, It does not necessarily begin exactly where it left 
off* Hot every cycle is tidily completed* As wa have seen, the phase 
of model building can lead back to a redefinition of the original 
goal or aversion image; and such redefinition can lead forward again 
to a redefinition of the personal plans related to them* The mind moves 
back and forth, refining and ' developing its purposes* Thoone clean 
break comes when action is taken in pursuance of a chosen plan; on this 
there can be no going back#
Hany cydes are in play at any one time* A short cycle may be 
completed in a couple of seconds, but a long one may take half a life- 
tirae and still not be complete. The Self, from this point of view, is 
like a rope of innumerable strands which are the plans it Has adopted 
over the years* Some are long term, some short; some are complete and 
woeen into the strict coils of the past; but at the growing end the rope 
is not tightly woven, it frays out with many roles stretching into the 
future, some further, some less far* The further they go, the looser 
and more generalised they are, yet they still apply direction and 
constraint to the future pattern of the individual.
It is important to note that the very words focussing, model 
building, deciding, realising, assimilating, adjusting, themselves 
refer to the acting out of personal plans. In fact the whole of ©ny 
one purposive cycle always represents part or all of the action phase 
of some wider purposive cycle; and ultimately all our activities are 
part of the acting out of the overarching personal plan of biological 
surviv&b which was adopted for us at our conception. As we have already 
noted, action is separate from decision, it follows automatically from 
the decision to adopt a given role; insofar as we become aware of it, 
ws are realising what wa are doing, and the realising is not the same 
as the acting# I can watch my hand holding a pen, writing these words, 
and at the same time I can monitor the impressions of touch that accompany
the writing, together with my internal "haptic" sense of the 
position and attitude of arm, hand end fingers. All the time the hand 
is acting; but it is only by means of this elaborate monitoring system 
that I can become ©ware of Its activity. I have just argued that the 
process of monitoring ie itself an activity; but it is a mental activity, 
that is, an activity of attention rather than motion* Moreover it is 
related to a different wider plan; while I am conscious of the writing,
I am not aware of the monitoring; only by widening the focus of attention 
can I become aware of the monitoring as such; and when that happens I 
am no longer aware of the writing except as a subordinate aspect of the 
wider activity which can be described as "He Monitoring Myself Writing" 
and which ie itself part of the actuElisstion phase of a still wider 
purposive cycle. ; , , a
The mind is economical and a great deal of our activity, as we 
have seen, simply does not get realised at all. Thie applies to mental 
as well as physical activity; we can become aware of ourselves exploring, 
focussing, model building, deciding, assimilating, only when we self­
consciously observe ourselves do these things; and whsn we achieve this 
we are in effect realising ourselves as acting out a personal plan 
adopted in some wider purposive cycle (though ©t the time we will not 
be aware of the wider cycle). Our earlier analysis has put action and 
realisation in one phase of "actualisation", and this Is necessarily so, 
because we can only realise what is happening now; but it is important 
to bear in mind not only that much of what we do is never realised, but 
also that we realise much more than our personal activity - for what wo 
are aware of can include the unrolling of the whole scenario within which 
our own personal plan is acted out.
The case of decision is comparable to that of action, but different 
in a significant respect. For whereas action is a process, decision 
appears not to?be so. I can say "I am choosing", which means that I 
am still running over the possible options; or "I havo chosen", which 
means that I have already decided between them; but I cannot pick on a 
precise moment of "I choose" when the actual choice is neither still in 
tha future nor already in the past. It is significant that decision, 
choice, has no apparent duration, and so we cannot become aware of it
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as a process* In this respect decision is like the shift between one 
fixation or predication and the next* One train of thought will usually 
include a whole series of predications, each with its own subject re­
cognised in relation to a predicate* In fcetrospect ua can sometimes 
follow the track of a train of thought with its associative links from 
subject to subject, Just as a psychologist in a laboratory may bo able 
to obtain a photographic record of the successive fixations of the eye 
as it scans a picture* But we can never pick on the join between one 
predication or fixation and the next, even when the mind switches from 
one train of thought to a quite different ono, or from a train of thought 
to a perceptual progression* If you stick s pin into me while X em 
thinking transcendental thoughts, my mind will imiasdietely switch to a 
perceptual predication? but in doing so it follows no apprehensible 
pathj the line of demarcation between the one and the other has no 
thickness*
The fact that there is a parallel between the way in which the 
Self decides between alternative plans and the way in which it shifts 
its attention from one predication to another is not altogether surprising, 
for in both cases we have to do with a process of selection - which is 
ultimately the same thing ae regulation, the emergence in accordance with 
law (or rules) of particular actuality out of a range of possibility*
In the first case the process of selection Ie determined by the automatic 
operation of the mind-body system at its current settings, which may 
be physical (the fact that I am hungry, or that, as I have lost my 
spectacles, I cannot see very well at the moment) or may be mental (the 
fact that I have decided to walk to the station, or that I am depressed 
by what I have just read in the newspaper)* These settings are multiple 
and complex to an almost unimaginable extent? indeed It is probably 
more helpful to speak not of the settings at tha time of the mind-body 
system but of the form at the time of the mind-manifold, In other words 
to use an analogue rather than a digital model* Yet somehow, by moans of 
the cumulative application of constraining rules, the mind eelects and 
organises, without effort of will, from the twin inputs of the senses 
and of association reverberating across the mind-manifold of knowledgs 
and memory, a single series of organised predications, perceptual or 
conceptual* The identifying of alternative plans as options can be part
of this process; then at a higher level of selection the mind easy decide 
consciously between them, thereby reducing the options to one. But this 
conscious decision is again a matter of regulation, the application of 
constraining rules which narrow down the possibilities of transition.
The question whether this selection at the highest level is in some sense 
a matter of free will whereas the other was automatic is one of great 
interest to which we will return; but it need not detain us here.
Structure and Process (2)
In this section 1 return to the comparison with Dames
6. Biller’s model, and the question of how the mind is
to be conceived in terms of structure and process.
In this chapter I have now given an account in the broadest terms
of the processes of consciousness* Elsewhere I have attempted what i9 
in somo respects a considerably mors elaborate account through an analysis 
of the processes of language. In the present context layyairo will.now 
be to turn to a closer examination of the nature and role of the Self 
in these processes. Before I do so, however, it may be useful to return 
briefly, in the light of the account I have just given, to the 
comparison with Dames G* Biller’s analysis. It will be remembered that 
he identifies three major subsystems at the core of the information- 
processing operations of any living system, namely the associator, the 
memory and the decider* The process of predication, as I have described 
it, is in a sense a process of association; it draws upon coded material 
derived from the sppsps (corresponding to the output of what,,Biller calls 
the "encoder”subsystem), as well as upon ideas elicited from the mind- 
manifold (corresponding to his memory subsystem); and it forms part of 
a wider process, the purposive cycle, whose function is to take decisions
issuing in behaviour by the organism. Uo are talking about the same
subjects; but we seem to be drawing different lines between structure and 
process.
It is an essential part of Miller’s theory that every subsystem 
exhibits both structure and process. He defines the associotor as "the 
subsystem which carries out the first stage of the learning process.
forming enduring associations among items of information in the organism”9 
in other word (in my terras) as the subsystem governing the input to the 
mind manifold* But this is a curiously restrictive definition, since 
you have to recognise something (drawing upon experience to do id) 
before you heve anything to learn* As I see it, there must be a prior 
process of association which I believe takes the form of a predication 
before you have anything to read into the moraory* Biller comments that 
"although associating at this ^ /organis^llevel has been Investigated 
by thousands of researchers it is a remarkable fact that as of now the 
structure of the associator is not known for any organism".'*'* An 
observer might be led to think that perhaps he is looking for something 
as a separate structure which is not there; what ho is missing is the 
grammatical structuring of all experience into predications.
Memory is defined by Biller as "the subsystem which carries out 
the second stage of the learning process, storing various sorts of 
information in the organism for different periods of time”; and this 
definition would cover well enough the mind-manifold as I conceive it*
But his discussion of the relevant processes of reading into storage, 
storage and retrieval, with their corresponding structures, is nearly 
all conducted in physiological terras; he makes no reference to the ways 
in which the material stored is ordered, nor to any correlation between 
this and the ways in which it Is associated, read into storage and 
retrieved. There is no separate identification of facts of existence 
and facts of classification. The distinction between association (as he 
narrowly defines it) and reading into storage ie far from precise; nor 
is it recognised that what is association in one direction is retrieval 
in another direction* (In the terras of my model only one word is needed) 
Nor is there any consideration of links of resemblance end links of 
organisation (or metonymy) as principles of association*
Isfhen it comes to the decider, "the executive subsystem", Biller 
says that "much Is still unknown about the structure of this most caucial 
of organism subsystems"^; but he refer© to various endocrine anil*neural 
components which are organised (in the mamalian case) into nine echelons, 
from that of certain neurones, as in the gut, which elicit contraction of 
a muscle by "axonal reflexes", to a series if different structures in the
1* "Living Systems", p. 407.
2* "Living Systems", p* 423.
brain of which the last is the cerebral cortex. At each successive level 
more information from inside and outside the organism is brought to bear 
on the decision. Miller’a discussion of the decider is related to the 
four|istages of the decision-making process as he sees it. In regard to 
the first stage, that of establishing purposes or goals, he refers to 
attention as a method of regulation which favours one category of inputs 
over another. He describes motivational drives as related to goals 
"determined by (I) disturbances in one or more of an individual’s sub­
systems, i.e. his physiological steady states? (ii) the Individual’s 
concept of what constitutes the optimal welfare for his total organism? 
and (iii) his suprasystem’s standards as represented to him by authority 
figures. He relates these three types of motivation to Freud’s id, ego 
and super-ego* Boxt he offers a physiological account of emotions as 
ieiehcei^ diencephalic processes in the brain elicited by
information inputs. As regards the second stage of decision-making, 
namely, analysis of the situation, Hiller finds little that is specific 
to cay, apart from noting that ablation of the posterior Intrinsic sector 
of a monkey’s brain appears to disrupt its ability to accumulate 
information providing cue3 to the correct solution of a problem. In 
regard to the third stage, however, that of the synthesis of a course 
of action, he discusses at greater length such matters as plans, strategies 
and algorithms, probabilities, utilities and costs, the importance of 
proper "chunking" of inputs and the influence of group pressures on the
individual? and on the physiological aspect he concludes that the frontal
1.
cortex must function whenever choices are made among alternatives*
In all this there is clearly much that can be accommodated to my 
model and Is in effect grist to my mill* But it seems to me that the 
processes he describes are not mutually related in a fully coherent way, 
and that they make an uneasy fit with his threefold structural division 
between decider, associator and memory. He does give some separate 
attention to "oystam processes", when ho deals with stress and anxiety,
1* Miller’s fourth stage of decision-making, that of implementation, 
need not be considered here. His discussion of this stage centres 
on the physiological mechanisms by which command signals are 
transmitted into effect. He notes that the sources of willed 
Impulses have not yet been identified, but it Is suggested that 
they may be "non-specific centres" of the raid-brain end 
diencephalon.
with concepts of personality, particularly as they issue in defence 
mechanisms or, as he prefers to calljthem, "adjustment processes", 
and with such concepts as "attitudes", "cognitive consistency" and 
"structural balance". Miller’s own definition of a system process is 
that it is one in which the subsystems act as components of the higher 
level system, but he says little to explain how in practice relation­
ships between the subsystem-components build up the system process. 
Overall we have a compendium of ideas but, as I suggested earlier, not 
a working model - not, in Biller’s own terms, a "concrete system"*
His defence, a perfectly legitimate one, against such a criticism 
would be that we do not know enough yet to be able to construct any 
detailed working model that would be more than a tissue of speculation* 
But for my part, as I have indicated on an earlier page, I believe that 
much of value can be achieved by trying to elaborate a coherent model 
to reflect the functions of the mind; and this is what, in the present 
study, I am trying to do*
Nonetheless, I feel myself challenged to say mors precisely how I 
would describe my own preliminary model, as sketched in this chapter,
In terms of structure and process* I conclude, fibst, that the mind- 
manifold is certainly a structure, synchronic and unchanging in relation 
to any one predication* It is the structure of one subsystem of the 
organism as a living system. It is itself of course subject to change 
over longer spans of time, and thereby is transformed into successive 
different structures as the input of experience and the crumbling effect 
of time have their effect. Correspondingly we can say that the 
irreversible flow of experience through the living system constitutes 
a single process* It is not impossible to Imagine the mind-flianifold in 
physical terms as part or all of the cerebral cortex or to imagine the 
flow of experience in physical terras as consisting of all the physio­
logical events, including neural events, that take place during the 
life of the organism* But it must bo remembered that we have no direct 
consciousness of either the mind—manifold or the total process of life* 
What we experience arc predications at the focus of the consciousness 
of Me Here Mow. And, crucially, it is at the focus of consciousness, 
within the span of one predication, that we are able to unify structure
and process, synchrony and diachrony.
In a predication the subject, which is a synchronic structure, is 
linked In a transition over real time, which is a diachronic process, to 
a predicate, which is again a synchronic structure. As the total pred­
ication is grasped and slips, in a further process, out of the span of 
immediate consciousness, it builds up a new synchronic structure, a 
reflection of which is read into the mind-manifold; and a further copy 
or image taken from it can thereafter be embedded as a subordinate 
synchronic structure In a succeeding predication, just as a subordinate 
cl&fsse can be embedded in a wider sentence.
The structures of consciousness are built of ideas which "are forms? 
and forms are themselves by definition synchronic end potentially capable 
of being analysed into configurations (or structures) of components. The 
relationships between forms are always also synchronic, except for the 
single central diachronic transition at the hinge of the predication 
at the focus of consciousness Hero Now. According to this picture, 
therefore, we have the mind-manifold as one major structure or sub­
system and the arena of consciousness as another# The arena is difficult 
to characterise because it has no lasting content. What essentially 
constitutes the arena is a stabilisation of tho coordinates of a space. 
Xsidor Chein quotes Koffka as arguing in his "Principles of Gestalt 
Psychology" that the ego is an object which "sorves as the origin of the 
system of spatial coordinates*** different from all others inasmuch as 
it determines fundamental space aspects". Chain puts the point in his 
own words as follows? "the self is that which is the origin of perceived 
space-time (origin of course being understood in the mathematical and not 
in the historical or genetic oenss); or, if you will, the self is the 
hereness in the thereness... I am here in space-time and the objects with 
respect to which I act are thero."^* I da not wish to go into detail 
about tho Self at this stage, but I would strongly endorse tho point that 
consciousness involveo a spaco Hore Now within which up and down, left 
and right, front and back have to be stabilised before any form or
1. "The Science of Behaviour and th© Image of Man" (Tavistock 1973)
p. 197* A note on Chein*s account of the imago of man is given
in Appendix I to this study.
structure can emerge? and this applies to the logical or metaphorical 
space of ideas as much as to physical spaces even when you are thinking 
about quadratic equations or the state of the economy you are facing 
towards the ideas before your mind, which ere in e true sense distanced 
from you and deployed in front of you* (It Is possible to perceive and 
think in two dimensions rather than three, but even then the images or 
ideas of which we are aware are deployed in depth in front of us end this 
depth provides an essential third dimension, even if we ore not conscious 
of it at the time.) The space appears to be synthesised anew for each 
predication, though for successive predications within a progression or 
a train of thought the new space io not totally different,' but rather 
represents a shifted perspective, an extension growing out of that of 
the previous predication without altering its basic coordinates.1* It 
is hard to think of the arena as a continuing subsystem with its own 
structure, comparable to the mind-manifold? indeed it is hard to conceive 
of it at all# Yet the continuity of the focus Me Here Now during an 
individual’s waking hours is the central fact of consciousness. It 
would bo rash in the extreme to suggest a physical location or structure 
for the arena beyond saying that it is linked somehow to the physical 
organism and moves with it through the world? but it 3s surely a fact 
of which our model must take account# Given its continuity I would 
regard it as in Miller’s terms a subsystem of the organism, and I 
would specify its structure as the frame of coordinates, up and down, 
left and right, front and back, within which every apprehension of 
consciousness has to emerge#
lifhat then of the ideas and predications, the forms, qualities and 
intensities of consciousness, the flow of information through the mind?
My answer would be that predications, which unite synchrony with diach­
rony, can be categorised as ephemeral structure/processes within the 
subsystem? their succession In progressions and trains of thought can 
be categorised as a characteristic process of tho subsystem; and tho 
succession of purposive cycles to which they belong can be categorised 
as simultaneous higher order processes within the subsystem. Thus we
1. See In this connection the section "The Nature of Logical Space"
on page 127 above#
have a basic structure consisting of the raincWnsnifold and the arena; 
and two basic processes, one at the lower level of the progression and 
the train of thought, and the other at the higher level of the purposive 
cycle. It is worth emphasising that only the predication of the moment 
is present to consciousness# The purposive cycle works itself out 
unconsciously, and so does the progression or train of thought, though 
we can always bring either of them to consciousness by making It the 
subject of a predication#
Certain further "system processes" which involve relationships with 
other subsystems remain to be discussed# First there is the processed 
and coded input of the senses transmitted from what Biller- calls the 
"decoder" t© the arena# This input consists of synchronic recodings of 
limited spans of the Irreversible diachronic flow of experience; they 
amount to "loose" forms or combinations of forms which, on reaching the 
arena, are organised through a process of focussing and selection into 
the predications of which we are aware# Beyond this there is the process 
by which a reflection of each completed predication is transmitted to the 
mind-manifold and tho reveroa process by which reflections from the mind- 
manifold - all synchronic forms or structures of forms - are transmitted 
to the arena for incorporation into predications# Finally there is a 
further process of output from the arena whereby, at the end of the 
third phase of a purposive cycle, a selected course of action, an adopted 
personal plan (which is itself a form or structure of forms) is transmitted 
via Miller’s "encoder" subsystem to other subsystems of the organism, end 
results in action* This is the process of behaviour*
The account of the mind given in this chapter is inescapably spe­
culative and involves many arguable assertions, a full discussion of which 
would take much more than the space so far occupied by what is already a 
long chapter# But it may serve nonetheless to suggest something of the 
nature of the structures and processes which any working model of the 
mind would have to encompass, and os such it may provide a sufficient 
frame within which to pursue our eqquiry into the Self.
Ills THE IDEA OF THE SELF IN CONSTRUCTION 
AND ACTION
Thou which within niB art, yet me2 Thou eye 
And temple of hie whole infinity#
- Thomas Traherne
Definitions and Perspectives
A first approach to the question of u/hat wo mean by 
the Self, identifying three perspectives, those of 
biological man, behavioural man, and psychological 
man#
Who- am X? What do I mean when X talk about myoelf? If I am a 
person, what is a person? It Is curiously difficult to give straight 
answers to such questions#
As a first step it may be helpful to consider what things can be 
reckoned as parts of me, and then to look at the sum of these parts.
Ply body, as I see and feel it now, is part of me, and eo are all the 
members and organs of my body# So are my thoughts and feelings at this 
moment# But so too are my memories and all my past activities and 
thoughts and feelings, going back to tho womb (even when I do not remember 
them); they all go to make up my total Self. So too my body in all its 
past history# So too my plans and aspirations, my future Self - body, 
thoughts# feelings, activities «* all the way to death and dissolution* 
Nearly all of my past has already gone beyond the recall of memory, 
but it is still part of the truth of what has happened in the world#
Nearly all of my future is beyond prediction or conception, but the 
fact that it is coming, however vaguely it may be delineated, is vary 
much p part of me.
The totality of all this I shall provisionally call the sum of me.
Now what is it that makes a sum of all these parts? Uhat binds them 
together? Firat, we may say, the continuity of the body as s physical 
form continuous in specs and time from conception to dissolution*
Secondly the briefer, overlapping continuities of ray behaviour, that is 
of linked sequential activities by the body, which extend from crawling 
or walking to playing football or performing tho role of Hamlet; and here 
us have to distinguish particular acts or sequences of behaviour occurring 
on particular occasions from recurring patterns of behaviour, like those 
associated with driving a car, or having a chip on the shoulder, which 
unify, In an abstract sense, many particular instances* Thirdly there are 
the continuities represented by my plans and aspirations, the paths which 
I plot out through the future which, as time moves on, are steadily over­
taken and replaced by present actuality, and are as steadily oxtsndad 
into a further future, fourthly there is the continuity of consciousness 
which consists, as I have argued, of a continuous sequence of predications 
of thought and perception, one at a time and one after another, throughout 
ray waking hours.
These are four types of distinguishable continuity which give apparent 
structure and unity to the accumulation of parts which is the sura of me.
But how do I know myself? Only through consciousness. But conscious 
knowledge always involves a knouer and what is known, an I and a not-I,
a subject and an object. The Self is what the knower as subject
recognises when he looks at the subject of his knowing, making it an
object.1* But as soon as it becomes an object it is no longer the
subject, the I cannot simultaneously be the not-I. I cannot know 
myself directly, because I cannot distance myself from myself. How are 
we to find a way out of this dilemma?
Let us begin by considering what we can say about the knower,
considered as an object. The answer is not very much. Essentially we 
deduce it as the point where the coordinates of the personal space in 
which I think ideas or perceive physical forms (that is to say, the arsna
of ray consciousness) have their origin* As Chein soys, it is "that which
is at the origin of perceived space time". It is also however the origin,
in some sense, of my perceived activity or behaviour - in Piaget’s uordo
"a centre of functioning", in Chein*s words "a hub of activity". At
1. I am using "subject" and "object" in the ordinary sense
corresponding to "subjectively" and "objectively"? but this
is not of course the same as the grammatical sense.
the same time it is always associated with the body end located in, or 
at least near, it* Yet it has no precise and permanent location in the 
body* Chein compares it in this sense to the body’s centre of gravity*
Ue ourselves tend to identify it not just with the body i#t with the 
total Self, the sum of me* One could say that it is tho representative 
of the sum of me at-the growing point of time, Mo-Hera-Now, where the 
future is still uncertain and the present is being created. It is the 
oye and the will of the total Self as it takes cognisance of the world 
and, in somo degree, creates it*
I am aware that the preceding paragraph somewhat strains 
comprehension and relies on metaphor to a greater extent than seems 
desirable in a study of this kind* But we must not delude ourselves 
that we can deal with the simple questions at thetead of this chapter 
without venturing on the brink of the comprehensible* Nor should we 
delude ourselves that any general theory of psychology which fails to 
face theso ultimate questions can ever establish a perspective to take 
in the whole man* I will return to the statue of the knower in the 
last chapter of this study* Meanwhile we can move to the question of the self 
what Is known* In effect we dealt with this question in Chapter IX 
We cannot directly know the Self as it is; but we can and do form an 
Idea of the Self, which provides the basis for our knowing.
How does this happen? To begin with, we can see, hear and feel 
bits of ourselves, end watch bits of ourselves acting, in the Here-Now*
And the model developed in Chapter II suggests that every such 
conscious experience can be remembered (though not every one is remembered 
in practice)* Those forms which ere remembered become accretions to a 
feature of the mind-manifold which is a representation of my total Self, 
located within the mind’s representation, or map, of the world in space 
and time. This feature is a complex suporimposition and organisation 
of all the remembered episodes, activities, imaginations, thoughts and 
plans of a whole lifetime in which my Self, in actuality or imagination, 
plays or has played a part* When I think of the Self at any time, the 
idea I evoke is the limited profile of this immense complex which 
emerges as relevant in the perspective or context of the moment; but 
it stands for the whole, even though the whole cannot bo grasped entire.
just as a two-dimensional Imago formed on my retina is realised as 
standing for tho whole of a solid three-dimensional objeafc, of which 
the greater part is hidden from view# What is more, it stands for 
the real whole, the thing in itself, the I, the Knower, tho Actor, 
not merely for the representation on the mind-manifold*
When I think of other people, the process is exactly the same, 
though the idea-complex representing another person, even one I know 
wall, is inevitably far smaller and less elaborated than the idea- 
complex relating to myself#
Any particular view that I take of myself on a given occasion (what 
I havo called the evoked Idea), although it may stand for the whole, can 
only embrace a minute fraction of all the detail that I potentially 
know about myself; and the same is true, though to a lesser extent, of 
my evoked idea of any other person who is at all well known to me*
Inevitably the evoked idea on any given occasion is highly selective#
It will consist of a number of features, or subordinate forms, super­
posed and organised in euch a way as to build up a more complex form#
Those features may bo particular events in which the Self has a part, 
or particular physical or mental activities of the Self, spreading over 
longer or shorter periods, whether in the past, the present, or ths imagined 
future; or they may be more generalised characteristics, classifications 
of many recurrent features# In many contexts the evoked idea is so vague 
as to be no more than a marker, but it is always sufficient to identify 
the particular idea complex we are thinking about, located as it is in 
space and time on the map of the mind-manifold#
It seems broadly far to say that there are three main types of 
perspective in which such a view, or evoked idea, may emerge, and 
consequently three main types of selectivity# First there is the type 
of perspective in which we evoke a highly generalised idea of the whole 
complex. Here I see myself as represented by my biological destiny 
across space and time — as the biological man, the organism defined in 
relation to its environment# Secondly there is the type of perspective 
in which the evoked idea is of some aspect of my behaviour os seen from 
the outside — or rather as I imagine that someone else, perhaps George
Herbert Mead’s "generalised other" would see it from the outside*
This could be called a view of the behavioural man, defined'essentially 
from tho outside in his relation to others, a view that includes the 
generalised classifications of pattorns of behaviour or disposition 
which are called traits* Thirdly, there is the type of perspective in 
which the evoked Idea is of some aspect of the purposive roles or plans 
or aspirations that I adopt for myself* This could be called a view 
of the purposive, psychological man, defined essentially in relation to 
his own aspirations for the future*
Ue note that the phenomena which emerge in the first two types of 
perspective are also open in principle to the observation of other 
people; they are "objective" phenomena# But those which emerge in the 
third type of perspective aro "subjective" phenomena: X can describe 
them to other people, but only I myself can observe thorn directly*
There is an idea complex in my mind-manifold relating to every person 
whom I know individually, including myself? and ideas can bs evoked of 
every such person in each of the three types of perspective. But when 
I am thinking of other people my ideas of their plans and aspirations 
are second-hand or conjectural; only in the case of myself, the 
reflexive person, are they directly observed. In general when I speak 
of an individual# I am thinking of the biological man; when I speak of 
a person* I am thinking of the behavioural man; when I epoak of a Self 
(even someone else1s Self) I am thinking of a man who Is subjective, 
purposive and capable of reflection. All three however relato to the 
same idea complex which can be called indifferently the idea of the 
individual, the idea of the person, or the idea of the Self. The 
distinction is one of perspective, not ultimately of subject matter. 
Logically, we may note, theso distinctions could bo said to^dofine the 
perspectives of human biology or anthropology, of behavioural science, 
and of psychology proper (which is concerned with tho psycho, usually 
translated as soul, spirit or mind); although in practice, of course, 
those perspectives considerably overlap at their borders.
Psychological Man
Man as a purposive being, concerned with imagined plans, 
always setting himself goals and always dissatisfied*
The relation of s plan to Its scenario, otherwise tho 
facts and possibilities of the surrounding world* The 
anticipatory Self as a rope of overlapping personal 
plans fraying out into the future*
My concern in this study is essentially with the conscious,
reflective Self, and hence with the third type of perspective, that of 
psychological man* This does not mean that I question the legitimacy 
of other views of man - the "bio-social view", for example, which is 
associated with H.3. Eysenck, or the strict behaviourist view associated 
with 8©F« Skinner* or the systems view developed by 3emes G* Miller, or 
George Kelly’s personal construct view, or Rom Harre’s "Architectonic 
Man", or the biological view based on evolution and bioenergetics by 
3.M. Brener, to mention but a feu. Nor, however, on the other hand,
am I willing to concede anything to the exclusive claims of those
proponents of other views who object altogether to mentalism, otherwise 
the use of the direct evidence of conscious experience, on the grounds 
that it "buries the sources of human behaviour within the individual and 
so obscures thorn from public view."1* The earlier parts of this work 
represent, as I would claim, the development of an objective model in 
terms of which it is possible to accommodate in principlG a whole 
variety of different perspectives on human nature, biological, 
behavioural or psychological, and to recognise the usefulness of 
different perspectives in different circumstances. It is only from now 
on that I narrow my sights exclusively to one particular typo of 
perspective; and, even so, as I have already said, I propose to return 
to a broader perspective in the final chapter.
In order'to approach psychological man, let us turn to Shakespeare. 
This is the soliloquy of King Richard II, defeated end held prisoner 
in Pomfret castlo, at the end of the play:
1. 3.H. Braoer in Chopmsn and 3ones ed. "Models of Man", British
Psychological Society, 1980, p. 88.
I have been studying how I may compare 
This prison where I live unto the world 
And, for because the world is papulous 
And here is not a creature but myself,
I cannot do it* Yet I’ll hammer it out*
My brain I’ll prove the female to my soul,
My soul the father; and these two beget 
A generation of still-breading thoughts,
And these same thoughts people thie little world,
In humours like the people of this world, 
for no thought is contented. The better sort,
As thoughts of things divine, are intermix’d 
Uith scruples, and do set the word itself 
Against the word,
As thus: ’Borne, little ones’; and then again,
’It is as hard to come as for a camel 
To thread the postern of a small needle’s eye’.
Thoughts tending to ambition, they do plot 
Unlikely wonders: how these vain weak nails 
May tear a passage through tho flinty ribs 
Of this hard world, my ragged prison walls;
And, for they cannot, die in their own pride.
Thoughts tending to content flatter themselves 
That they are not the first of fortune’s slaves,
Nor shall not bo the last? like silly beggars 
UJho, sitting in the stocks, refuge their shame,
That many have and others must sit there;
And in this thought they find a kind of ease,
Bearing their own misfortunes on the back 
Of such as ' have before endur’d the like*'
Thus ploy I in one person many people,
And none contented. Sometimes am I king;
Then treasons make me wish myself a beggar,
And so I am. Then crushing penury 
Persuades me I was better when a king;
Then am I king’d again; and by and by 
Think that I am unking’d by Bolingbroke,
And straight cm nothing. But whete’er I be,
Nor I, nor any man that but roan is,
Uith nothing shall be pleas’d till he be eas’d 
With being nothing.
"My brain I’ll prove the female to my soul, my soul the father; 
and these two beget a generation of still-breeding thoughts". These 
thoughts, he says, are like people, for they people this little 
world. And they have one dominant characteristic (this is what tho 
speech is about), that of discontent. For no thought is contented. 
Thoughts of things divine are intermixed with scruples - by which I 
think he means ideas of duty, bringing discontent uith our present 
state - or they run into seeming contradictions that are barriers to
comprehension. Thoughts tending to ambition fail. Thoughts of .ease 
and contentment merely flatter and deceive themselves. "I play", he 
says, "in one person many people, and none contented." Whatever I am,
I will be contented with nothing till I eventually am nothing. These 
are parts or roles that he is playing, but they are different from those 
of behavioural man, for they are not reflected in behaviours they are 
imagined personal roles or plans.
Here perhaps is the clue, to psychological man. He is full of f 
thoughts which always tend towards something, towards ooals; he is always 
setting himself goals and always dissatisfied. The crucial thing about 
him is that he is Here Now, but is never content with what he has or 
is Here Now, he is already looking forward with anxiety, greed, 
ambition, hope, fear or whatever to the future. Inching so he is 
constantly mopping out plans, or personal roles, as unique pathways 
leading towards his goals. Being plans, they are sequences of features 
of behaviour, but they are saen, understood, classified from the inside, 
in a different way from tho social roles of behaviourifl;; man, seen from 
the outside.1* The bargain which Goethe’s Faust struck with the devil 
was that the devil could take him if he ever said to the passing moments 
"Stay awhile, you are so fair". And Faust here is Everyman.
Man is of his nature a purposive being. In bodily terms the
preservation of the gene pattern is represented by what Ashby called
2
the essential variables , which have to be kept within certain limits 
of value if survival is to be assured. If the value of one of the essential 
variables is too far from the norm, we feel pain or hunger or thirst, 
for example; and the effect is that we establish imagined wish-fulfilment 
situations in which the value is brought back to normal. Wq explore
1. A comparable distinction is drawn by Professor Bohn Rex between 
ppychological and sociological explanations. "The former could 
be thought of as explanations of an actor’s actions in terms of 
his own pattern of motivation, whereas the latter must be thought 
of as explanations of one actor’s actions in terms of the 
pattern of motivation of another." ("Key Problems of Socio­
logical Theory", Routledge and Kegan Paul 1961, p. 179.) While 
I think the distinction is accurately drawn, I would not wish to 
exclude sociological explanations from psychology or vice oorsa.
2. "An Introduction to Cybernetics", section 10/4.
all kinds of perceptions# recollections and associations in such a way 
as to identify possible chains of cause and effect deriving from our 
own possible actions and leading through an environmental scenario to 
the achievement of the goal image or the avoidance of the aversion 
image. Successful achievement is associated with pleasure# which is 
in some sense an indication of what is ultimately good for the 
essential variables; and what we associate with pleasure becomes an 
object of desire.
Our goals are linked however only in exceptional circumstances to 
the direct preservation of essential biological variables. Ordinarily 
we are concerned to plot a path through a labyrinthine future# 
constantly establishing for ourselves proximate goals which are related 
not to physical indicators of need# but in the first instance at least 
to some idea of establishing our Self in a Situation which is imagined 
as satisfactory. Thus Richard II Imagines various personal plans, 
compares them with past experience# explores their associations and 
evaluates them, weighing them in the balance of pleasure and pains
Sometimes am I a king;
Then treasons make me wish myself a beggar,
And so I am. Then crushing penury
Persuades me I was better when a king...
It is clear however that we do not make these assessments in 
isolation from one another. The Self we imagine in a given situation 
not merely brings with It a body of a given age and condition, it also 
brings uith it s great deal of baggage from the past and a great many 
commitments to the future. These are all Incorporated as elements in 
the idea of the Self# which possesses enormously ramified links of 
organisation, because it has been associated with all the conscious 
experience of the individual in his lifetime. It is built up, like any 
other idea-complex, by the constant accretion of ideas which reinforce 
and modify existing features, or add new ones as the case may be. As 
we have seen, it includes all the past history - the past development 
and behaviour - of the man# so far as these have left any trace on tho 
mind; and also all hie future, so far as that can be predicted by the 
mind. The structures relating to tho past consist of the past 
development of the biological man# together uith those personal plans
ioy
(and any social roles they may subsume) which have been adopted and 
performed# or pertly performed to date, and haoe thus through their 
eventual performance been sealed in as ibshaviour, whether or not they 
went according to forecast. (Plans and roles which have been 
considered but not adopted can still find a place in the memory a3 part 
of the idea of the Self, but only as imagined, not actod out, behaviour.) 
The structures relating to the future consist of tho predicted future 
development of the biological man, together with those parts of .adopted 
personal plans which have not yet been performed or completed and so 
stretch on into tho future. These structures projecting into the future 
we may call the anticipatory self.
Ue can say that in any existential situation when the mind is
plotting out and comparing possible future personal plans, they are
matched against the complex of the anticipatory Self and assessed in
four ways more or less simultaneously. First they are assessed for
1 'logical compatibility - if the new plan is incompatible with an 
existing one, then either the one or the other has to be modified or 
abandoned. Secondly, as an extension of the first process, they are 
assessed for desirability? do they help forward other, usually longer 
term, plans which are an accepted part of the Self, or do they get in 
their way? Thirdly they are assessed for feasibility, the likelihood 
that they could be successfully carried through, given the facts and 
probabilities of the environment, including other people. Fourthly 
they are assessed for pain or pleasure. This is not a matter of tuning 
one form against another, but one of assessing the emotional resonance 
of'.the imagined plan, the simultaneous impact of all its associations 
in the mind, the blend and extent of which yield not only a specific 
quality and intensity of mood, but also, on a different register, a 
value for what we might describe as emotional want or emotional 
aversion. All four of these assessments can affect the acceptability 
of a new plan in different ways? but if eventually adopted it becomes 
part of the anticipatory Self, which is fundamentally a rope of over­
lapping personal plans of varying time spans.
1. The nature of logical incompatibility is discussed in "The
Grammar of Language".
It is true that us cannot dissociet© a plan from ths facts and 
possibilities of the surrounding world# which include those of the 
individual’s own mental and physical capacities# and in which the plan 
is embedded* Nor# consequently# can we dissociate it from the in­
dividual’s ideas concerning the world in general# that is# from the 
rest of his mind-manifold. Our model suggests# however, that we must 
envisage the environmental "scenario" as a unified idea-complex of its 
own within the manifold. The fact that it may ba built up originally 
of copies or reflections of relevant ideas derived from elsewhere in 
the manifold does not affsct this point. And when the plan is 
definitely adopted# the scenario complex# with the plan at its core, 
itself becomes part of the idea-complex of the Self.
Many of the personal plans building up the idea of the Self will 
be the counterparts of social roles# and these carry thoir own social 
constraints. But even when there is no external social restraint e 
man fools an internal psychological constraint which makes him reluctant 
to abandon a personal plan he has once adopted before it has reached its 
end. He may of course have to# because of some necessity imposed by the 
environment, physical or social* He may do it anyway, because he wants 
to adopt some other plan which is incompatible with it, or because he 
is disappointed with the way it is working out in practice. But it i© 
always a major step to abandon a long term plan once adopted# because 
it means abandoning part of a man’s idea of himself, and thereby aban­
doning port of the mechanism he has developed for svoiding contradiction 
among his shorter term plans* A man’s longest term plans, especially 
those concerning his religious or philosophical values# his family# his 
job and his position in society# tend to govern his life* In general he 
selects only such shorter term plans as are consistent with them. 
Otherwise# if these plans conflict# he can easily fetch up in trouble 
and confusion. He develops therefore a sot of more or loss consistent 
and interlinked longer term personal plans, tending towards goals which 
he accepts as desirable and which it would bo difficult anyway to change 
now without producing some highly undesirable sido effects. These plans 
are wound together in a skein which is set firm in the past, but frays 
out in generalised form into the future, constantly shaping the man’s 
choice among shorter term plans that emerge unceasingly in the press of
circumstance and the swell of desire* This complex of plans projecting 
into the future, combined with the mental and physical resources 
effectively available to the individual at the time, constitute the 
reacting part of the Self, which I call the anticipatory Self. This 
feature is central to the character of psychological man, the,man of 
purposes who is always focussing and refocussing his mind on images 
of contentment and working out trajectories that lead towards them, 
but whose mirage of contentment is never achieved!
Uhate’er I be 
Nor I nor any man that but man is 
Uith nothing shall be pleas’d, till he be eas’d 
Uith being nothing.
The idea of the Self is what it is at any given time. It evolves, 
grows, changes, decays, with biological man, but at any given timevit- 
is complete in itself, including its own past and future in synchronic 
form. Its reacting part can perhaps rightly be called the personality 
of the man. Even so, only one aspect of it - which we may call the face 
that the personality presents, otherwise the evoked idea of the Self - 
can come into focus at any one time in any one contingency of a person’s 
life.
To elaborate briefly on this word personality, I regard it as that 
in a man which determines his decisions. The word is commonly used by 
psychologists to refer to a particular composition of traits or dis­
positions, and this usage is appropriate to the perspective of behavioural 
man! a trait is itself a classification of behaviour. But what from 
the outside is classifiable as a trait or disposition, from the inside 
is classifiable as a plan. (I use the word plan to refer not only to 
specific personal roles applicable to specific occasions but also to 
more generalised plans or policies applicable to whole classes of 
occasions. If I become a solicitor, for example, or get married, I am 
in either case adopting a generalised plan uhich will be acted out in 
different ways in innumerable different occasions in the future. Many 
of our long term plans are of this generalised kind.1’) It follows 
therefore that in my use of the word personality I am referring to the
1. See the further discussion on pages ^ gg#
same thing as the behavioural psychologists, but looking at it in the 
perspective of psychological rather than behavioural man.
For most purposes psychological man represents a more useful,
comprehensible, manoeuvrable concept than those of biological man or
behavioural man. Yet can we say that this idea of the Self.represents
the essential man? I think not. It seems, and is, a contradiction to
treat the idea of something as its essential reality.—  This evolving
personality, psychological man, is still made of plans, just as, in a
different way, behavioural man is made of social roles; and, as
Shakespeare pointed out on more than one occasion, the actor is not the 
2same as his parts ; indeed he includes his parts. So ue come back to 
biological man, that four-dimensional world line, the individual who 
includes behavioural and psychological man in himself. This, one 
might say, is the actor, and therefore the true man, in theological 
terms the creature. Yet he is of the three the hardest to think about 
and speak about.
Uhy? I think because he represents a profound mystery which ue 
cannot anyway bring fully into focus. If ue take the underlying actor 
for granted, it is then comparatively easy to think about particular 
sequences of behaviour or particular personal plans, or even that 
composition of personal plans and capacities which is personality.
Usually when ue think of a man we think of him as psychological man, the 
man of plans and decisions; and this is natural because it is just in 
this way that we think of ourselves in any of the contingencies of life.
Yet, as the existentialists have pointed out, the decider and the actor
3 ,
are not quite the same. * Ultimately I am not a personality, a syn­
chronic composition; I am a life, a diachronic destiny. I can recognise 
myself here now, but that does not exhaust me; I am all that I was, and
all that I will be, and all that I ever heard or saw or thought or knew,
find as my destiny begins in mystery it ends in mystery, and it makes its 
own small track across a universe of mystery.
1. This point is also made by Isidor Chein: "The Self and the Self- 
Concept are not identical, no more than is any concept identical 
with what it is a concept of.” (op. cit. p. 206).
2. "One man in his day plays many parts”. But who, then, is the man?
No one has thought more profoundly on this point than Shakespeare. 
See in this connection the further discussion on page below. See 
also "Drama as the Deep Structure of Psychology” by fi.E.St.G. floss 
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Surrey).
3. This point is discussed in more detail in a later section. See 
page 374 below.
lile find ourselves faced here uith the limitations of all knowledge. 
What we know consists of facts; and these are always facts about reality, 
ideas that are identified as unique because of their reference to unique 
locations in space and time, but ideas nonetheless, not the immediate 
reality which we cannot ever frame into factual knowledge. On the face 
of it each of the versions of man is valid in its own context. In the 
words of Isaac Pehington, the Quaker, "Every truth is shadow except 
the last. Yet every truth is substance in its own place, though it be 
but shadow in another place.” In our immediate context it is purposive, 
psychological man with whom us are most concerned. In the sections 
which follow I will attempt a closer analysis of the way in which his 
personality is built up and operates. In doing so I will need to go 
over some of the ground covered in Chapter II when we were considering 
the purposive cycle, but this time I shall be doing so from a different 
angle, considering the idea of the Self rather than the purposive cycles 
in which, at every moment, the Self is occupied.
The Idea of a Person (l)
An account of the idea of the Self as built up from 
a superimposition of logical forms from which a 
particular profile is evoked on a particular occasion.
If a man*s idea of himself is not fundamentally different in nature 
from the ideas he forms of other things, and in particular of other 
people, the best way of considering how it is built up may be to look 
first at the way in which we build up other ideas.
In terms of the model described in Chapter II itis characteristic 
of any idea complex that it is built up by the sUperimposition of 
different logical forms, acquired in different circumstances. These 
are brought together either because they correspond to a single abject 
with a unique trajectory in space time, or because they are subsumed, 
as a family of forms linked by family resemblances, under a specific 
sign or symbol. Other ideas are continually beinij thought, but they 
have to be built up ad hoc on each occasion out of the forms available 
from this repertory, or derived from current perceptual experience.
Uhen one idea has been built up more than once it may acquire its own
sign or name, and so become a new complex on its own. The form which 
the same complex will yield when stimulated in different circumstances 
will vary, just as the wave form generated by a vibrating body will 
vary according to the way it is struck. Similarly the profile of a 
three-dimensional object - whether it is a salt cellar or a cathedral - 
will vary according to the angle from which it is viewed; yet in spite of 
this the profile of the moment is taken ae a sign of the three-dimensional 
shape which it is beyond the power of our senses to grasp as a 
simultaneous whole.
The elements which are superimposed as ue build up our idea of a 
person are recollections of situations, classifications (e.g. of social 
roles, traits and other behaviour patterns), events, thoughts, progressions 
of events or trains of thought, in all of which the person figures in one 
way or another. They are derived from predicative systems in which he or 
she is related to other people and things by links of organisation, 
whether spatio-temporal or logical; and it is a significant consequence 
that when we recollect the person other people and things are brought 
along too. But the fundamental link of organisation which holds all 
these scenes and ideas together is that they all find their place in 
or around a continuous series of transformations, or changes of state, 
of one natural object or body, which has a beginning in the formation of 
a zygote cell and an end in the dissolution of the last cell bearing the 
characteristic gene pattern.
It is important to note that the profile evoked in any given situation 
is not simply a reanimation of one of these recollections. 3ust as ue 
smooth a curve round the points plotted to make a graph, so we can fill 
in by imagination (though usually in a highly generalised way) the bits 
of which we know nothing. Out of the superimposed elements the mind 
builds not a pile of pieces but a continuous whole, from which we 
recreate in each context an appropriate, if sometimes vague and 
generalised, continuous profile. I can think of my father, now dead, 
as a man who lived for 77 years. I can think of him holding a particular 
job over a period of years, I can think of him as a student, or on his 
wedding day, or in the act of putting a golf ball on his lawn. These 
are recollections — or imaginations — of widely varying time span, yet 
each represents a situation. They are different images spreading ovsr<
different periods of his life trajectory, but each can be taken as an 
aspect and a sign of a whole that is inexhaustible by any cumulation of 
aspects. Significantly they include representations of both, personal 
plans and social roles which he has adopted at one time or another. My 
brother and my sister will have largely different recollections of their 
father, and in any given context each of us will evoke him somewhat 
differently. But the different detailed imaginations will conform to a 
broad general shape uniting points we have in common, and above all 
excluding things which are incompatible with the known facts. In 
relation to the four situations suggested above, for instance, although 
our individual evocations would be different, in a real sense we would 
be evoking recognisably, or at least reconcilably, the same man.
■ + ■ 1Harre and Secord in "The Explanation of Social Behaviour” argue
that there is no single self associated with any one biological individual, 
but rather "a multiplicity of social selves", each appropriate to a 
particular social circle and system of obligation. As against this, 
it is my argument that (i) there is a single idea-complex of the Self 
stored in the mind-manifold, although (ii) as a complex whole it is 
inaccessible to our grasp; on the other hand (iii) a particular profile 
standing for the stored idea-complex of the Self is evoked ad hoc in 
every relevant situation and every such profile or "evoked idea" of the 
Self will in detail be different from every other. Prominent among the 
elements which build up the idea-complex of the Self are the personal 
plans and social roles which the Self has adopted; and it is the social 
roles, as they find expression in the evoked profile, which correspond 
to the "multiplicity of social selves" postulated by Harrs and Secord.
The Idea of Person (2)
A discussion of the views of Harre and Secord.
Before I attempt to work out my own model in further detail it 
will be relevant here to discuss more comprehensively the "ethogenic" 
view of man expounded in Harre and Secord*s book. This approach to 
psychology grows out of certain ideas drawn from Kant and Boscovich
1. Blackwell, 1972, page 93.
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which involve, they say,
••• a radical revision both of thing concepts and of action 
concepts.
a. Things are to be treated as individuals with powers.
b. Action is to be treated as the realisation of a 
potentially created in space in the neighbourhood of 
active things.
... Ue say of a thing that it has a power when it is capable 
of a certain action ... *1 virtue of its nature. The conditions• ' JTI • • -I
which have to obtain ... are called * enabling conditions*.
On this basis, and drawing on the ideas of certain modern philo­
sophers, iri particular Strawson and Hampshire, Harre and Secord have 
developed what they call the anthropomorphic model of man. People, 
they argue, are things (biological individuals) existing in space and 
time, which, are agents capable of initiating change and thus endowed 
with powers. They are not only aware of other things but aware of 
themselves being aware and of themselves as taking actions. The 
characteristic human actions of an individual of this kind:
are generated by the conscious sBlf-monitoring of its 
performance in accordance with certain sets of rules which 
it represents to itself in the course of making anticipatory 
and monitoring commentaries upon its performance and which 
it subjects to critical appraisal in retrospective 
commentaries... It can therefore choose different sets of 
rules for action and this is why a multiplicity of social 
selves are possible, since a social self is the apparent : \ 
unifying principle present in an organism*s performance in 
some social episode. Retrospective commentaries are 
usually given in a context of justification... There are 
two basic powers upon which the possibility of all this 
depends, the power of conscious self-monitoring and the 
power of speech. Ue are inclined to think that the power 
of conscious self-monitoring is the most fundamental... 
Expressing what one means jge regard as a special form of 
conscious self-monitoring.
"A man, then," they conclude, "is a mechanism, but one which
monitors and controls the way he performs... Such a being will most
economically control the manner of his action by following rules and
3.by forming and attempting to realise plans." * They note that there 
is scope for argument about the extent to which linguistic powers and 
the power of conscious self-monitoring are connected, but they do not
1. Ibid. pp. 67-68.
2. Ibid. pp. 93-94.
3. Ibid. p. 97.
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try to resolve this problem. They emphasise that the standpoint from 
which monitoring takes place and from which commentaries are made is 
not itself capable of figuring in an account given from that standpoint; 
the commentator himself must necessarily escape observation. The stand­
point from which ue view our actions is, in Kant*s terminology, 
transcendental - not given by experience but presupposed by experience. 
(The application of this label, as it seems to me, hardly disposes of 
the relationship between the conscious commentator and man as a "bio­
logical individual” or "mechanism”, but this is a perennial problem, 
and one so elusive that Harre and Secord may well be wise not to spend 
much time upon it.)
On the basis of this analysis Harre and Secord construct what is 
essentially a psychology of powers, contrasting with the model developed 
in this study, which could be described as essentially a psychology of 
plans. The two are not however irreconcilable. Perhaps the essential 
bridge between them is the importance assigned to possibility or 
potentiality in relation to actuality. "Possibility exists”, according 
to Harre and Secord, "because human beings have the power to make 
anticipatory and retrospective commentaries and to imagine what is going 
to happen or what might have been."'*'* I am not sure that I can accept 
the causal link, which implies that possibility could not exist without 
human beings; but in the present context that is neither here nor there. 
The importance of the possibility of alternatives in relation to learned 
responses and the nature.of behaviour is discussed in this study, for 
example, in the section on "Behaviour" on pages 30-32 above, where an 
important link is established between behaviour and information - for 
the essential nature of information lies in a relationship betueen 
limited possibility and actuality, a point to which Harre and Secord do 
not appear to make any reference.
Where I have been more concerned uith the process of the selection 
and eventual realisation of specific plans and scenarios, Harre and 
Secord have been more concerned uith the powers and liabilities which 
are eventually expressed in these decisions. The Mature of Flan, they 
say, is unknown, but we identify kinds of man by means of "type terms",
1. Ibid. p. 246
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which can be analysed into a mix of psychic and physiological components. 
With their aid we can establish ’’paramorphic models” of man, and the 
total set of such models in a man's nature is mediately related to his 
social behaviour through his set of possible social solves. Each 
social self is manifested as a cluster of powers and liabilities.
Powers and liabilities may be long term or merely transitory and short 
term,, and their effectiveness is related to appropriate enabling 
conditions. The particular cluster of powers and liabilities a man has 
at a particular time is highly variable. It may be described in 
certain circumstances as reflecting a particular state of readiness; 
this is essentially a teleological concept, identifying a state of the 
organism in virtue of which it is ready to do a specific type of thing.
These concepts can be accommodated to my model. The particular 
cluster of powers and liabilities a man has at a particular time 
corresponds to the evoked idea of the Self, the particular profile which 
is evoked from the stored idBa-complex of the Self in the mind-manifold, 
on a particular occasion. As this idea is evoked the individual will bo 
simultaneously forming an idea of his environment as it exists on this 
same unique occasion, and he does this with the aid of idea-complexes 
in his mind-manifold ordered, as we have seen, in two ways: by location 
on a four-dimensional map of the world and history, and by ’cllbsification - 
the classes being labelled by symbols. Ideas are evoked from appropriate 
idea-complexes by a kind of resonance, through links of similarity or 
past association with forms identified in the immediate environment, 
whether of perception or of thought. From these classifications are 
derived the constraints, otherwise the rules and roles, by which the 
individual interprets his environment and his own powers and 
liabilities in the situation, and hence works out his own view of the 
range of possibility open to him.
On my account the profile of the Self evoked in any given situation 
is unique to the occasion; but such profiles can themselves be classified 
by means of ”type terms”; and elements within them can be classified as 
powers and liabilities (or clusters thereof). The nature of the 
individual is constituted by the whole stored idea-complex of the Self
1. Ibid. pp. 264-8.
in the mind-manifold. Individual social selves can be identified as 
the social roles to which the individual is committed in relationships 
with other people (who play complementary roles); and these appear in 
varying guise in the evoked profiles of the Self which emerge on different 
occasions. Roles (or plans) can be identified as forms uniting linked' 
successions of rules; as noted on page 3^ 35 below, my views oh Ahis point 
are very close to those of Harre and Secord.
In the upshot, therefore, my account is more idiographic, more 
concerned with the specific occasion, and less a matter of types and 
classifications than theirs. It is much more detailed (though no doubt 
correspondingly more speculative) in its analysis of what actually 
happens in consciousness, particularly in relation to the process of 
choice or decision; and this gives it, as I believe (and as I hope to 
show), a greater explanatory power. But there is no fundamental in­
compatibility in the two approaches.
The Idea of a Person (3)
Some comments on "self concept theory” and its relation
to the theories developed in this study.
Again, before I proceed to develop my own ideas in greater detail,
I need to make some reference to the considerable body of work which 
has been carried out, mainly in the United States, in the field of self 
concept theory. This represents a loose tradition, going back to William 
3ames, in which such figures as Cooley and Plead, Allport, Kelly, Plaslow 
and - pre-eminently at the present time - Carl Rogers may be said to 
stand, together with a number of neo-Freudians such as Erikson and Fromm 
and many others of different schools. These writers are linked by a 
concern with the concept which a person forms of himself as determinative 
of what he is and how he behaves. R.B. Burns in his comprehensive 
review of this field quotes Raimy's (1943) definition of the self 
concept as "the individual as known to the individual”. He continues:
"This aspect of the Global Self, the self concept or Pie, is the individual* 
percepts, concepts and evaluations about himself, including the image 
he feels others have of him and of the person he would like to be,
nourished from a diet of.personally evaluated environmental experience.” "^* 
for Burns the self concept can most usefully be approached as "a sat of 
self attitudes”. He quotes the work of Cattail and Child (1975) on the 
factor analysis of motivation, demonstrating the consistent appearance 
of a ”self sentiment” and concludes his work with a Rogerian assertion 
of the value of a positive self concept and of experiences ”such as 
acceptance and regard from significant others, success and achievement 
in salient areas”, which are conducive to this end.
Clearly the self concept in this terminology corresponds broadly 
to what I call the idea of the self, lilhy, then, can I draw so little 
that is relevant to my immediate purposes from so large and distinguished 
a body of work? I think the reason may lie in the strong emphasis laid 
during the last half century on what can be empirically tested and use­
fully applied. As a broad generalisation it is fair to say that 
psychologists in this tradition, having identified an entity which is 
clearly of great importance in people*s lives, have tended, reasonably 
enough it may be said, to concentrate on refining ways of classifying 
and measuring different aspects of the self concept, together with ways 
of using such measurements (in the field of education and elsewhere), 
and finally wayas of applying therapeutic techniques to change the self
concept and so to improve the individual's effectiveness. The
concentration is on testing and measuring what can be tested and 
measured, and changing what can be changed. The theoretical framework 
employed has been kept relatively simple, elaborated as a rule no more 
than is necessary for the practical purposes in view. There are reasons 
for this which may not always have been consciously worked out but which
are made cogently explicit by Broadbent in the paper discussed in the
introduction to this stydy.
The result is that the ee&£ concept remains, as it were, a black 
box. Ue learn more and more of its external measurements, as defined 
by ”type terms”, and we also learn something about ways of operating upon 
it which can result in changes in the individual's behaviour. But we 
are not much further advanced in understanding either its internal
1. R.B. Burns ”The Self Concept” (Longmans, 1979), p. 52.
constitution or how it functions in relation to other elements of the 
body and the mind, how it fits into a wider system. The elementary 
terms by which components or aspects of the self concept are described 
are themselves words of highly generalised meaning, not related to each 
other in strictly defined and imagined ways — component selves (material, 
spiritual, social, bodily), concepts, percepts, images, Gestalten, 
emotions, feelings, meanings, affects, attitudes, traits, dispositions, 
evaluations, interpretations, memories, relationships and so on. There 
is discussion of structure and process, but not much hard analysis of 
what elements are built in what space by means of what relationships 
into what structures; and correspondingly not much precise analysis 
of the processes of change.
I am not suggesting that the elementary terms employed lack precise 
reference or useful meaning; on the contrary they may carry valuable and 
accurate information. But each system of ideas tends to develop from a 
relatively restricted theoretical perspective and therefore applies in a 
relatively limited context, without precise means of translation to bring 
it into another context. I am inclined to the view that work of this sort 
is at its most illuminating when it is at its most impressionistic, as 
ifi the subtle and complex studies of Erving Goffman. But the kind of 
understanding towards which I am trying to work here requires a com­
prehensive perspective and a comprehensive model not merely of the Self 
but of the whole mechanism of the mind within which itQ^ fs^s and functions 
my concern is less with elucidating in detail particular aspects of the 
self than with establishing a coherent model of the self and mind as a 
functioning whole.
Df the writers discussed by Burns perhaps Kelly is the one who comes 
nearest to a similar ambitioh; but I have given reasons in an earlier 
^section why I think his scheme is inadequate. Of other writers Isidor 
Cheib (mentioned by Burns orily in connection with an article of 1944) 
has developed in his valuable book of 1972 "The Science of Behaviour 
and the Image of nan” a conception of the ”ego structure” as built up 
from "imbricated perpetuated motives” or "concerns” which has some 
similarity to my view of the anticipatory Self as built up of super­
imposed personal plans of varying spans projecting into the future.
Although I can accept much of what Chein says on particular topics,
I find the total structure of his model less convincing. In particular 
I think it suffers from the lack of any distinction corresponding to 
the one I draw between the evoked idea and the idea complex as stored 
in the mind-manifold; and partly in consequence of this its dynamics 
are far from clear. "The interplay of motivational forces in the ego's 
structure”, he says, "is... one of counterbalancing relevant considerations 
and finding paths of action that maximise the potential gain from the 
entire system of interlocking concerns...” But he is a long way from 
explaining how this is supposed to happen. (A more detailed note on 
Chein's account of the Image of Man is given at Appendix I.)
In concluding this section it may be relevant to comment that 
William McDougall in his "Introduction to Social Psychology” of 19DB 
(with supplementary chapters added in later editions) comes far nearer 
to setting forth a comprehensive model of the mind, including the self, 
than almost any of the writers who have succeeded him. McDougall*s 
once famous and now dated book exemplifies to some extent what other 
psychologists were reacting against when they turned to more strictly 
experimental work. His elaborate theory of sentiments built round the 
sentiment of the Self has been largely superseded by the more 
statistically based analyses of such writers as Cattell. Although his 
achievement deserves respect, his model is quite differently based from 
my own and I do not propose to examine it here. I shall therefore now 
return to my own model. I will attempt next to develop a more detailed 
account both of the ways in which the idea of the Self is built up 
through experience and of the processes through which it affects the 
decisions and behaviour of the individual.
Consistency and Patterns of Behaviour
The consistency of a stable Self as a requirement for 
coherence in an individual's responses and hence for 
effectiveness in regulation. Consistency as a social 
requirement, expressed in rules, roles and behaviour.
Hot only are there many gaps in our knowledge of any life 
vtrajectory - even our own - but many of the things we do know will not
come to mind in a particular situation; if we know a person at all wall, 
only an infinitesimal proportion can possibly come to mind at once* In 
each particular context one aspect of the psrson will be illuminated.
This may be, or may include, a sharp recollection of a past occasion, 
but often it will be an image drawing on past recollections, or at least 
not incompatible with them, but adjusted and extended to fit into the 
new situation. The image as a whole is then a sign of the person and 
probably labelled with his name. This is what happens every time we 
think of a person who is not present. The recollections which come to 
mind are those which are apt to the situation, that, is, connected by 
association with the context. They include physical images, but also 
words and actions, and the further associations and images to which 
they may give rise, in particular patterns of behaviour which may 
extend back into the past and on into the future as expectations having 
the character of generalised rules.
This whole process of imagining a person in a given situation is 
a kind of extrapolation, which is only possible because we can rely on 
a good deal of consistency in a person. To begin with, a person does 
not change physically except over a fairly long period of time, and then 
by imperceptibly small gradations. But, apart from this, we establish 
a regularity of character over a whole spectrum of behaviour in © man.
The expectations we build up may prove wrong in particular instances, 
but they are right often enough to make them reasonably.reliable.
The main reason for this is that such consistency is required if 
a man's responses over a period of time are to be coherent and his 
regulation of the environment consequently effective. This is a point 
to be considered in more detail later; but it may be useful to observe 
here that a stable Self of this kind is also a social requirement. 
Evolution has made man a social animal, inconceivable outside society, 
unable when new born to live more than a few hours without succour from 
other humans. Ultimately, this is a means of immensely increasing each 
individual's regulative capacity. But to exist in a society, which 
rests on cooperation, a human has to have an identity, so that others 
can know him and can have reliable expectations of him, even if they have 
never met him before.
Expectations reflect rules • As soon as an object has been classified 
by the mind as a human being, a person, ue can automatically have certain 
expectations of him according to the context. If ue add a few more 
attributes which are normally registered, such as sex, approximate age, 
kind of dress, language spoken, occupation, we can place him in a more 
precise class and correspondingly add to the rules which ue may assume 
to apply in given circumstances. These are social rules; they apply 
generally to all persons who are instances of the class as defined and 
are also units in a particular social system. This system may be that 
of human society as a whole (for some rules apply to all men) but it 
may be that of a nation, a linguistic group, a firm, a school, a foot­
ball team, a family. The members of a social group are particular units 
in a system in which each has a unique place; but they are also instances 
of the class of members of the group, all of whom are similar to each 
other in important ways. Essentially they are similar because they know 
and accept the same set of rules; and it is the operation of these 
rules which creates the system; for the units of a system by definition 
have relationships between them, and it is the possession of rules of 
behaviour, otherwise of sequential patterns of activity, in common 
which relates the units of a social system.
Having a rule of behaviour in common does not of course mean that 
the members behave in identical ways when they obey it. For such a 
rule has direction and it often applies differently to the different 
sub-classes with which it may be concerned. A schoolmaster and a school­
boy may both know and accept the rule that boys call masters ’Sir*, 
but the behaviour it elicits from each is different. Ue can say that in 
accepting the rule each is playing, or conforming to, a social role.
The same rule can affect differently those who fill different social roles; 
while on the other hand each role may be affected by many different rules, 
as both the schoolboy and the schoolmaster may confirm. A role defines 
a class of person. Anybody playing the role is an instance of the 
class. It is a classification of which the essential defining values 
are rules of behaviour - though these rules may themselves imply other 
restrictions; the role of father, for instance, can only be played by 
a grown male person.
Of all the rules which members of a social group may have in common 
the most important are the rules of a language. For the possession in 
common of the rules of vocabulary of a language makes it possible for 
them to have a broad understanding in common of the regularities of the 
physical world; moreover it it by far the most important of the means by 
which the rules of social behaviour are propagated from one member to 
another. Ue may note that the common possession of the rules of the 
English language itself defines a social role, that of English-speaker.
Uhen we say that the defining values of a role are to be identified 
as the rules of behaviourewhich it may seem to exemplify, we are 
implying that there is a hierarchical relationship between the two.
Uhat is a role - a form - at one level may be identified as a set of 
rules at another level. As I have suggested elsewhere, the set of 
rules corresponds to the social role as the tailor's set of measurements 
corresponds to the complete suit - though it is worth emphasising that
the rules have to covpr not only the individual measurements but also,
at a higher leVel of hierarchy, the ways in which these measurements are 
to be ordered together to build up the suit. A comparable definition
of role is given by Harre and Secord^s
"A role is what a person in a specific category does, but 
in a formal episode his actions and sayings are generated 
by his fallowing the /appropriate subset of rules... Thus,
role consists of a sequence of actions and knowledge of
role consists of knowing the rules which enjoin these 
kinds of action in the proper order and in the appropriate
circumstances. But of course much role filling is not a
performance generated by conscious following of explicit 
rules...".
My ideas have been evolved in a somewhat different context, but they 
appear in this area to be fully compatible with the views of Harre and 
Secord. My only comment would be that, like nearly all modern 
philosophers and scientists, they steer clear of the concept of form, 
and I believe that is to their loos; in practice, as we grow up and 
learn the rules of the multiple social groups to which we belong, we 
do not in general learn the rules as such; we learn to know, as broad 
forms, the social roles which matter in each group, the rules are 
abstractions which we only need to establish explicitly in particular
1. "The Explanation of Social Behaviour”, Blackwell 1972, p. 184.
situations where there is some degree of obscurity or conflict.
This hierarchical relationship makes possible a vast simplification. 
Dust as a curve, which would have to be represented by a whole series of 
discrete coordinate values at the system level, can be recognised at the 
unit level as one single value in the register of two-dimensional 
outlines, so one role can be fixed and stored in the mind as one idea, 
yielding in any given context one value at the unit level. On the 
other hand in any given situation, where juxtaposition of unit values is 
not sufficient for our purpose, we can close the focus of attention and 
try to formulate the explicit-rules which should apply. Thus in most 
ordinary situations when I am acting the role of father I will not need 
to hesitate about deciding what a father ought to do; but in a situation 
of moral difficulty or social complication, if I have to decide what 
punishment is appropriate to a small boy who throws stones,...or in what 
way a father should behave in church when giving his daughter away in 
marriage, then the mere recognition and juxtaposition of a unit value 
or form for the father role may not be enough; I may have to focus mors 
closely and consider explicitly what rules of behaviour I ought to follow
In doing this I will not necessarily proceed at once to the abstract 
formulation of rules; the natural first step is to call to mind in some 
detail a series of comparable situations and juxtapose a number of 
instances of the role as played by myself or others in the past. That is 
to say, I may first focus my attention on the irregularities of the curve 
more closely, examining the sub-roles or routines which build up the role 
to see if I can get a good enough reading as a result, before I proceed
to the next step of taking measurements. Often iddeed this process of
comparison and juxtaposition, with a constantly varying focus of 
attention, gives a subtler distinction than such measurements as we 
can arrive at. To reduce to rules my conception of what a father should 
do in this particular situation may produce only a crude approximation 
to the idea I have in mind. Yet in the last analysis a role is a com­
bination of ways of behaving which are rules. Working in reverse, if
we are given a set of rules relating to the behaviour of one type of 
person in one type of situation we can, as it were, bring them to life 
in the conception of a role. A set of such values, as we have seen,
yields a role, just as a set of measurements by a tailor yields the con­
tours of a suit.
Behaviour, Role, Plan and Scenario
A section concerned with the further analysis and 
definition of terms, as a preliminary to more detailed
consideration of the way in which the complex of the
anticipatory g§lf is constructed.
In any actual or foreseen or imagined situation concerning an
individual, certain aspects of our idea complex relating to him or her
are evoked, and in consequence certain expectations are aroused, growing 
out of behavioural patterns which form part of the complex. At the same 
time we are aware that such patterns only became effective to the extent 
that they are motivated from the inside, as it were, by appropriate 
personal plans, directed towards personal goals (whether positive goals 
of achievement, or negative goals of a v o i d ance)A man does not in 
practice reliably live up to social expectations if he has a strong 
personal motivation to kick over the traces and do something quite 
different from what he is socially committed to doing - for example, if 
he is planning to run away with his neighbour's wife. Consequently in 
building up our idea of a person we are concerned not merely with his 
external social roles, but also with what we can deduce of the internal 
personal plans that support them. These build up a structure of their 
own on which the external roles are carried; but this structure does not 
by any means correspond exactly to the external structure; there are 
often gaps and tensions between them.
In order to avoid possible misunderstanding here, it may be helpful 
to redefine, in relation to each other and to certain other terms, . 
four key words, behaviour, role, plan and scenario, as I am using them 
in this study. Behaviour is any observable action or sequence of 
actions performed by an individual or organisation; it excludes thoughts
H. Of. Chein's discussion of traits and motives on pp. 280 ff. of 
"The Science of Behaviour and the Image of Man": "The trait... 
cannot be comprehended apart from its blank and contextless 
(and therefore meaningless) description, save as one can relate 
it to the motives that are being served." (p. 281).
or feelings which cannot be directly observed by others. A behavioural 
pattern is a classification of a particular repeatable type of 
behaviour.
A social role (or role without any qualifying adjective) is a pattern 
of behaviour determined and defined by social rules or expectations.
In a given situation it is always one of a pair* the counterpart of a 
corresponding social role acted by others (singular or plural). Human 
society is a network of such pairings of social roles, reflecting a 
complex fabric of obligations and expectations. These are often built 
into organisations, structures of complementary roles which interact with 
individuals and other organisations. Individuals have purposes and 
consequently they adopt plans, which are sequences of behaviour designed 
to achieve specific future goal images or to escape specific future 
aversion images. Organisations also have purposes and adopt plans, 
which in their case I distinguish as projects. These plans or projects 
represent paths leading towards the achievement of particular purposes 
within the constraints of the physical and social environment as it 
exists and as it is forecast into the future; and these constraints 
represent the scenario of the plan or project. Such a scenario i s - 
constituted by the natural laws and regularities of the surrounding 
physical world and by the human laws, rules and expectations of the 
surrounding social and political world. The scenario incorporates both 
the plan itself and the roles through which the plan is linked into the 
forecast environment, as well as the ways in which others interpret these 
roles.-*
I shall only refer briefly in this context to organisations, 
projects and the structure arid process of society; I mention them only 
for the sake of completeness, since I have made them the subject of a 
separate study, "The Grammar of Social Interaction". I need however 
to refer here to social roles insofar as they affect the individual 
who adopts them. Since human beings live in a social environment, the 
completion of any individual plan (or personal role) almost always
1. "I may not be' able to see myself as others see me, but I am
constantlysupposing them to be seeing me in particular ways, 
and I am constantly acting in the light of the actual or 
supposed attitudes, opinions, needs and so on the other has 
in respect of me." (R.D. Laing et al, 1966, quoted by 
F. Fransella).
involves the acting out of ons or more social roles, in part or in whole. 
The same sequence of behaviour therefore is both part of a plan related 
to a particular personal goal, and also part or all of the acting out 
of one or more social roles; and each of these social roles is related 
to other social roles played by other people or organisations in the 
social environment. As port of a plan the behaviour is related to a 
personal goal; as part of a role it is related to social obligations 
to other people.
There is of course some behaviour which does not affect others, 
and so does not reflect any social role; but a behaviour that is con­
sciously and deliberately undertaken must be part of a plan. Thus if 
I walk to the station, my actions represent behaviour which is planned 
but is not social behaviour. On the other hand when I buy my ticket f romi ■ 
a station official my behaviour involves acting out a social role, in 
obedience to a number of social rules. Yet both my walking and my 
ticket buying are parts of a single plan, the purpose of which is to 
arrive at an office in London. Why do I want to go to this office?
Because I have a job to do there. What is this job? A social role.
Why must I perform this social role? Because I have contracted to do
so. Why did I contract to do so? In order to fulfil a longer term,
more general plan, that of earning my living. And so on, and so on.
It is not that roles and plans .are intermeshed; it is rather that 
one (the role) is carried on the back of the other; the role is the 
external aspect of a plan which emerges whenever that plan involves 
entering into a relationship with the social environment. In a 
fundamental sense the plan is primary, the role is secondary. The plan 
is adopted as part of myself, the role is something that'I.put on as a 
means of carrying out the plan, just as I put on an overcoat as a means 
of keeping out the cold. Yet in another sense the role - or at any 
rate the network of potential roles established by the rules and 
expectations of the social environment - can be regarded as primary.
I establish my own purposes and my own particular plans; yet I can only 
start fteom where I am at any moment; and the possible goals that I may 
set myself, with thbs possible means that are available to me, are 
strictly constrained by the facts of my body and the physical and social
environment in which I find myself, including the fects of my own past 
history, as well as the framework of the surrounding world. The scope 
I have for adopting a new plan is limited by the plans I have already 
adopted in the past and the social roles which I have already undertaken 
in relation to them, whether from free choice or under coercion. Thus 
plans are restricted by possibilities. But plans are still idiosyncratic 
to the planning individual and it is his plans that build up his 
idiosyncratic personality. The study of psychological man is at the root 
an idiographic enterprise, while the study of behavioural man is a 
nomothetic enterprise.
One further aspect of the definition of these terms remains to be 
clarified. As I have mentioned earlier, I use the word plan to refer not 
only to specific plans related to the achievement of specific goals on 
particular occasions, but also to more generalised plans or policies 
applicable to whole classes of occasions, on each of which a specific 
sub-plan exemplifying the generalised plan is put into effect. Here we 
need to make certain distinctions. I may adopt a long term plan to 
become Prime Flinister. This involves a remote goal, but still a specific 
one. Because it is so remote I will have to adopt a series of more 
limited sub-plans in order to achieve it - to join a political party, 
to becone a candidate for Parliament, to win the constituency election, 
to be appointed a Flinister, and so on. The same is still true in the 
parallel case where my long-term plan is much more general - for example 
to attain a position of prestige and authority — because, although 
conceived in such general terms, it is still a specific goal. However 
there is also a less specific case to consider. If I decide to get 
married, I adopt a plan which is not directed merely to a single goal, 
to be achieved on my wedding day, but one which will also affect me 
on innumerable occasions over the rest of my life. The sub-plans I 
adopt on these occasions are not stages towards the wedding day, which 
is already past; rather they are sub-plans of a long term plan to live 
the life of a husband.1* Now it could be said that this means that in
1. Colin Flurray Parkes is referring to this type of situation when 
he sayss "There are... some types of goal situation that are con­
tinuous over time, e.g. occupation of territory, incubation of eggs 
or maintenance of proximity to mother. In such cases there is no 
consummatory behaviour and achievement of the goal situation 
initiates a special type of ongoing activity, whose effect is to 
ensure that the goal situation will be continued." ("Bereavement*, 
1972. Pelican edition, p. 74.)
getting married I am in fact adopting a generalised social role; and 
consequently that these bits of behaviour are actually sub-roles, not 
sub-plans. But the truth is that they are both. I could not sustain 
the role if I did not have an underlying purpose in doing so; this would 
be true even if my marriage had gone sour and my purpose was only the 
negative one of avoiding the unpleasant social and financial consequences 
of divorce. The fact that I can ask myselfs "liJhy am I doing all this?" 
is evidence that I must have some underlying purpose, otherwise I would 
not be doing it. Often, I suggest, these are cases in which the 
individual adopts a social role and makes it into a personal plan. It 
then becomes anrldealhrolelsa role which is adopted as a purpose in 
itselff not a means to some other underlying purpose. Fiany of the . 
longest term, governing plana which make up the anticipatory Self are 
ideal roles of this sort. The most characteristic of all are ideal 
religious or heroic roles, which the believer adopts to form his own ideal 
Self, even if he knows he cannot live up to them - when, for example, a 
Christian "puts on" the role of 3esus Christ as "the Way, the Truth and 
the Life".
Finally we can identify the most general case of all when an 
individual adopts a social rule (as defined in the preceding section) 
as one of his personal long term plans - for example if he decides 
to make it his purpose to speak the truth on all occasions, or to do 
no murder, or to honour his father and his mother. These are ideal 
rules, ultimate generalisations of ideal roles, which are here 
established as long term plans constitutive of the anticipatory Self.
It is worth adding in conclusion that even in these ideal cases the 
distinction remains between the two sides of the coin, the plan and 
the role, the inner and the outer faces of the same behaviour. For 
the plan is part of a man’s idea of himself, an element of his 
integrity, while the role is an element in the fabric of society.
The plan is related to a man’s purposes, the role is related to the 
constraints of the world. The plan is analysable into sub-plans and 
finally actions. The role is analysable into sub-roles and finally 
social rules. Adopting a role is fundamentally a moans towards 
achieving the purpose of a plan already adopted.
The Polarity of Uish-fulfilment and Real Life
An examination of the way in which an individual’s 
thinking is polarised between images of wish-fulfilment 
and images of present reality; and of the way in which 
plans are developed as a means of building bridges 
between these poles.
In the case of our own Self we build up in our mind what is basically 
still the idea of a person, not altogether different from our ideas of 
other people. But the idea complex relating to our own Self, as noted 
earlier, is vastly more detailed and prominent, partly because it 
enters into so many more of our memories, and partly because it is 
associated with values of sensation, emotion, pleasure and pain which 
cannot be directly registered in connection with anyone else. I can 
see or touch my own limbs and other external features in exactly the 
same way as those of other people (though with certain restrictions as , 
to angle of view and approach). On the other hand ray registration of 
the pain in my stomach is in an obvious sense private to myself, even 
though I may try to recode it and so describe it to the doctor. And 
just as we are directly aware of our own emotions, so we are also 
directly aware of our own personal plans and motivations, without any 
need to deduce them from appearances - though this is not to say that 
we are incapable of deceiving ourselves about our own underlying plans 
(the question of unconscious thinking and the unconscious plans that go 
with it will be considered on a later page). Correspondingly the 
structure formed by our private internal plans is liable to loom much 
larger, where our own Self is concerned, than the external structure 
of social roles through which it is linked to the common world of 
human society; for it is in the private world of plans and motivations 
that our decisions — even our decisions concerning social roles — are 
taken.
Pleasure, pain, emotion, these affect the selection of goals and 
the mechanism of choice and decision, processes in which the idea of 
the Self plays a crucial part. To recall our previous analysis, the 
mind is constantly construing incoming sensory impressions, together
with the associations which they immediately call to mind; while at the 
same time it is following trains of free association in the directions 
in which the threshold resistance is the lowest, and these in turn inter­
act constantly with its continued construings of sense impressions* The 
tendency is for a polarity to be established between images of wish- 
fulfilment to which the lowest threshold settings lead, and impressions 
of the Self in its current environment* But there is a continuous inter­
action of association between these poles. The form which the wish 
fulfilment images will take is affected by what is currently going on 
at the other pole, for the thresholds of association are mutually lowered, 
so that ue tend to construe our perceptions in ways related to what is 
uppermost elsewhere in our mind at the time, and we tend to identify 
objects of desire or aversion which are related to the physical situations 
in which we find ourselves*
One important aspect of this process of interaction arises from 
the tendency which ue have already noted for the mind to make 
predictive imaginings, following out the effect of known rules of 
sequence as they develop out of the existing situation. The sort of .. . . 
predictive imaginings which the mind makes will tend to be affected by 
its current wish-fulfilment tendencies; but the predictive possibilities, 
at least in the short term, are much sestricted by the actual situation 
and certain immediate forecasts impose themselves automatically. If I 
am sitting in my chair the immediate forecast is likely to bB one of "no 
change". But, wherever I am, if I see a tigec advancing towards me it 
is likely to be anenof dramatic change. Now as soon as the mind 
recognises this forecast situation and assesses it as unpleasant, there 
is an immediate reaction in the sudden formation of a new wish-fulfilment 
image - oh to be somewhere else. Subjectively we recognise an access of 
emotion. This always accompanies a violent and widespread change in the 
threshold settings of the mind-manifold. It may be maintained while any 
particular group of settings continue to be set exceptionally low - though 
us may note that this situation, with its accompanying state of high 
emotion, does not usually last for very long; for not only does the 
environment often change of itself; the mind too is constantly taking 
bction to change the environment, and particularly so when it is in a 
state of high emotion.
Action is in the first place a physical movement, or an application 
of the mind, which is under the control of the conscious will. The 
range of immediate possibilities of action in any given situation is 
relatively small, even if combinations of, for instance, simultaneous 
muscular movements are taken into account. And the mind itself is 
^•trammelled by rules of association and continuity. However the mind 
is not much concerned with single steps* It moves on from passive 
predictions of what will happen anyway to alternative predictive 
imaginations of what will happen if some positive action is taken. But 
not merely one action? what it imagines is a series of causally linked 
actions, consequences and further actions, which may be prolonged over 
minutes or hours or days or years, and which abuts in some end-situation 
assessed as pleasurable or at least less painful than the present. Any 
such series is equivalent to imagining a span of the Self’s own future 
life trajectory, or that of some system (another person or €5nation,for 
instance) with which the individual is concerned emotionally. Each span 
is likely to be focussed as onB system under one image. It may have to. 
be worked out in much mere detail; the working out might indeed involve 
the writing of a volume or the designing of a complex machine. But in 
each case the whole, as a plan for the Self, has to be subsumed under 
one image for the purpose of retrieval, assessment and decision. The 
scenario always shows the path towards a wish-fulfilment image. 
Predictive necessity may in same circumstances lead unavoidably to ex­
tremely unpleasant situations, as when we realise that the ship is 
sinking beneath us; but the mind will always seek to find a way out; 
beyond the shipwreck it will look for the raft or the life—boat — some 
means of salvation for the essential variables, somebbww*.
Once a plan has been adopted, it is part of the continuing Self 
and will come to mind, forming part of the Self’s profile, in any 
appropriate context. But meanwhile the mind is away on new tracks of 
association, prediction and desire. As we saw earlier, the acting out 
of the plan does not require continuing conscious attention. The 
polarity between desire, or Shakespeare’s ’’discontent”, and actuality 
is never iesolved for more than a moment; indeed, although no more 
than one system car ever be at the focus of consciousness at one time,
the trains of association and imagination relating to many different 
objects of desire and many different decisions are usually being pursued 
simultaneously below the conscious lev/el as part of the reverberation 
of association across the mind-manifold* Yet any plan once adopted has 
a constraining effect on other decisions until either the acting out 
is completed or it is interrupted and replaced by something else. The 
constraint has the effect that no new imagined plan can be adopted and 
annexed to the Self if it is not logically compatible with any relevant 
old one which is still not complete - or, rather, no such new role can 
be adopted unless the old one is abandoned.
A great many of our minute to minute decisions are acted out and 
completed immediately. If I decide to pick up a pencil off the floor, 
the imagined new plan of myself picking it up fits with no effort into 
the profile of the continuing Self sitting in my chair. The process of 
decision occupies no more than a split second, then spills over at once 
into the action, which again is completed within a split second.
Consider however the situation if, half way down, I am brought up short 
by an unexpected twinge of lumbago. The monitoring feedback draws 
attention at once to a discrepancy between the plan as imagined and 
adopted, and the plan as acted out. There is a new factor not foreseen*
A new wish-fulfilment image - stop that pain - appears at once, reinforced 
by sharp emotion, and leads to the imagination and immediate adoption 
of a new personal plan, that of myself slowly and cautiously straightening 
up again before my hand has reached the floor, the new plan is 
incompatible with the old, but in the circumstances its attractive power 
is the greater and the old is abandoned. I may retain the old wish- 
fulfilment image, I may still want the pencil; but I will now adopt a 
new and perhaps more indirect strategy for getting it; the original 
plan is abandoned for good and if something like it is ever adopted again 
it will nonetheless be a different plan in a different situation.
The Traveller
An illustration of the process by which the mind 
successively imagines and adopts plans and sub-plans 
of varying time—spans to achieve its purposes#
We have seen that, while many personal plans are of. short time span 
and swiftly completed, others may be of much longer span. Consider the 
case of a traveller who sets off on a walk through tha hills. He knows 
the general direction of his destination* In taking the decision to walk 
there, he has first imagined and then adopted a personal plan stretching 
over the whole imagined span of his journey in time and space. As he 
sets off he may mark a dip in the hills on the skyline as his initial 
objective. It may take him rathBr far to the East, but he may head towards 
it nevertheless as offering an easier journey, since the crest is lower 
than on the more direct line. This further decision involves the 
imagination of two more alternative sub-plans, either of which could fit 
into the first and overriding plan, giving more particularity to one 
part of its highly generalised form. He compares the two, his predictive 
imagination suggesting that the higher and more direct route will make 
him more tired but may make it possible for him to arrive earlier. Ona 
image will seem to him more attractive or less painful than the other 
and he will adopt it.
As he proceeds, he will have to make a series of such decisions.
Some will be of short span — is he to clamber over this fallen tree or 
walk round it? - some more far reaching: is he to follow this road, 
along which he can move much faster but which seems to take him far to 
the right of his intended course? Each of these decisions fills out his 
original plan, clothing some part of it with more detail but not effacing 
the general outline, which remains overriding. Each sub-plan is matched 
to the overriding one and is abandoned if found incompatible with it.
To put it the other way, a distant generalised future is gradually 
given detail in the form of imagined alternatives, certain of which are 
adopted and acted out. In the process these ere fused with the mind’s 
construing of the immediate sensory input end thus made actual, acquiring 
far more detail still.
The execution of any plan, once adopted, tends to sink out of 
consciousness, but it is monitored subconsciously and the attention is 
alerted if the perceptual feedback shows any significant deviation — 
if, for example, as the traveller executes the plan of walking across 
a grassy meadow, he finds hie feet sinking into an unforeseen patch of 
bog. Every imagined plan is related to realistic predictions. If he 
comes to a stream, he may imagine himself jumping over it, but he tests 
this plan against another, which is that of his known long-jumping cap­
acity — one which may be based either on a specific memory image or on 
a vaguer image generalised from many past experiences and the constraining 
rules in regard to his physical performance which they embody.
Prediction and imagination are constantly interacting with each 
other. If he is walking along a straight even path his attention may 
be far way, concentrating on the difficult interview he has to face 
tomorrow (imagining yet another plan); but the monitoring perception 
goes on all the time and is always, though not always consciously, an 
ingredient in his awareness. At a moment of physical judgement and 
decision, as when he is measuring his leap across the stream, the span 
of consciousness contracts to the actual span of close perception. This 
may embrace only a fraction of a second, but the nature of concentrated 
perception is such that it includes a relatively great amount of 
information in a small span. Even herB there is a whole series of 
gradually narrowing perceptions and predictions leading up to the 
moment of the leap; end that moment is not a break, but is followed by 
intensive monitoring of what follows* By contrast If he has an easy 
jump to make over a puddle, only a glance is necessary and he can think 
in terms of a single movement instead of a series of sub-plans unified 
by intermittent widening of the focus of attention to envisage the leap 
as a whole.
Broadly it can be said that the longer the time span of a plan the 
less precise detail it is likely to hold. As the traveller considers 
the whole span of his journey he is guided by the vaguest plan in the 
vaguest scenario, whether the latter takes the form of a picture of 
"over the hills and far away” or that of a recollection of some relative 
positions on a map. As he imagines the nearer stretch between his
starting point and the dip on the skyline, he has some direct perceptions 
tc give definition to parts of his image? but there may still be great 
gaps of dead ground between, which are imagined in the most cursory 
fashion, or not at all, unless the need arises. Yet when the need
does arise, always some sort of image is yielded. If he asks himself
how far he will have got by lunch time, some conception of a point between 
here and there will come to his mind. For a scenario (or a plan
emerging in a scenario), though it may be evoked from the recognition
of a few isolated values, has continuity. Once realised, given body or 
continuity in this way, a plan, like any natural object or abstract idea, 
will always yield a value or set of values in a given context to which 
it is related, as a curve will always yield a location at the point where 
a given line coosses it, or as a plaster dinosaur in a museum, though 
built up from a collection of isolated measurements of fossil bones, yet 
forms a whole yielding a single coherent profile from any angle 
whatever.
In the case of our traveller, as he casts his mind forward or back 
to particular points on his journey (including the point of the present 
moment), what he recognises in each sub-context is a sub-plan — himself 
jumping the stream or having his lunch or whatever it may be. As he 
proceeds on his way, he is all the time taking in and construing a 
constant stream of sense impressions. He construes them, as we have 
seen earlier, by relating them to the ideas already uppermost in his mind, 
the ideas for which the thresholds of association will be at their lowest. 
These will tend to include the general plans which are of the greatest 
current importance to him? and among such plans those which are linked, 
by easy associations to the Incoming impressions will tend to have 
the greatest effect. Thus the sensory impressions received by our traveller 
will tend to be related to the general plan of himself making his journey. 
Roughly it would be true to say that each time he tops a crest or turns . 
a corner and a new vista comes into sight, he has to set his course 
again, fitting the exigencies of the immediate situation to thB over­
riding purpose of reaching his goal. This process is essentially that 
of creating in imagination and then adopting - making part of himself — 
a particular sub-plan which relates the incoming impressions to the
general plan. The span of each sub—plan can of course vary within wide:, 
limits and there may be sub-sub-plans and so on. If he finds his path 
blocked by a boulder, he may adopt the sub-plan of Self pushing it aside, 
only to find that the boulder is too heavy to move; and thereupon he 
may turn to the alternative sub-plan of finding a way round it. Each 
decision or act of will is an act of creation, the selection of particular 
values from the environment and the evocation or creation from them of 
a particular contour or plan; yet it is not creation entirely de novo9 
for it is also always the discovery of a new pattern compatible with the 
old, of a new more particular contour which fits into the overriding 
general shape. The creation is part of a dialogue between the existing 
general plan and the environment, which results in the emergence of what 
may be a number of imagined plans, and the adoption of one of them.
At every moment of self-consciousness a new Self is discovered, yet it 
is a new Self fitting on to the old, or rather fused with it. The 
selves fit within each other like overlapping scales; but the scales vfry 
immensely in span, for I can recognise myself at one moment as a pilgrim 
to the grave and at the next moment as a man turning a door handle; 
and they can be many layers thick, one on top of the other; from the 
wide and generai^ ttf the more and more narrow end particular. ■****«*«*&?
Decision
The polarity of desire and actuality and the successive 
acts of adoption by which the two centres of conscious­
ness are brought momentarily together in the adoption of 
new plans.
Every new plan adopted becomes part of the Self. But so in a way
does every personal plan ever imagined, however remote it may be from
being carried out. We remember the fantasy of the abandoned alternative, 
just as we remember the thing we actually did; and as our memories fade
with time, it sometimes becomes harder to distinguish the one from the
other. What distinguishes the memory of the plan we actually adopted 
is essentially the fact that it is accompanied by perceptual detail.
If it is a plan of any long span, it also incorporates a wealth of 
sub-plans which give it further particularity. Even if it is one of
short span, it will be reinforced, like the one we described of 
pushing the boulder aside, by a detailed mass of perceptual information, 
for which there is no equivalent in a plan that is merely imagined 
briefly and then discarded. Roreover it also fits in a somewhat 
different way into the continuous sequence of systems recognised by 
the waking mind. The imagined plan of course also appears in this 
sequence, for it comes before the mind at a particular time as one element 
in a train of thought. But the acted plan is related invariably to some 
physical action or series of actions by the body. Even in the case of 
a mental plan like that of reading a book this is true: to imagine 
reading ’’War and Peace" is a mental event occurring in the sequence 
of mental events, but it is a very different event from actually reading 
it, using one’s eyes and sitting in a chair. The body has its own 
history in our remembering, for the input of the senses never ceases 
during consciousness, and th& acted plan is associated with this input - 
with Re Here Now - over the whole period to which it relates, as the 
imagined plan is not.
Wo have already noted that in consciousness there tends always to 
be a polarity between the focus of desire and the focus of perceived 
actuality. Purposive thought builds in imagination a causal bridge 
(which is a scenario incorporating a personal plan) between the two.
And when we act in accordance with our purpose the bridge, as we 
proceed, becomes actual. It is our continously monitoring feedback 
perceptions which establish its actuality, as they establish its 
correspondence with, or deviation from, the original imagined plan.
The process of consciousness is that of a succession of acts of 
creation by which the two centres of consciousness are brought together 
in a new plan that is made actual as it passes into memory, while 
simultaneously a hew polarity emerges.
The actual moment of decision is the moment when one system in 
the succession of predicative systems which constitutes the train of 
thought comes to incorporate actual perceptual units that fill in 
spaces, as it were, which in the preceding system were filled by more 
generalised sensory images. When the imagined plan is recognised as
fused with the profile of the continuing Self, imagination spills over 
into action. It is of course possible to make a mental resolution 
which does not apparently require to be initiated by any physical 
movement and so sealed in to the Self in the way we have described.
But even in a case of this kind we mark the decision as having been 
taken at a particular time and place which are identified perceptually; 
some form of perceptual sealing must take place if it is a real decision 
and not merely another plan floating freely in the imagination and thus 
without any continuing power of constraint.
Looking at it from another angle, we could say that, as we saw 
when we were considering the purposive cycle, the stream of consciousness 
has a dual current* There is first of all the steady current of input 
through the senses, recording the World Here Now, which never ceases 
during waking hours and arguably never entirely even during sleep.
These sense impressions are always construed in some degree and monitored 
by the mind, though they are often ingredients in the coloration of 
consciousness rather than forms at the full focus of consciousness.
There is however alsr a second continuous current which is the uninter­
rupted succession during waking hours (and also during dreams) of 
predicative systems at the focus of attention. These may be perceptions 
but they may also be imaginations or recollections, as the mind follows 
the course of free association or the chains of causal thinking in the 
manner which has been analysed on earlier pages. When the attention is 
focussed on a perception, the two currents may be momentarily fused into 
one, but at other times the current of attention may wander far away 
into the past or the future or into fields of abstraction or imagination, 
while the monitoring current pursues its own subterranean course, bound 
to strict perceptual succession in space and time, ticking the minutes 
away. Attention describes arabesques around the plodding course of Me 
Here Now, but is always returning to it, and must do so every time a 
decision is taken. Perception itself can be split, for if I spend an 
hour watching a football match on television I will be focussing my mind 
on a field of visual perception, yet my attention for most of the time 
will be far away from the monitoring current. The latter will only 
occasionally rise to the surface, as for instance when I become aware 
of myself as stiff or uncomfortable and change my position.
The conclusion to which this examination leads us is that a self- 
conscious perception cannot in fact be sharply distinguished from an 
act of decision*^* It is when we become aware of perceptions in 
relation to a plan of the Self in a given situation that we seal in this 
plan to the past Self, the Self of recollection* A decision is an act 
of self-recognition or, perhaps better, self-creation, the adoption of 
a new contour, a new personal plan* The difference between an act of 
sgif-conscious perception Which Is no more than that, and an act of 
perception Which is also an act of decision is a matter of time span.
In the first case the span of the contour of the Self which is recognised 
extends no further than the actual span of the perception. In the second 
case the context is wider and the contour extends further into the future 
Thereby it automatically involves the acceptance of certain predictions 
and often also the making of certain choices. The point Which all this 
brings out is that a decision is not so much a particular adtion as a 
recognition, a construing, a reinterpretation, an exten&ion, a 
recreation of the idea of one’s own Self.
The quasi-identity of acts of self-perception and acts of decision 
can be seen most clearly in relation to the incidental decisions which 
follow from the acting out of a decision of longer span. I know the way 
to my house and when, on the way home, I come to a fork in the road I 
turn to the right at the appropriate time without any sense of taking a 
decision. Looking ahead I see the fork and judge the distance; and 
the subsequent act of decision — though it must in one Sense be taken 
separately each time I go this way - is not introspectively separable . 
from the act of perception* This is because in adopting the sub-plan 
of Re Turning Right I am doing no more than fill in a necessary detail 
of the wider plan I adopted when I decided to walk to my house. I am 
conforming to an earlier decision. There is no need for doubt or 
hesitation* The same analysis applies to many details of the 
presentation of the Self and the recognition of the roles of others 
Which figure, more or less unconsciously in our behaviour.
Yet in fact every new plan has to be conformed or accommodated 
to an old one - or rather to the profile of the continuing Self embodying 
all relevant plans, as it emerges in this particular situation. This 
profile is a combination of values relevant in the situation, including
1. A thought familiar to William 3ames* Cf. "Principles11, Vol.1, p.447
probably a physical image as well as positive or negative ©motional
resonances in relation to particular plans adopted (or not adapted) ^
in the past. The decision to walk to my house was itself an
accommodation to a profile including a positive value for the wider life-
plan of myself as a man with a home and a family who lives in that house. 
Ultimatelyjevsry new personal plan has to be accommodated to plans of 
wider span and greater generality right up to the point where we are 
dealing with plans extending over the whole span of a man*s remaining 
life* It is this system which makes the mind so efficient a regulator.
It enables the organism to adapt its response not merely to isolated 
immediate values in the environment but also, so far as may ba necessary, 
to take in longer term plans within plans. Every act of decision is a 
rapprochement of the past and the future in the creation of the present. 
Thus the system makes it possible for our responses to different situations 
over a period of time to be consistent with each other and thereby it 
makes the idea of the Self a coherent whole. It achieves this result 
in an economical way, since in any one situation only those contours of 
the continuing Self which are relevant (through association in the 
context) come into play, forming what we have called its profile in the 
situation.
Alternatives and Compatibilities (l)
An examination of the way in which the mind imagines
alternative plans and chooses between them.
Coherence of respone is achieved over great spans in spite of 
the fact that the number of units that can be related into one system . 
at the focus of consciousness is limited; and the means by which this 
is achieved is the principle of hierarchical distancing, which enables . 
a single value at one level to epitomise in a fused or concrete form 
(at the cost of some generalisation and thus some loss of information) 
what will Gmerge at the next level as a whole set of values articulated 
in a system or complex. This is the root mechanism of the plan itself, 
a single value integrating a whole set of values as* a curve integrates 
a set of points through which it is drawn. And it is perhaps 
significant that this mechanism comes into play even in the case of
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the most immediate reaction of the Self to a value registered in the 
environment which threatens to disturb one of the essential variables - 
say a blast of cold air*
The reactions even in so simple a case, is not a one-to-one response 
to a value in the register of cold; it is a response to a plan integrating 
many values (or what would be many separately distinguished values at 
a different level of hierarchy)* I dp not react to cold but to the idea 
of myself cold# The obvious regulatory action in the situation may be 
to adopt the plan of myself shutting the window; and if I am much pre­
occupied I may find myself doing this almost unconsciously# Still more 
is this true of a movement like that of brushing a crumb off my sleeve, 
in which the plan involved is no more than an image of my arm and hand 
executing the movement and the hand brushing against my sleeve - first 
imagined and then almost immediately monitored in actual sensation# The 
span of the whole episode is very short and the facts which the act of 
regulation take into account are very few; it is almost a direct response 
to b stimulus; but this very limited plan is nonetheless accepted 
effortlessly as an aspect of the continuing Self and it can be recognised 
as such if the process is brought to a sharp focus of consciousness.
It may be useful to recall that I am using the phrase 11 the idea of
the Self” to reflect the Self as established at a given point in time, 
with all that,has ever happened to it so far that has left some continuing 
mark, including its bodily history and attributes and all its past 
thoughts* I distinguish however between this total stored idea-complex 
and the idea evoked on any given occasion. In any one situation 
naturally only one aspect or profile of this Self is recognised, the
"evoked idea”; but, as we have already seen, it is recognised as a
sign of an inexhaustible whole, built up from the superimpositian of 
all past recognitions of the Self or parts or aspects of it over a 
lifetime. Moreover insofar ae this Self included personal plans or social 
roles not yet acted out, it is an "anticipatory Self, it exercises 
constraints on behaviour in the future and thus indirectly extends on 
into the future. But it does not include the imagined plans which the 
mind is entertaining but has not yet adopted. These are still loose, 
as it were. Once the situation in which they emerged has passed by
(and assuming they were not adopted) they become merely aspects of a 
past situation, part of the scenario in which a different plan was 
actually adopted and sealed into the Self - though the mind's thinking 
about them can also be recollected as part of the actualisation phase 
of a wider purposive cycle.
Ordinarily no trivial decision is brought to a sharp focus at all; 
that is, our, recognition of what is happening is not raised to the 
level of a predicative system. The mind automatically explores along 
various tracks the associations that the imagined plan arouses in this 
context and if it encounters nothing of interest (no area where the 
thresholds of association are unusually low) the action follows and the 
whole episode fades immediately out of mind. But if the plan stirs up 
strong emotion, or if it encounters some incompatibility, the focus 
of attention begins to close and the plan emerges into full consciousness.
If there is an incompatibility, it will be between the imagined 
future plan and the more general profile of the continuing Self which comes 
to mind in the context. It will be a logical incompatibility of the 
kind considered earlier: the imagined plan and the anticipatory Self 
each imply different values on a particular register at the same time 
and so they cannot fuse together* This .sort of conflict seems at once 
to cause the thresholds to be lowered and the mind to pay closer 
attention.
An apparent logical incompatibility can sometimes be removed on 
closer examination when the context is filled out; it might for 
example seem impossible for an object to be both round and vaporous, 
but closer consideration could show that in an astronomical context at 
least (and perhaps in others) the two attributes are not incompatible.
Again if the imagined plan is that of myself flicking a crumb from my 
sleeve, one aspect of the continuing Self as it emerges in this situation 
may be a plan of myself as a man with good table manners. Are the two 
compatible? The answer tends to depend on the detail of the situation.
If I am sitting at trable at a formal dinner party they probably will 
not be; the urge to brush off the crumb will probably be resisted and 
this imagination replaced by another - perhaps of myself carefully and
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surreptitiously picking it up and putting it on my plate. If, on the 
other hand, I am eating a sandwich on a park {sench by myself, there will 
probably be no incompatibility; the action will follow swiftly and in all 
likelihood below the fall focus of consciousness.
As this example shows, when an incompatibility exists and seems' ^  
inescapable, the mind looks for an alternative imagined plan which can 
more easily be accommodated to the continuing Self (as it here emerges).
It chooses between the two by imagining and balancing the consequences 
of each (that is, the development of each in its scenario) in the scales 
of pleasure or pain, gratification or discomfort. The choice may be 
one of evils, but predictive necessity may allow no scope for any more 
attractive course.
Ue have already noticed how the mind is constantly and automatically 
making predictive imaginations by extrapolating from the present situation 
in the light of what it knows about the world. This process of predictive 
imagining includes the behaviour of the Self, predicted on the basis of 
the profile of the anticipatory Self that emerges in the situation. If 
the immediate predictions do not work out favourably, the mind not only 
imagines -Abie alternative future scenarios and plans resulting from 
alternative courses of action it can take; it can also narrow the focus 
and work out those it has already imagined in more detail; furthermore 
it can give more attention to the profile of the bpticjpatorySelf 
relating it more closely to the situation and filling out the contextual 
detail. As the contextual perspective changes, so automatically does 
the profile of theantlt^atcjr^Self♦ And these changing profiles are not 
always consistent with each other; we are far from being perfectly 
integrated people.
Thus when I first sea a tiger in the distance advancing towards me, 
the profile of the anticipatory Self that emerges may be that of Self 
valiant; and in the radiation of associations from this T may find myself 
imagining future plans to fit on to it which feature myself walking boldly 
past the tiger, looking it in the eye. As I feel out the contextual 
detail, however, both in the imagined future situation and in the 
present perceptual situation (these being the two focal centres of my
consciousness) I find predictive detail accumulating which gives a high
value on the aversion register# In the changing situation I find a new
profile of the continuing Self emerging, that of Self prudent; and to 
match it imagined plans in which I hide behind a bush or a rock as the
tiger goes by. Further consideration however still leaves this as
anything but an attractive wish-fulfilment image. All of a sudden a 
different profile of the continuing Self emerges, that of Self getting 
somewhere else quickly to avoid danger — and to match it a plan in which 
I run like mad. This image, in all likelihood, will be accompanied by a 
rush of emotion, associated with a direct threat to essential variables, 
which sweeps away the other imagined plans and spills over precipitately 
into action.
Alternatives and Compatibilities (2)
A further extension of the thought experiment of the
traveller to bring in more complex problems of choice.
This process of self-creation through choice is clearly of so much 
importance that it may be useful to consider a different example of the 
way in which a man confronts himself with alternatives and decides 
between them. Let us go back to our traveller walking through the hills. 
As he comes round the shoulder of a hill he sees lying to one side of the 
path at the bottom of a slope the crumpled figure of a young man with a 
motor cycle lying nearby. His first reaction is no doubt to imagine a 
goal image which features himself down'at-the bottom of the slope invest­
igating what has happened; and this is almost automatically extendedJby a 
causal chain - here literally a chain of steps - picking out a way by 
which he could reach the spot, thus becoming an imagined plan.
This plan is in fact an aspect of a normal prediction scenario such as 
the mind automatically casts forward in every situation. In a dynamic 
situation the tendency is for predictive images to come first and for the 
mind then to pick one as a goal; while in a static situation the wish— 
fulfilment image comes first and the mind then looks for a causal chain 
leading to it. In the present example either could come first; ths 
traveller's mind will almost certainly envisage him going down to see 
what has happened, partly because that is one of ths most obvious 
predictive possibilities and partly because such a situation naturally
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wakens curiosity in most human minds and makes it an object of wish- 
fulfilment to find out more.
At this stage, however, as his imagination begins to fill in 
contextual detail, his mind may develop a number of alternative courses, 
each represented by an imagined plan with an associated emotional colour 
yielding a value in the register of gratification and aversion. They 
are disparate images relating to different time spans, and with varying 
degrees of compatibility with each other. One might be a short-term 
plan of himself helping the young man, which might be accompanied by an 
emotional tinge of concern and sympathy. This might be developed into 
a longter term plan of himself helping the young man to the nearest 
farmhouse. There might be a short-term plan related to the idea of 
Self squeamish at the prospect of blood? or of Self helpless and a bit 
frightened? or of Self not wanting to be bothered. These latter are 
perhaps to be regarded as predictive or contextual elaborations of the 
original plan and scenario, rather than new plans in their own right? 
but they can powerfully affect in particular the emotional coloration 
of the traveller*s experience.
Development in detail of the plan involving practical help could 
lead to the prediction of much time, effort and trouble being devoted 
to the task once it was embarked upon. This in turn could yield a high 
value in the aversion register which could begin to outweigh the initial 
feeling of concern and sympathy? it could then lead to a search for a 
practicable scenario with a plan for the traveller which avoids his 
getting mixed up with the accident. He might, for example, retrace his 
steps for a few yards and take thB other turning by which he could 
still reach his destination without much of a detour. Then no one might 
know that hs had ever passed this way.
The decision would now tend to resolve itself into the choice 
between these two incompatible imagined plans of longer span. If the 
traveller is one type of person the idea of the more cowardly course 
might immediately induce an emotion of shame or guilt yielding a vilue 
in the ayerqi.on register sufficiently strong to sbttle the choice(ie5wij:j^ out 
further ado. Shame and guilt are specifically feelings which relate
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to the possible or actual betrayal of accepted long term roles or 
plans respectively of the continuing Self. Another type of person might 
however hesitate longer; and the choice would then have to be settled 
by developing in more detail the profile of the continuing Self on which 
the imagined plan would have to be fused* This process could bring to 
the surface of consciousness the associations which earlier produced 
at a subconscious level the rush of feelings of fihame or guilt.
So far all the decisions the traveller has been taking on his way 
have been related 'to. the sub-plans of various spans within the over­
arching plan of himself making his way to his destination. This longer 
term plan has never been in question as representing in this general context 
the relevant contour of the anticipatory Self. Now, however, he is faced 
with an imagined plan which is irreconcilable with /t further progress 
towards his destination, at least for a considerable time. He is anxious 
to get there quickly and so this prospect immediately yields a value on 
the aversion register. He may have a strong wish to help, however, 
either out of simple concern, which makes it an object of desire to go 
and hBlp, or out of a sense of obligation.
How the emergence of a sense of obligation into his consciousness 
means that in the developing situation new contours of the continuing 
Self have come, as it were, into view. Hitherto his journey-plan has 
been the plan of longest span involved in his decisions. But when he 
is faced with a course which cannot be accommodated with it, he has to 
look to a plan of still longer span and greater generality. For this is 
how the mind works as a regulator, bringing in the longer span profiles 
to effect choice or reconciliation when in the shorter span we are ...faced. 
with irreconcilable alternatives, each of which has a strong claim.
That is to say, the hierarchical level is raised; more general con­
siderations are brought into play.
In the present case these considerations may be of three different 
types, in ascending order of generality; How important is it to the 
traveller to gBt to his destination quickly? Idhat will other people think 
if he takes the more cowardly course? And what would it be right for 
him to do?
To deal with the first question he imagines the scenario resulting 
if he does, or alternatively does not, arrive in time at his destination* 
Perhaps a number of people are assembling to meet him* The profile of 
the continuing Self, reflecting decisions already taken and so far 
followed, is one that includes the idea of himself there among them.
An opportunity in his career may be missed if he fails to turn up*
Thus the imagined plan of himself helping the motorcyclist is incom­
patible with the profile of the continuing Self that emerges in this 
context.
If he turns to the other course, however, he is up against the 
second question. If he leaves the man lying, someone may get to hear 
of it, he may be found out and in that case he will be despised and 
ostracised? this again is a powerful aversion image - for another of 
the plans of the continuing Self is that of himself in a social role 
as a man well thought of and of good repute? and it involves a sense 
of shame even to imagine himself in the position of being ostracised.
Perhaps here the predictive calculations are reassuring? it is 
misty, no one is around, he would not have been expected anyway to take 
this route. But still the third question remains to be faced. Would 
it be right to leave the man lying, even if he could get away with it?
If he goes to tha man’s assistance he may do himself harm materially, 
and it is unlikely that others will ever hear of the virtuous deed.
Yet the plan of being virtuous yields a certain value in the scale of 
gratification? while even to think of the alternative yields a sense of 
guilt. As this implies, there is in our traveller a further long term 
plan of the anticipatory Self, that of Self kindly, compassionate and 
helpful to his neighbour? and any imagined plan incompatible with this 
one provokes a sense of guilt. Shame and guilt shade into one another, 
but broadly shame is the painful emotion of finding oneself an object 
of contempt or derision to others? while guilt is the painful emotion 
provoked by the sense of having failed oneself. In the first case we have 
an imagined or actual plan which is incompatible with a profile of the 
continuing,Self reflecting an adopted social role. In the second,,,eqqg 
We have one Which is incompatible with a profile representing one’s own 
most fundamental personal plans or ideal roles, the last range of the 
contours of the Self*
There are two types of these fundamental unifying plans, first 
those which reflect the body and its needs for survival, and, secondly, 
the most general plans of the anticipatory Self as a member of human 
society. The latter may be plans first adopted in the earliest years 
and reflecting a child’s early identifications of itself over against 
parents and others. These bring with them (on the Freudian hypothesis) 
associations of scenarios in which "introjected" punishing figures exact 
painful retribution for departures from the indicated plan; and they also 
bring with them, on this hypothesis, plans of rebellion and guilt like 
that of Oedipus.1*
To adopt any new plan which is incompatible with any existing plan 
of the continuing Self is in a sense to damage the integrity of the Self- 
If the traveller has set his mind on playing his part at the meeting to 
which he is going, any decision which means that he will not get there is 
in a real sense an amputation of part of himself - still more so if it 
means sacrificing a significant opportunity in his career. But this is 
still the sacrifice of a relatively short term plan, whereas to lose 
his reputation among his associates is to damage a long term plan of the 
anticipatory Self; and to do something contrary to his own self-respect 
is in a fundamental way to damage his integrity.
To abandon a short term plan usually means abandoning it for good, 
if only because of the effect of the lapse of time which changes the 
situation. If our traveller starts to go to the injured man’s help, 
but then ahahlddjhs the idea and takes the other road, it will soon be too 
late for him to change his mind again, and the plan will then have bean 
abandoned for good, in taking this step he will also have betrayed a 
generalised long term plan, that of Self as Good Samaritan, kindly and 
self-sacrificing. Such a betrayal will weaken the long term plan, and 
a continued series of betrayals is liable to lead to its total abandon­
ment. But an isolated betrayal, or indeed several such, need not have 
this effect. They may lead instead to an access of guilt and remorse
1. These ideas are further discussed in the sections on "The Origins
of She Self” and "The Psychology of Wholeness” in Chapter IV.
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which tend to reinstate the long term profile as a wish-fulfilment image 
and can only be appeased by its conscious readaption and reincorporation 
into the Self through a resolve to do better next time.
Sometimes an individual, when faced with a choice which seems to 
imply some betrayal of one of his longer term plans, may wish to make 
it clear to others that he is not really giving it up at all; and to 
do this he may perform his adopted plan in such a way as to distance 
himself from it, to show that he is not fully committed to it in all its 
apparent implications. This is the phenomenon of role distance as 
described by Erving Eoffman.“* An adult may, for example, (Join ,in.,a.. 
childish game with an elaborate jokiness designed to signal that he has 
not really abandoned the generalised plan of being an adult. The 
distancing of his behaviour cannot alter, the fact that he has adopted this 
particular plan and is going through with it; but the manner he adopts 
in performing it constitutes a message in a code well understood by 
others around him, the effect of which is to make it clear that the 
generalised longer term plan, which he might seem to have abandoned 
because of its apparent incompatibility with this behaviour, has not been 
abandoned at all. In other words he is not really off his nut.
On other occasions an individual may be forced to abandon a major
long term plan, not for any reason of this own, but because the world in
which he finds himself has changed and he can no longer imagine any
feasible scenario in which the role giving effect to this plan can be
realised. This is the experience of loss or bereavement, one in which
the established wholeness of the idea of the Self is damaged because,
as it were, of a gap which opens up in the environment, making it
impossible any longer to sustain what has been a major element in the
2
structure of the anticipatory Self. Bereavement in this sense is the 
counterpart of sBlf-betrayal; but in the one case the damage to a 
person's integrity is externally caused, while in the other it is 
self-caused; and the accompanying emotions are correspondingly 
different.
1. "Role Distance" from "Encounters", 1951 (Penguin Edition 1972).
2. See "Bereavement" by Colin Hurray Parkes, 1972 (Penguin Edition
.1975).
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Emotion, Desire, Aversion
An examination of the nature of emotions and of the way
in which they affect the taking of decisions*
The analysis made so far of the way in which the mind makes decisions, 
annexing new plans to itself, suggests that ultimately it is the pull,, of 
emotions which determines choice. We have now to consider more closely 
what emotions are.
All mental life is accompanied by a certain quality of emotion.
Every abstract cell of thought or association appears to be characterised 
by a specific tinge and intensity of mood quality, as every visual cell 
appears to be characterised by a specific tinge and intensity of colour, 
and every aural cell by a specific tinge and intensity of sound quality.
And this quality of mood in turn appears to be analysable as the combined 
precipitate of the particular cloud of associations attaching to the cell 
but not individually recognised, just as the sound quality is analysable 
in terms of the unheard overtones accompanying it.
Emotion is related to mood values (as I use the word) in the 
same way as harmonies and harmonic progressions are related to the notes 
of which they are made. Whereas a mood value is an attribute of a cell 
of thought, an emotional value qualifies our recognition of a predicative 
complex or system? it is made out of the individual mood values by 
means of a sort of sustaining pedal effect spread over the system or 
sub-system as a whole. The mood values of individual cells - as conveyed 
for example by individual words - are sometimes distinguishable from each 
other in retrospect, but as they are apprehended their contributions are 
merged in a flux of emotion. The harmonic quality and intensity of this 
flux are endlessly changing. For any given system at any time they have 
specific unrepeatable values dependent on the precise mix of associations 
evoked at that time. The same idea realised on two different occasions 
may have a very different emotional accompaniment on each occasion, just 
as the same view seen on different days will always show differences in 
detailed colour values. Even on the same occasion, as the mind develops 
contextual detail bringing in more and different associations, so does 
the emotional tinge tend to change. I may dwell at first with
compacency on the prospect of hiding behind a bush while the tiger goes 
by, but as my mind develops contextual detail the complacency may give 
way to panic.
As every emotional flux has specific unrepeatable values, it is 
strictly unique. However we are able to identify similarities between 
emotional experiences and hence to attach labels to broad categories of 
emotion — like rage, fear, anxiety, depression — even though we cannot 
readily draw a boundary between, say, fear and anxiety, in the same 
way we can distinguish broad kinds of colour — red, green, pink, and so 
on but we cannot readily say where one shades into another, let alone 
define colour harmonies with precision.
We classify emotions not only by their type, but by their intensity? 
and we can also classify them by the values they vield on the registers 
of desire and aversion, pleasure and pain. Every emotion tends to 
involve an urge to maintain a given situation, or to seek a particular 
type of situation, or to avoid or escape from a particular type of 
situation. This is to say that each emotion tends to be accompanied 
by a lowering and raising of the thresholds of association in particular 
directions.
Our perceptual consciousness may be accompanied by Components of 
physical pleasure or pain which are distinguishable from strictly
perceptual qualities such as those of colour or sound or touch. We
cart perhaps best regard them as values derived from the same base,of 
experience as strictly perceptual qualities but classifying it 
differently in a register of sensations of physical well or ill being 
which merges into our classification of emotions without any sharp 
break.
Our thinking about a wish-fulfilment image, whether it is a glass 
of beer or a well-paid job, is marked by a tinge of emotion, varying 
with thB image and the context, which is classified both as pleasant 
and as a desire. We speak of a desire as always being directed
towards an object of some kind; but it is also a particular kind of
emotion. All emotion, as we have seen, is accompanied by the lowering 
of thresholds to association in a certain way* but a desire is accompanied
1. See the section "Understanding a Sentence (9)s The Harmonic Flux"
in "The Grammar of Language”.
fay tfc]B canalisation of association in a very specific direction. As 
soon as the mind, from the general drift of free or predictive 
associations, concentrates an a particular wish-fulfilment image, we 
recognise desire. Consequently the imagination of new plans tends always 
to be associated with desire in one form or another, or correspondingly 
with aversion in one form or another.
Ordinarily the mind, through the process of free association, seeks 
out what it wants, not what it dislikes. However the normal process of 
predictive imagination may lead in some contexts to aversion images, 
representing situations to be avoided. The mind does not simply avert 
its attention from them; this could be dangerous to the essential 
variables and consequently would not bs conducive to efficient regulation.
If I see the tiger coming down the path, the idea of the tiger, and the
Imagined plan leading to a fatal encounter between ihe tiger and myself, 
remain continuously as units within the span of my attention. The 
thresholds are lowered to this extent towards an aversion image if it 
appears to represent a real threat; but for the rest the raising and 
lowering of thresholds is such as to enable the mind to seek, not a plan 
leading to encounter, but a plan leading to escape. Ry mind is 
concentrated marvellously towards any plan which leads out of the 
present situation; it averts attention from any plan that leads towards 
the aversion image. At this stage therefore it does not have a specific 
goal; it has a specific aversion and in such circumstances almost anything 
els8 becomes a goal. The attention is focussed in part on the aversion 
image but in order, as it were, to create a ring fence around it and 
deflect attention from a plan leading in the forbidden direction. Thus 
the normal effect of an aversion image is to lead rapidly to.ths 
identification of an alternative goal which then becomes the object of 
positive desire. In the instance of the tiger the negative emotion of 
fear gives way to the positive emotion of longing for the safety of the 
tree for which I am nou running. At the same time the negative emotion 
and the aversion image which inspired it remain part of the mind*s
consciousness, ingredeents in the system which is at the focus of
attention, at least so long as the danger remains.
When a particular plan is adopted from desire, not predictive 
compulsion, the adoption is marked by a specific tinge of satisfaction,
and this may continue steadily or intermittently as we monitor the plan 
being successfully acted out — that is to say, as we recognise that our 
perceptions in the Here Now are effectively sealing it into actuality. 
Thus if I move from wanting to eat that delicious looking melon to - 
actually eating it, the plan as originally imagined is matched to the 
feedback of sensory impressions. Hunger is replaced by gustatory 
satisfaction, a state with a different specific emotional tinge (and 
one which might for Instance be shaded on this particular occasion by 
disappointment that the melon does not taste quite assgood as it looks).
The forced adoption of an unwelcome plan, as when the boat sinks 
and we have to iwimsfor it, is marked by pain or distress, which 
continues, whether at the focus of consciousness or as an ingredient^f 
our consciousness of something else, for as long as the unwelcome plan 
continues. If it is a long term role - if, for instance, I lose my leg 
and have to adopt a one-legged plan for the rest of my life - I may 
however become reconciled to it as part of my continuing Self. Then,vj 
although it will colour my awareness in many contexts, as part of th8 
state of my body, it no longer in most contexts carries an exceptional 
emotional charge.
Both satisfaction and pain, however, compel attention if they are 
intense, and thus ensure that the plan to which they relate figures 
prominently in the mind’s trains of thought at the time they are felt. 
Though their objects are present rather than imagined in the future, and 
they can therefore no longer be classified as instances of desire or 
aversion, they still have an effect in adjusting thresholds towards 
maintaining, or escaping from, the plans to which they relate. But 
they are accompaniments of a monitoring process that checks the progress 
of a plan, rather than of a selection process which leads to the 
adoption of a plan,- that is, of the phase of actualisation (monitoring 
and action) in the purposive cycle, rather than that of purposive-model 
building or that of decision.
In retrospect, when a desired plan has been successfully acted 
out, the mind may yet return to dwell upon it from time to time, 
experiencing now a different kind of pleasure, or nostalgia^, leading* 
to the lowering of thresholds in the direction of its repetition, where
this is possible, or otherwise, where this is not possible, in a more 
generalised way towards the adoption of plans like it. Similarly when 
there has been a failure in acting out a plan once adopted, the mind 
may dwall on the past failure with a different kind of distress. This 
may be frustration or shame or guilt or remorse, leading in turn towards 
the re-emphasising of the type of plan which last time was frustrated or 
betrayed. Thus if I break my resolution to give up smoking for the New 
Year my remorse may yet reinforce the general long term resolution to 
give up smoking and lead me to try again rather than abandon the whole 
idea. On the other hand in different circumstances looking back on 
failure in the past may lead to an indignant resolution not to try that 
kind of thing again. All these processes are characteristic of the phase 
of readjustment in the purposive cycle.
In many descriptive models of the mind emotio.is, or alternatively 
’’drives" or instincts associated with certain emotions, are identified 
as providing the ’’motor energy” of the mind. Sometimes a list of 
fundamental drives or instincts is worked out - which varies considerably 
with the model. Sometimes they are identified as differentiations of a 
single central drive ("horme” for McDougall, love for Suttie^, sometimes 
as differentiations of two central drives, as with Freud’s Eros and^ JyLs., 
death-instinct. The model I have been elaborating, however, does not 
conveniently lend itself to this sort of interpretation. The emotions 
accompany and reflect adjustments in the thresholds of association; and 
a powerful emotion reflects a rapid and widespread adjustment. But it 
does not follow that the emotion bears a causal relationship to this 
adjustment; rather the converse; It is a description of the adjustment 
rather than its cause.^*0n this model the mind is conceived as a regulator 
which, by the cumulative application of inbuilt rules in dialogue with 
an input in the form of regularities imposing themselves from the 
environment, reduces the chaos of potentiality to a series of discrete 
systems at the focus of attention, making a continuous succession during 
consciousness. This process leads to the imagination and adoption of 
personal plans, each involving a series of physical actions and sometimes 
mental resolutions, and abutting (if successful) in the achievement of a 
goal or the avjhidancB of an object of aversion. Uhat causes this to 
happen is ultimately the set of rules inbuilt in the gene pattern as 
this is given definition through dialogue with the impinging
1. This does not however affect the fact that it is ultimately the 
balance of emotional intensities which finally determines what 
plan the mind decides to adopt. This point is discussed in the 
next section.
regularities of the environment.
It is difficult and perhaps impossible to disentangle with any 
clarity what the inbuilt rules are. They contribute to the formation of 
a whole, which is the regulator, the mind-manifold, ©ith ell its threshold 
settings as they stand at a given moment; and it is hardly possible*to 
distinguish the extent to which the end-result is the product of 
heredity or of environment. The attempt could be compared with the 
attempt to distinguish with precision, when looking at a landscape, the 
contributions of the original composition of the rocks, the eroding effect 
of ice, wind and water over millennia, and the effect of plant growth 
(itself determined in some degree by climate) over millennia in determining 
the ultimate form of what we see. Without entering into the controversies 
which rage over the general issue of the effects of heredity and environ­
ment, we can observe that it is certainly possible tc identify certain 
broad patterns of threshold settings, like certain broad features of 
the landscape, as falling in recognisable classes - food-seeking patterns, 
for instance, which we class as characteristic of hunger, or U-shaped 
vallpys which we class as ^characteristic of erosion by glaciers in,^ a^ vSi 
past Ice Age. The most natural way to categorise the patterns of threshold 
settings is by the type of goal towards which they bias the mind - food, 
for example, or aggressive action against another, or flight, or rest 
as the case may be.
To some extent however these classifications are arbitrary, or related 
to specific contexts, which is why they tend to vary from one psychologist 
to the next. They are descriptions of particular types of patterns, 
but the patterns to which they refer are not in fact sharply segregated 
into groups; their variations are continuous and they shade into one 
another as colours do, so that it is a matter of opinion and context 
where exactly blue ends and green begins. (Uhat provokes a particular 
type of pattern moreover is not a particular type of object, but a 
particular type of object in certain appropriate conditions - edible 
objects, for instance, when the body has been deprived of nutrition for 
a period. Ule have to do oot with an autonomous drive that is waked 
or lulled in different circumstances, but with a description, a coding, 
of a particular type of adaptation to the environment. It is true that 
there appears ultimately to underlie all these adaptations a tendency
for the organism to maintain its essential variables within the values 
which are conducive to health and survival. But this end may be served, 
even in the case of a single variable, like that of the calorie intake, 
by a great variety of different patterns of threshold settings, different 
"drives", different emotions in different circumstances. A descriptive 
model of the type we.have been elaborating is that of an open, self- 
regulating system, with an input and an output of both matter/energy 
and information. It has no need for "drives", instincts or emotions 
as sources of motor energy. They are labels for types of constellations 
of threshold settings, or rather for the codings through which these 
constellations become available to consciousness, as single values in 
the harmonic register of emotion, each representing the precipitate of 
a cloud of associations and/or sensations.
The Conflict of Emotions
When the mind is in a situation of choice or indecision, it may be 
confronted with a number of goals and aversion images and with various 
imagined plans associated with them. A plan, it will be remembered, 
includes the goal image, but also includes a causal chain, of greater 
or less conductivity or probability, leading from some possible action 
or series of actions by the Self in the present situation up to the 
goal. A goal image in isolation from a plan is hardly conceivable; 
even the remotest wish-fulfilment image, as soon as it becomes an 
object of desire to the Self, must ipso facto be brought into relation 
with He Here Now; but in such cases of remote possibility the causal 
chain is no more than a vague link of sequence which has no significant 
conductivity to purposive thought.
When the mind iS faced with a choice between several courses of 
action, the span of attention includes the various plans corresponding 
to these courses, each forming a unit or sub-system and each invested 
with a certain tinge of emotion and a certain degree of desire or 
aversion. If the same plan is related in different ways to different 
aspects of the anticipatory Self, it will be associated with a different 
emotional tinge in each context. The attention will also include some 
realisation of the relevant contours of the anticipatory Self, in 
relation to which the desires or aversions emerge, but these contours
are normally much more generalised than the imagined future plans.
For example, I taay have a sharp imagined profile of myself owning the 
car which I am looking at in the dealer’s window. But the relevant 
profile of my continuing Self is a more general idea, relating to the 
state of my bank balance, my financial prospects and other calls on my 
money. It may take a good deal of contextual elaboration to get a 
precise profile out of this. When the. mind is facing a choice between 
various courses, the attention may shift about, concentrating on each 
imagined plan in turn in its different contexts as a separate system, 
but the total sitaation will always remain present as the context or 
suprasystem in which the system is realised. At such a.moment the 
other courses may have sunk out of individual consciousness altogether, 
but they will still be contributing as associations to the emotional 
tinge of the experience(reverting to our other example, my anxiety about 
the tiger will continue as an emotional undertou in my consciousness 
oveh when my mind is concentrated on how I am to climb the tree of 
refuge - and not least if I am uncertain about how good tigers are 
themselves at climbing trees).
It may be that in a situation of choice a man is faced with two 
or three alternative plans which are all desirable, all mutually 
exclusive, and none of which have any significant negative emotional 
tinge. The simplest example of such a situation might be that of choosing 
between several different cakes on a plate. In this situation a man 
decides which he likes most; he simply balances the appetite awakened 
by each against the appetite awakened by the others and chooses the 
one which has the strongest pull. The mind appears to have some means 
of evaluating and comparing quantities of appetite or desire, even when 
the quantities are evoked by dissimilar objects. If, for instance, in 
addition to choosing between the cakes he has a further course open to 
him, also mutually exclusive with the others, of catching the early train 
home, he is quite capable of balancing this course with the others - 
though admittedly to match like bith like is easier and quicker. It 
is significant that he is likely to balance two courses first, that^pf 
eating any of the cakes and that of catching the train; then only if 
he has once decided for cake will he close the focus of attention and 
choose between the different cakes available. Alternatively, if the
choice between the cakes is easy, he may decide that problem first and 
only thereafter turn to the other question before him.
In other words where ue have a number of choices we usually break 
them up into a series of choices between in each case a relatively small 
number of courses, as this makes the balancing and comparing easier. In 
any given situation we can always group the courses arbitrarily (though 
usually, so far as possible, we match like with like) and then compare 
the winners of each group, as it were, to decide the ultimate winner by 
a knock-out process. Where the choice is difficult we can only compare 
two alternatives at once; and it seems probable that this Is always the 
underlying process. It is only the span of memory which in easy cases 
enables us to bear in mind three or four options at once and decide 
which of them carries the most weight , just as the span of perception 
enables us to see four straws together and decide at oneoglance which * 
of them is the longest.
The train option in our present example, however, does introduce 
another factor, that of balancing a positive against a negative pull.
The attraction of catching the train is balanced by the negative tinge 
of its implication, the deprivation of cake; and similarly the attraction 
of any cake option is balanced by the negative tinge of missing the tram* 
In fact our first example was misleading. There is no course that does 
not involve both negative and positive emotions, for the reason that 
each imagined plan is itself a value on the register of what I am to 
do next, and thereby, if it is to be realised, excludes all other 
values. The mind evaluates each plan in succession in the context.
The adaption of any one plan always means abandoning others.
Consequently, insofar as any plan exerts a positive attraction, an 
equal and opposite negative pull is attached to any alternative.
This is bhe converse of the fact that if a plan leads to an aversion 
image and so provokes a negative emotion, an equal and opposite positive 
emotion is attached to any alternative. In any given situation of 
choice between the two courses, therefore, the attraction of any one 
course is diminished by an amount equal to the attraction of the other.
If there are six mutually exclusive courses the attraction of one is 
diminished by an amount equal to the attraction, not of all the other
five together, but of the most attractive of them; and initially the 
mind may be uncertain of this quantity until it has considered each 
individually and, if necessary, conducted eliminating rounds to reduce 
the number of contestants* If the tiger is after me and I have to choose 
between jumping into a river and climbing a tree, the attractiveness of 
each of these courses is increased equally by a positive charge which 
is the opposite of the negative aversion inspired by the tiger. The 
charge is not however multiplied when there are tuo courses, it is 
merely available and held in suspense till the elimination between the 
two is hurriedly decided on other grounds.
Now if my impression is that tigers like climbing trees but do 
not like jumping into rivers, this may affect my choice. It will do 
so however not by a altering the aversion charge, which remains the same, 
but by altering the probability of the tree course being a true alternative 
a true escape from the tiger* To the degree that the probability of 
the plan is reduced, its capacity to carry the aversion charge is 
correspondingly diminished* The probability is simply the predictive 
likelihood that if I adopt the plan and take the appropriate actions 
the scenario will unroll itself in the manner predicted and abut in 
the wish-fulfilment goal that I have in mind* Every plan depends on 
a predicted scenario and therefore has a certain greater or lesser 
degree of probability, that is, of conductivity to purposive thinking.
As this indicates, one of the main tasks of the mind in a situation 
of choice is that of sorting out the true alternatives, grouping them 
correctly and getting the groups in the correct sequence. Uhat are 
the alternatives in any situation will depend on the context, which 
in turn will depend largely on the values yielded by the mind-manifold, 
by Me Here Now. This applies in a physical situation when I am
confronted with deciding on a route along a number of branching paths?
the alternatives and the sequence in which choices of alternative 
turnings have to be made depend largely (though by no means entirely) 
on my starting point, the place where I am now, which sets the
perspective for the whole operation. But the same applies also in a
more abstract situation, for example, when I am trying to fit together 
a number of conflicting or partly conflicting activities, as I plan 
what I am going to do during the day ahead. The first pair of
alternatives may be that of either lying longer in bed or catching the 
earlier train. If I catch the train I havs the further alternative 
of doing some shopping before going to my appointment or getting through 
some work in my office* If I lie in bed and catch the later train there 
will be no time for shopping, and so this choice does not arise; in the 
shorter time available, however, I may have ifche choice between doing a 
lesser amount of work and having a cup of coffee. If on the other hand 
I lie in bed longer still and miss the later train, I will not be able 
to keep my appointment at all. I could perhaps telephone through and 
change the time; but this might annoy the man I am meeting and diminish 
the likelihood of a successful meeting. And so on* The mind's task is 
to decide which courses are alternatives to each other and group them 
together; in each case, with Me Here Now, they represent together a 
context of choice in which each course represents a different possible 
value for one variable, that of uhat-do-I-do-next-in-this-situation.
Each indicates a different possible state to which the system could 
move.
Having grouped the alternatives, the mind decides between them by 
considering them individually in the way we have already examined, 
assessing their positive and negative emotional charges, conducting 
eliminating rounds if necessary, and adopting the plan which yields on . 
balance the highest positive charge. If none of them yields a positive 
charge, if the man is confronted with a choice of evils, then he adopts 
the course with the least negative charge. In a situation of sequential 
choice, as when a man is planning a day's activities ahead, he will 
proceed to examine and assess the further implications and choices 
with which this course confronts him before coming to a final decision. 
This process of elaborating implications can also be applied to the 
other initial alternatives and the effect may be to alter his initial 
assessment of the emotional weighting of each. As ho follows out the 
implications of further choices, the cloud of associations evoked by 
the role concerned is developed and extended, with the result that 
there is a change in its emotional tinge.
It is clear that a situation of sequential choice, which is the 
normal situation of our lives, rapidly offers an extreme complexity of
alternatives and implications, possibilities and impossibilities* The 
function of logical reasoning is to pick a path through these branching 
possibilities* Thus logical reasoning depends essentially on 
disentangling what are true alternatives (and thus mutually exclusive 
values) on the register of what-do-I-do-next, and then following out 
the implications in terms of subsequent groupings of alternatives and 
subsequent choices* It is the mechanism of emotional weighting which 
makes it possible to achieve decision between alternatives. It is clear 
that the mind would soon be totally bogged down In a morass of 
alternatives if there were not some quick means of eliminating all but 
a few at each stage*'*'* In practice this elimination appears to be 
achieved in two ways: in the first place by a hierarchical grouping 
into longer and shorter term decisions, the latter being subsidiary to 
the former; and in the second place by the weighting of each alternative 
with an appropriate positive or negative charge, a mechanism which 
gives a direct answer with a minimum of delay in the great majority of 
cases. The exceptions are essentially cases in which either the emotional 
weightings are evenly balanced, or cases in which the longer term plans 
embodied in the continuing Self are brought into play.
A case in the first of these categories in fact tends to be 
transformed into one in the second category; because, as we have seen, 
where the pull: of two short term future plans in relation to the 
continuing Self tends to be evenly balanced, the mind as regulator will 
bring in a longer term plan by way of contextual elaboration. In this 
new context the two imagined plans will themselves develop neu associations 
and so yield new values on the emotional registers; and these can decide 
the Issue. If I have to choose between an apple and a cream cake, the 
immediate emotional weighting may favour the cream cake so strongly that 
the issue is decided without further reference. But if the balance 
is at all even, it will take longer to assess .; the relative weighting 
of each, and this time will allow further associations to be explored 
(indeed more time is needed because further associations have to be 
explored to settle the issue). In particular in this instance 
association may bring the longer term generalised plan of Self slim and 
fit Into play; and against this, while the plan of Self eating apple 
gives a positive value, that of Self eating cream cake yields a strongly 
negative value. Thus in the end I may decide for the apple after all.
1. Cf. Sloman's remark about rules of thumb quoted on page 6? above.
Social Pressures and the Pattern of the Self
A brief account of the organisations and thought 
communities of human society and the way in which 
they affect the plans and social roles adopted by 
the individual*
Human beings can only live in cooperation with each other; and ue 
have already seen that in trying to achieve our individual purposes we 
are constantly adoptidg social roles, tha existence and nature of which 
are determined by the social environment in which we live. As I haVe^t^'cT 
already made clear, I do not intend to discuss the structure and 
process of society in the present study more than is necessary for my 
immediate purpose; but some reference to the shaping pressures of 
society is unavoidable in connection wifeh the weighting of an individual’s 
choices and the achievement of consistency between them.
If the mind’s successive decisions are to regulate effectively 
the way in Which an individual reacts to his environment, it is essentiall 
that they should not be constantly contradicting one another. Ue have 
seen that broadly conflict is avoided by making sure that short term 
plans are accommodated to the longer term plans of the anticipatory 
Self. But these plans are often shaped in the main by social pressures; 
for if human societies are themselves to be regulated effectively 
some consistency has to be achieved not merely between the decisions 
that are taken by each individual on his own, but also between those 
that are taken by different individuals. Bcoadly this is achieved through 
what I have called thoyght ^ communities, which shape and constrain the 
value systems of people who belong to them, because they provide the 
common coin of ideas - the thought currencies - in terms of which 
people take cognizance of the world, formulate their judgements and 
consequently locate their values.
A thought community is any group within which there is a 
differentiated circulation of ideas - a family, a school, a commercial 
organisation, a locality, a workforce, a scientific community, a 
language community, a nation, a civilisation. Such communities vary 
widely in size, in the sort of ideas they share, and in the intensity
of their exchange of infoismation* Every adult in our society belongs 
to a large number of different thought communities, and virtually no 
two people belong to exactly the same set* But thought communities 
in their varying scope and generality form a loose hierarchy extending 
from the family to the civilisation; and when two strangers meet they 
can almost always quickly identify some currency of ideas they have in 
common*
What constitutes the common coin of a thought community is not a 
logically integrated system of ideas but, in T*S* Kuhn’s terms as 
applied to a scientific community, a set of 11 exemplars” forming a 
”paradigmn* It represents in effect a sort of macro-language In terms 
of which the world is divided up and understood; and its use can thus 
greatly accelerate the process of mutual understanding by comparison 
with what would be necessary if every detail had to be spelt out in a 
verbal language* The system usually includes a number of people - who 
may be living or dead, or even mythological figures - who are the 
reference personalities of this community, the known stars of this 
particular firmament*
One of the effects of intercommunication within thought communities 
is inevitably to produce a certain alignment of ideas and values among 
their members - an alignment at least of the terms in which issues are 
formulated and understood, even if not of the judgements made about 
them (there is always room for a wide range of what Erving Goffman calls 
’’meaningful non-adherences”). But this effect does not in any case 
alter the fact that there are multitudes of thought currencies with their 
corresponding thought communities* The loose system of hierarchy by 
which the more general overlap the more particular may help to achieve 
a degree of alignment among those which are closely connected in subject 
matter; but the contingencies of life are constantly bringing people 
into contact who tBnd to see and judge the things immediately at stake 
in different terms, because of the different mix of thought communities 
to which they belong* The manager and the trade union negotiator are 
examples of people who inhabit different yet overlapping worlds; they 
have some thought currencies in common, from the language of the work­
place to (it may be) their common support of the local football team,
but in nearly all cases they also belong to separate communities which 
see the world in different terms and carry different value systems - 
communities identified with class, educational background, party, 
neighbourhood, interest groups, recreation groups and so on. It is 
significant that when the values of the narrower communities clash, 
there is a tendency to appeal to the wider, more generalised values 
associated with the wider thought communities to which both sides 
belong - for example to the national interest or the values of "common 
humanity”. In a given contingency a solution may then be found if 
agreement can be reached over a limited range of issues on what 
claims will for immediate purposes be accepted.
An analysis is presented in "The Grammar of Social Interaction" of
the process by which a pedestrian and a motorist, coming up to a crossing
at the same moment,^might establish a sufficient understanding to avoid
an accident. On the basis of this simplest and most transitory of
examples the general conclusion is reached that if two people are to
cooperate, they need to set up an organisation for the purpose; to set
up an organisation they need to reach some agreement as to the ends it is
to serve; to agree on certain ends is by implication to agree on certain
values; and in order to agree on certain values it is necessary to set
up an intercommunicating system which is in Bffect a limited ad hoc thought
^^munity. The agreement they reach need not imply any wide-ranging
agreement at all between their personal value systems, it relates merely
to **what claims concerning what issues will temporarily be honoured" —
and these claims may include those of superior force. Nevertheless it
does imply some limited overlap, and this suggests that when two people
are in communication with each other in a contengency it will normally
be much easier for them to identify common ground to provide the basis
for cooperation if they already have membership of one or more thought 
«
communities in common.
If I speak of thought communities rather than, more conventionally, 
of social groups, this is because the conventional term tends to blur 
the distinction which I regard as extremely important between the 
thought community and the organisation. A nation, for example, is a
thought community, a state is an organisation in which individuals take 
part in their roles as citizens, judges, officials or whatever it may be. 
An organisation is a structure of paired, complementary roles, often 
hierarchically arranged, which serves for the achievement of certain 
ends. The players acting the roles can themselves be plural as well as 
singular (as with members of Parliament in the organisation known as the 
House of Commons); and still more often the players are themselves sjb— 
ordinate organisations (like the factories of a motor manufacturing firm) 
rather than individuals. An organisation however can only act through 
individuals or subordinate organisations and is not itself capable of 
belonging to a thought community, though its existence may generate one 
based on the individuals who have roles within it. An individual acting 
on behalf of an organisation can only agree to courses which are 
consonant with the constituted purposes of the organisation; it may be 
possible to alter or extend these purposes, but this can seldom be done 
easily or quickly. The organisation reflects through its constituted 
purposes certain values agreed between those who set it up, and it is 
limited to actions regulated by those values. It is possible for a 
sing&e individual to set up an organisation himself and to retain all 
powers of decision in his own hands; but even in such a case he is 
dependent on the cooperation of employees who will be committed (even 
if they are slaves) only in the terms of some implicit or explicit 
contract.
The interactions of organisations with individuals and with othBr 
organisations, large ar small, take place, like the interactions of 
individuals themselves, in the environment of a society which in general 
leaves free play to ecological forces but also imposes on them the 
ultimate constraints of a political organisation or state. The basic 
function of a state is to prevent conflicts in a particular geographical 
area from getting out of hand, and it does so by making and enforcing 
laws and judgements. This, however, it can only do in terms of some 
more or less explicit value system which determines the form and nature 
of its institutions; and such a value system can appropriately be des­
cribed as an ideology.
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Interactions between states also take place again in ecological 
fashion, subject to little regulation beyond what is imposed by the 
physical constraints of the world. Yet, to the extent that there is 
communication between these states and the people who inhabit them they 
form part of a wider thought community, a civilisation, which develops 
its own commog coin of ideas and a consequent system of values.
Over the span of recorded history civilisations — which correspond to 
”known worlds” — have spread and grown as conquerors have built up their 
empires and the strong have assimilated the weak. In every case, after 
a shorter or longer period, the empires have fallen apartj but in general, 
when an empire falls, the parts into which it disintegrates are larger 
than those which went before, and the known world which it has created 
remains to some extent in being as a system across which communication 
is maintained. Thus, partly as a result of technical development in 
the field of communications, the size of civilisations has generally 
tended to increase. Finally in the 18th and 19th centuries the empires 
of Europe overllowed into every corner of the globs and made of the 
whole world a single civilisation, superimposed though it might be upon 
massive remnants of older civilisations. As political structures these 
empires disappeared with remarkable swiftness, but in terms of ideas 
the unity they created has in many respects grown stronger since 1945, 
as Western science, technology and communications have asserted 
themselves worldwide. Yet the resulting accommodation of thought 
patterns has been of a limited and unbalanced kind, for reasons which 
it may be useful to explore.
Historically it has been the function of religion in its broadest 
sense to develop and make explicit the ultimate coinage of binding ideas 
of a civilisation, in terms of which people understand the world and 
form their judgements. Churches have existed as organisations to pro­
pagate ideas concerning the ultimate religious visions and values which 
the civilisation should have. In practice there has always been 
fragmentation, scepticism and dissent. Not even the mediaeval papacy 
was able entirely to dominate the self-expression and solf-awareness 
of the civilisation of mediaeval Christendom. But in the past every 
civilisation, when at its height, has had the self-confidence of its
own righteousness, and this has been reinforced by a religious system 
providing the framework within which the world has been conceived and 
outside which it has hardly been possible to think.
Our modern world civilisation, however, still very loose and 
fragmented, has not yet developed any religious orthodoxy of its own? 
and there is a major obstacle to any such development in the fact that 
over recent centuries in the West — and now across the world - science 
has gradually separated itself from religious myth and developed an 
independent momentum as the effective means of explaining the natural 
universe. But science itself is raordlly neutral. In driving out myth 
it has deprived religion of its most universal means of expression without 
putting anything in its place; for science cannot supply the function of 
religious myth in providing a common coin of morally unifying ideas.
The acceptance of scientific interpretations of nature bnd of the methods 
of science, with all their accompanying fruits of technological achieve­
ment, has indeed had a major practical effect in unifying the modern 
world, which could not otherwise have become a single civilisation; 
but in moral terms our nascent civilisation is unified only by a shaky 
acceptance of certain ideals of human rights and democracy, essentially 
of Western provenance, such as are enshrined, for example, in the 
United Nations Charter; and even this is often no more than a lip 
service, supported by no coherent faith and at odds with such forces 
as those of nationalism and class war. With the general decay of 
religion and the competition of different religious claims (including 
those of Marxist "science”) the foundations of most of our moral 
valuations have tended to sink below the level of consciousness, to 
bBcome implicit rather than explicit.
The foregoing analysis has inevitably been presented in an 
extremely compressed and dogmatic form; but it may be sufficient for 
illustrative purposes in thB present context. If we return now to the 
individual we can seB that the thought communities to which he belongs, 
or to which he has belonged in the past, do not directly determine the 
form of his personality, because they do not directly determine what 
plans he adopts; but their influence is considerable, because they do 
tend to impose their pattern on the organisation of his mind-manifold.
We noted earlier that the complex superposition of forms in the 
manifold was organised in two ways, by reference to a map of the world 
and history built up through an individuals life experience, and by 
reference to the signs and symbols of the codes or languages known to 
him* Certainly a personfs mother tongue, with all the particular 
discriminations which it supplies or fails to supply (like the multiple 
discriminations concerning snow which are available to an Eskimo but not 
an Englishman), has an important effect in determining what he can most 
easily think* But apart from the ordinary languages he knows, the 
common coin of every thought community to which he belongs constitutes, 
as I have suggested, a macro-language, and this in turn influences the 
larger scale organisation of the manifold* The extent of the effect 
in every such case is determined by the intensity of the communication 
in this particular currency; while the interrelation of the effects of 
different thought currencies on the manifold is organised (so far as 
it is organised at all) by the broad hierarchical pattern of scope and 
generality into which, as wo have-seen,: the - thouight communxties tend to 
fall*
It will be seen that, while I fully acknowledge the existence of 
the shaping pressures of society on the individual, and while the model 
which I am presenting attempts to explain how they are brought to bear,
I am far from accepting the suggestion of such as George Herbert Plead 
that it is effectively the social pressures of the "generalised other" 
which constitute the Self. I do not agree that "a person is a personality 
because he belongs to a community, because he takes over the 
institutions of that community into his conduct"*^*
In each succeeding contingency of an individual's life the 
existing anticipatory Self, built up from past decisions related to 
past scenarios will play an important part in determining what plans 
he will adopt; but an equally important part is played by the way in 
which he interprets the world and so envisages the present scenarios
1* "Self" in "George Herbert Plead on Social Psychology" (University
of Chicago Press, revised edition 1964) p* 226* Some comments
on Plead's views on the self are given in Appendix II to this
study*
232.
in which his present alternative plans are deployed. The coordination 
of an individual's shorter term decisions tends to be effected, as we 
have seen, by reference to their compatibility with longer term 
decisions, often taken many years before; and these longer term 
decisions again tend to relate to scenarios shaped by the ideas of 
broader thought communities of nation, language and civilisation to 
which the individual belongs. A modern Englishman many not be a 
Christian, but the broader ideas in terms of which he coordinates his 
judgements will inevitably be ideas shaped by the Christian tradition, 
even when they identify what he rejects rather than what he accepts.
In this connection we may note that an individual's personality 
has often largely been formed at its deeper levels by decisions taken 
in the past when he belonged to a different set of thought communities 
from those of today. The longest term plans of all may well be plans 
laid down in early childhood, usually in relation to parent figures, 
plans which, with their scenarios, are for the most part buried ouh of 
direct consciousness. Cases can easily arise in which there is conflict 
between what is submerged and what is consciously adopted, the pull 
of the unconscious expressing itself in an intensity and quality of 
emotion that seem inappropriate, or in what may seem to be irrational 
imaginations and desires distorting the conscious process. Religious 
ideas, as the ultimately coordinating ideas of a man's mind, often have 
a close associatioen with patterns of love or hate, obedience and 
rebellion, towards parent figureejsptsSblished in childhood; and fot«Ph,i<*r 
individual to achieve a reasonable degree of coherence of mind and 
personality it may become necessary to rescue some of these earliest 
layers of experience into the arena of consciousness.
It is important to bear in mind that the framework of a society 
is constituted not by its thought communities but by its organisations - 
including its political organisations - and the roles they create which 
individuals have to adopt. The role a man has in an organisation 
determines, in my terminology, the rank he holds in the hierarchy of 
that organisation. By contrast the status he is accorded by the people 
with whom he comes into contact, while it may take account of the rank
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he holds in various organisations, is determined by the values of the 
thought communities to which these people belong, in combination with 
the unique contribution due to the nature and history of each judging 
individual.^ "* At the same time the roles that an individual adopts 
and the corresponding organisations that he joins will inevitably 
determine in part the thought communities to which he belongs. 
Furthermore the organisations are established and developed by means of 
constitutive and executive decisions? and these decisions have to be 
related to the values of common ad hoc thought currencies cobbled to­
gether by the cooperating individuals on the basis of their own value 
systems. In Erving Coffman’s words (which I have already quoted in 
part)i "Together the participantj^cqotribute to a single overall 
definition of the situation ^ and hence in my terms to an agreed 
scenario/V which involves not so much a real agreement as to what
exists, but rather a real agreement as to what claims concerning what
2.issues will be temporarily honoured.” * It is in the light of such 
definitions of the situation that organisations are constituted, roles 
are established, and projects are undertaken; and it is to such 
organisations, roles and projects that the plans adopted by individuals 
in pursuing their own lives have to be accommodated.
Ultimate Binding Ideas
An examination of the psychology of religion as expressed 
in terms of the model developed in this study, and with 
; • particular reference ttr^ the^ nature and function of "ideal” “
or "heroic” roles.
In the two concluding sections of this chapter I look more closely 
at two aspects of the working of the idea of the Self; first its 
relation to the "binding ideas" of religion, or its psychological 
equivalents, and secondly in relation to the meaning of freedom.
1. Cf. Ron Haree’s distinction between the practical order and the 
expressive order ("Social Being", Blackwell 1979, pp. 4—5).
2. "The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life" (1959, Penguin 
Edition 1971), Introduction.
Historically it has been the function of religion in its social 
aspect to articulate and transmit the broadest values of the society 
it serves and in some sense to make manifest the ideal pattern of 
the society* General moral maxims in the form of rules like the Ten 
Commandments have often been part of the stock in trade of religion, 
but they are insufficient to express or relate much of the deeper 
complexities of the pattern of society, or the large part of that 
pattern which operates below the level of consciousness* flyths, as 
we have seen, whether in strictly legendary or in quasi-historical 
form, have served the purpose of expressing more effectively a sense 
of the contours of the Society’s own continuing identity and providing 
ideal roles that, like personal plans, express not single values, but 
complex combinations of values embodied in single forms. Furthermore 
such myths as those of Heaven and Hell or of the circle of rebirth 
have served the purpose of adding emotional weight to the attraction 
of the "good" and the aversion inspired by the "evil"*
If religion is to be effective as "that which binds" a society or 
a man, it has to make its appeal to the members of the society by 
reflecting in some degree the unconscious as well as the conscious 
patterns of their minds. It can impose its own more explicit pattern 
only insofar as the individual finds it corresponding to something in 
himself and so can adapt it as a plan expressing his own anticipatory 
Self* This process involves his situation both as a member of a society 
with a collective past and future, and as an individual human being.
At times religions have adopted highly rationalised theological 
systems which provide a theoretically efficient system of regulation 
with clear distinctions between categories of behaviour, and a clear 
hierarchical system of reference to a higher level of generalisation 
when conflicts cannot be resolved at a lower level. In accepting a 
religion a man may adopt a ‘s4*ol0 system of this kind as part of his 
anticipatory Self. But the difficulty with such rational arrangements 
elaborated at the conscious level is that, as the historical situation
1. No disrespect is implied by the use of the word myth, which
in its strict sense is a way of expressing the truth
symbolically by means of a story.
changes, so the theological system, just because it is so clear and 
explicit, becomes harder to adapt to new patterns and circumstances.
Human nature and human society do not altogether change and a great system 
like that of St. Thomas Aquinas, adapted to man’s understanding of the 
world at one time, will always have relevance in another time if 
sufficient contextual elaboration is undertaken to make this so. But 
in many situations the relevance will be remote. Plans are related to 
predictive scenarios and insisting on a given plan may in some 
circumstances mean insisting on the interpretation of the world in terms 
of a given scenario. When man's knowledge and understanding of the 
world have changed, this can lead to a conflict such as Galileo encountered, 
which can bring a man to the alternative of abandoning the whole system 
on which his Self has been conformed, or abandoning the proven rules 
by which he understands the world. This risk applies not only to 
theologies based on the rational interpretation of revealed truths, but 
also to atheistic ethical systems‘(such as one based on the greatest - 
good of the greatest number) as soon as they begin to concern themselves 
with specific contexts and actual situations.
There is an alternative, that of adopting entire the imagined 
personality of some heroic figure, historical or legendary, as the- 
ultimate regulating pattern, an ideal or heroic role such as we have 
discussed earlier. The advantages of this method of regulating the 
system are greater than might at first appear. We have already noted 
that the mind has the capacity to create a coherent role from a few 
rules or indications, just as it can creatively imagine a curve uniting 
a few scattered coordinates* This is the capacity that underlies our 
adoption of idealised personalities.
Consider the idea of a young red-haired Russia-speaking 
telephonist. From these few attributes the mind builds somehow a 
coherent idea of a person. It probably assumes (because the social role 
of telephonist is normally filled by women) that this telephonist is 
a woman; it adds in other attributes and produces a particular logical 
form - a profile as we have called it - which is taken as ths sign of 
a much greater though unspecified total complex. Corresponding to 
this capacity is that of imagining with facility a new profile of a
known person in a new situation. Such a recreation or extrapolation 
of the person in a new context will to some extent be arbitrary. As 
we saw in relation to ideas of my father, it will vary from one observer 
to another. But the realisation which it produces will nonetheless be 
far more subtle, complex and coherent than anything that could be built 
up from a descriptive list of attributes, however detailed* In 
particular, it affords far greater flexibility in adapting the idea of 
the person to a new context, real or imagined, We can imagine what he 
would have done, how he would have looked, with far more facility than 
if we had laboriously to deduce every predicted characteristic individually 
from some set of known past characteristics. And correspondingly if 
we look to such an ideal role for guidance in the complexities of life, 
we can often find it with much greater effect than if we try to apply 
some set of generalised moral rules.
It is relevant that the adoption of generalised plans taken from 
other people, such as parents or teachers or religious or legendary 
heroes, is part of the normal process of growing up and accounts for many 
of the earlier layers (including unconscious layers) of the idea of 
the Self in all of us. The anticipatory Self, providing as it does the 
projected continuation into the future of the plans we have already 
adopted, constraining our actions in accordance with long term purposes, 
is very largely an ideal Self. It does not reflect just what we are 
(though it has to accommodate itself to the hard facts of the environ­
ment as we know it, including the physical facts of our bodies and t h e t 
historical facts of the past); it reflects what weuant to be. The 
adoption of some ideal personality as the ultimate regulator of all our 
plans is therefore entirely normal and natural.
We have to bear in mind, however, that another part of the 
normal process of growing up is to discard, or at least dethrone, 
previously accepted ideal personalities. One reason for this is that 
an ideal personality, although up to a point much more flexible in its 
realisation in new contexts and its application in particular 
circumstances than a rationalised philosophy or theology, may be more 
restricted to a particular perspective and may lose its virtue and 
effectiveness if that general perspective is abandoned. Inevitably
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it has, as it were, a narrower base* The philosophical or theological 
approach will at least attempt the greatest possible generality*
Marxist philosophy (or science or theology, as it may variously be 
regarded) is founded on certain basic rules dbout the course of history 
derived from philosophical argument* Theology has usually been based 
on a cosmology (as for example in the first chapter of Genesis or the 
first chapter of the gospel according to St^.3ahn). As against this, 
the ideal personality is always that of a man (or woman)* However 
remarkable — even superhuman — he or she may be, he or she must have 
certain limiting characteristics which are not only those of basic 
features of human nature, but those of a time and place and a series 
of social rol8s* The great facility with which we can recreate such 
a personality applies within a certain range of experience, but usually 
not beyond. A Homeric hero can be vividly conceived in many 
circumstances, but hB is not easily transplanted to modern London, whereas 
the philosophical theories of Plato or Aristotle can more easily survive 
the sea change.
Any great religion will tend to have it both ways. Marxism will 
supplement its philosophy with an infallible hero-figure like that of 
Lenin or Chairman Mao. Christianity, having surrounded 3esus Christ 
with saints and hierarchies, superimposes on the ideal role a great 
edifice of philosophical rationalisation, ”that great panoply in which 
Dante and Aquinas walked entire” as C.S. Lewis called it. The 
Christian version of the ideal personality however does show important 
differences to which attention should be drawn.
In the first pMce the adoption of the ideal personality is 
absolutely central to Christianity. The New Testament is penetrated 
by the conviction that there is no salvation through the law, ”the 
ministration of Death engraven upon stones”; and the alternative it 
offers is not any systematic philosophy at all, but that of putting 
on Christ, of being conformed to Christ, of believing not so much in 
a series of credal propositions as ”on Christ”, who is/the Ressurection 
and the Life”. This personality is not regarded, however, merely as 
a suitable crown or 3ungian reconciling symbol for all the various 
plans which the Self adapts, harmonising them together. Christianity
makes the extremely radical demand that a man must die to his old Sfelf 
a^ltogether, before he can be born anew and ”come in the unity of the - 
faith and the knowledge of the Son of God unto a perfect man, unto the 
measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ”
Horeover to be conformed to Christ is not in effect to adppt any 
specific and therefore limited profile of human pride* It is to be 
conformed, not specifically to the carpenter and rabbi of Galilee, 
but to ”Ssjh8 man for others”, . the^ pajk.Jwho said ”inasmuch as you did it 
for the least of my brethren you did it unto me”* A Christian, it may 
be argued, can identify himself with Christ only to the extent that he 
sacrifices himself totally and identifies himself with others; hs has 
to sell all he has In order to gain the pearl of great price; and the 
ideal personality, it may be suggested, is therefore free of the 
limitations of perspective which apply not only to other ideal 
personalities but also, in the last resort, to all the philosophies 
as well. The corresponding drawback is that the role begins to appear 
more and more ideal, more and more impossible of achievement.
Mote In connection with the Christian ideal role the question is often 
asked how far it is possible for men of later ages to know 3esus 
Christ at all, or even to be sure that he existed, when 
effectively the only information available about him comes from 
four short gospels written some time after his death and liable 
nowadays to be nibbled and shredded away by modern textual 
criticism, gospels which in any case leave great areas of his 
life undescribed* This is not the place for an attempt to 
answer such a question in detail; but it may be relevant to in­
dicate the form which an answer might take that grows out of the 
arguments used earlier concerning the ways in which we create 
our own ideas of persons. Thi? gospels, it may be suggested, 
are remarkable documents, providing us with information in a 
form corresponding much more closely to thB pattern of our own 
ideas of people we have known than any long, detailed coherently 
rationalised biography would do. The gospels contain an 
astonishingly large number of brief, vivid vignettes of the 
man, his circumstances and his teaching, the teaching itself
1. Ephesians 4, 13.
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being reflected almost entirely in stories and parables, hardly 
at all in abstract generalisations. The 107 verses of the 
Sermon on the Mount in St. Matthau's gospel deal, on my count, 
with over 50 individual situations that can be separately 
visualised. There are considerable differences in perspective 
in the different gospels, and even minor inconsistencies of 
narrative* In all this, however, the material we have about 
Oesus resembles the sort of material our minds accumulate about 
people we have known in life, with its layer upon layer of 
relatively disconnected incidents and situations, and its lack, 
in the ordinary way, of any comprehensive historical sequence 
and rationalisation. A biography of its nature gives one view 
foom one angle, but this is the sort of material from which the 
mind can best create its own profile of the man in any given 
situation. Admittedly one man's recreation of Christ will not 
be precisely the same as another man's; but it has been 
suggested on an earlier page that this is true anyway of all 
our knowledge of other people. The sheer copiousness of the 
gospel material, when considered in this light, is sufficient 
to ensure that anyone who knows the Mew Testament stories well 
can probably recreate 3esus in his mind, and so can know 3esus, 
much better than he can a contemporary public figure about whom 
he reads regularly in the newspapers; and again the copiousness 
of the material should be sufficient to ensure that, although 
different people will inevitably have different images of him, 
they will be recognisable and reconcilable images of the same 
man. The essential proviso is that they should base themselves 
directly and freshly on the gospels, not on selected 
recollections of anything from Sunday School hymns to Hollywood 
epics.
Duty, Desire and Freedom
This section undertakes an exploration of the nature of 
freedom in terms of the mechanism of choice elaborated 
earlier in the chapter. This establishes a basis for 
the further discussion of freedom and determinism within 
a wider framework in Chapter VI.
240.
jjie noted earlier that in a situation of choice the mind would attach 
a different emotional weight to each of the imagined future plans which 
it was considering, and that the decision would appear to go in favour 
of the alternative with the greatest emotional weight or pull in the 
context. The actual emotional tinge of each plan, governed by the 
moving cloud of association which it provoked, was individual and 
specific to itself and the situation. But the mind seemed able to weigh 
disparate roles, like that of eating a cake and that of catching a train, 
in a single balance. That is to say, it would seem able to assign a 
value (in the context) to each of them in a single register of desire.
Vet there seem to be two kinds of desire. To be free, on the face of 
it, is to be able to do What you want. And not to be free is to be 
prevented from doing What you want, as when you are locked in a cell 
and Want to get out* But this leaves out of account the distinction 
between the pull >of desire proper, which tends to be related to a short 
term plan, and the pull of duty, which ^ends to be related to a 
generalised long term plan.
Whenever there is a conflict between a long term and a short term 
interest we tend to feel it as a conflict between duty and desire.
. The difference in emotional tinge between the two can emerge even in so 
limited or trivial a case as that which ue were considering of th8 choice* 
between a cake and an apple. It emerges much more strongly in a case 
like that of the traveller and the crashed motorcyclist. It is to be 
noted, however, that whether a particular plan exerts a pull as duty 
or as desire is a relative matter and depends on the alternatives 
available. The traveller's desire to get quickly to his destination 
is felt as desire when it is balanced against his duty to go to the help 
of the motorcyclist. Earlier in the day, however, it may have been 
felt as duty when it was balanced against the desire to lie longer in 
bed.
It is possible to be faced with a conflict of duties, as with a 
conflict of desires, but this often resolves itself into a situation 
in which the lesser duty becomes a desire rather than a duty. I may 
for instance be in a position in which I ought to keep mn appointment 
with the dentist, but, if I do this, I shall not be able to take my
sick child to the doctor* I will resolve the problem by a process of 
contextual elaboration. How urgent is my need for the dentist? Here 
I undertake a closer evaluation of the short term plan. I consider 
specifically, first, the degree of toothache — which is swung as an 
equal and opposite charge into the strength of my desire to go to the 
dentist (it is significant that the word in this context is desire, not 
duty). Secondly, I consider the embarrassment caused by cutting an 
appointment (in this context the word might be duty, not desire).
Then I consider how sick the child is. Heee I elaborate the predictive 
scenario unrolled from the child's symptoms and consider the alternative 
consequences of myself adopting different plans within it. Can my 
wife take the child to the doctor instead? Here I consider the 
predictive possibilities and then, if I conclude that she could do so,
I match the plan of myself leaving her to do it with the plan of the 
anticipatory Self which might be labelled “Self helpful to busy wife**, 
and I obtain a negative value. Assuming that the child is not very 
ill, the conflict becomes one between the more selfish desire to go to 
the dentist and the leos$elfish duty to help my wife, in effect between 
a shorter term and a longer terra plan. Duty by no means necessarily 
wins? nor perhaps necessarily ought it always to win. If my toothache 
is bad enough I go to the dentist with a relatively clear conscience, 
leaving the chore to ray wife and knowing that she will do it more or 
less willingly, since she has herself a plan which might be labelled 
"Self helpful to suffering husbsndf
Consider now, however, the difference if the child seems to be 
really ill. There is no longer a question of a conflict of duties or 
desires. I have an overwhelming desire to take the child at once to 
the doctor myself; and my wife does too. We both go, and the appointment
with the dentist is brushed aside. This is not a matter of a stronger
duty supervening. I love the child, which means that I identify myself 
with it; if the child suffers I suffer, if the child needs medical help,
I want to get it. Love is related to an immediate short term plan.
To adopt this plan is to satisfy a desire, not a duty.
In one sense if I do what I want, I am exercising freedom, whether 
I do it in conformity with a sense of duty or in conformity with desire.
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let subjectively duty is felt as a constraint imposed on desire. In 
attempting to sort out the diffe^e^ce between the two it may be best 
to begin with physical desires and appetites like hunger, thirst and sex* 
These are fundamentally gene-determined. Although the form in which 
they express themselves in a particular individual may depend to some 
extent on the course of his upbringing and experience, they are 
directly related to certain physiological variables in the organism.
It is fair to say that just as the normative values of the variables 
themselves are gene-determined, so is the satisfaction conveyed by any 
event that brings the actual values closer to the normative values 
like eating when a man is hungry. Within this limited context the 
exercise of freedom is the taking of voluntary actions which lead to 
pleasure or satisfaction.
In practice we find simple pleasure in many events which are not 
directly linked to essential variables - in playing a good stroke at 
golf, for example, or climbing a mountain, or winning a competition, 
or listening to a symphony or in giving pleasure to someone we love.
It seems reasonable to suggest that there is pleasure to be gained in 
any successful exercise of the capacities of the Self, provided it 
involves overcoming some difficulty, whether physical or mental or 
both.** We may note too that, although such an exercise may be of no 
direct biological value, yet insofar as it extends'the coordinating 
capacities of the Self (and anything once achieved can more easily be 
done again), it makes it more likely that the Self will be able to deal 
with complex threats to the essential variables in the future. In 
other words by developing skills it increases the regulative capacity 
of the Self and so, potentially, its capacity for survival.
Any successful exercise of this kind involves the adoption of a 
plan and its effective achievement. Insofar as we adopt painful short 
term plans in the effort to achieve a desired long term plan (as in 
climbing a mountain, for example) wa are deliberately constraining our 
short term desires for the sake of a greater, but delayed, satisfaction. 
On the other hand we often have to sacrifice short term desires not in 
order to adopt a specific plan that can be achieved in a precise moment 
of pleasure, like the moment of reaching the top of the mountain, but
1. This idea is described by Professor 3ohn Rawls as "the
Aristotelian principle" and he defines it as follows: "Other 
things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realised 
capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoy­
ment increases the more the capacity is realised or the greater 
its complexity." ("A Theory of 3ustice", Oxford 1972, p.426).
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in order to conform to the requirements of society or of our long 
term interests, that is, to avoid prejudicing a highly generalised long 
term plan applicable not to a single specific occasion but to a whole 
class of occasions.
It is evident that if we always followed direat desire, with no 
thought for sterner obligations, the result would not only be poor 
regulation from the point of view of the survival of the organism, but 
poor results, over a period, from the point of view of satisfying 
desires. For the sacrifice of prudential forethought would soon mean 
a restriction of opportunities. We should have less control over our 
destiny, not more. It would seem to be the case that we can maximise 
satisfaction for the future only by pursuing a policy of moderation.
If ws are always sacrificing for the future we get no present 
satisfactions. If we always go for the short term plan ws restrict 
the scope for statisfaction in time to coma. Ran cannot do without 
duty and obligation, even though ho cannot live by them alone. Yet 
there is no doubt that subjectively duty feels different from desire.
It involves effort and constraint whereas desire does not. There is an 
element of compulsion in duty and the work of the psycho-analysts 
suggests that it is coloured unconsciously by fear or by aggression 
directed against the Self.
A man is not free if his decisions are ruled in this way by the 
atavistic unconscious roles of his anticipatory Self. One road to 
freedom is therefore that of understanding. This does not only involve 
a man’s understanding his own motives, it also requires him to bring 
into the light of consciousness the full implications of the alternatives 
with which he is confronted. The case which we considered of the choice 
between going to the dentist and taking the child to the doctor provides 
an example. The alternative plans, each as a single undifferentiated 
form, will immediately yield conflicting emotional values. If however 
us avoid rushing to a decision and try instead quietly and patiently 
to sort out the implications by the process of contextual elaboration, 
we are likely, first, to take the (Immediate emotional steam out ofvthe;^ :t 
situation and, secondly, to articulate the alternatives in a somewhat 
different and much more detailed way. tha examination on an earlier
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page has already shown, the more we analyse, break down and articulate 
the alternatives in detail, the more we are likely to dissipate their 
emotional force, and the more we are likely to end up with a sense of 
understanding, and of what feels like a free choice between alternatives, 
rather than a conflict of duty and desire*
Admittedly in the case of the tiger in our path it was suggested 
(perhaps somewhat against probability) that the initial reaction might 
be none of sang-froid, only later to be overwhelmed by the reaction of 
panic as the implications of the situation became clearer. In the 
circumstances however this panic reaction would not be an irrational 
one; and it is noticeable that there would be no particular sense of 
freedom about the decision to run away. Ue would feel there was no 
choice. It would be a simple emotional act; and correspondingly there 
would be no complex articulation in our understanding of the situation.
Choice is always a matter of balancing one emotional pull against 
another, but where the alternatives are articulated in detail the 
situation is reminiscent of the case in which we approach closer to 
a picture and distinguish, instead of a single undifferentiated patch 
of green, a large number of blue and yellow spots. The whole is broken 
into facets of mood and spread over a longer period of time; and if, 
after this analysis, we reintegrate the role and realise it again)as a 
whole, it retains something of this complexity and its emotional tinge 
will tend to be different from what it was before. On the other hand, 
if the emotions which it inspires are related to contours of the 
anticipatory Self of which we stilJLjppmain unconscious, it will ypjt^^ 
retain most of the strong emotional colouring which it had originally.
Through understanding ;B}e can achieve philosophic freedom, which is 
a rational comprehension of the situation, a rational formulation of 
alternatives, and a relatively calm and unemotional choice.1- This is  ^
the most efficient type of regulation. It does not imply an escape
1. Cf. two remarks from Spinoza's "Ethics”: "The more an emotion 
becomes known to us the more it is within our power and the 
less the mind is passive to it” (Part V Proposition 3); "Inso­
far as the mind understands all things as necessary, it has 
more power over the emotions or is less passive to them.”
(Part V Proposition 6).
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from what might appear to be the ultimate determinism of the world.
Even the most refined exercise of choice by the most philosophic of 
minds seems to be the product of the genes with which the philosopher 
was equipped at conception, as they have interacted with the environment 
over the rest of his life till the particular moment in question. But 
just as the reality of determinism in this sense cannot be proved, 
escape from it is an unreal conception. It implies an uncaused event, 
and this to our minds is inconceivable; we can postulate if we wish 
a supernatural world which produces through its interventions occurrences 
in the natural world that appear to be uncaused; but then we are faced 
with detecting the cause of the supernatural cause; and the regress 
is infinite.
In fact freedom, as we think of it subjectively, is the exercise 
of foresight, the formulation of alternatives and decision between them.
If there is no choice there is no freedom. But if we are faced with 
an inescapable course and yet pause long enough to accept the situation 
and recognise that every imaginable alternative is impossible, we are 
already choosing. If there is some degree of choice there is some -n 
freedom. If we are moved to immediate action as soon as our mind has 
established a goal and imagined a plan leading to it, we are moving forward 
along a predetermined path, just as a bucketful of water poured at the 
top of a sandy bank will trickle down a path of least resistance, 
predetermined by the weight of the water and the structure of the bank.
But if we pause, formulate alternative goal images, imagine appropriate 
plans, and weigh the choice between them we are exercising freedom in 
a way that has meaning. To articulate and understand what one is doing 
is to be free in a sense which is true even for a member of a chain 
gang.
It is significant that it is essentially at such moments when we 
pause and choose between alternative roles that we become aware of 
ocoselves. If I am absorbed in watching a football match I am fully 
conscious of the match, but I am not aware of myself until something;w^  
brings my attention back to Me Here Now and I have some choice of my 
own to make. It is true that I can make choices of a kind without being 
aware of the fact, as when I take the right turning on the way home, or
scratch my nose when it itches. But these are not true choices, they 
do not involve the formulation and weighing of alternatives, they are 
an automatic, programmed reaction to a stimulus foreseen in the 
programme - whether an innate programme (as in the case of the itch) 
or an adopted long term plan (as in the case of the turning).
Admittedly the propensity to pause, formulate and choose may also 
be programmed into the man; but this is a very different process, 
programming for freedom, as it were. And it has great practical ad­
vantages in a complex situation like that of the world in which we find 
ourselves, where it is impossible to have enough inbuilt rules to cope ; 
efficiently with all contingencies. It makes it possible for the organism 
to make effective use in its reactions to the environment of a far 
greater amount of information. It ao longer has to have a ready made 
rule for reacting usefully (that is, in the long term interests of the
survival of itself or its race) to whatever may occur. Instead it
articulates imagined plans and weighs them in the scales of emotion.
This is a sort of reaction. Out of the confrontation of the environment 
and the anticipatory Self a now plan is synthesised. But it is not
automatically sealed into the Self. On the contrary we keep it detached
from our anticipatory Self until ws have synthesised others to compare 
with it (including the alternative of continuing as before); then we 
adopt one of the alternatives; and it is in this process of detachment 
and adoption that ws become conscious of ourselves. The quasi-identity 
of decision and self-conscious perception, on which comment was made 
earlier, derives from this. It is possible to argue that our moments 
of self-consciousness and freedom are the only reality we know; that the 
rest is mere articulation, extension of units in the dimensions of 
understanding; and that this articulation, including memories of the past 
and imagination of the future, serves essentially to give form to the 
reality of the self-conscious moment, not vice versa. The qoeld of 
space and time is merely the me.aips<,to articulate the span of consciqupT*. 
ness with its hopes and fears and strivings, its freedom of choice in 
which alonB we become aware of ourselves. Ths deterministic world Is 
no more than a frame for freedom.
This is a way of thinking which has recurred in human history 
among those who are of a mystical mind* It is perhaps one aspect of a
truth which is always beyond our grasp* But freedom itself can be 
understood in other ways than this and I shall return to the subject 
in the last chapter of this study*
At this point, however, I conclude my account of the way in whiqh^ 
the purposive cycles of conscious life lead to the adoption of successive 
personal plans of varying time span* To summarise, these plans are 
superimposed on each other like overlapping scales; each represents 
the creation of a new profile of the Self adapted to a new situation, 
but before it can be adopted it has to be matched to the existing 
profile in this situation of the existing idea of the Self - specifically 
that part of the idea of the Self which projects into the future and 
consists of plans already adopted which have not yet run their course, 
and so constrain the choices that can be made* The relevant structure 
of the idea of the Self, as it is brought to bear in determining a 
man's decisions, is essentially, according to my account, this structure 
of overlapping plans projecting into the future, which I call the 
anticipatory Self, the personality of the man. And I have tried to show 
in some detail, with the aid of thought experiments like that of the 
Traveller, how the process of decision and progressive self-creation 
actually takes place. In the next chapter I turn to the question of 
how we can make judgements about this process, in particular about 
whether it is working well or badly, for good or ill*
IV: THE MECHANISMS OF COHERENCE
Uhat Holds a Man Together
The preceding chapter has brought out the importance of 
maintaining the coherence of the idea of the Self, and 
in particular of the anticipatory Self, if effective 
regulation is to be*achieved. This section provides 
an initial analysis of the patterns of motivation 
through which coherence is maintained.
Freedom in everyday terms usually means something much simpler 
than the arguments of the preceding section might suggest. Ids tend to
think of it in terms of the purpose for which a plan is adopted. I
have the sense of freedom if my choice derives from a purposive cycle 
related to a goal image (and hence animated by feelings which we 
classify as desire or duty). I do not have the sense of freedom, even
though I have made an unfettered choice, if the decision derives from
a purposive cycle related to an aversion image (and hence animated by 
feelings which we classify as prudence of fear). This is one of the 
ways by which, in our everyday judgements of people we distinguish what 
holds a man to a particular plan or obligation. It has nothing in 
particular to do with philosophic freedom or with questions of ultimate 
determinism; it reflects an understanding of the word which is perhaps 
not the most profound or interesting that man can develop, but one 
which almost certainly represents what it most often, and most usefully 
means in the ordinary occasions of life. A closely related, though not 
identical, classification, and one which is again reflected in our 
ordinary use of words, is that which would divide the motives that hold 
a man to his plans or roles into three categories - those of integrity 
(obligation to himself), of good faith (obligation to others) and of 
fear. It may be helpful to attempt some analysis of these three 
categories, one by one.
Integrity concerns the interrelationship of the personal plans 
which a man adopts, in particular the need for consistency and, uhere
appropriate, hierarchical ordering between them, so that the 
anticipatory Self which he builds up is coherent and feasible. The 
practical need for integrity in this sense is reflected in a psycho­
logical need which we can express as a raising of the thresholds of 
transition against personal plans which are directly or potentially in 
conflict with other plans already adopted, especially those of longer './L 
span. The pull of integrity we associate with the pull of duty; and 
in our judgements of other people we admire those who show integrity.
We may not think much of the longer term plans and principles which a 
man has adopted and ws may think he ought to change them; but if he 
adopts sub-plans, even onBs that we approve in themselves, which are 
inconsistent with his major plans, he can command no respect from us. 
Conversely if a man sticks to his principles and maintains his integrity 
we do not withhold our respect on this account, even if we disapprove of 
his behaviour strongly on other grounds.
Integrity is a matter of a man’s obligations to himself. It is 
not the same thing as good faith, which is a matter of his obligations 
to others, expressed in the social rales he adopts. The adoption of a 
personal plan need not have any implications for a man’s social roles.
I may decide to go on a diet without that affecting other people’s 
expectations from me. But that is not usually the case when I adopt a 
plan. Even when I go on a diet I shall probably have to agree with my 
wife about altered arrangements for family meals. And a major personal 
plan - such as that of earning my living by holding down a particular 
job in a business or Governmental hierarchy - will entail, as we have 
seen earlier, the adoption of large numbers of social roles in relation 
to other people or classes of people* Every social role implies the 
obligation to do certain things in certain circumstances, whether it 
is a specific agreement to meet a particular train tomorrow, for 
example, or a doctor's general undertaking to abide by the Hippocratic 
oath in all the hypothetical future circumstances in which it may apply. 
The carrying out of an obligation under a major social role is in effect 
the adoption and carrying out of a hierarchically subordinate role, a 
sub-role. The fact that people in general meet their obligations and 
in general carry out the roles which they have adopted is what establishes 
and maintains the whole complex fabric of human society; and the
psychological forco which holds men freely to their obligations to others, 
even when they are not immediately palatable, is consequently of crucial 
importance. This forcB is good faith, which is itself at the root a 
very generalised personal plan, but one that anybody who belongs to a 
social group must adopt, implicitly or explicitly, as a condition of 
his membership; and which indeed, insofar as man cannot live outside 
society, he has to adopt in some degree as a condition of his humanity.
Difficulties can arise if a man finds himself, through accident of 
birth or circumstance, as a member of a social group which he did not freely 
choose. in the case of a child his social responsibilities are in 
the first place adopted, by proxy as it were, by his parents or relations; 
but as he grows up he is expected to take on more and more social roles 
in varying social groups as his own responsibility; and social groups 
often have initiation rituals of various kinds to mark the transition 
from tutelage to full membership. If he freely and enthusiastically 
adopts the appropriate social role, which then becomes related to his 
own personal plans and part of his own anticipatory Self, no difficulty 
should ensue, provided he has the integrity to maintain the role and 
no conflicts arise with other major plans or roles which he may have 
adopted. But he may consciously reject the role required by a social 
group in which he finds himself, or which may be established round him 
against his will (for example after a revolution). Alternatively a 
man may remain both vague and lukewarm in his allegiance to a group 
without consciously and forcefully rejecting it; this seems to occur 
most frequently in the case of the larger enveloping groups such as 
the state which we do not initially choose ourselves; people may 
become consciously keen and loyal citizens of their states, but in 
many cases, to say the least, this would be a considerable exaggeration 
of what they feel about the obligations of citizenship.
Sometimes a man can simply withdraw, or be ejected, from the 
group in which he finds himself; his obligations then cease and he has 
no further commitment in good faith to thB role in question. In 
other cases this may not be possible and then he may find himself under 
some coercion to naintain his allegiance to this role. The worker who 
refuses to join a trade union may find himself pressed, for fear of
ostracism or other sanctions, to .become a member and accept the 
consequent obligations. A citizen who does not feel much identification 
with the state or its rules concerning private property may not be re­
strained by any strong obligation of good faith towards other citizens
from stealing their goods; but he may then find himself subject to the
coercion of public law. There is an immense variety of situations in
which people find themselves under,pressure to conform to social obli­
gations of one kind or another simply for fear of the consequences; and 
fear therefore must be added to integrity and good faith as one of the 
forces which hold men to their roles* Fear, however, is in a different 
category from the other two, since it is in no sense a plan or role 
which the individual can consciously adopt or sustain; rather it is 
an emotional charge, which affects the threshold settings in his mind- 
manifold and so makes it harder to adopt some types of plan but easier 
to adopt others.
Sometimes these pressures reinforce each other, fly rather weak, 
though genuine, resolve to be a brave soldier and go over the top to 
attack thB enemy trenches may be reinforced by the Obligation of good 
faith towards my comrades, and also by fear both of what they will think 
of me if I fail, and of the legal penalty which, if I do fail, a court 
martial will surely enforce upon me. Sometimes however the pressures 
can go in different directions (even in this case fear is pulling 
two ways). Again, if I am a pacifist, my private integrity may require 
me to refuse to fight; but if I am a loyal comrade and citizen good 
faith may pull me another way. In another case again fear of public 
opinion may pull me one way, but fear of the law (which is not always 
supported by public opinion) may pull me another way; and in some 
circumstances fear of a local gang of thugs might pull me yet a third 
way.
Whereas integrity and good faith will always be pulling in the 
direction of some coherence - though coherences may conflict - fear 
need not do so, it can be an entirely disintegrating force. Theoretically 
ub can distinguish three kinds of fears first what we might call 
providential fear, which reinforces a man in a course which his integrity 
requires; secondly what we might call prudential fear, which dictates
the adoption of certain plans rather than others where integrity is not 
at stake; and thirdly disintegrating fear, panic fear, which does have 
to be resisted if there is not to be a surrender of integrity. Courage 
itself is integrity in conflict with fear, and courage we always admire, 
even when we do not like the cause in which it is deployed.
A problem can arise when the acting out of a plan or role leads 
a man into commitments or conflicts which he had not foreseen when he 
undertook it - when for example a man who takes on a public office 
finds himself let in for heavy private expenditure which he has not 
foreseen . In such cases we tend to feel that a man is in "honour” - i.e. 
in integrity and good faith - bound to carry out his obligation if the 
undertaking he made definitely covered it, unless he is formally re­
leased from it by the others concerned. Ue are dealing here with 
communication between human beings, which is clearly a crucial matter 
wherever social roles - which by definition involve obligations between 
human beings - are concerned. The precise words, or other signs or 
symbols, that are used are important, and this is true especially in 
two types of context. First of all, if I use words in such a way as 
to deceive others either about my own roles, or the personal plans 
supporting them, or else about other things which are relevant to 
their roles, I am infringing the obligation of good faith; that is to 
say, I am betraying them. Lies and deceit are forms of the betrayal 
of good faith. Secondly a man is bound by his word and this is no 
superficial embellishment of behaviour, but a structural principle 
of human society; for it is by means of words or their equivalent that 
we communicate, and so formalise and make effective our adoption of 
particular social roles.
A commitment may be absolute and so binding in all conditions, or 
it may be partial or limited or conditional in some fashion; and we 
have to use words or other signs or symbols to communicate precisely 
what it is. Correspondingly it is the words or signs in which a given 
commitment is expressed that the law, wheq necessary, will seek to 
interpret where there is doubt or vagueness. And if a man says certain 
words he is taken to commit his own integrity and good faith to the 
role, even if he does so under some degree of duress. It is not for
a quibble that a man gives up his life when, for example, he is one of 
the thousands in history, including 3esus Christ himself, who have gone 
to their death rather than declare a false allegiance or deny a true 
one. It is one thing to perform under coercion, that is, out of 
Prudential fear, some particular action which is repugnant; but it is 
quite another for a man to have to declare in words, or by means of 
some symbolic act, his adherence to a role which is inconsistent With 
the major plans of his anticipatqry^Self; and it is another thing ,agaip^  
to do something under duress which is hot only repugnant but actually 
and explicitly violates one of those plans; duress, for example, may 
mitigate but cannot excuse an act of murder.
It is important to bear in mind that a social role relates to a 
particular social group. Any one role is always complementary to 
another role carried by another member or other members of the group.
The two roles (which in some cases may be identical with each other, 
but usually are not) between them sustain a relationship; and relation­
ships are the constitutive elements of social groupings - or, perhaps 
more precisely, of social organisations, for these are expressly not 
merely amorphous aggregations. Any system of relationships enshrines 
its own values or principles - which are rules or laws - and any person 
whose own principles and governing roles, whether as an individual
or as a member of some other social group, represent a threat to the
1*principles of the initial group, will be regarded as an enemy.
Towards a recognised enemy we feel no obligations of good faith; even 
lies and deceit may be justifiable in our dealings with him, unless 
we have mutual obligations arising out of common membership of some 
other group - which is to say unless he is not, in the wider context, 
an enemy at all.
It is possible for us, especially if we have adapted principles, or 
governing personal plans, of the kind enjoined by some of the major 
religions, to regard ourselves as members of a group embracing all 
mankind, so that no man to us is an outsider or enemy; but even if
1. "Principles" are here equivalent to highly generalised long
term plans, as I am using the word "plans".
integrity requires that this should dictate our own behaviour, the 
desired relationship in given instances can only be established if the 
other people we encounter adopt appropriate complementary roles; if 
that man is shooting at me, even if I regard him as my brother, I 
cannot establish a brotherly relationship with him until he is per­
suaded to think differently about me. Wb may note that, just as 
consistency between personal plans tends to be achieved by a hierarchical 
ordering of the more specific, shorter term plans under more general 
longer term plans, so narrower social organisations tend to be ordered 
under more generalised, inclusive organisations, of which the state is 
the most important. In general enmity between two organisations is not 
allowed to go to destructive extremes because in a wider context the 
members of both also have roles as members of a more inclusive 
organisation, and where there is conflict the values and roles of the 
more inclusive one have the superior claim. Ultimately at the level 
of the state overall social values expressed in terms of law may be 
enforced by the public coercion of a police force. But when there is 
enmity between states there is no superior regulative authority with 
effective power above them and the uncontrolled expression of enmity 
may result in war.
In effect, if our everyday use of words is anything to go by, we 
make two kinds of judgement in this context - first as to integrity and 
secondly as to desirability. Successful regulation by any biological 
or social system in its environment must involve some coherence of 
strategy if the essential variables are to be preserved within necessary 
limits; and our recognition of the virtue of integrity is in some sense 
the recognition of a duty falling on each individual to live and make 
the best he can of his life. We regard as true integrity that which 
is maintained by the free choice of the individual, otherwise it is not 
his own life that he is leading, or his own Self that he is creating; 
indeed if a particular required kind of behaviour is secured from an 
individual by social pressure or compulsion it is the integrity of 
the social group which is being maintained, possibly at the expense of 
the individual1© own integrity. On the other hand (and here we move 
into questions of desirability) it has to be recognised that the choices 
available to a man and the things that he wants must be governed to a
large extent by the social environment in which her has grown up; and 
furthermore that as our existence depends on the maintenance of a social 
fabric it is not wrong in all circumstances for social pressures to 
bB exerted in the interest of the group and at the expense of the 
individual* Nevertheless, just as we admire most an individual whose 
behaviour is determined by motives of integrity and good faith (which, 
as we have seen, becomes part of his integrity).rather than by fear, 
even of the prudential variety, or by incoherent desire, so we reserve 
our admiration for a social system which achieves coherence but does 
so with a minimum of compulsion end a maximum of consent.
This line of argument can lead us to the straightforward conclusion 
that what is good is thB full development of individual human beings, 
that this means that each individual should achieve, through his own 
freely determined action, a pattern of integrity of his own choice, and 
that a social system is good to the extent that it facilitates ^ this 
for all its members and without detriment to those outside it. 
Unfortunately, however, this does not get us very far. One man’s 
pattern of integrity can often only be realised by infringing the freedom 
of others. One social group can only realise its aims if those of 
others are frustrated. Within a large social system almost invariably some 
social groupings have better opportunities than others. How then ought 
a man’s pattern of integrity to be formed? and how ought social systems 
to be organised? These are great questions to which I cannot hope
to give good answers. They cannot be entirely separated from each other,
yet they are very different in their orientation. In the remaining 
sections of this chapter I attempt to indicate a possible approach to 
the first question; the second Totms the subject of a separate study.:
The Origins of the Idea of the Self (l)
An attempt to identify and to describe, in terms related 
to the model built up in preceding chapters, the earliest 
beginnings of the idea of the Self - not merely as a body
given identity by location and memory of past events, but
as an anticipatory structure projecting into the future.
Let us go back to the earliest days of life and consider how, in
terms of the model built up in this study, the idea of the Self can 
first be seen to emerge* It seems a reasonable speculation that a 
baby*3 first focussed mental activities are concerned with wanting and 
getting food* He sees the breast* This stimulates?excitement and 
consequent activity; first positive, directed activity, grabbing with , 
hand or mouth; then, if the grabbing is unsuccessful, negative, undirected, 
random activity, kicking and crying. The directed activity can be 
regarded as functional, if not strictly purposve; the undirected 
activity is not obviously so, but it may have the function, in cybernetic 
terms, of provoking at random a step change in the parameter variables 
of the system (i.e. the mother1s behaviour) which may or may not 
ultimately help the baby to acbievB his original goal.
If he is to do all this, does the baby need to have any idea of
himself? Arguably no. He could be an automaton programmed to react 
in such ways. But I have put forward the hypothesis that if he is awake 
he is conscious; that, if he is conscious, his mind is making successive 
predications; and that every time he makes a predication he is grasping 
some subject as related to some predicate in space over time. On this 
hypothesis does he need to have an idea of himself? The answer is, I 
think, that if his reaction is coloured in any way by past experience, 
then memory must be involved; any memory which affects him in this way 
must be connected with his body, and must be remembered moreover because 
of this connection; and this in turn implies the existence of an idea
complex of the Self in the mind-manifold, though not necessarily a
conscious recognition of the Self* For the memory need not, be of a 
specific occasion; our model of the mind suggests that the stimulation 
of memories may produce a collective emotional coloration of the current 
experience rather than any explicit evoked image, and this is no doubt 
likely to be the cas3 with afcaby who sees the breast and immediately, 
on the basis of past experience, focusses his attention on it with a 
feeling of pleasure and desire. The subject of consciousness is the 
breast, not any specific memory; but memories nevertheless affect the 
quality and intensity, if not the subject, of the experience.
This is not to deny that even a small baby may have a memory reaching 
back perhaps even to the womb, or that these memories may begin straight
away to create a complex of ideas connected to each other because they 
are linked to one body with a continuous existence. Biological man 
is there anyway from the moment of conception. Some kind of idea of 
the Self must accompany the most rudimentary set of conscious predications 
and it has been my contention that you cannot remember anything of which 
you were totally unconscious at the time of the experience, or which was 
not, at the very least, called into consciousness with the aid of some 
residual "iconic” image, immediately afterwards. Admittedly the 
status of our own very earliest memories is particularly hard to 
determine. Often we seem to be remembering indirectly by recalling - 
and even refurbishing—* our own past recollections of events still 
further in the past, rather than directly recalling the events themselves. 
But as against this there is now ample evidence that people can in 
certain circumstances recall the events of their bath, and even some­
thing of their life in the womb, with a vividness and emotional power 
which strongly suggest a recollection that is direct rather than second­
hand.^’ For the purposes of the present rather schematic argument, 
however, it is not necessary to resolve these interesting, if speculative, 
issues. It seems at least a plausible hypothesis that at the very 
beginning of its life a baby is likely to have little, if any, self- 
conscious awareness of a continuing Self; it tends to react anew in 
each situation without reference to the past and without consciously 
choosing between alternatives. Further, it seems a plausible 
hypothesis that as a child grows, as his capabilities develop and his 
needs become more complex, it becomes desirable and necessary for him 
to achieve some coherence in his successive responses. How does he 
do this?
I would suggest that the crucial step must come when the baby 
begins to recognise behaviour, that is, change masking identity — not 
a breast which is available or unavailable, but a person giving or 
withholding the breast, pursuing a plan, acting a social role. As a 
counterpart to this there emerges the idea of his own Self persisting 
through change, a body existing continuously in time and doing
1. See for example Frank Lakes "Tight Corners in Pastoral
Counselling" (DLT) 1981.
different things at different times, otherwise pursuing plans and acting 
roles. Each occasion of action may still be unconnected with its 
predecessors. Insofar as the actions of the parent figure in giving or 
withholding the object of desire are entirely arbitrary and unpredictable, 
there is still no scope for purposve thought and no advantage in 
recognising a person rather than an object. But a further step now ; -it . 
becomes possible, namely recognition on the baby’s part that his actions 
may be taken as messages — signs or symbols of what he wants — to which 
the parent figures may respond. A whole new perspective is then opened 
up* The baby is Impotent to control the environment directly except 
insofar as he can grab at what is immediately in front of him; but 
through communication he can achieve some power to control it indirectly, 
through the intermediary link of the parent figure who may give him 
what he wants.
This process involves the acquisition of new behavioural roles for
the baby: noises or gestures which are not simply directed activity,
like grabbing, or merely undirected activity, like yelling, but are 
coded signals of something else - basically Indications of need, of 
pleasure and of displeasure. Correspondingly he learns to interpret 
actions by parent figures not merely as givings or withholdings, but 
as signals of pleasure or displeasure. First he will just try it on, 
signal what he wants and himself register pleasure or rage according 
to whether he gets it or not. But then he may note that this can be a
two-way traffic. His mother’s actions too may be interpreted as signals
of what She wants or Indications of pleasure or displeasure at what 
she is getting; moreover her own pleasure will often be accompanied by 
actions giving pleasure to the baby, while her displeasure may be 
accompanied by the opposite. In each situation the baby communicates 
to the parent what action by the parent will please him; while she in 
return communicates to him what action by him will please her. If 
pleased the baby will award the parent smiles and, if displeased, yells; 
while the parent, if pleased, will give him what he wants and, if 
displeased, withhold it.
In this fashion the possibility of choice based on prediction, 
and hence the possibility of purposive thought cycles on the pattern we
described earlier begin to come into view. Such thinking involves ths 
possibility and necessity of an idea of the Self, not merely as a body 
given an identity by location in space and (through memory) in time, _ 
but also as an anticipation projecting into the future; for when us 
imagine and choose we adopt a personal plan leading towards a future 
goal; and this is perhaps the root from which the anticipatory Self 
will grow. Initially it is still not a continuing Self except insofar 
as it relates to a body with a continuing identity and a cumulative 
history; even so, there may be no idea of the whole body as distinct 
from parts concerned in particular plans* The adoption of one plan is 
unrelated to the adoption of any other; it is a piece of new thinking 
related to signals made and received in the given situation. Isle have 
therefore a succession of ideas of the Self which are hardly to be 
distinguished from ideas of particular actions or experiences by parts 
of the body. They may be very similar ideas, because they arise in 
connection with the same body in a succession of very similar environ­
ments, but they do not form a single coherent Idea complex. There is 
no need for anything more so long as each plan is of so short a span 
that it is envisaged and completed before the next ons comes within 
range. But as a child grows, as his capabilities develop and hss needs 
become more complex, a situation begins to emerge in which there has 
to be some coordination of his different responses over a longer span. 
Such coordination requires a much more complex mechanism of response.
It involves deciding on a particular activity with a view not merely to 
its immediate effect, but also to its secondary effect; and in the 
simplest case this means its effect on subsequent activity by the 
parent figure. If the parent figure is pleased, she will do child- 
pleasing things; if displeased, child-displeasing things. And with 
this recognition we arrive at a new world, that of differentiated 
persons with continuing identities playing mutually complementary 
social roles.
The Origins of tha Idea of the S§lf (2)
A discussion of 3ohn Shotter*s views on the development 
of personal powers.
Before proceeding any further with these speculations it may be 
helpful to consider how they relate to certain current theoretical ideas 
about the development of personality in the very young child. 3ohn 
Shotter has suggested1, on the basis of experimental work by Spitz, 
thats ■
Within the totality of the child and his mother she constitutes a 
Inechanism* via which he can execute actions in the world. (That 
even very young children (4-18 weeks) will execute intentional 
actions if given access to the appropriate mechanism has been 
strikingly demonstrated by Bruner (1969)). It is only via her 
instrumentality that he comes to differentiate the forehead— 
eyes-nos8 sign Gestalt as a meaningful entity. She appreciates 
in his movements, his manifestations of affect, the nature of 
his mental state and responds to them in such a way that she 
presents him with the characteristic Gestalt just at the time she 
is gratifying his needs. It only appears and functions within s 
the ongoing circular affective exchange which has its source 
and terminus in the child but which is mediated via the 
•mechanisms* the mother now provides. The child could not have 
distinguished the sign Gestalt entirely by his own devices. 
Currently he can only act because his mother acts *as if she 
understood* him, and it is in this sense.that the child of 3 
months is in ^psychological symbiosis* with his mother. He 
can only differentiate himself from her by constituting 
within himself some of the mechanisms the mother now provides...
According to Shotter the end of the period of psychological
symbiosis with the mother comes with the development of the child’s
ability, around the age of 15 months, to say *no* to his mother. As
he learns to move around she has to curb some of his initiatives,
and this he will often resist. ’’The period of social games can now  ,
begin... Knowing how to open and close the social link at will must
be the first social skill a child acquires if he is to play social
2.games and acquire personal powers.”
1. In ’’Acquired Powers” in R. Harre ed. ’’Personality” (Blackwell 
1976) pp. 32-3.
2. Ibid. p. 35.
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This description corresponds well enough with my earlier 
speculations. But when it comes to the interpretation of what is 
happening a significant divergence comes to light. The core of this 
lies in the fact that Shotter* following flead, fiacmurray and others* 
appears to regard the Self as essentially a social construction built 
of social rules or roles, whereas in my view the Self is built of 
individual plans which often include social roles but are not identical 
with them. Shatter describes the child in the earlier, symbiotic stage 
as a natural agent who may manifest natural powers in an apparently 
directed and regulated way, executing intentional actions, but who 
nevertheless does not know what he is doing. Only later, as he learns 
social skills, does he become an individual and monitor his own 
behaviour.
Concerning the processes between mother and child: liihat begins 
as a physiological contact, moves through a period of purely 
idiosyncratic exchanges mediated via affect in which the 
mother is instrumental in bringing the child’s vague 
intentions to fruition, and finally ends with a period of 
social games. It is on acquiring the skill to conduct games 
with others that the child embarks on the path to trus personal 
powers. In playing with others he will ultimately acquire the 
skill to play all the parts of the game himself, and his 
dialogues with himself conduct reflective thought. At first 
it was his mother who reflected him back to himself, but 
ultimately he will be able to do everything without her help 
at all, and even, in the invention of new games, go beyond 
her personal grasp of the world to the realisation of new and 
unimagined powers, relying always, though, on forms of 
expression negotiated with others.
There are important and valuable insights in this complex of ideas; 
but there are also, in my view, some crucial weaknesses of analysis 
which are reflected in the odd and contradictory terminology which 
Shotter uses in regard to rules and regulation. “While the observed 
behaviour ^ of natural agents?, ” he says, “may indeed be regulated, 
it may not be rule-regulated at all. Regulation is characteristic of 
all processes in ’open systems* maintained in a 'steady state* 
according to 'system parameters’ (v. Bertalanffy 1968); that is, it 
is characteristic of all organic systems, human beings included.” But 
strictly, he suggests, “rules must involve agreements between people.
1. Ibid. p. 41.
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Thus rule—regulated processes* strictly* are processes regulated.•• 
by the individuals involved in them all agreeing to perform their 
activities within certain acknowledged constraints or a system of inter­
locking constraints.n *^ Now this, strictly* is an odd use of words, 
since to regulate, according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary* and as 
the etymology suggests, is ”to control by rule”. Regulation that is . 
not by rule is in effect a contradiction in terms. (My own use of 
these words is defined in the opening section of Chapter I of this 
study.) An odd, if consistent* terminology does not necessarily do any 
harm; but here it does seem to have the effect of leading Shotter to 
pass over the problem of the regulation of the "spontaneous” 
activities of natural agents, and in particular not to recognise that 
the regulation of any organic system must be in some sense a self­
regulation.
2 .
As I have already suggested on an earlier page, such regulation 
could in some instances be entirely a matter of reflex responses 
programmed in the genetic constitution of the organism; but as soon 
as we come to learned responses - that is, responses which are neither 
pre-programmed nor of a random nature, but intelligent. - we have to deal 
with a process which must include some model of alternative 
possibilities and hence some mechanism for selecting between them in 
accordance with the preferences of the Self (which are expressible as 
rules); and this in turn must involve some structure, however primitive, 
that represents the Self in the circumstances and so constitutes the 
rudiments of what I call the idea of the Self. This, I have also 
argued, may also include some kind of consciousness (though not of 
course self-consciousness), some sense in which the organism knows
takes cognizance of what it is doing, even though it does not know that
■ • ■ ■ ■
it knows.
Shotter talks about "simple” regulation as distinct from rule- 
regulation; but he does not recognise that even simple regulation 
involves that application of a rule or rules (they could be called 
constraints if it was desired to avoid the word rule). He refers to
1. Ibid. p. 26.
2. See page 32 above.
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’system parameters’, but does not recognise that if any particular 
parameter has any intelligible effect on a system, then its effect must 
be definable as a rule or rules. He says that a very young child 
simply plays out the possibilities inherent in an imaginary situation 
without any understanding of what he is doing; but he does not recognise 
that every imagined situation brings its imagined constraints, otherwise 
rules, and these define what the possibilities are; moreover that if the 
child is conscious yet does not understand what he is doing, the 
further question has to.be askeds what then does he understand, what 
is he conscious of? Shotter does not answer, or raise, this question.
He refers to Wittgenstein’s remark that we do not use or learn language 
by means of strict rules; but he does not go on to the corollary that 
it would be impossible for us to use or learn a language, or, for that 
matter, for a child to play at anything, without any rules at all.
Without some very general rules we could not even differentiate talk 
or play from other activities.
The upshot of rny argument is that we have to accept that the 
Self has an inward as well as an outward face; a human being has 
plans and purposes which are personal to himself as well as roles 
(supported indeed by plans) which are mediated by a social structure; 
he can be regarded in different perspectives not only as biological man 
and behavioural or social man, but also as psychological man; he has
thoughts which follow the regulation of the purposive cycle and are  .
by no means merely an internal dialogue with himself in roles negot­
iated previously in a social context. In other words it is not possible 
to reduce plans to roles or roles to plans. In a sense the roles are 
carried on the backs of relevant plans, but even so they are not 
determined by them; as Shotter rightly emphasises, they are negotiated
with an external social reality. And it is the Self of plans which 
1.
is the negotiator.
1. Shotter suggests that "to possess personal powers is to manifest
not just directed, but self-directed activity... such as to express 
meanings in one’s actions. That is, one has to make oneself 
intelligible to oneself in other’s terms and in doing so make our 
actions relevant to other than our own immediate need3 or interests. 
We must put ourselves in a position for which we are responsible, 
Mead would say.” (Op. cit. f!The Development of Personal Powers”, 
pp.240-1). I see no reason to accept, however, that we are unable 
to recognise meanings in terms of our own aims and purposes without 
reference to other people’s termss I would define meaning as ”use 
in relation to a purpose”. Nor do I believe that responsibility 
can adequately be defined by.identifying it with the acceptance.of 
externally determined, even externally negotiated, social values 
(see the final section of this study).
There is hardly space here to deal in detail with the internal 
dialogue theory of thought; but it may be sufficient for present 
purposes to say that it is usually asserted on the basis of insufficient 
analysis of what a dialogue is (often no analysis at all). Ply own view 
of dialogue, developed in "The Grammar of Social Interaction”, is that 
it is always related to a purposive cycle or cycles, just as individual 
thinking is, but that in this case the cycle is one which is common to 
the participants?
At each step of the dialogue participants.make statements, or 
ask questions in answer to which others make statements; 
at each step assent is tacitly assumed or explicitly given to 
any statement just made, or else is explicitly withheld so 
that more discussion must take place before the cumulative process 
of building up common understanding and agreement can go further. 
Every step in the cumulative process is effectively an agreement, 
at least for immediate purposes, though participants may not 
regard themselves as fully committed; they arrive at what 
Erving Goffman described as "no'tso much a real agreement as to 
what exists, but rather a real agreement as to what claims 
concerning what issues will be temporarily honoured."
Of course not every dialogue leads to an agreement on common action 
frequently it will go no further than the first phase of the purposive 
cycle, that of exploration and orientation; but every effective dialogue 
does lead to some degree of common understanding (which may include 
understanding that there is a difference). In any case for present 
purposes the point is clear; when I think, this does not mean that I 
am conducting a dialogue with myself; on the contrary thought by the 
individual is logically prior to dialogue of any kind.
To say all this, however, is not to say that Shatter is wrong in 
ascribing great importance to the emergence of the social self, which I, 
like him, uouid distinguish as the person. I entirely agree with him 
that to become a person the child has to distinguish between people and 
things, to learn how to open and close the social link at will and 
thereby to recognise "the humanity, the autonomy and cognitive status 
of the other by some form of greeting - even if only a smile"1; more­
over that the emergence of this power grows out of a kind of dialectical
1. 3ohn Shotter; "The Development of Personal Powers" in M.P.f‘1. 
f L Richards ed. "The Integration of a Child into a Social World" 
^Cambridge 1974).
exchange with the mother* or parent-figure. In the next section I 
turn to a closer examination of the nature of this momentous step in 
development*
The Origins of the Self (3)
Consciousness* self-consciousness and the origins of 
abstract thinking? the relationship between this and 
the development of the individual's capacity to become 
an^object to himself.
I have suggested that a child's purposive activity in its earliest 
stages involves a succession of disconnected episodes in which there 
emerge a succession of disconnected ideas of the Self which are hardly 
to be distinguished from ideas of parts of the body. There is no need 
for anything else, because each of his plans is envisaged and completed 
before the next one comes within range. Memories of the past do affect 
the present but not in the form of explicit cognitions, rather in the 
form of emotional overtones or "affect". Shotter*"quotes with approval 
the argument of Spitz that:
When.the infant experiences a need, it will provoke in him 
an affect that will lead to behavioural changes which in, their' 
turn provoke an affective response and its concomitant 
attitude in the mother.
This I accept. I would only add that the nature of the infant's 
feelings will be effected by its own past experiences and will therefore 
be liable to change over time both in quality and intensity. My theory 
of the synchronic resonance of association (see pages 116, - 124 above) 
suogests how the simultaneous impact of associations,/Working like over-
■ ' ' ■’/  "■ i
tones at the unconscious level, can generate the qualities and
intensities of emotional experience, and at the some timg shift the
thresholds of association, thereby helping to determine the action
that the individual takes.
The question that arises now is: how does the child learn to 
develop an idea of the Self which has continuity from one experience
1. 3ohn Shotter: ^Acquired Powers” in R. H a r r e  ed. "Personality" 
(Blackwell 1976).
to the next and which thus makes passible the coordination of his 
responses over a longer span? The answer, it has already been 
suggested, lies in the beginning of his differentiation of persons - 
of his mother as a person and so of himself as a person interacting 
with her. But how does this happen and what does it imply? It has 
been suggested by George Herbert Mead, and by many who have followed 
him in this, that it is only as the individual becomes an object to 
himself that he becomes self-conscious, indeed develops a Self at all? 
and Shotter argues that it is at this stage that the individual begins 
to know what he is doing and to exhibit "monitored behaviour". But 
I think the crucial point is a different one.
I see no reason for not accepting that a baby (when awake) is 
conscious from the time of birth? and consciousness, I have argued, 
involves the recognition of predications, that is of forms emerging 
in a space (which may be an analogical space with a synchronic time 
dimension) and over a span of diachronic time. As the period of 
"psychological symbiosis" comes to an end, the baby begins to be aware 
of himself and his mother as separate forms; he becomes aware of "me", 
as Mead would put it. But I am not sure that in terms of pure 
consciousness any major development is thereby involved. It may 
indeed be trus that what is most distinctive about man is that he is 
aware of himself. As Pascal put it in a famous passages "Man is but 
a reed, the feeblestin Nature; but he is a thinking reed... If the 
universe were to crush him, he would still be more noble than that which 
kills him, because he knows that he is dying..." But this refers to a 
degree of awareness which even adults do not rise to very often or for 
long periods. It is an awareness of the Self being aware, a consciousness 
which in Mead's terminology includes the "I" as well as the "me". It 
has no relevance to the stage of development which we are now considering# 
Monitoring of the Self's activities is always necessary if they are to 
be properly executed at all, but, as I hove argued in discussing the 
refev ant stage in the purposive cycle (that of "Actualisation", other­
wise "Action and Monitoring"), nearly all our self-monitoring takes 
place below the level of consciousness anyway.
Uhat us do have to reckon with here, I suggest, is the emergence 
of abstract thought, that is, thought which depends on links of
classification Gith the past* For what distinguishes a person from a 
mere perceived form or process is that a person has continuity and 
sameness even through changing aspects of behaviour. Continuity 
implies location in time and space extending beyond tha span of 
immediate perception. Sameness implies classification. And the idea 
of the same thing behaving in different ways at different times, N 
thereby exhibiting different powers, implies the interdependent concepts 
person, behaviour and role (or type of behaviour). I do not mean 
that the child consciously realises these specific abstract ideas, but 
rather that his thinking comes to reflect the functions to which they 
refer, lie may note that at this stage the distinction between persons 
and things may still be fairly blurred; a small child tends to personify 
things and may well be encouraged to do so by his mother.
The thesis I am putting forward thus takes the following form.
In a child's earliest months of life his explicit consciousness, which 
is of perceptual forms (mediated originally, in all likelihood, by 
innate perceptual schemata), does not extend in time or space bsyond 
the immediate perceptual span of the moment. His experiences leave 
their deposit on the mind-manifold and increasingly, therefore, a 
resonance of associations from, the past may colour his perceptual 
consciousness; but such memories are not ordered and do not became 
individually explicit at the focus of consciousness. As he grows 
older, however, the ideas in the mind-manifold are gradually brought 
into order in the two ways noted on a previous page - first, through 
the construction of a model or map (initially perhaps a number of 
unrelated maps) extending in both space end time, on which events, 
past, present and future can be located end so related to each other; 
and, secondly, through classification, the formation of complexes of 
ideas linked by similarity of form or past association, complexes 
which are identified by perceptual markers or symbols (e.g. "Mama", 
"Dada") and can be recalled by memory or imagination as well as by 
direct perceptual experience. Once this is achieved, we have a basis 
for thinking about persons and roles, places and things. This is 
precisely what the baby proceeds to do as he emerges from the period 
of "psychological symbiosis" with his mother; end it is his mother who. 
In the ways Shotter has described, encourages him through their
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exchanges to develop this recognition of himself as an independent 
person in an objective world. In the process, as thinking is liberated 
from the immediate perceptual span, the purposive cycle can begin to 
separate itself from the narrower predications in which it is realised.
The Origins of the Self (4)
The plan of the good child as the core of the anticipatory
Self. ’
We noted earlier that the coordination of a childfs responses over 
a longer period involves deciding on a particular activity with a view 
not merely to its immediate effect but also to its secondary effect — 
essentially its effect on subsequent activity by the parent figure.
If the parent-figure is pileased, she will do child-pleasing things; if 
displeased, child-displeasing things. From this wo can straightforwardly 
derive a simple basic classification of the possible activities, the 
plans, which are open to the child, distinguishing (i) those plans which 
load to pleasure both directly in themselves and also indirectly because 
thoy are approved by parents; (ii) those plans which do not lead to 
pleasure directly but do so indirectly because they are approved by tHe 
parents; and (iii) those plans which lead to pleasure directly but are 
liable to be followed by punishment or deprivation. Of these (i) and 
(ii) can be described as sub-plans of the generalised plan of being a 
good child; while (iii) consists of sub-plans of s generalised plan of 
being a bad child. There is also however a fourth category of planss 
(iv) those which lead to relief from hurt or frustration - a kind of 
relative pleasure - by means .of-aggressive or destructive moves against 
the parent figure. A child may as a primary choice adopt plans in 
any of the first three categories, but he will not make a primary choice 
of one in the fourth category; this can only be a matter of secondary 
choice arising out of the frustration of a primary choice. Plans in 
the fourth category are also sub-plans of the generalised plan of being 
a bad child. It is my suggestion that plans in categories (i) and (ii), 
building up the wider plan of being a good child, become the core of a 
continuing anticipatory Self; but that the same doss not apply to plans 
in categories (iii) and (iv), building up the wider plan of being a bad 
child.
Why not? To answer this question wa need to recall once more the 
distinction drawn earlier between the idea of the Self in the mind- 
manifold and -oea of the continuing or anticipatory Self. The 
former includes all that the mind has recorded both of the history and 
of the accompanying environment of the physical body, and of its past 
and present plans and roles and their scenarios. But the latter, the 
idea of the anticipatory Self, which is part of the former, consists 
only of those physical and social predictions and those generalised 
plans, with their generalised scenarios, which are of long span, 
leading on into the future, and so exercise constraint on future 
decisions. Thus the idea of the good child, with a variety of sub­
plans hierarchically subordinate to it, continues as a sort of ideal 
projection into the future; and insofar as it constrains the future 
decisions of the Self it imposes a degree of coherence on the Self, 
matching it to a generalised image which comas from the requirements 
of the parent figures and is in effect a creation of the parent figures.
Wow every baby is unique and his uniqueness expresses itself in 
particular wants and desires in particular contingencies. But this does 
not amount to any unique core of the anticipatory Self. Without any 
conscious intent, but as a kind of pragmatic wisdom, he is bound to 
adopt the plan of being a good child insofar as he learns to want to 
do things that please his parents in order to gain the benefits that 
accrue from doing so* But other wants and desires falling outside our 
categories (i) and (ii) will keep springing up. At times he will 
succumb and adopt plans in category (iii) or fail to adopt those in 
category (ii). At times, furthermore, either because he has done this 
or for other reasons, he will encounter frustration and will consequently 
adopt the aggressive and destructive plans of category (iv), the 
category of rages and tantrums. Whereas the plans of (i) and (ii), 
however, build up a consistent positive pattern, that of the good 
child, those of (iii) and (iv) do not build up to any consistent image 
that could exercise constraint on future decisions. They ore either 
unconnected with others, as in (iii), or. as in (iv), they are 
consequential, secondary plans which would never be adopted as a primary 
choice. The only unity they possess is a negative one, that of being 
incompatible with the plan of being a good child. The bad plan is not
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a positive one, it con bo defined only by negatives. So, either way, 
it is the good plan, with its sub-plans, which forms the lasting core 
of the Self, providing an element of identity (which is sameness from 
one occasion to another) and stretching on into the future, constraining 
futuro decisions* The good plan becomes a sort of compass by the aid 
of which a course is plotted through the contingencies that a human 
encounters in hie life - though he may at times be blown off. course by
strong wants or desires leading to the adaption of bad plans, or as a
result of sheer inadequacies in the compass mechanism.
Although this plan may be the core of the anticipatory Self, it 
is, in its origins, obviously very little differentiated, of a rather
standard pattern (though with some variation dependent on the parents
and the particular situation), and of no striking interest or idio­
syncrasy. But we noted earlier that according to Dr. U.R. Ashby the 
mind is developed over time into a regulator (f^ J'of' immensely increased 
capacity by the use of "design and information" (as variety derived from 
the environment itself) to amplify the quantity of design in the
fundamental regulator (R^ ) supplied by the gene pattern. So too that
aspect of the mind-manifold which reflects the anticipatory Self is , 
developed enormously in detail and idiosyncrasy by the cumulative 
effect of experience in the individuals life, which is unique to him - 
particularly in its pattern of cumulation over time. But this 
anticipatory Self, the only continuing integrator of the choices which 
the mind makes, is always, if toy argument is accepted, the result of
accretion upon the foundation of the plan of being a good child, laid
■ • ■ • 1. ' 
down in early childhood, the prototypical "ideal role". As this
implies, the true Self is always fundamentally the good Self, of which
the bad Self is only the negative counterpart. The problem of
identifying the right plan for the Self in a given situation is that
of ensuring that it is truly laid on this foundation; and it follows
that if earlier layers have not been truly laid there will be faults
and incoherences deep down in the foundation which it may take major
excavation and rebuilding to set right.
This conclusion is of central importance to my understanding of
1. See page 191 above.
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the way in which the coherence of the idea of the Self is established 
and maintained, and consequently to my understanding of how we can make 
judgements about wholeness and lack of wholeness, health and ill-health, 
good and evil, so far as they concern the SBlf. I recognise that much 
of the argument of this section has been theoretical and schematic, 
without much support from empirical evidence; but this can hardly be 
avoided in view of the fact that I am concerned here with what happens 
in consciousness, not directly with externally observable behaviour.
I maintain that the fourfold classification of the basic plans open to 
a baby, and the conclusions which flow from it in regard to the basis 
of the continuing personality, are not only derived from a coherent, ;if 
speculative, argument, but are also very much in conformity with 
ordinary experience and common sense. Indeed the fourfold classification 
applies with equal appropriateness to the plans of activity open to my 
cat ; on the basis of ordinary experience and common sense I am very 
sure that the cat (who appears to be conscious, though not self-conscious) 
not only adopts at different times plans for activity in each of the four 
specified categories, but is perfectly well aware of the distinctions 
involved.
Finally it may be worth while to draw attention to the fact that 
these arguments link up with the anciefat and redoubtable philosophical^ 
argument, going back to St. Augustine and beyond, that evil is the 
privatio boni, the deprivation or damaging of good, not a positive 
reality which can exist on its own. A closely related idea has been
1. An interesting question arises concerning the language of sounds' 
and symbolic movements by which a dog or cat which is at home in 
a human family communicates with the members of the family and 
reciprocally understands their communications. A whole vocabulary 
of signs and symbols is mutually accepted through a process of 
negotiation, as Shotter would say, which reflects the social rules 
and roles defining the social situation in which the intercourse 
takes place. A cat, for example, can develop e whole repertoire 
of sounds (purrs, cries, gurgles) and gestures (back arching, 
curling round furniture in greeting, pushing the nose against the 
human hand, standing up against the food cupboard, and so on) 
which are accepted symbols of communication; and correspondingly 
a variety of human gestures and tones of voice come to be 
recognised and interpreted in different consistent ways by the 
cat. Through the use of such a language as this the animal 
comes to express a distinct personality within the family, 
which is analogous to a human personality.
expressed in the saying that "Evil is good that has ceased to work for 
the whole and is working only for itself”* It is a misunderstanding of 
the prlv/atio boni principle to suggest that it waters down the concept 
of evil to any degree. Evil is not a mere lack of good, but an active 
deprivation or damaging of good. The direct aggressive power, threat 
and malevolence of evil as a force in the world is not in question.
The point is that the criterion for identifying Whether a force or a 
will or a person is evil is that it damages or threatens to damage the 
good. This is a negative criterion. The nature of what is evil depends 
on thB nature of what is good, but not vice versa. There is no positive 
criterion by which you can identify something evil for what it is, there 
is only the negative criterion that it hurts the good. This problem is
usefully discussed by Robert Nozick in the section on "Value as Degree
of Organic Unity” in his "Philosophical Explanations”.1* As he says,
Evil is not merely the absence of good, someone else*s not 
being there; it is itself a presence, a positive force - I 
moan a negative one. Ue have the picture of some natural 
scale where evil does not merely receive zero on a scale of 
goodness, it receives a negative value.•• Disvalue is not 
merely the absence of value but a caunterforce of some sort... 
Opposition is not mere lack of supporting, negation not mere 
absence of affirming.
The Early Structure of the Idea of the Self
An examination of the process by which the plan of tha 
good child is detached and internalised, together with 
internalised images of approving and disapproving parent 
figures; of how this enables the child to establish his
independence as a biological unit; of how it legitimises
an element of aggression in the personality; and of the 
nature and importance of ontological security.
In pressing on to those conclusions I have in one respect been 
moving on too fast. There is an obstacle to be considered. If the 
original idea of an anticipatory Self is the plan of the good child, 
which is ultimately determined by the approbation and disapprobation 
of parent figures, why should this process not go on, as the child
1. Harvard 1981, pp. 418 ff.
grows older, so that he develops all the time a more complicated 
continuing Self, but one still matched to the parent figures around, 
and consequently not fundamentally an own Self at all? The process 
does not in fact go in this way* At an early stage the plan of the 
good child is broken off and internalised* And the reason would appear 
to be threefold* The internalisation of a primitive good Self ensures 
first that the child has a compass within, by which it can be guided 
if the parent figures, with their signals of approbation and disapprobation 
are not around. Secondly it ensures that the task of integration does 
not become impossibly complicated; the internalised ideal Self, by 
reference to which he has to make his choices, does at least remain 
more or less the same, except for any new plans he adds himself? he 
does not have to dig up and reorganise his own past all the time in 
response to capricious signals from surrounding parent figures, signals 
which are bound to become more unpredictable and idiosyncratic to the 
parents as the circumstances of the life of the growing child become 
more complex. And thirdly - most importantly - it establishes the child 
os on independent developing personality, an own Self that is not a mere 
reflection of others and so can enable the whole mind-body system to 
function os an independent biological unit.
Uhen the plan of the good child is internalised, it is evident 
that the parent figures have to be Internalised too, since without the 
attraction of their approval and the fear of their disapproval the 
incentive to be good would be lost* They represent in fact part of the 
scenarios of the possible plans of the continuing Self, certifying some 
of them by their approval as "good" plans and giving a bad taste of 
disapproval to possible "bad" plans* On the face of it this means that 
the child, as he or she grows up, has to internalise two continuing 
persons, not only that of the good child, but also that of a sort of 
composite parent figure expressing encouragement of this and discourage­
ment of that. But these are not parallel persons, their functions are 
quite different. In terms of the model developed earlier in this study, 
the first is the core of the conscious idea of the Self, to which, after 
consideration and weighing of alternatives, now plans are added, layer 
upon layer, as life proceeds; the second have the function of influencing
the choices of the first and this means affecting the nature and intensity 
of the emotional coloration of alternative courses as they are imagined 
and weighed in the balance, making same appear desirable and others 
repellent, with all shades between.
The suggestion: (developed in this study is that the emotional 
coloration of conscious life ie due not to the ideas grasped In explicit 
succession as logical forms at the focus of consciousness, but to the 
accompanying groundswell of innumerable ideas not separately and explicitly 
recognised at all but contributing simultaneously and in aggregate as,,* 
the overtones, harmonies and dissonances of consciousness bo the nature 
of the conscious experience. Thus if they are to carry out their function 
the parent figure associations must operate at the unconscious levsl, 
adding their emotional impetus to the purposive cycles which occupy the 
conscious mind, but distinctly separated from the explicit conscious plan 
of the good child, which is that of the continuing, independent Self.
Indeed they need to remain unconscious and separated from the Self 
not least because in the normal case there is a continuing relationship 
in the real world with the real parent figures, who may well on occasion 
do things which are strongly dissonant with the associations of the 
introjected parent figures. This relationship can now develop on a new 
basie as between free, separate, but interdependent personalities. In 
the earliest stages, It would seem, the boundary between the child*s 
Self and the parents is often not clearly drawn in the child’s mind, 
since its own identity is so closely linked with those through whom 
alone it can exert any effect on the world. The fact thit they do not 
always do what the child wants is not immediately incompatible with 
this, because the child still does not have an established continuing 
identity. It can identify itself with the angry parent at one moment 
and the rebellious child at another. The emergence of a continuing Self 
makes it possible to establish a continuing identity over and against 
that of the parent figures - and over against not only the real parent 
figures but also the introjected rewarders and punishers; for the 
rewarders and punishers cannot affectively perform their functions if 
they are identified with the recipient of their attentions.
The new relationship with the real parent figures ie still normally 
a very close one, but it is one in which the participants are recognised
os separate and free, yet at the same time part of a wider complex 
whole, in such a way that what hurts the one hurts the others, and 
what gives pleasure to the one gives pleasure to the others* This is 
love, a relationship of freedom combined with acknowledged inter­
dependence* If I love my neighbour as myself, I do not confuse my 
identity with his, but I do identify bis fate with mine, I identify 
myself with a whole of which we are both necessary parts* The plan 
of the good child itself fundamentally implies the adoption of a social 
role, as we have defined the phrase, one pole of a relationship of which 
th8 opposite pole is represented by the parent role* The child and the 
parent learn from each other how to join together in this relationship 
of mutual love* At the seme time it is important to note that the 
emergence of the new iddependent role gives for the first time a sort 
of legitimacy - in appropriate circumstances - to aggressive behaviour 
by the child* In the earlier stage the accepted parent role includes 
both rewarding and also punishing, aggressive behaviour; but the child, 
when it is being aggressive, is not conforming to the role of good 
child; aggressive behaviour is naughty* Once the transition is madB, 
however, to a continuing Self, with its own introjected if unconscious 
parent figures, the possibility arises that aggressive behaviour may be 
approved and supported by the internalised parent figures when it is 
directed not against them, but against others - usually in practice the 
real parent figures. This arises the more readily because the 
boundaries of the Self may not yet be firmly drawn and the tendency to 
identify the Self with the internalised parent figures, instead of 
clearly establishing its indppendence, may easily assert itself. If 
the real parent figures do anything which the child judges to be "unfair" 
(an idea which arises deep in the original layers of the personality and 
appears to be linked to the emergence of the idea of good faith and 
social obligation) they are more likely than anyone else to become the 
objects of this new-found righteous indignation. The harnessing of 
aggressive feelings on behalf of the new Self is no doubt essential to 
facilitate the establishment of a fully independent personality; but 
the integration of aggression into the approved plan of the Self is 
clearly a matter of great moment for the future.
The establishment of an independent personality must inevitably bring 
with it a sense of the precariousnees of that personality and a need to
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sustain and defend it. It seems likely, therefore, that this is the 
stage at which wo can identify the beginning in human consciousness of 
a certain preoccupation with what other people think, and consequently 
with what Erving Goffman colled the presentation of the Self. Rom Harre 
has argued strongly that the preservation and raaintenace of honour and 
reputation is in fact the chief concern of all human beings and the 
structuring principle of human society.1*
It will be evident that in much of what I have been saying I have 
been describing, from a different angle and in terras of a somewhat 
different model, the process which Freud described as the emergence of 
a special modification of the ,fEgow which ,fstands in contrast to the
2*other constituents of the Ego in the form of an Ego-Ideal or Super-Ego.” 
Freud describes the Ego-Ideal as ,Ja precipitate in the Ego” consisting 
of twin identifications with the father and the mother **in some way 
combined together*1, thdnrelativa intensity of each reflecting the^p- 
ponderancs in the individual of the two sexual dispositions. Ho goes 
on r,The Supor-Ego is however not merely a deposit left by the earliest 
object-choicos of the Id; it also represents an energetic reaction 
formation against those choices. Its relation to the Ego is •
exhausted by the precepts ”You ought to be such and such (like your 
father)R; it also comprises the prohibition ’*You must not be such and 
such (like your father); that is, you may not do all that he does; many 
things are his prerogative.”
This double aspsct of ths Ego-Ideal Freud Cfseribss to the effect 
of the repression of the Oedipus complex. It seems to me that there is 
a tendency here to treat ths adoption of a role phasing to the parent 
figure too easily as an identification with the parent figure. There 
is indeed a csrtain link; lovo, os we have seen, is always a kind of 
^identification with the loved one; what hurts or pleases the loved 
one hurts or pleases me. But it is not strictly an identification, or 
ought not to bs; it is a recognition of both as parts of a combined 
whole. There is distinction as well as combination and it is a common­
place of both the analytic and psycho-analytic sbhools that the 
establishment of this distinction is essential to the emergence of a
1* ^Social Being” (81ackwell 1979). See also above page n 3*
2. **The Ego end the Id” (Hogarth Press) 5th impression 1949, p.44.
a truly independent Self. As Dr. Anthony Storr has put it,
Mthe hypothesis seems inescapable that the infant’s world 
consists originally simply of itself; itself not separated 
from the mother who tends it, nor from the blankets which 
cover it... In the beginning was All and Everything, the 
wholeness which comes from total dependence. •• It is only 
gradually that the sssll child begins to be aware of himself 
as a separate entity and at the seme time to be aware of other 
people as separate also. It is probable that this loss of the 
original or primary identification with the mother takes place 
partly by means of the child becoming orientated in space 
through the discovery of the boundaries of Its own body...
This realisation of separateness leads, I believe, to anxiety 
and fear... it becomes expedient for the child to try and 
please the adults for fear they may abandon it or punish it... 
and it is therefore expadient to assume the aspect and mimic 
the behaviour of those upon whose benevolence one’s security 
depends.”
The effect of successful analytic treatment Is to enable ths true 
personality to emerge and "to cast off identifications which have been 
made solely on grounds of security”.1* Dr, Starr’s account is in 
general admirably clear, but it seems to me that ho also is too quick 
to regard a role intended to please the adults as identical with a role 
"mimicking the behaviour" of the adults. Both can occur, but they are 
two very different things; and In our present context, where it Is our 
concern to try to establish ths original nature of the independent Self,
the difference is crucial. .
Dr. R.D. Laiog gives an account which is similar in its 
fundamentals to Dr. Starr’s, but adds some points of Interest:
"The initial structuralisation of being into its basic elements 
occurs in early infancy. In normal circumstances this occurs in
such a way as to be so conclusively stable in its basic
elements (for Instance the continuity of time, the distinction 
between the self and not-self, phantasy and reality) that it 
can henceforth be taken for granted.•* The individual then 
may experience his own being as real, alive, whole; as 
differentiated from the rest of the world in ordinary cir­
cumstances so clearly that hie identity and autonomy are 
never in question; as a continuum in time; as havinginner 
consistency, substantiality, genuineness _.j|nd worth; as spatially 
'-po-exte'nsi’Ve toith the body; and usually., as haying begun in or
ground birth and liable to extinction with death. He thus has a
firm core of ontological security.
1. "The Integrity of the Personality" (Penguin edition, 1972 
impression) pages 80-85#
2. "The Divided Self" (Penguin edition 1965) p. 17 and p. 41.
The suggestion that the initial differentiation of the continuing 
Self corresponds to the emergence of the role of the good child might 
seem to be at odds with the fact that this is precisely the role 
which is most often assumed as what Dr* Laing calls a ”falss Self” 
by schizophrenics and others who are lacking in ^ontological security”. 
Against this my contention would be that in sach cases we ere dealing 
with a false role of the good child; what Laing would call the true 
Self behind the false one is — insofar as it is an entity continuing 
from the past on into the future - the true role of the good child*
For what else is the true Self but the good Self? How else can a true 
continuing Self find shape and definition? I think Dr* Laing,would 
himself agree with this* ”One*s first social identity”* he says in 
,fThe Self and Others” ,”is conferred on one. We learn to be who wo
X,
are told we are.” It is necessary however to bear in mind that wo 
are here dealing with psychological man* The actor* biological man, 
comes first before any continuing role is adopted, and it is he who 
carriee the potentiality for love; but it is only at this point, with 
the adoption of the first continuing plan, the actuality rather than 
the potentiality of love, that psychological man begins* The basic role 
of love is the same for everyone, since it is on that foundation alone 
that the personality can develop in such a way as to realise the destiny 
of the whole man, biological man. The essential distinctions to be 
drawn are those between the primary identification with the mother in 
which, as Storr paints out, there is still no differentiation of ..a real 
Self, the adoption of the role of a good child pleasing to the parent 
figures, and the superimposition on this role of secondary identifications 
(mainly, in the early years, of the parent figures themselves)*
The adoption of secondary identifications is up to a point a normal 
part of growing up, but insofar as they are adopted through fear or 
anxiety they must eventually be cast off, as Storr suggests, if full 
maturity is to be achieved. There are many case histories to illustrate 
this, of which the case of-Mary Barnes may be taken aa an example.
Dr. Doseph Berk© says of hers
”She had to separate herself from relationships which had 
taken place in the past, apart from people or events in her 
present. The distinctions she had to make were not only
1* ”The Self and Others” (Penguin edition 1969), p* 95.
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between the here and there, but also between the then and 
now# If she could manage this, she would probably find the 
'real nary®. This person had been buried under more than 
forty years of conflicting identifications with her mother, 
father, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, extended family 
members, school teachers, and everyone else whom she had 
incorporated, with or without projected fragments of herself!” *^"
The. feey to the puzzle is perhaps the need which Laing has 
identified for ontological security* * As an infant I am ontologieally 
secure if I am good and ay environment, complete with the parent figures 
who dominate and determine it, is good* As a grown person I am onto- 
logically secure if I am at home in the world, if I can accept myself 
as basically good and accept that my environment, with the fate that 
governs it, is good; as most men would say, that God is good* There 
is an element of tautology her© because the very meaning of the word 
good is rooted in the sense of ontological security* Wow it is clear 
that from the earliest days the child’s idea of his or her parent figures, 
and of what they want him or her to be like, may not be accurate? and 
that once these ideas are introjected end cease to emerge into conscious­
ness they may became widely at variance with what the child’s own 
conscious assessments would suggest* Ploreover there are from the outsat 
many other elements in the SBlf besides the plan of the good child - 
notably an unruly throng of wants and desires, frustrations and 
aggressions* But I am proposing only that the idea of the good child, 
related to what these parent figures are thought to want, provides the 
core role of the anticipatory Self, not the total Self.
I should perhaps re-emphasise here the distinction between the 
long term plans which exercise constraint upon future action, and the
1* ’’flary Barnes” by flary Barnes and Boseph Barks (Penguin^edition 
1973) p. 285. ^
2* In Erikson’e terminology the equivalent of Laing*s ^ontological 
security” is ’’basic trust11 • (’’Childhood 4u?Society”, Paladin 
edition 1977, p. 222-224)* frank Lake is another example of a 
therapist who has developed, as part of what he calls his 
’’ontological model” a similar conception of the need for ’’acceptance^ 
which makes possible ’’being-itself”. He offers a detailed  ^
’’ontological analysis” of the normal mother-child relationship 
and of the way in which flaws of different kinds in this relation­
ship can underlie the different major types of neurosis*
(”Clinical Theology”, DLT 1966? ’’Tight Corners in Pastoral 
Counselling” OLT 1981.)
past plans or ephemeral present plans which still form part of the total 
idea of the Self as it exists in the mind* For the Self, as Laing 
indicates, Is co-sxtensive with a body differentiated from the rest of 
the world, continuous in time and therefore possessing a history. 
Reverting to the terminology used earlier in this study, we can say 
that the total Self is biological man, with his life-course from the 
cradle to the grave, and the idea of the Self in the mind-manifold 
reflects this whole Self, with all its remembered past plans and their 
accompanying scenarios. But completed and discarded plans and past 
history have no relevance to purposive thought and decisions in the 
Here How except insofar as they help to lead to the adoption of 
persisting plans that project into the future - again with accompanying 
predicted scenarios, though these must necessarily be highly generalised 
in nature. The form of the anticipatory Self changes with time, as 
plans of shorter span are acted out to their conclusion and as new 
plans extending significantly into the future are adopted; but, as 
already noted, it is always from the beginning an ideal Self# The infant 
does not always, by any means, act in accordance with the plan of the 
good child; nor does the adult, in his shorter term decisions, always 
adopt plans which conform to his own longer term idea of himself. But 
such delinquency brings punishment from the Super-Ego, as Freud would 
say; and although the Ego in particular situations may do things which 
are quite incompatible with the role of the good child, or of the 
established anticipatory Self, normally there is ininbither case any 
question of a different, rival anticipatory Self getting established., , 
This does indeed happen sometimes when within a person different, 
conflicting anticipatory Selves, reflecting different persisting wills, 
take root together, identifying their own goal images and personal plans 
leading to them. But this, when it happens, Is always a more or less 
pathological situation. The deeper within the core of the Self the 
division lies, the more serious the situation is. Uhat can produce 
mental illness at the unconscious levels of the coherence of the Self, 
as with Flary Barnes, can at other levels lead to moral delinquency 
and crime - which ore also arguably to be classified as pathological 
phenomena. William Law was reflecting the traditional wisdom of the 
confessional when he saids
The multiplicity of wills is the very essence of fallen nature,
and all its evil, misery and separation from God lias in it; 
and as soon as you return'to and allow only this one will, 
you ara returned to God and must find the blessedness of hie 
kingdom within you.
The name of the devil who entered into the herd of Gsdarene swine was 
Legion. Any independent centre or centres of will within the personality 
are dangerous; they are indeed what an older usage called demons, end 
the word fits even when they are relatively benevolent'In' nature, like 
the muse or "daemon” that may seem to a writer to take over and use 
him as an instrument of its own creative power. * We may note that 
3ung has defined demons as ’’interferences from the unconscious” * and 
Freud is quoted as saying ”In our eyes the demons are bad and 
reprehensible wishes, derivatives of instinctual impulses that have 
bean repudiated or repressed.” *
The Origins of Neurotic Stress
An account of-the origins of neurotic conflict in 
the personality in terms of the incompatibility of 
plans adopted at different times by the anticipatory 
Self.
It will be recalled that in terms of the model which has.been 
developed In this study the root of neurotic conflict in the 
personality lies essentially in the tension bstwsen plans which are 
Incompatible with each other. In a given situation, through the 
processes of the purposive cycle, a goal is established, alternative 
plans are evolved for achieving it, they are compared and evaluated 
for desirability and feasibility, and then they are weighed, as it 
were, against each other in an emotional scale* One of the main 
criteria for evaluation is that of compatibility with the existing 
anticipatory Self, that is with tho plans, long term and short term, 
which have already bean adopted into the Self and which have not yet 
been acted out to completion. Any sharp dissonance between a new plan 
and the existing anticipatory Self, especially as represented by its 
most fundamental long term plans or "ideal roles” produces a painful 
emotional charge which is likely to outweigh the emotional attractions 
of the new plan. In the normal case the now plan is abandoned and
1. Cf. Kipling’s discussion of his "daemon” in "Something of 
fiyself” (Hacmillan 1937).
2. "Psychological Types” (Kegan Paul 1946) p. 138.
3. Quoted in Kenneth Leach "Soul Friend” (Sheldon Press 1977).
282.
either a different way is found of pursuing the goal in question or the 
goal itself is abandoned as impossible of achievement* The abandoned, 
plan or the abandoned goal are not repressed out of memory (though time 
may gradually obliterate any recollection of them). They remain part 
of the idea-complex of the Self but they are definitively not adopted, 
they are not part of the anticipatory Self.
Difficulties may arise, however, in two ways: first when a situation 
arises in which9 as sometimes with bereavement, it is no longer feasible 
to work out any plan which is compatible with the preservation of a 
basic ideal role5 and secondly when the pull of an incompatible plan 
is so great that the mind is unable to relinquish it and keeps coming 
back to it. ■ •
The first of these situations is perhaps the most threatening and 
is liable to arise at the deepest level when there is a threat to 
"ontological security", that is to the basic role of one who trusts 
and loves the enveloping power and knows in turn that he or she is 
loved. If a baby is separated for a prolonged period from his mother, 
or undergoes some comparable experience of deprivation, it becomes 
harder and harder for him to maintain this basic plan or ideal role, 
the one which grows in due course into the role of the good child. In 
his efforts to preserve this role, if we are to follow Frank Lake’s 
analysis, he feels increasing separation anxiety which may grow into 
terror, dread and despair; and in reaction he may develop fantasy plans 
either of aggressive behaviour accompanied by rage, or of "libidinal" 
imaginations of the mother’s return, accompanied by separation from 
reality."*'*These are defences against ontological insecurity, a 
threatened disintegration of the continuing, anticipatory Self, of 
which the core is the role of trusting, loving and being loved. When 
the mother does return, or there is some equivalent restoration of 
security, in a favourable case all this experience recedes into the 
past and is gradually and healthily forgotten. But in an unfavourable 
case the experience leads to lasting damage.
Then the rage, the lust, the terror and the despair are repressed
from consciousness, together with the plans to which they relate,
plans directed touards goals of aggression, possession, flight and
1. Lake was here following Pavlov and applying what he called the ,
I 'Pavlovian- theory of -T-ransmarginal Stress, a theory also applied,
in a different context, by William Sargant (Cf. "Battle, for the
Mind":''(Helnemann ■ 1957). .
■ ' ■ ■ - - • -- - 1 1 i
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relief from pain; but in repression they are not obliterated, they are 
still in some sense incorporated, though unconsciously, into the 
palimpsest of plans which is the continuing anticipatory Self; and 
so they continue to distort the individual’s pattern of reaction to 
life, mainly through the effort which is required to keep them from 
expressing themselves directly* We find, to use Lake’s terminology 
again, the anti-libidinal super-ego, or the anti-aggressive super-ego; 
or we find compulsive or obsessive mechanisms, or mechanisms of denial 
or projection, all of which sap away at the individual's capacity to 
live in trust and freedom, as one at home in his world*
It would take me far beyond the framework of this study to develop 
these ideas in detail* My present aim is to show that widely accepted 
basic categories of psycho-therapy can be linked into the model developed 
here; and in particular to emphasise the importance which is attached, on 
this model, to the issue of whether a particular plan is or is not 
adopted as part of the anticipatory Self. If it is, then it becomes 
part of the Self which reacts to the contingencies of the world; but 
if the Self’s reactions are to lead to effective regulation of the 
individual's life, it is essential that the profiles which it presents 
in particular contingencies should bo related to a reliable assessment 
of the facts and probabilities of the real world. If this is not the 
case, if the anticipatory Self includes plans which are in some sense 
based on fantasy or denial or projection, then either the individual 
is living in a dangerously unreal world, or else, in order to carry on 
normal life, he has to expend great effort on the repression of what is 
incompatible, so that suffering or distortion of the personality results 
in one form or another.
Why need this ever happen? Why does the Self not simply reject 
the unrealistic plans and roles? The answer seams to be that it is 
usually prompted to these defences by the danger of disintegration.
The fantasies, denials, projections and so on which the Self does adopt 
are defence mechanisms, whose function is to protect it from ultimate 
horrors which cannot be faced — life, for a baby^ in total separation from 
its mothfer. A bereaved person also has to face a drastically changed 
reality and the process of adjustment, even in a normal case, may well 
involve a degree of delusion or living in fantasy for a certain time.
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But in the pathological case the adjustment is never fully made.
Similarly if the baby’s fear of ultimate rejection is never fully 
exorcised, the defensive fantasies that go with it are never entirely 
rejected, even though they may be repressed from consciousness. And 
one reason for this may be an inability to face the reality of the 
unacceptable past because of the explosive power of the emotions of 
fear, rage or hatred tha^Mb.uid' then be released. It has in factJbe&f| 
suggested that a defensive mechanism such as depressive withdrawal may 
sometimes be brought in at the very beginning, specifically so as to 
prevent the full effect of other defensive fantasies and the emotions 
they would generate from being experienced even at the outset; and this 
may be one reason for the ferocity with which these emotions sometimes 
break out when they are eventually released.
Since the early in'Jiestigations of Freud it has been known that the 
bringing of repressed material into consciousness can lead to an 
"abreactive" experience of great intensity, and that this in turn can 
lead to a process of healing if ths buried experiences can thereafter be 
accepted and in some sense integrated into the conscious Self. Such 
integration is possible if the established structure of the anticipatory 
Self is strong and coherent enough and if the buried experiences can be 
seen in a new perspective in which they no longer represent a threat to the 
coherence of the Self. As psychotherapists generally recognise, a 
sufficient degree of "ego strength" is necessary if the Self is to 
have the capacity in this way to absorb and integrate what was previailsly 
kept out of consciousness.
Attention needs to be focussed, however, on what is meant by 
"integration" in this context. According to the model developed in 
this st^dy it does not mean the integration of formerly repressed 
plans into the continuing anticipatory Self. On the contrary it means 
the final definitive exclusion of plans and fantasies which the Self 
was previously not strong enough to abandon. If I discover that as a 
small child I felt a fierce anger and hatred towards my mother, linked 
to aggressive fantasy plans, it may be very salutary for me to realise 
and face this fact. But if I am effectively to "integrate" this 
discovery my first need is in fact definitively to exclude it from my
continuing idea of my Self. At the same time I allow the facts of the 
past experience and the force of the emotions involved to take their 
part as elements in the total idea-complex of the Self in the mind- 
manifold, no longer barred from retrieval into consciousness; and 
this requires not only abandonment of the original fantasies as part 
of my continuing anticipatory Self, it also requires abandonment of 
the "super-ego" plans or ideal roles which previously applied instant 
repression to ideas drawn from the forbidden past.
This section represents of course no more than a sketchy indication 
of how the model of the mind developed in this study can be related to 
models widely accepted in the world of psychotherapy. But it may be 
sufficient for this purpose. The point I would wish to labour, and 
one to which I shall.return in a later context, is the point just made 
that healing doBS not entail the "integration" of previously unacceptable 
ideas into the continuing anticipatory Self, rather it means their final 
definitive exclusion from the continuing Self and their release, together 
with their associated memories, into the more or less accessible store 
represented by the total idea-complex of the Self in the mind-manifold. 
Models of the mind - and I am thinking of Sung’s in pafcticular - which 
are not able to accommodate this sharp and important distinction are 
liable to lead to serious misapprehensions.
The Growth of the Self
An account of the process by which the adult personality 
grows to maturity and of the problems of sincerity and 
authenticity wHich emerge in the process.
There is simplicity in children's reactions, mainly because the 
roles they adopt are of relatively short span. To be a good child 
is to adopt the immediate behaviour which pleases the grown-ups around; 
and as a child one may do this simply because one loves them and wants 
to please them, or simply because one is afraid. At another moment one 
may rebel because one is being frustrated by the grown-ups and is angry 
with them, hates them; or else because one is &o longer sufficiently 
afraid and thinks one can get away with it. bJhile a child is loving he 
is very loving, while he is hating he is very hating, and he does not
bother about trying to reconcile the two in some longer term consistency. 
Because he is one thing at a time and is not trying to remember one
plan while he adopts another, and because the range of possibilities he
is dealing with is so greatly restricted by the shortness of the span 
over which he is looking, questions of integrity hardly arise. There 
is thus a genuine innocence about childhood which is reflected in the 
directness of the works of art which children produce.
This innocence is not lost with the establishment of a continuing,
anticipatory SbIT. Children commonly produce good naive works of art 
up to the age of eight or ten, long after the emergence of the Ego- 
Ideal. What then happens eventually to destroy simplicity? The answer 
seems to be: the increasing possibility of alternative choices. The 
"shades of the prison house" which close, as Wordsworth complained, 
around the growing boy, are shades of complexity and calculation that 
come with longer spans of thought. We have already noted the immense 
complexity of alternatives to which a situation of sequential choice 
can give rise. The initial idea of the Self as good child is sufficient 
to carry a child through early years within the protection and certainty 
of the family, providing a core of coherence round which ’
personality is gradually built up. Through this he can elaborate in 
exchanges with people and things in the environment his initial under­
standing of the world; but it is nevertheless not enough to enable him 
to deal with a wider world.
In this early phase a child passes through a great wave of learning, 
concerned primarily with two kinds of knowledge: first of people and 
relationships within the family or its analogue; and secondly of the 
means of learning and communicating - that is, of language itself. By 
the age of six or eight, however, a child is usually beginning to come 
into effective contact with the outside world, and by eight his powers 
of language acquisition are already falling fast: never again \ will he 
acquire a mother tongue. As school age, or its equivalent, approaches, 
a child in almost any society begins to become personally aware of a 
great many more people and ideas, both in his own experience and (at , •
least in some environments) through media such a3 books and films and 
television programmes. Most of all he is likely to become aware of a
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peer group of other children of the same age who remain a strong 
influence throughout the middle years of childhood. At the core of him 
there remains the plan of the good child, which was always his own plan, 
ev/en though in elaborating it he might be guided, encouraged, driven 
by the surrounding adults - and even though he might fail to carry it 
out: for a small child*s naughtiness is essentially, to use an ancient 
word, concupiscence, the pursuit of incoherent short terra desires, not 
pride, the adoption of sorae long terra counter-plan. Wow, however, he 
may find that his peer group defines for him a different plan which is 
hard to reconcile with his first identity. The range of his knowledge, 
his capabilities and his purposive activities is rapidly extended and, 
with this extension, situations are constantly arising in which the 
limited central plan of the good child does not give sufficient 
guidance. He extends it therefore by taking models for imitation - 
older or more dominant children, teachers, heroes from books or the 
television screen, even the original psrent-figures. For it is only 
at this later stage - again in the normal case - that a child will 
become, if he can, proud of his parents or parent-substitutes in 
relation to other people, identifying himself consciously with thsm and 
taking them as models for imitation in defining his own plans and his 
own identity, (it must be remembered that performing a plan that 
pleases people is not the same as imitating them).
It is thus not unreasonable as a generalisation3' to describe the 
whole period of middle childhood and early adolescence as one of
learning and of borrowed identities. The child is trying on all kinds
of plans, not in a random way because they have to be accommodated 
somehow to the identity built up in his early years, but as it were 
experimentally, with a readiness to discard plans as easily as he 
tries on new ones, and with a certain licence from society, which doss 
not yet hold him fully responsible for what he does. In this phase 
the direct simplicity of the small child tends to be last. His 
identity is extended, but to a large extent with borrowed and fluctuating 
plumage; and the consequent*loss of first hand authenticity is reflected 
in the works of art produced at this age. The poem which follows,
written by a child of nine, shows something of the transition from the
1. Indeed it is generally accepted doctrine. See e.g. Erikson^ 
”Childhood and Society”.
first state to the second:
0 garden sweet with scent of roses 
And flowers of every hue,
Where the great red poppy grows 
And mignonette grows too.
Go away weBds 
Ids don*t want you 
To choke the poppies 
And cornflowers blue.
Varied sweet william 
Grows just here 
By the brook 
So clear, so clear.
Green leaved ferns 
Live by the brook 
And maks it a fairyland 
In a book.
There are different voices here. The first verse has a rather grown-up 
air; the second has more of the directness and vividness of a child's 
own reactions; the last two give a more uncertain sound; and the final 
line shows why - the fairyland comes from a book. The whole is a 
mixture of the authentic and the second-hand.
When an adolescent becomes an adult, usually with some formal change 
of status, he finds himself thenceforward held responsible for his actions 
and in particular for maintaining in good faith and consistency the 
major roles which he has adopted. He is expected to stick to longer 
term social roles which are coherent with each other and to carry out 
the obligations which they ent&il. This is necessary because, as we 
have already seen, good faith in the carrying out of obligations is the 
warp and weft of human society. And there goes with this need a social 
regard for sincerity, which is essentially the characteristic of a man 
who is to be relied upon because he is acting in a role that fits into 
a plan fully adopted as part of his continuing Self, and fully coherent 
with it. The effect of sincerity is simply that a man's plan in adopting 
a role, and consequently his motives, whether of desire or of aversion, 
for carrying it out, are what they seem to be; otherwise that his actions 
are not the expression of some hidden plan, related to hidden motives.
It follows that there can be two kinds of insincerity, the first that 
of the Plachiavel, where concealment is conscious and deliberate, and the
second - which can be distinguished as inauthenticity - that of the 
neurotic, where it is due to a flaw in the anticipatory Self, a lack 
of inner coherence which means that a man cannot do what he intends 
with conviction because there is some deeper allegiance within himself 
that pulls him away from it, or towards something else that is 
inconsistent with it*
The consolidation of the Self at this stage represents the 
emergence of the adult personality* Inevitably this personality is 
shaped to a considerable extent, in its constituents even if not in 
the more idiosyncratic whole, by the social environment in which the 
man or woman has grown up* It is hardly surprising that initially the 
personality is often insecure and variable, nor that conflict may 
develop between the need for coherence and the roles which society 
offers or demands* Integrity requires that a man should adopt plans 
and roles that are consistent with each other, compatible with the 
state and nature of his physical body, and feasible in the circumstances 
of his life - though ultimately there can be situations in which it 
requires the sacrifice of life itself* As this implies, however, if a 
man is to maintain his integrity in all circumstances, he needs to have 
an idea of himself which is clear enough to enable him to know in all 
circumstances what course is consistent with his ’trud* Self and what 
course is not. But we know that this is often not the case. Hamlet 
might have agreed with the advice of Polonius to Laertes nto thine own 
self be true”; but, as the whole play shows, this was not for him a 
simple matter* The problems and difficulties of being true to oneself 
arise partly because a man*s governing plans are inevitably generalised 
in nature and can be worked out in particular detail only as his life 
unfolds; and as the detail is worked out inconsistencies and conflicts 
can appear between plans which in the brood were compatible enough. 
Moreover, as life unfolds, new purposes and new plans develop whose 
implications for the integrity of the continuing Self are not always 
immediately evident* More subtly and fundamentally a man may not be 
able in a particular situation to identify any clear structure of the 
Self which is relevant in the circumstances, or, if there is one, it 
may seem to him or to others false or insincere - not the real man*
If the others around him continually reject, brutally or (as is more
often the case) subtly and even without being consciously aware of what 
they are doing, his own idea of himself, he can be placed in a despp:ate 
situation. ' -
It is useful hero to distinguish the physical plans from therrest.
By physical plans I am referring to those which are associated with the 
needs and capabilities of a person's own body. This is like other 
bodies but none the less unique - not only in its own precise details,,* 
but more particularly in its unique trajectory through space and time, 
leading through situations which are different from all others (at least 
in their details) and which in their succession build up a history that 
is cumulatively still more unique. From the point of view of identifying 
the authentic idea of the Self, however, what matters is not so much 
the uniqueness or otherwise of the plans associated with a given body, 
but their necessity. For certain purposes the existence of a given 
body with a given history restricts sharply the plans which it is open 
to a man to adopt, and gives a certain inescapable authenticity to those 
which he does adopt. If I was crippled in a certain way with polio 
in my youth, I will be confined to a wheelchair and my physical plans 
will be restricted accordingly; the wheel chair man is then in relevant 
perspectives my ’real Self; there is no choice and so no question of 
doubt.
Up to a point the same kind of argument can be used in relation 
to personal plans and social roles. If I am an Englishman brought up 
in England and speaking only English as my mother tongue, there will be 
various things about me that are inescapably conditioned by these 
circumstances, and which, being inescapable, are in a simple way 
authentic. With an adult in a modern Western society this argument 
does not reach very far; there remains an enormous range of possibility 
over which I have to decide myself who I am to be. Here the distinction 
drawn earlier between personal plans and social roles is important.
A plan is a pattern of behaviour leading the Self positively along a 
path towards a goal image or negatively away from an aversionnlmage — 
though the goal may be remote or even timeless, as when it takes the 
form of being like a particular hero figure. The anticipatory Self is V 
built up of personal plans, and preponderantly these are of the positive, 
not the negative, kind. Social roles, by contrast, are patterns of
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behaviour which represent the appropriate poles of particular social 
relationships. A particular situation in a particular society offers 
only a limited number of social roles and may require* under penalty, 
that given roles be adopted in the interests of the coherence and 
persistence of the society itself. A particular individual lives in. 
a particular place and time and has to imagine and adopt his personal 
plans within the range of what is conceivable and possible in that place 
and time; and his personal plans are bound to embrace a great number and 
variety of social roles.
If some or many of these are obnoxious to his continuing Self and 
adopted only under compulsion he can still up to a point retain his 
integrity if he is clear about this himself and frank about it to others.
He may be unhappy but he will not be insincere. But this is true only up 
to a point; if the plan adopted under, compulsion is fundamentally conjyya^ 
dictory, rather than merely obnoxious, to his continuing Self, and in 
particular if it has effects on others which are incompatible with what 
can rightly be called his honour, then integrity is inevitably sacrificed. 
If he deceives others about it, he will be insincere in the Machiavel's 
mode. But it can often happen that he is at odds within himself about 
it, and hence insincere in the neurotic's mode. Every society and every 
thought community within a society uill have its own values endorsing 
and requiring certain roles and frowning upon others; and there is 
likely to be some coherence between these general values and the patterns 
in which children are brought up, so that in a stable, unchanging society 
the core of the continuing Self tends to be relatively well adapted to 
the requirements of the environment in which the individual Is to live*
In growing up ws all of us have to lose the naive integrity of the small 
child, but even so there are adults who somehow retain all their lives a 
kind of primal integrity growing straight out of their childhood.
These are cases where a person's governing plans have effectively been 
defined without conflict by the society in which he has groun up. They 
are so totally enclosing and unreilective as to be beyond question and 
beyond choice. He makes decisions and adopts a variety of plans as he 
pursues his life, but the enclosing framework of his Self is given and 
linked to the framework of the social environment, which in turn is ,
accepted just as the facts and necessities of nature are accepted.
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In his admirable book ”Sincereity and Authenticity”1 the late 
Professor Lionel Trilling makes the remark that me cannot say of the 
Patriarch Abraham that he was a sincere man; the question of sincerity 
can hardly arise with such a figure. Again he suggests that it would 
be absurd to undertake an assessment of the sincerity of that epitome 
of grief, Wordsworth’s ’’flichael”, the old shepherd whose son was drawn 
away to the city and destroyed by its corruption; the old man continues 
to work on slowly by himself at the sheepfold which he and his son had 
begun together;
and *tis believed by all 
That many and many a day he thither went 
And never lifted up a single stone.
In either case the man’s integrity is beyond our questioning because 
there is so much of inevitability about it. Far it would not conceivably 
be in character for Abraham to sneak off with a few camels for a tour 
of the fleshpots of Egypt; nor can we conceive that old Michael is putting
on an act; the wound is deep in his fundamental being, it is irremediable
whbW'-s • . • ' •' * ,K
and wo know it, as he knows it (even though perhaps, in a sceptical - ^
modern way, we may wonder whether he is not sometimes a little aware 
„ of the figure he is cutting before„bis neighbours). There is an 
important sense in which it can be true of people in simple societies 
and small groups, as it is of children, that there is no choice or 
ambiguity about their governing plans or their understanding and inter­
pretation of the world around them - and this not because they are 
compelled by exterior force (though compulsion there may be) but 
because that is the way in which they have grown.
The distinction with which we are concerned is akin to that which
was drawn by William Games, following Francis Id. Newman, between the
once-born and the twice-born. ' The possibility of the once-born type 
of natural unreflective integrity in an adult however is usually 
dependent on the existence of an unquestioned social framework with given 
rales and a given understanding of the world. These conditions are 
more likely to be found in a tribal society or, within a more complex 
society, in a sub-system which reproduces something of the settled scheme 
of things that might be expected in an ageless tribal framework. It
1. Oxford paperback edition with corrections, 1974.
2. ’’Varieties of Religious Experience” 1902. Longmans Green
edition 1947, pp. 79 ff.
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has been argued that packets of rural society in England beSore 1914, 
for example, have sometimes afforded conditions of this kind. Such 
natural integrity, however, becomes a rarer flower when great social 
changes take place over a short span of'time, so that the environment 
in which a man grew up has much less relevance or appropriateness to 
the world in which Mir edislt life is lived; as it does in any case when 
society grows more complex, social mobility increases, and correspondingly 
. the range of possible roles and the, scope for ambiguity in relationships^, 
is increased, nan begin to wear masks and then, with an access of self- 
consciousness, to wonder who thBy are and which mask fits them best. Often 
they find no answer.
The Achievement of Authenticity: A Historical Excursus
An attempt to indicate in the broadest terms how, since 
prs-classical times, human sensibility has evolved in 
relation to the search for sincerity and authenticity, in 
the countries of the West.
There is a historical perspective to bis question and we shall 
need to give this some separate consideration, though I shall be able 
to provide no more than a few scattered generalisations rather than a 
systematic review. Different historical situations lead to different 
^problems and different patterns of integrity. It is in a world far 
removed from Abraham1s, one that has known capisivity by the waters of 
Babylon, that thB psalmist cries: ”Lo, thou requirest truth in the 
inward parts; and shalt make me to understand wisdom secretly...
Hake me a clean heart Q God; and renew a right spirit within me...
0 give me the comfort of thy help again; and stablish me with thp 
free Spirit.” Uar, captivity, trade and the growth of empires put an 
end to the isolation of nomadic and village communities, and thereby, 
in some degree, to the simplicities of the patterns of the Self available 
to men. In the classical world and in the world of the Now Testament 
we are dealing already with camplbx'Societies, criss-crossed with the' ’ ^  
^survival of age-old ways and imperatives, sometimes rural and pastoppl^..^ 
sometimes military and heroic. In the funeral oration of Pericles a 
questioning self-consciousness is strikingly extended beyond the 
individual to the nation, seeking out a justification for the policies
of Athens not simply in the magnification of the city»s power or its 
Gods, but in terms of its virtuous role in the world: 11 our city is an 
education to Greece”.
After classical times the Dark Ages swept some of this complexity 
of consciousness away, but in time a new complexity developed within 
the framework of mediaeval Christianity and feudalism. Yet is is 
important that mediaeval Christendom, though far from being a tribal 
society, remained a world with a fixed and given frame, in which peoplev 
were born into their station within a strict social hierarchy, and 
broadly were held to it; in which the Church provided all the explanations 
and there was no serious questioning of the conceptual system by means 
of which she enabled people to come to terms with the world. The rules 
of social hierarchy and theological commandment were constantly being 
broken; but by and large even those who broke them did not much question 1 
their legitimacy, the necessity for ”degree”, or the real danger of 
hell-fire. And as a generalisation it is not unfair to say that 
mediaeval people tended to be unreflectively themselves. They had no 
lack of character or individuality, as ”The Canterbury Tales”, for 
example, so vividly demonstrate, but the fremework of mediaeval society 
left little room for questioning or ambiguity in relation to their 
governing plans and roles. The faces in mediaeval pictures reflect 
this; a picture is first of ell af a king and only secondarily of a 
differentiated individual. It is with the Renaissance that we find the 
development of a self-conscious Interest In the individual person and 
his possibilities; and this is expressed In a new kind of portraiture 
of extraordinary power.
The Renaissance found its origin in the rediscovery of a lost ' 
ancient world, and this was matched by the discovery of new worlds over­
seas and an increase in wealth and the scope for social mobility at 
home. These new frontiers lay beyond the mediaeval framework of 
understanding and they led to an enormous enlargement of possibility.
But they led also to the loss of old certainties. There was a new sense 
of the great potentialities of man, of man as the measure of all things, 
but also a new sense of men as an actor with multiple roles and 
uncertain identity, no longer sure where he was going or who he was.
As Trilling emphasises, ,?the sixteenth century was preoccupied to an 
extreme degrea with dissimulation, feigning and pretence**. ’I am not 
what I am* could have been said not alone by Iago but by a multitude 
of ShakGcpeare’s virtuous characters at some point in their careers*”
The man of the Renaissance still expressed themselves largely in Christian 
categories? but faith uas no longer inevitable* The attitude of educated 
people to religion had become ambiguous, aware of alternatives, 
searching for new answers both within the Church and without* looking’ 
for means of expressing the new consciousness of the individual.
Stoicism* a philosophy of solf-disciplins and self-cultivation* exerted 
a widespread attraction* Fien were fascinated by the heroic ideal* the 
cult of the great man* but at the same time, with good reason* sceptical 
of it. The idea that greatness, achievement, the full development of 
a nan’s own potentialities* is its own moral justification begins to 
emerge, for instance in flarlows, or in such a Shakespearean character 
as flacboth. But it was never developed* For as the claims of religion 
became less dominating, those of the social order grew stronger*
This was the ago in which the modern nation stats began to emerge 
as a developed social order centred on a sovereign* It was the age 
which produced in such as flachiavolli,and later, as tho nations became 
more established, in Hobbes* Grotius, Locke and their successors the 
first great modern theorists of the state and of sovereignty. The 
feature that draws our attention in the present context is their 
elaboration of the claims of society on man# flschiavelli begins not 
from the nature of man, or God’s purpose for him, as a mediaeval writer 
might have done, but from the given existence and necessity of the state, 
and his concern is essentially with how strong and effective government 
is to be established and maintained# To quota 3ohn Plamenatz, nhe 
approved most strongly the moral qualities that make political societies
2
free and strong, and individuals enterprising, bold and public spirited” ? 
deceit for him was contemptible if it arose from cowardice or muddle, 
but not if it represented a bold stratagem adopted for a desirable end. 
Those of Bacon’s essays which deal with morality and practical state­
craft reflect an essentially similar view - no doubt in port derived from 
flschiavelli*
X* Op# cit* p. lo*
2. ”Man and Society” (Longman’s 1963), Vol. 1, p. 31#
This is not the place to attempt an analysis of the way in which 
these .ideas developed over the years? but it may suffice to suggest 
that with the consolidation of the modern European state came the 
consolidation of a conventional morality, endorsed by established 
religion but rooted more fundamentally in the maintenace of an accepted 
social order. This is not to say that it was a false morality; it 
has already been argued that any system of relationships must enshrine 
values of its own and some tension between individual values and those 
of society is inevitable. Mor was it static; there were differences 
in different countries, and uithin each country there were changes 
over time. But everywhere it reflected the acceptance of a more or 
less stratified society and the importance of knowing and accepting 
your station.
This was no reversion to thejtiddla Ages. It is significant tha!^^ 
the problems of the individual seeking his individual integrity and 
identity within the given order were the recurrent theme of the great 
writers of the French "Grand Si^cle". But integrity was not to be 
divorced from the conventional code of honour. The tragic conflict of 
passion with honour and duty is characteristic of Racine and Corneille.
By contrast La Rochefoucauld is concerned to show up continually the 
underlying baseness and self-seeking of human beings actldg apparently 
generous and honourable roles. The exposure and^anunciation of 
hypocrisy is characteristic of the century and in particular of its 
greatest comic writer, Moliere. This kind of exposure and denunciation, 
as we find it in "Tartuffe", is in a fundamental way a defence of the 
social order, expressing the requirement of society that men should not 
only act their proper roles but do ad with integrity and conviction.
The hypocrite is potentially subversive of established values, and 
the satire of the "Grand Si^cle" is generally directed to seeking out 
the crannies of deception and self-deception in human nature, with a 
view not to questioning the existing code but to exposing departures 
from it and helping or compelling men to be honest in their adherence 
to it. This task could be pursued in a sympathetic as well as a 
mocking vein, as it was most notably in the case of floliere’s most 
famous character, Alceste in "Le Misanthrope", a profound study of the 
difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, of ever achieving true honesty
in a human social environment.
By the middle of the 18th Century, though the framework of 
conventional society and conventional morality was more strongly 
established than ever, it was increasingly felt as a constricting cage 
within which it was impossible to be sincere. Things began to break.
The hallmark of classical art is the capacity to achieve Integrity and 
power of expression within the rales of a common and Indeed conventional 
language. But the language had begun to seem dry and the expression 
trivial. In art the dams were first breached by the German Sturm und 
Drang, soon followed by the flood tide of Romanticism. In politics 
the French Revolution and the Revolutionary Wars created a great divide; 
they swept awy for ever the certainty and assurance of the old order, 
even in countries where the old order survived or was in some degree 
restored. In morals the integrity of what Trilling calls the honest 
soul, the "honnete homme", straightforwardly at home within the old 
order, was replaced - not altogether but to a significant extent - by 
the sincerity of the anguished or defiant individual. There were 
attempts to create a new conventional morality of the revolutionary era, 
drawing on Rousseau and the stoic virtues of an idealised Republican 
Rome. These attempts, which we associate with the names of Robespierre 
and David, failed to take root, but they were followed by persistent 
further attempts throughout the 19th Century and after, by socialists 
and revolutionaries of every type, to generate a revolutionary 
consciousness within which individual sincerity could march with the 
full assertion of the valuss of a new social order. Marx argued that?
the actual individual man must... in his individual work and 
individual relationships become a species being; man must 
recognise his own forces as social forces, organise them, and thus 
no longer separate social forces from himself in the form -of - 
political forces. Only when this has been achieved will human 
emancipation be completed.^*
In parallel a variety of attempts were made to purge and revitalise 
the traditional order, by harking back to an idealised Middle Ages, 
by turning to evangelistic religion, by developing the utilitarian ethic 
But nowhere did it prove possible to build a new moral and social order,
1. Quoted in D. McLellan "Marx" (Fontana 1975), p. 30.
either revolutionary or traditional, which men would take for granted, 
and within which a classical art could take root and grow. "Once-born" . 
individuals there were; but the art which has been most influential and 
has seemed to strike the widest response in every national culture has 
tended, since the first outbreak of the Sturm und Drang and the later 
works of Mozart, to be that which reflects the individual’s attempts 
to build his own integrity out of the material - or the ruins - of his 
own life.
Often indeed the subject is not so much the positive attempt to 
build a new individual coherence as a rejection - regretful or scornful, 
cold or passionately hating - of the accepted ethos of wholeness 
altogether, and a dasparate turning to authentic feeling wherever it 
leads, however much it fragments and destroys the personality. Trilling 
has analysed this process with.percipience. He draws attention to 
Diderot’s remarkable dialogue "Le Neveu de Rameau", perhaps the first 
open confrontation of the "honest soul" and the "disintegrated 
consciousness", and to Hegel’s equally remarkable discussion of this 
work, in which he argues that the disintegrated consciousness, 
abdicating integral selfhood, is a means of advancing Spirit to’h 
higher level of conscious life". RamGau in the dialogue, like the hero 
of "The Sorrows of Young Uerther", does not personally reject the 
accepted "noble" ethos of society, he simply cannot^live it. Later, 
from Shelley and De Sade to I\!ietzsch8, Baudelaire, Rimband, .Kafka,' 
Lawrence, Beckett, Sartre, and many others, the rejection may be far 
more violent. The pressures of society and morality are sensed as 
tending constantly towards the creation of a false person, made out 
of other people, not the real Self at all* The social roles, in our 
terminology, take over the personal plans. But the alternative is 
seldom another, more authentic, coherent person, it is a fragmented 
Self whose authenticity is bought at the price of disintegration and 
ultimately perhaps self-destruction. The search for authenticity 
leads easily to a cult of sensation or of strong feeling for its own 
sake, since in passion and sensation a man can experience a real, 
though fleeting, unity of mind. We may recall the revolutionary 
Decoud in Conrad’s "Nostroma" of whom the narrator sayss "He had 
recognised no otherairtue than intelligence and had erected passions 
into duties".
The most sustained attempt to develop the idea that a man’s self- 
fulfilment is its own justification was made by Goethe in "Faust’’, 
which occupied him at intervals for almost all of his long life. But 
Faust, a somewhat neurotic representative Han, in effect maintains 
the coherence of his personality only by ceaseless desire and activity:
Ein jed’ Geltrst ergriff ich bei den Haaren 
Ich habe nur gewunscht and nur vollbracht 
And abermals gewunscht, und so mit Macht 
Hein Leben durcphgestifrmt.^ *
Once the figure of Gare, creeping through the keyhole, is able to reach 
him he is destroyed. In a Prologue and an Epilogue in Heaven an explicit 
attempt is made to justify Faust as "a good man in his dark striving” 
who, in spite of his crimes, at least never stopped trying. His ultimate 
redemption is shown as occurring through the intervention of the 
"e^ ’ternal feminine” (in the shape of Gretchen with three female
. $ l/\ *
penitents led by Hary Magdalene making their a/pplications to the 
Mother of God); but that conclusion is singularly unconvincing, 
essentially because it represents redemption without repentance by r;,
Faust himself.
England escaped revolution or invasion during the Napoleonic 
period and, as Trilling suggests, the solidity of the old order of 
society may in general have been stronger than it Was in most parts 
of the Continent, so that it was perhaps more often possible to,achieve 
the old-fashioned kind of sincerity growing from simple acceptance of 
one’s place in an accepted world — that is, to be a character after 
the fashion of one of Dickens’ worthies. He points out that in England 
one major novelist, Oane Austen, stood firmly for the sincerity, 
morality and truth that can be grown in a world accepting traditional 
values in a conventional way* Even in the early 20th Century this
line finds a late, uneasy prophet in Rudyard Ki/pling (an admirer, as
" 2.might be expected, of Dane Austen) and a mourner in Yeats* * But the 
counter-current flowed too through 19th Century England and 
increasingly became dominant; while on the Continent, from the 
Revolutionary Wars onwards, even the traditionalists Were self-conscious 
ideological rebuilders, not the simple inheritors and sanctifiers of a
1. t have grasped every pleasure by the hair; I have desired and 
achieved and desired again, and so I have stormed through my 
life.
2. Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold...
The ceremony of innocence is drowned*
settled tradition
The hundred years or so from Wiatzsche to the painter Francis Bacon 
have seen a continual intensification of the expression of man’s 
alienation from himself and increasingly despairing attempts to overcome 
it. The Rilke of the Duino Elegies is characteristic in this respects
Und wir: Zuschauer, immer, uberall,
"" dem alien zugewandt, und nie hinaus!
tins uberftillts. Wir ordnens. Es 2erfallt.
Wir ordnens uiedar und zerfalien sslbst!^
Characteristic also is the Eliot of MThe Waste Land”, with its famous 
epitomising lines
These fragments I have shored against my ruins.
The scream of the expressionist, the nausea of the existentialist, the 
taste of dust and ashes that is so pervasive in the early Eliot, in 
Greene and UJaugh and Hemingway, all are reflections of this situation.
Its persistence as a major preoccupation over several centuries, and 
the rising pitch of hysteria with which it is liable to be expressed, 
are remarkable phenomena and suggest strongly that, although there have 
been many prescriptions - moral, political, aesthetic or religious — 
against this sickness, so far no lasting cure has been found. Yet there 
is often a sense that this anguish cannot be altogether in vain. 
Fundamentally the point is Hegel’s, that disintegration is a necessary 
price for advance to a higher level of consciousness.
Throughout his work Rilke shouB a nostalgia for the once-born, 
for simple being. He develops a sort of iconography of those who 
come near to escaping what Ifolderlin called the law of succession and 
thereby seems to reach a pinnacle of being: the child, the lover, the 
acrobat, the hero, the mourner. But man can never quite achieve, let 
alone rest in, the perfect moment, he cannot quite combine being and 
consciousness. Rilke turns from his nostalgia to develop the alternative 
that man’s task is essentially to grasp the world and become conscious of
1, And we: spectators, always, everywhere,
Turned towards the all, but never out beyond!
It fills us to overflowing. We order it. It falls apart.
We order it again and fall apart ourselves!
of It uith intensity. Every age* he says* has its “disinherited ones” 
to whom neither the past belongs nor yet the immediate world? 'but.our 
task is not to try to escape our tribulations, following the cheap 
distractions of the market place, but to face and accept them with joy 
and praise;
Sie abcr sind ja 
#nser wlntsrwahriges Leub, unser 'dunkeles. Sinngrun,
■^ ine der Zeiten des heimliehen 3ahres nicht nur - 
Zeit —* sind Stelle, Siedlung, Lager, Boden, Wohnort. *
In his recoil from the inauthentic he shows his affinities with the 
existentialists* But this is still not much more than a courageous 
gesture. Rilke does not tell a man how to establish his true Self? 
nor indeed tan any of the poets and artists take us far along this road 
They describe or express the sickness - and they seem in no doubt that 
it is a sickness - but they do not offer a cure.
Botes ; The foregoing can claim to be no more than a broad, 
illustrative sketch. I have drawn examples from the history ; 
of ideas and from literature* But a similar evolution of 
sensibility can be traced in all the other arts. Perhaps it 
Is clearest in architecture, the art form most directly related 
to human living. The Middle Ages sau? an efflorescence of great 
architecture in an evolving but coherent style, for the most 
part by anonymous architects, and directed to the glory of God 
and the service of the Church* At the Renaissance there was a 
shift towards secular buildings and the expression of 
individual personality, especially that of great and dominant 
people — in Italian palezzi, in French Renaissance chateaux, 
in the “prodigy houses’1 of Elizabethan England, like the 
Hardwick Hall of Bess of Hardwick. The classical languago of 
architecture was rediscovered and although it was spoken at 
first uith some strange inflexions, at least In countries at 
a distance from Italy, in due course a coherent, though again 
steadily evolving, classicism, reflecting a formal social 
order, established itself in different local varieties across 
Europe. This provided a language of splendour for palaces and . 
cathedrals but also a civilised vernacular for humbler purposes. 
By the beginning of the 19th Century, however, some men were 
finding such a stylo inadequate for what they wanted to 
express. They looked for something more exotic in which to 
reflect their romantic natures, turning to Cathay or Morocco
1. They
Are our winter foliage, our dark thought-evergreen,
One of the seasons of the hidden year - not only 
Season - our point, position, ground and dwelling jSace*
or ancient Egypt or a revived Gothiciem for inspiration. An 
earnest and in part successful attempt was made to speak a 
coherent and evolving Gothic language again, but this was 
applicable only In the limited corner ofylifo now remaining 
to the Church. The classical tradition^.,meanwhile lived on - 
in England till the.1840s, in parts of the Continent much 
longer — only to give way ultimately to individualism, eclect­
icism and fancy dress; a capitalist individualism reflecting 
powar and energy but often at the core an Individualism 
alienated, not securely at home in the world. In the twenties 
and thirties of the 20th Century a new style began to emerge, 
one that seemed perhaps capable of becoming the true evolving 
architectural language of the machine age. But its development 
was halting and slow; a comparison with the amazingly rapid 
early evolution of the Gothic style, once the language of the 
pointed arch and vault had bean invented, provides an instructive 
contrast. And after making a certain amount of progress the 
style began by the late 1960s.to fall apart* Instead of a 
steady evolution architecture seemed to move by waves offashion, 
made passible by photography^which rapidly exhausted themselves, 
like the short-lived but world-wide epidemic of matchbox slabs 
in the 1950s. The public themselves bscame disaffected to a 
remarkable extent from the ruling stylo, but could only 
express their revolt by turning to the sometimes undiscriminating 
preservation of all things old* The revulsion was perhaps 
mainly against an industrial society of vest organisations 
reflected all too faithfully in its building artefacts. But a 
significant element in it may perhaps have been due to the 
availability of means of unlimited reproduction - photographs 
in this instance - which in any art can easily load to the 
dominance of fashion as against the slow evolution of a general 
language which each artist speaks with his own individual 
accent. The resulting inauthsnticity is not that of a false, 
deceiving identity, but rather that of a collective, anonymous 
identity within which the Individual feels that his Self cannot 
be expressed at any deeper level and within which in consequence 
he docs not feel at home. The converse of this trouble arises 
when the artist, as perhaps happens more often in the fields of 
painting and music, finding no language available in which he 
can express himself authentically, proceeds to invent his own — 
necessarily on Instrument of limited vocabulary by comparison 
with any developed language of art, and one which members of 
the public anyway may not easily bo persuaded to bother to 
learn. '
The Psychology of Wholeness (l)
The concepts of mental illness and mental health as they 
relate to the coherence of the idea of the Self.
Perhaps then we should turn to the doctors. Alienation oaed to be 
a name for madness. Modern psychiatric medicine Is rooted in the
conception of madness as a mental illness affecting the integration of 
the mind, and of the doctor’s task as that of restoring mental health, 
or wholeness* Its tradition goes back to the work of Charcot at the 
SalpStriere on dissociated personalities, and to that of his most 
famous pupil, Freud. Freud did not discover the existence of unconscious 
mental activity, but lie develnoed for the first time techniques for 
exploring and mapping the unconscious, for identifying sources of con­
flict in the mind and for bringing what had been hidden to the surface 
in order to make possible its reintegration with the conscious mind.
His work has proved perhaps more relevant to the troubles of the 
alienated neurotic personality than to the extremities of the madhouse, 
and from an early stage it was seized upon by writers and artists also 
preoccupied from a different angle with the conflicts of the mind. The 
theory of the Id, the Ego and the Super-Ego gave a new expression to 
the problems of the disintegrated consciousness and the honest soul, 
new ways of identifying and investigating failures of sincerity or 
authenticity; and Freud’s emphasis on the central importance of sex 
pointed to new patterns of wholeness to which the individual could 
aspire.
It has been said that for Freud a person’s degree of mental health*.*,, 
was to be measured by his or her ability to live in civilisation with 
the minimum of unhappiness or the maximum of gratification; and his 
objective criteria of measurement were the ability to work and the full 
development of genital sexuality. But these are limited end relative . 
measures. In a certain sense Freud denied the possibility of wholeness. 
Hot only is there an inevitable conflict between the pleasure seeking 
of the Id and the requirements of society, but society has a protagonist 
within the gates of personality itself in the Super-Ego, a protagonist 
moreover who isf distinguished by cruelty and malevolence. For FrGud 
there does not seem to be any such thing as a single Self, there io 
no question of trying to achieve a closer approximation to some real 
authentic person who is there in potentiality, only a question of 
achieving the best ad hoc accommodation of conflicting elements with 
which to cope with a hard and tragic world. In a strange way the persons 
with whom he is dealing are not whole human beings, but those sub—
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personalities, the Super-Ego, the Ego and the Id* and these in turn are
but channels of expression for the fundamental insticts Eros and the
death instict. Of the Id he says that it "cannot say what it wants; it
has achieved no unity of will”.3’* But the Id nonetheless has strong
multiple wills and the Ego is conceived in relation to it, to use Freud's
own simile, as a man on horseback, a separate personality in touch with
the external world as the Id is not, trying to control and guide the Id;
while the Super-Ego is conceived as the "harsh taskmaster" of the Ego*
"The Ego develops from perceiving instincts to controlling them, from
obeying instincts to curbing them. In this achievement a large share
is taken by the Ego-Ideal, which indeed is partly a reaction formation
against the instinctual processes In the Id. Psycho-analysis is an
instrument to enable the Ego to push its conquest of the Id further 
2.
still." It is perhaps fair to say that forF^eud the true Self is 
the Ego, but the ego has no special identity, it evolves ad hoc as in 
effect the interface between an inner instinctual world and external 
Mality, and the inner world will always continue to be populated by 
the multiple wills, or "object cathexes" of the Id and the separate 
personality of the Super-Ego, with its own separate roots in the Id,
as well as the Ego itself.
Freud uses a very different model from the one developed in this . ( 
study, and it is a model which does not lend itself easily to our 
present purpose of trying to identify an "own Self" to which, following, 
Polonius, we can be true. The underlying image Is that of a container 
within which there wells up a flow of blind instinctual energy, either 
libidinal or destructive. This energy has a sort of inherent directional 
urge towards appropriate objects in the external world, but can only 
make its way towards them through the interface of the Ego which channels
the flow according to its perception of external reality, and subject to
the interference of the Super-Ego, which .is itself powered by deflected , 
streams of the same origin. Ulhat is desirable is simply to achieve 
an'adjustment to reality which permits the maximum Qnobstructed flow 
of instinctual energy. The Super-Ego has a function in this - though 
one which is often carried out with crude insensitivity - because it 
is a force which approximately reflects the interests of society, and
1. "The Ego and the Id" (Hogarth Press 1949) p. 87.
2. Ibid. p. 82.
so also the long term interests of the individual, as against the 
ruthless short term egoism of the Id* Freud’s isocount remains a 
brilliant speculation which opened up important new territory for 
investigation, but his model seems to me to be ultimately unworkable, 
mainly because there is no clear distinction between the sources of 
energy, the roles, and the personalities or sub-personalities which 
act the roles. This is reflected in the lack of a clear distinction, 
g^t'vl.east in “The Ego and the Id”, between the Ego-Ideal and the Super—-®:5 
Egos elsewhere^* Freud refers to the second as the ’’vehicle” of the 
first, but the implications of this arc not.worked out, nor, to my mind, 
could they be in terms of the model.
The Psychology of Wholeness (2)
A discussion of the views of 3ung, particularly in
relation to the integration of the ’’Shadow”.
In contrast to Freud, 3ung laid emphasis on the unity or potential 
unity of the psyche. The underlying image with which he works is still 
by implication that of a sort of container within which the psychic 
energy or libido wells up. There are three levels within the container, 
that of the conscious ego, that of the personal unconscious and that 
of the collective unconscious, and at this lowest level the container 
opens into the limitless sea of the collective experience of the race* 
The psychic energy is in part channelled into the conscious activities 
of the ego or the personal but this inevitably involves the differential 
development of some elements of the individual’s potentiality and the 
repression of other opposed elements, which form the ’’shadow". There 
is a law of opposites whereby the more one side of a man is developed 
in his conscious life, the more the opposing side of his nature gains 
strength in his unconscious.
The persona is the mack, "the individual’s system of adaptation 
to, or the manner he assumes in dealing with, the world... One could 
say with a little exaggeration that the persona is that which in 
reality one is not, but which oneself as well as others thinks one is."
1. "New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis" (Hogarth Press)
4th impression 1949, p. 88.
The conscious ego includes not merely the persona but also other 
elements of the Self brought into consciousness. It does not however 
correspond to the true Self, since this
"is a quantity that is suporordinate to the conscious ego.
It embraces not only the conscious but the unconscious psychs"; 
and
. "however much we make conscious, there will always exist an 
indeterminate and indeterminable amount of unconscious 
material which belongs to ths totality of the Self."
"The Self is not only the centre but also the whole 
circumference which embraces both consciousness and unconscious; 
it is the centre of this totality just as the ego is the centre 
of the conscious mind."i*
Beyond this, however, the Self is also the most central of the Archetypes 
Each of these "is an irrepresentable unconscious pre-existent-form that 
seems to be part of the inherited structure of the psychs... The 
archetype underlies the feeling-toned complexes and shares their : 
autonomy." The archetype of the Self coincides with God’s image, from 
which it cannot be distinguished empirically. "One can then explain 
tha God-imago... as a reflection of the Self, or conversely explain the 
Self as an imago Dei in man."^*
The persona is not ths true individual. In order to realise the
true individual it is necessary to bring out repressed elements of the
psyche and integrate them with the conscious elements; and this in
turn can only be achieved through an upheaval, often of shattering impact 
which involves the sacrifice of the "differentiated function" and the 
establishment of the "transcendent function", bringing about a free 
equilibrium of forces that reconciles the opposites. The means of 
reconciling them.are provided by the archetypal symbols which emerge 
from the collective unconscious, and in particular by the archetype 
of the Self. The latter can find expression in symbols of many kibds, 
but does so typically in the concentrically arranged figures known as 
mandalas.
The whole process is that of individuation, defined as "the process
2 .
of forming and specialising the individual nature." ' It leads to a
1. Definitions from various of Dung’s works and quoted in the 
glossary to "Memories, Dreams, Reflections" (Fontana Edition
■ '1967)..,
2. ’Psychological Types" (Kegan Paul 1946) p.561.
sense of reconciliation and acceptance: ”It is as if the leadership of
the affairs of life had gone over to an invisible centre.,, and there
is a release from compulsion and impossible responsibility”.1* Bung 
emphasises in “Psychological Types” that:
the saving factor is the symbol which is able to reconcile 
the conscious with the unconscious and embrace them both...
The synthetic method develops the symbolic phantasies 
resulting from the libido which is introverted through 
sacrifice. Out of this development a new attitude to the
whole arises whose very difference generates a new potential.
This transition to a new attitude I have termed a transcendent 
function.* .
Bung is very much aware, however, of the problem with which we 
have been concerned of the adjustment of the Self to society. Referring 
to the emergence of previously repressed material into consciousness, 
he says;
Wow berein lies the danger that the very forms with which 
these things reappear, as well as their new and wonderful 
brilliance, may so intrigue the individual that he either 
forgets or repudiates all former values... This reversal 
of values is -tantamount to a destruction of previously 
accepted values; hence it resmbles the devastation of a country 
by floods... When, in spite of all, the reconciliation of 
the pairs of opposites transpires as a force ma.ieure, the 
danger of inundation and disintegration necessarily follows, 
and in £.~p&§isMcrly characteristic way, since the dangerous 
eaunter^fendsncies get smuggled in under the cloak of 
correct ideas... Under no circumstances can individuation 
Pe the unique goal of psychological education. Before ■
individuation can be taken for a goal the educational aim of 
adaptation to the necessary minimum of collective standards 
^ must first be attained. A plant which is to be brought to %C 
the fullest unfolding of its particular character must first'";;::^  
of all be able to grow in the soil wherein it is planted...
The opposition to the collective norm however is only 
apparent, since on ’closer examination the individual standpoint 
is found to be differently orientated but not antagonistic to 
the collective norm. The individual way can nevor be actually 
opposed to the collective norm because the opposite to the 
latter could only be a contrary norm. But the individual way 
is never a norm. A norm arises out of the totality of 
individual ways... ^Individuation/ though certainly concerned 
with the individual bypath/ precisely on that account also 
needs the norm for its orientation towards society and for 
the vitally necessary solidarity of the individual with 
society. Hence individuation leads to a natural appreciation 
of the collective norm, whereas to an exclusively collective
1. “The Secret of the Golden Flower” quoted in Fordham "An 
Introduction to Bung’s Psychology” (Penguin 1953).
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orientation to life the norm becomes increasingly superfluous; 
whereupon real morality /said elsewhere to be dependent on 
freedom^ goes to pieces.**
3ung is clearly c ncerned, much more than Freud, with the discovery 
and expression of a truly unified Self. The aim of therapy is not simply 
to remove obstructions to the free discharge of instinctual energy, 
but rather to achieve a free equilibrium of forces, appropriate to the 
individual and taking account of his natural endowment as a human typer 
(whether he is introverted, for example, or extraverted), an 
equilibrium that bubbles gently, as it were, in the container, and can 
be maintained without intolerable effort and repression. This idea 
may have some affinity, as Dr* Anthony Starr has claimed, with the 
concept of a homeostatic, self-regulating system, though it is to my 
mind a cloudy affinity, not supported by any detailed model. The 
equilibrium of forces, uhich involves interchange with the external 
world and consequently some adjustment to the "collective norm” of 
society, defines in effect the circumference of the Self; but its inner 
nature and form can be expressed only by an archetypal image which is 
also, as we have seen, a divine image.
dung is a considerable figure, a man of many important insights*
But I find myself thoroughly uncomfortable with his basic model and 
his terminology. His model is an elaborate one, but it seems to lack 
the precision of "clear and distinct ideas”. He says that an archetype 
is "irrepresentable", yet in the same sentence claims that it can 
"manifest itself anywhere". His concept of the Self as archetype seems 
at one point to come close to what in another context might be called 
the Holy Spirit; but at a second point it appears to represent, more 
conventionally, the totality of the conscious and unconscious contents 
of the mind; and the quasi-identity of these two concepts seems to me 
to be unconvincingly presented os an assertion rather than as the 
outcome of analysis and argument.
Sung’s concept of the Shadow as a relatively autonomous splinter 
personality, built up of elements which are repressed from consciousness 
because they are incompatible with the conscious persona or ego, is an 
interesting one; but I am far from convinced that chese repressed
1.*. / Quotations from "BsyclTological T y p e s , ' G  _ Baytre^eggjX
..Paul) 1-946 impression.
elements in fact normally coalesce into a coherent Shadow personality, 
even though this may indeed happen in some cases. To treat R.L. 
Stevenson’s creation 3ekyll and Hyde as in any sense a prototypical 
pattern of human psychology, as at least one Oungian has done , seems 
to me totally unjustified. Since Freud opened up the field of the 
unconscious, it has been common ground among all who accept the 
general validity of "depth psychology” that to bring repressed elements 
into the light of consciousness may be the means of achieving a new 
integration of the personality; and Sung's insight into the relevance 
of symbols in this context seems to me important. But he does not offer 
any precise model of what is integrated or how; and his theory that the 
achievement of wholeness requires in some sense the integration of the 
Shadow, and thus of evil tendencies with the good, represents to my 
mind a dangerous half-truth which leads 3ung and many of his followers 
astray.
I have already indicated in the section on "The Origins of.
Neurotic Stress” the way in which I would translate this problem into 
the terms of my own model. In particular I have emphasised the argument 
that psychological healing does not entail the "integration” of 
previously unacceptable plans into the structure of the anticipatory Self, 
but rather their final definitive exclusion from this continuing, reacting 
Self to which, in a submerged way, they have previously been attached, 
and their release into the more or less accessible store which is the 
total idea-complex of the Self in the mind-manifold. Sung's accoupt^gf 
’individuation” does not accommodate this distinction. According to 
him the repressed contents, including the darker elements of the shadow 
side of the personality, are brought into consciousness, transformed in 
some sense by being placed in a different perspective, and integrated 
in a new equilibrium, with the aid, it may be, of an appropriate emergent 
symbol. "Historical Christian psychology”, said 3ung, "thinks rather 
of suppression of evil than of a complexio boni et mali. Thus alchemy 
tried the idea of a certain transformation of evil with a view to. Its 
future integration." * And Bung, the conscious successor of the 
alchemists, sought a similar theoretical conjunction of the opposites, 
an attempt in which, to my mind, he failed as decisively as the
1. 3ohn A. Sanford in "Evils the Shadow Side of Reality" (New Yorks
Crossroad 1981).
2. Letters 2 p. 401, quoted by 3ohn A. Sanford in "Evils the Shadow
Side of Reality" (New York; Crossroad 1981).
alchemists themsleves.
It is no doubt a 6air criticism of traditional morality that it
tended to look for the suppression of unacceptable tendencies by
harnessing the brute force of the super-ego; but it is not an
improvement on the traditional view to justify individuation in a form
which brings good and evil into a sort of balance. Jung’s clinging to
this concept of integration led him into some of his odder theological
views* including the view that the Trinity should be replaced by a
Quaternity* It also underlies his rejection of Augustine’s view of
evil as a privatio boni to which I have referred earlier. * The root
of this attitude is to be found in Jung’s sense* on the face of it
reasonable* that the traditional Christian ideal of trying to achieve
perfection and to be conformed to Christ is quite impossible and leads 
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only to hypocrisy. * But Jung, with all his clouds of argument* was 
never able to square this circle* to make clear sense of his idea of 
the Self as an ’’unfathomable union of opposites’5.
My contention here, contrasting with his, is that ths only continuing 
pattern of the Self is the anticipatory Self, which is of its nature a 
kind of aspiration never quite embodied .in actuality. To grow in 
health involves, an a Christian view, the purification of this Self of 
aspiration, bringing it closer into conformity with the Christ ideal and 
with the inner ideal of the good child, trusting, loving and loved. But 
the actual manifestations of the Self as Ego from minute to minute are 
always comrpomises between the aspirations of the anticipatory Self (at 
the best of times an imperfectly integrated structure) and the reality -
not only the reality of the environment, but also the reality of the
total accumulated idea-complex of the Self, built up as a store of 
experience over the whole of•the individual’s lifetime, as this is 
expressed in the emotions generated from it in particular contingencies.
1. See p. 272 above. See also in this connection John A. Sanford,
op.cit. Sanford, a convinced Jungian, develops a confcfcast between 
the ethic of Jesus and the ethic of Paul which represents, in my 
view, a travesty of the teaching of both. Ho makes Jesus out to 
be a Jungien who teaches the recognition and acceptance of the 
Shadow as part of the integratad individual, and Paul, that great 
critic of the Law, to be a legalist imposing a standard ethic by 
collective authority. On the question of the privatio boni, however, 
Sanford argues effectively that Jung was in the wrong and misunder­
stood Augustine’s argument. I think that fundamentally Bung was
making the logical error of failing to distinguish a negative from 
a contrary. Evil is the negative, not the polar opposite, of good. 
The distinction corresponds to that between all the directions that
are not North and therefore lead away from the North and the one
direction which is ths contrary of North, namely South.
The issue which arises here is important, because on this point I . 
am at odds not only with Jung, but also, when allowance is made for 
differences of terminology, with more or less all the current schools 
of humanist psychology and psychotherapy. The disagreement is partly 
on a technicality; it could be argued that what Jung describes as the 
transformation of the previously repressed material and its subsequent 
integration corresponds to what I call its definitive exclusion from 
the anticipatory Self and its release into the accessible general store 
of the.total idea-complex of ths Self. If that argument is accepted, 
then all I have done is to develop a clearer and sharper interpretation 
of what happens, and there is no irreconcilable conflict. Jung’s 
"individuation” corresponds then, in my terms, to a reorganisation of 
the anticipatory Self in such a way as to eliminate contradictions and 
improve the integration of the structure. But even if this is conceded 
there is nevertheless a deeper disagreement, which arises on the moral, 
rather than the psychological, level.
The issuo can be crystallised in the question; What is health (or 
wholeness)? If we straightforwardly interpret moral good in a man as . 
good will and moral evil as ill will, the will to harm others, does 
wholeness lie in a complexio boni et mali» a well-balanced integration 
of good and bad elements, of benevolence and aggression, of self- 
transcen<ling and self-assertivs tendencies (to borrow Koostler’s terms)?
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Or does-It lie In such a purification of the anticipatory Self that 
the bad elements are eliminated, that there is no ill will left, that 
the self-assertive tendencies become identified with the self- 
^transcending tendencies (which is not the same thing -as their beings 
suppressed)?
On one point we can be agreed straight away. Psychological 
healing, as we normally encounter it, seldom goes beyond a better 
integration of benevolent and aggressive elements. Frequently it 
involves digging out and expressing all sorts of negative feelings - 
resentment, jealousy, hatred, fear and so on — which have been deftied 
and repressed in earlier years* But the modern psychotherapist is not
2.(p*310) From the introduction to "Psychology and Alchemy”; Jung’s
Selected Writings, ed. Anthony Storr (Fontana 1983) p. 271.
ordinarily trying to abolish such feelings. The last thing he wants is 
more repression and he is much more likely to encourage their open 
acknowledgement and adoption* What is more, my own arguments have 
suggested that it is necessary at the oedipal stage to internalise elements 
of aggression and incorporate them in the anticipatory Self, as the price 
of establishing the child as Independent individual; It seems 
unrealistic to imagine that it is either possible or desirable at a later 
stage to manage altogether without the will to do harm to others.
This I accept so far as it goes® But I would argue that it still 
leaves us without any firm psychological basis for morality. A man is 
relatively whole if his aggression and ill will aro out in the open, 
understood and relevant to the world in which he finds himself, rather 
than buried and distorted, working through the unconscious, growing out 
of long past situations, not the present world. Again he is relatively 
wholo If thereby ha is enabled to adjust himself to his environment, 
reducing to a minimum the conflict and stress within himself and 
releasing his aggression in ways which go with the grain of the social 
order and bring him success within it rather than failure. But is 
this goodness? Is this wholeness? Is this the moral idea by which we 
should be guided?
I believe the answer is no, This flawed ideal, this relative 
integration incorporating elements of malevolence into a more or less 
balanced whole, is not to be scorned. It is usually the best men can 
aspire to; and at hts highest it can be a heroic ideal in pursuit of 
which a man may lay down his life for his tribe. But it is intrinsically 
flawed, it represents always an accommodation with evil, it never can 
be an integral expression of love. It cannot ever be regarded as the 
"real" Self to be achieved through therapy or any other means; it is 
just another, even if perhaps better, version of the anticipatory 
Serf.
Yet is anything else possible? It is my contention that there is 
an alternative which is the ideal expressed by the life of Jesus, the 
man for others, the ideal of the saint. This is probably never 
attainable for more than a very small fraction of mankind, and even by 
them, I suspect, only fitfully in times of grace, not as a personal
possession or permanent achievement. Nevertheless I believe this is the 
only true wholeness, the only true Self, the ideal which puts all human 
strivings into perspective. It is in a sense unnatural, because it 
involves going back beyond original sin - beyond the oedipal assumption 
of aggression into the Self - to the image of God in man. It is not 
the adoption of a rigid plan of virtue enforced by a fierce super—ago, 
it is a retrieval of innocence and joy, the plan of the good child.
In the last analysis it is not to be distinguished from uhst Jesus was 
constantly preaching, thB coming of his Father’s Kingdom.
This theme I shall develop, in its psychological aspects, in part 
of the next chapter. Meanwhile I turn my attention to one further method 
of conceiving the whole man which should not be left out of account.
The Psychology of Wholeness (3)
A brief consideration of the relevance of the work of
psychologists concerned with the measurement of
behavioural traits, in particular Raymond 3. Cattell.
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I have suggested that the anticipatory Self is a matter of 
aspiration rather than actuality; the actual manifestations of the Self 
which we recognise from>minute to minute are compromises that emerge 
at the interface between the anticipatory Self and the surrounding real 
world. These successive Selves are always'unique to the moment, each is 
different from those that come before and those that follow after. Yet 
in a sense they represent the actual man much mors closely than his 
continuing aspirations, and it could be argued that the right way to 
reach the actual man is to work out a sort of average of the features 
which distinguish his successive actual manifestations. After all 
that is precisely what we do in everyday life when we form our own 
estimates of other people and how they are likely to behave, tie can 
even apply a similar technique to ourselves, as when we fill in the 
questionnaires that certain psychologists lay before us.
The definition of the personality by some such method of 
measuring and averaging the ad hoc manifestations of the individual 
has indeed bean the preoccupation of a major school of psychologists
today. In contradistinction to Freud and Jung and their followers they 
are concerned with the classification and measurement of personality 
in ways which may possibly.owe something to Jung’s theory of 
psychological types, but which trace their own descent from Galton, 
Spearman and Thorndike* With the aid of a battery of tests, measuring 
a person’s score in a considerable variety of dimensions, such as those 
of introversian-extraversian, anxiety, pugnacity. Intelligence or 
ego-strength, a profile of the personality is obtained, which may be 
compared with the set of raeasurements which a tailor takes when he is 
cutting a suit. But whereas the tailor’s measurements can be 
systematically related together to create the unique form which is the 
suit, matching the man, the psychologist’s measurements cannot; and it 
is much to be doubted whether they are sufficiently comparable entities 
ever to be made commensurable in this way. While these techniques may 
have a good deal of practical value, particularly in relation to 
specific problems of adjustment to the social environment, they have 
little to tell us about the inner nature or form of the Self.
Professor Raymond B. Cattell, a leading representative of this 
school, says very candidly;
A trait... is not something existing in a person; it 13 a 
concept and a measurement derived from his relations with 
the environment. From another aspect behavioural traits 
are the necessary negotiations or compromises between the 
physiological demands of the organism on the one hand and 
the physical and social demands of the environment on the
other... If the reader asks what has happened to the soul
one reply would be that the modern psychologist is as afraid 
of mentioning the word in public as a Victorian curate might 
have been of mentioning sexual intercourse. Each is showing 
respect for something a little outside his area of special­
isation, yet in neither case can it be ignored... As we
reach the rather cloiidyheights of such concepts as ’adjust­
ment* and ’integration*, and try to put them into measurement 
form, we realise that we ore approaching the neighbourhood 
f of what has intuitively been called the soul. !w*
Professor Cattail does not rule out the possibility of ultimately 
measuring the soul, as he calls it, with the aid of concepts and 
mathematical models more sophisticated than those at present available; 
but he recognises that this is still a long way off• He continues;
Essentially we mean by a well-integrated man ons whose various 
purposes cohere in a single harmonious life goal... The 
concept is hard to get Into measurement form because what 
'interferes* depends so much on individual values. By values 
we mean the social, artistic, moral and other standards which 
the individual would like others and himself to follow. Most
value attitudes are found embedded in the self-sentiment and
super-ego structures. The calculation of the degree of 
integration present in the individual's values is a social 
calculation, as well as an individual one, for it requires us 
- to find out how well society would do with various combinations ^  
of values; and this is something for the future.-"^*
In this passage Professor Cattell goes some way towards defining from a 
different angle tf approach the problems which we have been examining 
in this study; but he does not take us any further towards solving them
and I doubt whether any of the test battery psychologists can do so*
In our present context there is clearly more relevance in 3ung's 
consideration of the need to reconcile the emerging individuated Self 
and the "collective norm”. However it does not seem to me that Jung, 
even in his later works, ever successfully came to terms with the problem 
of what should happen when we cannot accept the collective norm, otherwise 
the laws and customs of our society; or the problem of how we should 
decide whether the collective norm with which we ere faced Is one which 
we ought to accept, and to which therefore our Selves should be 
adjusted, or one which we ought to resist. And, although I cannot claim 
a detailed acquaintance with all their work, it seems to me that the 
same comment can probably be made about the general theoretical ideas 
of other distinguished therapists such as Carl Rogers and George Kelly.
A doctor's job is essentially to restore us to "fitness", appropriateness, 
for living in the world in which we find ourselves and so to produce 
well-adjusted people, life do not expect him to do more, and are perhaps 
rightly inclined to feel a bit suspicious if he claims or sets out to 
do more. Yet the world in which we live extends into the future and 
includes the potential as well as §he actual. Too close on adjustment 
to an existing state of affairs could leave a man dangerously ill- 
adjusted to possible change. But if possible change is to be token 
into account, it is necessary also to consider what a man can and ought 
to do bimslef, not merely in order to adjust to changed circumstances,
1. "The Scientific Analysis of Personality” (Penguin 1965) p.263-4*
but also to impose change on the environment to match existing or 
potential patterns in himself. In the last analysis therefore, as 
3ung would prouo^x/ have agreed, it is impossible to separate 
altogether the psychiatrist's task of bringing his patient to fitne 
for the world from the moralist's task of deciding on much more 
absolute grounds what kind of world ought to be brought about, and 
how individuals ought to behave.
V: PATTERNS OF THE IDEA OF THE SELF
A Review
A section in which I take stock of the position we have 
now reached and set a new course.
liie have been trying to achieve some understanding of the nature of 
psychological health or wholeness and of how it can be pursued and 
achieved. The conclusions to which we have been led so far imply that 
we shall not be able to find answers to our questions within the strict 
confines of psychiatric medicine, nor of science itself, nor even of 
analytic philosophy, tie need to identify some principle or principles 
of value such as science of its nature cannot provide, and which must 
therefore eventually be adopted as an assumption, on some kind of faith. 
This brings us to a kind of impasse in which it is necessary to 
consider carefully where our argument has been leading us, and what 
objective we can reasonably set ourselves.
It may be sensible to begin with a brief recapitulation of some 
of the principal steps through which the argument has taken us. tie 
began by considering the organism as a self-regulating system and 
developed a model exhibiting, as the basic elements of this system's 
purposive activity, individual steps of predication. In each of these 
steps a subject form, recognised synchronically, is related in diachronic 
historic time to a predicate form, and these predications are integrated 
into purposive cycles through which the system articulates possibilities 
and arrives at decisions. The forms which are brought io a focus 
of relationship in the successive contingencies of consciousness are 
derived on the one hand from the unceasing input of the senses and on 
the other hand from the reflections and' reverberations evoked by these 
stimuli in the context of the moment across the immense internal system 
of the mind-manifold.
This manifold, it has been suggested, is ordered in two ways, 
under the markers of a sort of flexible space—time map of the world 
and history as understood by the organism in its lifetime to date, 
and under markers of classification by all the codes and languages,
including perceptual and verbal codes, acquired in this experience.
Mot everything that a man perceives is recognised, not everything 
recognised is retained, and even that which is retained is subject to 
the decay of memory. Nevertheless there is built up in the mind- 
manifold a highly detailed record both of the,environment in which a 
man has lived and also, Within this environment, of his own pest 
development and activities, an image of his own Self whibh can bs 
grasped from different angles as his biological Self, his behavioural 
Self, and his psychological Self. This growing record of biological, 
behavioural and psychological man we have described as the idea of 
the Self, the dominating feature of the mind-manifold, a feature of 
such vast complexity that only small fractions of the whole, or vastly 
generalised impressions of larger aspects of it,, can be brought to 
focus at one time.
One part of the idea of tha Self is the anticipatory Self, 
consisting of those personal plans adopted by psychological man which 
at any given time have not yet run their course, but stretch out into 
the future, often the indefinite future, and so constrain directly the 
regulating decisions which the individual takfes as he works through 
the purposive cycles of his consciousness. Each decision is related 
to the particular aspect or face which the anticipatory Self presents 
in the perspective formed by the ideas and impressions spreading across 
the mind in the sequence of predications momentarily focussed into 
consciousness; for a decision amounts to the adoption of a personal 
plan which is then grafted for good or ill on to ths idea of the Self. 
However the choice between possibilities is determined not simply by 
the logical compatibility of the plan with the relevant aspect of the 
anticipatory Self; ultimately it is determined by the emotional tides 
generated across the manifold by the associations of the different 
possible plans as they interact with those of the anticipatory Self. 
These associations make their impact simultaneously and collectively, 
without individually emerging into consciousness, but it is they that 
bring emotional colour and intensity into the experience, ihe strong 
desires and aversions uhich thGy generate can simply overcome the pull 
of the anticipatory Self, while in other cases the dissonances they 
evoke within the anticipatory Self may lead to confusion and malaise.
In the attempt to understand those processes uo have tried to give 
an account of thB origins of the anticipatory Self in the continuation 
of the plan of the good child who responds to the approval Or disapproval 
of parent figures; and thereafter to give an account of the way in which 
the pattern of the individual Self develops upon this core through 
continuous interaction, first with the family, then with people in a 
wider world, and all the tirna with the values of a given society. In 
this fashion we arrive at two complementary concepts, that of the good 
person and that of the mentally whole person, of sincerity and authenticity. 
The good person, in making his decisions, follows with courage and 
integrity the long term plans of his anticipatory Self; he is not led 
astray by the pull of incoherent desires or aversions, nor does he 
build himself up in false images of pride. The mentally whole person 
is one whoso anticipatory Self is coherently constructed on the true 
foundation of the good child, not confused by unresolved identifications, 
introjections and projections, but united in a loving relationship with 
parent figures and ultimately with other people; a Self whose 
succeeding plans adopted in elaboration and extension of the original, 
are compatible with each other and do not give rise to hidden faults 
and tensions in the structure.
So far as sincerity is concerned, we recognise that there is nothing 
to stop a person abandoning a given plan and substituting for it a 
different and quite incompatible one, so long as other people era not 
concerned; but if they are, he has obligations to them arising out of 
his necessary social role of man of good faith, which he cannot 
unilaterally repudiate without moral fault. These are the obligations 
of honour which help to maintain integrity. Situations can arise in 
which a man cannot avoid adopting one or another of two plans which 
are in conflict, and this means abandoning the other in betrayal, It 
may be, of other people to whom he is committed. In such cases tho 
plan of longer span will normally have priority; and coherent 
hierarchical arrangement of plans can help to reduce the likelihood 
of conflict. But when such conflict occurs, even if it is unavoidable, 
a fault emerges in a man’s integrity; and if a man io pulled hither and 
thither by his dssires without any set frame of consistency, these 
faults can only be multiplied.
L So far as authenticity is concerned, it is evident that anguish, 
paralysis of will and mental breakdown can follow if the plans which a 
person consciously adopts are too much at odds with the deeper layers 
of the anticipatory Self uhich do not emerge into explicit consciousness 
but powerfully affect the emotional tides of personality. Logically 
there can be no way out of this dilemma except either to adopt conscious 
plans which conform to the underlying pattern of the idea of the Self, 
rather than to the requirements of soc5.ety, honour, other people; or 
else to undertake some radical transformation which digs out what was 
repressed and makes it possible to abandon or reconcile the buried 
dissonant and irrelevant plans, leaving as the anticipatory Self an 
integrated hierarchy of conscious personal plans that fits Into the 
existing world. The first is the way of "I’homme revolts”, the rebel, 
the bohemian, the artist for art’s sake, ths existentialist, all those 
who try to achieve authenticity in despite of the conventional values of 
society. The second is the way of ths patient who undergoes analytic 
treatment in the hopo of understanding and accepting himself and finding 
a now pattern of "individuation” which will be adjustable to the 
’’collective norm"; or of the Marxist who tries to become a "specibs- 
being”, denying or in some way eliminating all the elements of himself 
that are at odds with the collective norm established by the vanguard 
of the proletariat.
The first way tends to lead towards the "disintegrated consciousness” 
and sometimes to crime (as with Faust) rather than to a new developed 
coherence of the Self; while the second, even if successful in digging 
out what was repressed, runs into the problem of deciding what kind of 
society is both good and feasible, and so worth being adjusted to. Ths 
second way also runs into further problems, whatever the norms which may 
be chosen, when it comes to deciding how the individual is to deal with 
the previously buried and dissonant plans of the "shadow” Self (to use 
3ung’s terminology). Tho cartharsis of recognising and expressing what 
was previously buried can often bo beneficial in itself, making it possible 
to abandon or reconcile much of this material; but the type of 
psychology that seeks to accept, integrate and by implication to approve 
all sorts of conventionally unacceptable plans is liable to load back to 
a doctrine of cultivated swlf-indulgence and anarchism that is in practice
dangerous and self-defeating.
In short the Ideas wo have been developing provide some means of 
describing where we stand end so of diagnosing our condition. They 
are insufficient to provide us. with the further guidance we need in 
order to lead our lives. Nevertheless they do perhaps provide some 
pointers which are worth following up. The most important of these is 
that our argument already rests upon one arbitrary assumption which comes 
so naturally that we are hardly aware of it - namely that survival is 
good and we are in favour of it; and correspondingly that we are in favour 
of health, which reflects full development, and of moral wholeness or 
coherence, which makes for efficient regulation and so for the survival 
of the organism. There is no way however in which we can prove that 
.this .assumption is justified•'in anyfc.absolute sense. When we examina 
it we find it full of ambiguity.
At a first glance it might seem that in attaching ourselves to 
this principle we are at the least placing at the centre of our Judgements 
a life force which is inescapable, expressing itself in the. mysterious 
but certainly elemental drive of evolution. But to espouse the drive 
of evolution does not get us very far. To begin with, the evolutionary 
struggle for survival takes place at several levels. Some have argued 
that tho underlying struggle for survival is that of individual genes*'; 
but it can hardly bs denied that it also takes place at the level of 
the organism and at the level of the social group; and in reaching 
moral judgements of any kind it rnakss an enormous difference to which 
level you give the priority; The principle of reverence for life to 
which many people may bs drawn, and which is associated, for example* 
with Buddhism and with the views of Christians such as Albert Schseiizer, 
is directly in conflict with the drive of evolution; for evolution, 
however Its mechanisms are understood, has no regard for the less fit 
individuals or theJass fit species.
Sometimes it is persuasively arguod that with the advent of 
civilisation end the consequent accumulation of knowledge from 
generation to generation, the competitive forces of the evolutionary . 
struggle have been replaced by the immensely more rapid evolution of
1* Cf. Richard Dawkins "The Selfish Gens” (kford) 1975.
human civilisation, involving as it doss competition between ideas and 
cultural patterns rather than between races or individuals; ultimately, 
it is suggested, this offers the prospect of some degree of conscious 
human control over the development of the planet's affairs. This 
argument has force; but in no way does it bring us nearer to solving 
the problem, it only makes a solution more urgent.
Yet, in spite of all these complications, us have to return to 
some form of humanism, that is to say, some value system which favours 
the fullest possible realisation of individual human potentialities*
This is essentially because there is no positive alternative; the only 
conceivable alternatives are negative, arbitrary and destructive,,, and 
therefore cannot form the basis of any coherent value system. They 
cannot do so for precisely the same reasons as made it Impossible, as 
us saw, for the values of the bad child to form ths basis of a coherent, 
developing personality. Nihilism is not a philosophy, it is an anti­
philosophy. LJhat does not make for coherence makes for disruption or 
corruption ~ words which define evil in all its negativity. In St. 
Augustine's words, IJJf evils cause no damage to anything they are not 
evils; if they do damage something they diminish its goodness ... and 
if they seiallou it up altogether nothing of its nature is left to ba
damaged. And so there will bs no evil by which it can be damaged since
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there is then no nature left fihose goodness any damage can diminish.11 
The basic trouble about this world is that what makes for coherence in 
one direction is all too liable to do so at the price of disruption in 
another direction.
If we can accept, then, that we have to begin from the standpoint 
of humanism, ue find our ideas moving in one of four possible directions, 
depending on the priorities we determine -directions which we can label 
as those of the species-bsing, of the free individual, of the great man 
and, finally and paradoxically, of the man of sacrifice, otherwise tho 
man for others. 1 do not argue that there aro only four possible 
solutions to the problem of human values; rather that no totally 
satisfactory solution has ever been found, but every attempt to create 
a coherent system of values - that 'is to say every cohorent moral
1. "Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum" I 4 f, quoted by
C.vG. 3ung in "Aion".
philosophy, and ©very universal religion —  tends to develop in one of 
those four directions* Sometimes the attempt is mads to develop in 
more than one direction ot once; but this inevitably exacts a price 
in terms of incoherence.
Accordingly in the first of the four following sections I will 
examine briefly the Implications of the concepts of the species-being, 
the free individual and the great man; while in the second and third I 
will turn to the concept of the man for others, which is the Christian 
concept* In the fourth section, under the heeding of "Saints end Heroes1*, 
I will consider how these contrasting concepts in practice affect human 
lives and human societies. Ssfcre proceeding, however, I need perhaps 
to devote a few words to explaining what I am trying to do in all this,
and how it is relevant to the central theme of my study.
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I said in the preface that I would not approach the problem of 
the Self with definitions and philosophical argument; rather I would 
adopt the approach of a descriptive, phenomenalist psychology, describing 
in as comprehensive a way as possible what happens in consciousness and 
so observing where and how the Self emerges. Along this path I have.. 
come to describe the idea-complex of the Self in the mind-manifold, 
and how the anticipatory Self emerges in different contingencies of 
life in different aspects or profiles which are major determinants of 
the individual's decisions. In looking more closely at the 
anticipatory Self I have been trying to work out how if brings a 
degree of coherence into its decisions; and this has led to the 
suggestion that the idea of the.Self will tend to be shaped, 
consciously or unconsciously, by a humanistic value system falling 
basically in one of four categories, each of which I have identified 
by a particular model or type of man. I am concerned, however, not 
merely, to describe how the pattern of an idea of the Self emerges, but 
also - a much mare important question in rGal life - to decide how we 
are to identify the real, the true, tho authentic idea of the Self, 
that is, the pattern by which the individual's decisions rightly ought, 
to be determined, by contrast with the false, inauthentic profiles which 
all too often show themselves. Again my abject is to proceed, not by 
a priori philosophical argument, but rather by trying to find ways of
identifying and describing a true Self as it emerges, in contrast to 
false selves, to recognise Its hallmarks, to define its idiosyncrasy - 
and style. The final two sections of this chapter will be devoted to 
this perhaps somewhat unusual enterprise.
Three Currents of Humanism
A brief discussion of three possible ways of interpreting 
the humanistic principle of self-realisation ~ the model of 
the species-being, the model of the free individual and -v 
the model of the great man.
If we are looking for the fullest possible realisation of individual 
potentialities, we are likely to turn first to the assumption that 
society ought to be organised for the greatest good of the greatest 
number and that to the extent possible the pattern of individual selves 
should be adjusted to make them well adapted for this. If as many 
people as possible are to achieve as many of their desires as possible, 
a coherent social order is needed and hence a considerable degree of 
uniformity over basic values? when this is not the case, one individual's 
achievement will all too often be at the expense of another's. The 
society has to be of an appropriately egalitarian kind, but, given this, 
the individual ought to conform to it and the efforts of parents, 
educators, rulers and doctors should be directed to enabling him to do 
sc without alienation or insincerity.
It will be evident that the logic of this tendency can ultimately 
be a totalitarian one, at least in the hands of ideologues who consider 
that they know what form the society should take and how it should be
brought into being. For Marx the solution is in
"the formation of a class in civil society that is not
a class of civil society, of a social group that is the 
dissolution of all social groups, of a sphere that has 
a universal character bscauso of its universal sufferings 
and lays claim to no particular right, because it is the 
object of no particular injustice but of injustice in 
general. This class can no longer lay claim to a
historical status but only to a human one. It is, 
finally, a sphere that cannot emancipate itself without 
emancipating these other spheres themselves. In a word, 
it is the complete loss of humanity and thus can only 
recover itself by a complete redemption of humanity.
Ihis dissolution of society, as a particular class, is 
ths proletariat.•
1. "Dautsch-franzosische Oahrbucher" quoted in David McLollan
"Marx” (Fontana 1975) p. 32*
This eloquent passage has a curious ring of Pauline Christianity about it} 
but Marx looks for redemption to a collectivity, a class hypostasised,' 
that bears the universal sufferings of mankind and thereby in its final 
exaltation emancipates all mankind; whereas the Christian.looks to sn ■ 
individual, sacrificed and redeeming, with whom each man, accepting his 
own sin and responsibility, has individually to be joined. The root of 
the difference between them is that the Christian accepts his share of 
responsibility for the sin and miseries of the world and is redeemed by 
dying to his old Self.and being individually reborn; while the Marxist 
regards evil as the responsibility of other classes, not his own; for 
him redemption is to be achieved through the triumph of the collective 
proletariat.
The second direction in which our minds can move is the one adapted 
by people who consider that all alienation and inaut'nenticity are due 
to the constrictions imposed by society and the family. The individuals 
are not mad or bad, it is madness and badness in society and the family 
that makes them so. IJhat is needed is to set man free. The logic of 
this tendency is ultimately anarchistic and it is one that is reflected 
in the inclination of some psychiatrists to regard the attempt to make 
the individual well adjusted, in the sense that he is able to conform 
to the expectations of society and the family, as a betrayal of his true 
inner needs and indeed a cause of madness. It is rare to find anyone 
who consciously takes such views to their logical extreme. But in the 
permissive society of today, as the barriers of convention crumble, ..the 
influence of this ethic of "self-determination” is extremely widespread; 
and it leads increasingly to a world of isolated, atomic individuals, 
with commitments to each other which are no more than matters of temporary 
convenience, as each does his or her own thing. There may be no lack of 
cant about caring, sharing and loving, but the commitment is strictly 
limited; the selfish need or want has the overriding claim.
The dangerous implications of this type of ethic when taken to an 
extreme were described with characteristic vehemence by Dostoyevsky in 
"The Brothers Karamazovns
Uhat is the outcome of this right of multiplication of needs?
Among the rich isolation and spiritual suicide and among the
par envy and murder, for they have been given the rights but 
have not been shown the means of-satisfying their needs,..
Today eu»rv/noo is still striving to keep his individuality 
as far aparv as possible, everyone still wishes to experience 
the fulness of life in himself alone, and yet instead of 
achieving the fullness of life, all his efforts merely lead 
to the fullness of self-destruction, for instead of full self- 
realisation they relapse into complete isolation*
This was written a century ago* One wonders what Dostoyevsky would.have 
had to say about the world of the rich fantasised in modern television 
sagas like “Dallas” and "Dynasty”•
In more recent times such ideas as "self-realisation", "self- 
actu&lisation", "self-mobilisation” and "personal growth" have been 
associated with the school of so-called humanistic psychology, which has 
flourished especially in the United States. This school has given rise 
to a proliferation of systems of therapy, life enhancement, creativity, 
personality development and counselling of many shades and varieties*
As means of helping people to face their problems and to accept the 
need for change, some of these techniques have proved their worth, 
and through their application a large amount of valuable clinical 
experience has been accumulated. But it is not always recognised that, 
as they, are usually presented, they tend to express and support a whole 
system of implied values which ore largely unexamined. These under­
lying theoretical presuppositions, reflecting a remarkably optimistic 
and permissive view of human nature, are far from strongly establishedj 
and in this context it is a fair point to make that the protagonists 
of self-realisation do not appear so far to have produced any theory 
of what they mean by the self that is remotely adequate in philosophical 
or scientific terms.
These issues have not often come sharply to attention, no doubt 
because the ideology is generally more implicit than explicit, and 
tends anyway to mirror the ethos of age (which it has done a good deal
to shape). But it has not boon without its critics and I would dray
attention here to a forceful polemic against humanistic psychology by 
Dr. Paul C. Vitz entitled "Psychology as Religion: the Cult of Self 
Worship".’1” Dr. Vitz is a Professor of Psychology at New York
1. Lion Publishing 1979 (U.S. Edition 1977).«
University and he writes, as it were, from within the establishment,
having himself at one time taught the doctrines which he now criticises*
In his book he focusses initially on four high priests of the movement, 
Carl Rogers, Abraham flaslou, Rollo Ray and Erich Fromm, but he goes on 
fcto develop a more wide-ranging critique of "selfism” as the dominant value 
system of modern consumer society* A less polemical but equally 
penetrating critique of this movement, set against a wider historical 
and theological background is given in the long chapter "Direction, 
Counselling and Therapy" in Kenneth Leech’s "Soul Friend". *
Less fashionable today than either the first or the second is the 
third direction in which our thoughts can move if we are judging from 
a humanist dtandpoint, that which accepts that some men have much 
greater potential than others and maintains that the fullness of their 
living justifies itself even though others may suffer. The great man 
in his achievement and defiance attains authenticity of the only kind 
that matters. In Yeat^s words:
A great man in his pride
Confronting murderous men 
Casts derision upon 
Supersession of breath.
The implication, which may or may not be consciously drawn is that 
inferior men, who lack the authenticity of greatness, have only the 
mentality of slaves and are not worth substantial consideration.. This 
attitude has affinities with the heroic traditions that go back far into 
history. Any war psychology will always make appeal to it. But the 
heroic tradition is also linked to tragedy, irony and mystery ~ as it 
always is in Yeats:
’The work is done* grown old he thought 
’According to my boyish plan;
Let tha fools rage, I swerved in naught,
Something to perfection brought.’ -
But louder sang that ghost: ’tilhat then?*
It tends to go perhaps with a stratified society and the poverty of ,■< 
resources which means that there cannot be much opportunity anyway for 
more than a few. In more modern humanistic form it can be seen in
1. Sheldon Press, 1977.
Goethe's "Faust", and in Carlyle's "Heroes and Hero-Worship", but it 
reaches its full development in Nietzsche, for whom God is dead and true 
value can onl, expressed by the Superman. This tendency has no great 
overt following at the present day, but the cult of greatness has deep 
roots in human nature, it appeals to the followers as well as the v 
leader, giving legitimacy to both the exaltation of pride and the 
exhilaration of contempt. It can grow easily out of the ruins of 
idealistic illusion. We shall hear more of it yet.
I recognise that the foreging paragraphs amount to no more than
a few brush strokes. I am making no attempt here to develop or analyse
in any detail the implications of these three possible ways of looking
at the world; such a task cannot be fitted within the frame of this 
1*
study. * But I believe these few indications will nevertheless be 
sufficient to draw attention to the familiar patterns of thought I have 
in mind, which will not be difficult to recognise. Each of them 
reflects something of the truth about human nature; each has had, in 
one form or another a very wide currency; yet none of them, as it seems 
to me, can release us from what William Law called the multiplicity of 
wills, from sickness, corruption and evil; rone of them can bring us to 
simplicity, health, integrity, wholeness, sanctity, wellbeing -words 
which all point the same way towards an ideal which seems to draw all 
men, yet seems to be always beyond attainment. Attempts are often made 
to find a path of compromise between these three different ways, and a 
compromise is perhaps always better than any one of them in extreme 
form; but I do not think any logically convincing compromise has ever 
been found.
What, then, can we hope of the fourth, the paradoxical pattern of
humanism, which looks for the fullest realisation of the Self through
the fullest sacrifice and denial of the Self. This pattern too,
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exemplified in the figure of Gesus Christ, has had a very wide currency
1. Some aspects of it are tackled in a further study "An Approach
to a Bust Society", which, inter alia, deals in some detail with 
Professor 3ohn Rawls* important book "A Theory of Gustice".
2. It is clearly exemplified also in some degree in Buddhism and
other religbns and philosophies. But of these I am not qualified
to speak with any confidence. Buddhism, as it seems to me, is 
ultimately a religion (or philosophy as some maintain) of the 
annihilation of the Self, whereas Christianity is a religion 
which involves putting off the old Self and putting on the new 
Self conformed to Christ, a sharing in Christ's resurrection life.
in the world; and again it can ba criticised for lack of success. 
Christian pray for all sorts and conditions of men that God should 
make his ways known to them, his "saving health unto all nations"; 
and they believe that in their faith is offered to all men a means of 
grace, a way of integrity, a healing redemption, a rule of life. Yet 
there have not been over many takers, particularly in recent years, 
for a more than conventional Christianity; and Christians themselves 
have certainly not been exempt from the moral division and the sense 
of alienation from a true Self that characterise so much of Western 
society. Is this because Christianity does not work? Or because, as
O.K. Chesterton said, it has been found difficult and not bean tried?
In the next two sections I will consider some of the points at which 
Christian teaching might be said to bear upon the questions with which 
we have been most fundamentally concerned here. I shall thus be dealing 
with the fourth pattern of humanism, as I have called it, in considerably 
more detail than the others, and this because I believe that in the 
present context it offers a now perspective of understanding upon our 
subject, the idea of the Self.
The Christian Idea of the Self (1)
An analysis of the Christian account of the Self as it
relates to the model built up in this study.
The analysis with which the last feu sections of this study have 
been concerned suggests that the problem of the integration of the Self 
has two main aspects, that of the deep constitution of ths anticipatory 
Self as it has grown up through an individual's lifetime and that of the 
conscious, explicit rationalisation and determination of the decisions 
which the individual has to take from day to day. The first is a 
matter of his mental wholeness or sickness, the second a matter of 
his moral integrity. The two are necessarily connected. Our conscious 
living, as it takes place from moment to moment, consists of predications 
and decisions in the Here Now. The issues with which we are faced 
present themselves in forms determined largely by our conscious under­
standing of the world; and this in turn will inescapably be shaped to a 
great extent by the assumptions, the categories, the languages and the
OOU*
social roles of the society in which wo find ourselves. On the other 
hand our emotional reactions to the situations thus formulated and the 
roles we consequently adopt will be determined partly by our bodily 
nature but always in and through the deeper constitution of the anti­
cipatory Self which has been built up through our lives, most crucially 
in the environment of the earliest years of our lives. To be truly 
whole we need to be integrated all through both the deep structure and 
the surface structure of our Selves.
Christianity claims to be the religion.of love and liberation. Its 
moral teaching was summed up by St. Augustine as "love and do what you 
will"; and St. Augustine was following St. Gohn and St. Pauls "This is 
the commandment, as you have heard from the beginning, that you follow 
love"; "For you were called to freedom bretheren; only do not use your 
freedom as an opportunity for the flesh but through love be servants of 
one another. For the whole law is fulfilled in ono word 'You shall 
love your neighbour as yourself." The point is made over and over 
again in the New Testament; and almost as often come warnings of the 
danger of relying on the law, "the ministration of death engraven upon 
stones"; "You are severed from Christ, you would be justified by law; 
you have fallen away from grace". In psychological terms we might say 
that this means that a surface integration is not good enough; and indeed 
the New Testament requirement is not that we should reform our ideas or 
suppress our desires, but that we should be reborn. As Micodemus is 
told? "Except a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God*;.*
That which is bran of the Flesh is Flesh and that which is born of the 
Spirit is Spirit. Do not marvel that I said to you 'You must be born 
anew*. The wind blows where it wills, and you hear the sound of it, but 
you do not know whence it comes or whither it goes; so it is with every 
one that is born of the Spirit". This suggests that in order to be 
blown by the Spirit we have first to achieve a kind of weightlessness 
which requires being born anew of the Spirit. It is only then that we 
can be ruled by the Spirit and not the Flesh, and blown where the 
Spirit wills; it is only then that we can love in the Spirit of Christ 
as servants of one another, obeying the commandments of God which, 
because we truly love God, are not then burdensome at all.1 *
1. 1 Gohn 4, 11; Gal.5, 13-14; 2 Cor. 3, 7; John 3, 5-8.
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Developing a closely similar line of thought St. Paul says that if
we are to be b o m  anew our old Self has to die firsts ’’Do you not know
that all of us who have been baptised into Christ Jesus were baptised
into his death?.«• t/e know that our old Self was crucified with him
so that the sinful body might be destroyed and us might no longer be
enslaved by sin... yield yourselves to God as men who have been brought
from death into life... Are we to sin because we are not under the
law but under gracs? By no means... You have died to the law through
the body of Christ, so that you may belong to another, to him who has
been raised from the dead in order that we may bear fruit for God.” *
St. Paul develops the idea of opposition between the Flesh and the. Spirit
in passages touards which the reaction of the contemporary world tends
to be profoundly suspicious and uncomprehending? ”Far the desires of
the Flesh are against the Spirit and the desires of the Spirit are
against the Flesh; for these are opposed to each other to prevent you
from doing what you would” ^i.e. from being freeJ*  ”But if you are
led by the Spirit you are not under the law. Now the works of the
Flesh are plain: immorality, impurity, licentiousness... But the fruit
of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, ,
faithfulness, gentleness, self-control: against such there is no law.
And those who belong to Christ Jesus have crucified the Flesh with its
2
passions and desires.”
However it is only in the light of the doctrine of the need to be 
baptised into the death of Christ and reborn as a new creature that we 
can turn towards the appalling demands of the teaching of Jesus himself 
in the Sermon on the Mount: ”Think not that I have come to abolish the 
law and the prophets; I have come not to abolish them but to fulfil 
them... Whoever then relaxes one of the least of thoss commandments and 
teaches men so shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven... 
unless your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and pharisees 
you will never enter the Kingdom of Heaven.•• every man who looks at 
a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart.
If your right eye causes you to sin pluck it out end throw it away...
If you love those who love you what reward have you? Do not the 
Gentiles do the same? You therefore must be perfect as your heavenly
,1. Romans 6, 3-15; 7, 4.
2. Gal. 5, 17—24.
F'ether is perfect... If your eye is not sound your whole body will be
full of darkness... No man can serve two masters... You cannot serve
God and Mammor ""'■'crefare I tell you be not anxious about your own life.. •
Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness and all these*things
1*
shall be added unto you.” Christ does not rejBct the law, he transcends 
it in his teaching because for him it is not what you do that is subject 
to judgement, but who you are - not murder but the very thought of 
murder if anrepented, not adultery but the very thought of adultery 
if unrepented. What he taught was an extreme, immoderate and frightening 
religion, because, although it offers the pearl of salvation, it demands 
total surrender - the death of the old Self - first. This comes through 
unequivocally at many places in the New Testament and it is nowhere 
contradicted or qualified.
What are we to make of such teaching in the terms of the analysis . 
developed in this study? To begin with it would indicate that we 
have to go back right to the earliest stage of the establishment of the
Self as an independent entity, based on the role of the good child, with
introjected parent figures who react approvingly or disapprovingly to 
possible courses of action as they are formulated in the arena of 
consciousness. Fundamentally, as we saw, the good child has love for his 
or her parents and obeys bheir wishes gladly and freely, even whan they 
run counter to immediate desire; this is because hs feels integrated by 
this lave in a wider whole of which the parents are also part, and 
consequently he feels pleasure when they are pleased, hurt when they 
are hurt. However any growing child will be frustrated from time to 
time and will have feelings of anger, aggressiveness and a will to 
destruction. These feelings and the behaviour to which they lead are 
essentially transient and ad hoc; they have no essential part in the 
role of the good child, which is a continuing as distinct from a 
transient role and an ideal as distinct from an actual one.
It is no exaggeration, on this thesis, to say that the only
continuing personality a man has is an ideal personality, exercising 
some form of direction and constraint upon his actions, by no means 
always successfully. However we noted that in the process of , 
establishing an independent Self the good boy or girl would introject
parent figures and that one of the effects of this was to give a sort
1. Matthew 5, 17-6, 33.
of legitimation to aggressive feelings and actions which they would 
not have otherwise have received. In the more primitive stage, whereas 
the parent figures may, as part of their normal function, not only 
disapprove but punish what the child does, the role of the good child 
as it emerges is essentially one of compliance and obedience. Rages, 
tantrums and aggressive behaviour are never approved, partly no doubt 
because in the nature of things they are always inevitably directed 
against the parent figures themselves* The relationship is therefore 
unequal. The parent figures deal out reward and punishment in a way 
which may seem arbitrary but must nevertheless be accepted! the good 
child*s role is one of love and obedience only, whatever the parents do; 
any aggressive behaviour is automatically treated as bad. t^ e noted 
however that, as the independent Self is established, this changes; 
the child now has internalised parent figures which can legitimately 
show aggression in appropriate circumstances, he can be righteously, as 
it were, angry and aggressive.
This development seems to be inevitable and universal, a necessary 
prerequisite for the child to establish a decisively separate identity 
and to assert and develop it through the years of growth, so that he can 
stand up for himself in the world. Yet it involves © fundamental 
dissonance with thB role of the good child - or rather it does so when­
ever elements of aggression and self-assertion are incorporated Into the 
continuing roles of the Self; for disconnected episodes of anger or self- 
assertion in self-defence do not affect the continuing roles* If we try 
to interpret into such terms as these the Christian teaching about being 
born anew which we have just been considering, we arrive at the doctrine 
that it is necessary to repudiate from its very roots the Self.that has 
been built up in this way, Incorporating elements of aggression and 
self-assertion. It is necessary to be reborn a3 a new Self Identified 
exclusively with what was always the true Self, the original role of 
the good boy or girl pleasing to the parent figures and finding pleasure 
in them, the role of love. Merely to suppress the aggressive feelings 
is not enough, the need is for a new birth in which they are no longer 
effectively there, in which the ”commandments are not burdensome” 
because ”you have died... so that you may belong to another”.
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This is not to return to a primitive state of identification with 
the parent figures, but a new birth in which the "new creature” 
recognises himself as a separate identity but one united in love with 
other members in the body of Christ, who is the word, the expression, 
of the Father* The parent figures who provided the whole world in 
which he lived in infancy are replaced by the almighty God in whom he 
"lives and moves and has his being". The tiUal flow of his life is the 
love of God, to whom in obedience he is conformed, whose good will he 
utterly trusts, and with whom he is united in love. As a corollary he 
is united in love with all his fellow Christians who are also members 
of the body of Christ. Potentially he is united in love with all human 
beings, for all are the children of God, all in their true selves are 
obedient to God,s will - which is to say that they have the potentiality 
to be conformed to Christ and so they bear within them ths image of God.
Arthur Koestler speaks in "The Act of Creation" of "the dichotomy 
of self-asserting and participatory tendencies of behaviour at all 
levels... ^whichj derives logically, os it were, from the dual 
character of every sub-whole os a subordinate and super-ordinate entity"; 
but in the reborn Christian the participatory or (to use another of 
Koestler*s terms) self-transcending tendencies should take over entirely 
and the eelf-assertive tendencies, which are alien to the fundamental 
role of the good child should be sloughed away. Passing anger or 
indignation he may show, as Christ did with the moneylenders, but he 
should never be possessed by the settled aggression which becomes 
hatred. "Be angry but do not sin; do not let the sun go down on your 
anger, and give no opportunity to the dev61".^* The foundation of his 
identity, like that of the small child with his parents, should be the 
assurance of the love and goodness of God, even though God is beyond all 
human understanding and even though his providence is inscrutable, his 
justice beyond any human assessment of fault or merit. In 3ob*s words 
"though he slay me, yet will I trust in him"; in St. Paul’s words (and 
again those of the Book of 3ob which ho guotes "0 the depth of the 
riches and wisdom and knowledge of God5 How unsearchable are his 
judgements and how inscrutable his ways! For who has known the mind
1. Eph. 4, 26.
of the Lord, or who has been his counsellor? Or who has given a gift  ^
to him that he might be repaid? For from him and through him and to him 
are all things. To him b© glory for ever."^*
What is implied is the rebuilding of the Self from its foundations 
and the elimination from its foundations of those elements of aggression 
and destructiveness which in the natural course become incorporated at 
the origin. Clearly the material of the idea complex of the Self 
accumulated through past years must in general remain the same; but 
the structure of the anticipatory Self is to be rebuilt. Some plans 
projecting into the future have to be eliminated and others adjusted, 
but above all their priority and hierarchical ordering are to be 
radically changed, since all have to be brought under the domination of 
a new final plan, the ultimate contour of the idea of the Self, which is 
the image of Christ.
This is nothing lees than the shedding of what may be identified 
as original sin, a radical therapy indeed. In a sense it is an ; 
unnatural process and the reborn Christian who results is not a natural 
inhabitant of this world; he is "in the world but not of the world".
But in another sense he is a more natural person than the ordinary 
unredeemed man, because he has been brought back to his true nature, 
that of the good Self, obedient end trusting, full of love for God, 
without guile or hatred or self-assertion. Above all perhaps, because 
he has a total trust in God, he has no fear - for "perfect love casteth 
out fear" - and that is why he can stand up as a man without the need 
for pride in some human image of himself and the self-assertion that 
this entails. He does have an image within himself to which he is 
conformed — what we have called on an earlier page a heroic or ideal role 
but this is not any rigid pattern of personality, it is that of Christ, 
who said "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of my 
bretheren ye have done it unto me" ; Christ "who emptied himself, 
taking the form of a servant... And being found in human form he 
humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even death on a cross."
What then must a Christian do to achieve these remarkable
1. Rom.11, 33-36. 2. Platt. 25, 40. 3. Philippiens 2, 8.
transformations? He must confess his sins and worship his God.i#
Through confession his aim is to achieve humility, which is not a 
grovelling self-abasement, but a lucid self-knowledge, Issuing in 
simplicity. As George Herbert asked,
Give mo simplicitie that X may live;
So live and like that 1 may know thy wayes.
Herbert wrote a poem "Confession” which expresses the need and purpose 
of simplicity in terms which a psychologist would recognises
tie are the earth? and they £our affliction^
Like moles within us, heave and cast about?
And till they foot and clutch their prey,
They never cool, much less give out.
Wo smith can make such locks but they have keyes?
Closets are halls to them and hearts highuayes*
Only an open breast 
Doth shut them out, so that thsyycannot enter?
Or if they enter, cannot rest,
But quickly seek some new adventures 
Smooth open hearts no fastning have? but fiction 
Doth give a hold apd^handle to affliction. • ..'.r.
Humiility opens the way to rebirth by removing the barriers of self—
2deception and false ambition ? but only through worship is the 
transformation itself achieved. In humility a man can bpen himself 
to communion with his God? but it is the love of God, not any strength 
of his own, which remakes him in a new image, conformed to another and 
yet more truly himself than ever he was before, no longer driven by the
1# It may be relevant to quote here some words of Erik Erikson about
the psychological roots of religions **The parental faith which 
supports the trust emerging in the newborn has throughout history 
sought its institutional safeguard (and on occasions found its 
greatest enemy) in organised religion. Trust born of care is, 
in fact, the touchstone of the actuality of a given religion*.* 
Primitive religions, the most primitive layer in all religions, and 
the religious layer in each individual abound with efforts at 
atonement which... try to restore faith in the goodness of one*a 
strivings and in the toindnass of the powers of the universe. Each 
society and each age must find the institutionalised form of re­
verence which derives vitality from its world—image... The clinician
can only observe that many are proud to be without religion whose
children cannot afford thBir being without it. On the other hand 
there are many who seem to derive a vital faith from social action 
or scientific pursuit. And again there are many who profess faith, 
yat in practice breathe mistrust both of life and man.1* ^Child­
hood and Society**, Paladin Edition 1977, p. 255.)
2. D.W. Harding, professional psychologist as well as literary critic,
old multiplicity of selfish wills, but willing one thing, the service of 
God.
Leaving aside for the present the question whether these procedures 
are efficacious, or their end result desirable, ws may take note that 
they are concerned essentially with the deeper layers of the Self. When 
it comes to the law of love a general guide to conduct, but they 
obviously do not give unequivocal answers to the great variety of 
practical moral questions which arise in a world whose value patterns 
are not Christian and ara often not compatible with each other. The 
Maw Testament has a general answer to this problem in the doctrine of 
freedom in the Holy Spirit* "X will pray the father and ho will give 
you another Counsellor to be with you for ever, even the Spirit of 
Truth... The Holy Spirit whom the father will send in my name he will 
teach you all things and bring to your remembrance all the things that 
I have said to you... No longer do 1 call you servants for the servant 
does not know what his master is doing? but I have called you friends... 
When the Spirit of Truth comes he will guide you into all the truth.” *
As St. Paul insisted, "for freedom Christ has made you free*"
The Christian has to exercise his own judgement in th© situation 
in which he finds himself? Christian morality is indeed a situation ethic 
in this sense* But it has to be a judgement enlightened by the Holy 
Spirit and so reflecting the mind of Christ. A man's freedom is to know 
and do God's will, not his own, to serve others not himself. If it is 
used as an "opportunity for the flesh” he is not led by the Spirit.
Only in God's service - which leads to other people's service - is
perfect Iteedam. This sounds paradoxical but is not so. It is only when 
a man takes the short view that to be free is to do whatever he wants 
whenever he wants it that he runs into paradox? for either this means
draws attention to the same point as mode by T.S. Eliot in 
"The Elder Statesman"? "Confession... is ths first step, 'And 
perhaps the most important', that Claverton takes towards hie 
freedom. His full freedom is gained by facing his ghostq and
no longer trying to run away from them. It is after that that
he can say
I've been freed from the self that pretends to be someone?
And in becoming no one I begin to live."
(O.lif. Harding, "Experience into Words", Chatto & Hindus 1963,
Penguin Edition 1974, p. 163).
1. From the Gospel according to St. 3ohn, ch. 14 - 16.
the subordination of himself to varying and passing desires, "the 
multiplicity of wills", or it means the subordination of himself to a 
long term ambition, a single major image. Either way this Is slavery 
to sin, which is the old Self in its two basic forms of concupiscence 
and pride. The one disintegrates the man. The other integrates him, 
but in a fixed image which becomes a prison to destroy him. The true 
Self is the Self obedient to God, continually remade and therefore free. 
There is only one true image, that of Christ, who emptied himself as the 
servant of others.
The Christian Idea of the Self (2)
A continued exposition of the Christian view of man and 
morals, as interpreted in terms of the model built up 
in this study, arriving at the final questions Is the 
whole edifice of Christian morality unrealistic and 
delusive?
The claim ie therefore that the reborn Christian makes truly free
choices, for he is not under the law, he is not driven by any external
compulsion nor enslaved by the selfishness of the Flesh, he is led by 
the holy and free Spirit within him, Interpreting the mind of Christ.
How then is it suggested that the Christian should acquire this 
holy Spirit? As we have seen already, the answer is through baptism 
into the death of Christ, which extinguishes the old Self, and rebirth 
into the life of Christ. This is essentially not an isolated but a shared 
life as a member of the church, which in St. Paul's great image is the 
body of Christ, and consequently animated by the Spirit of Christ* Each 
limb or organ of a body is different from every other; even when they 
are paired, the left differs from the right. Each moreover is self- 
determining so far as its internal processes are concerned. Yet each 
in isolation has no life and no effective self-determination. Its 
freedom is realised only in concert with the others, "the complete 
consort dancing together"• The behaviour of any one member is constrained 
by its relationship of service to others in a whole which has a moaning 
much greater than that of its parts; yet in this participation and ser­
vice the member's true freedom resides, the freedom to be itself and to
fulfil its natural function, that of a pert not of an isolated whole.
The itpage is particularly apt because the coordination of the whole 
body depends on the head, not simply as the location of the brain, but 
also in a narrower physical sense; the balance of the whole structure 
under the force of gravity is critically determined by the position of 
the head in relation to the rest, and the mechanism of coordination works 
through this relationship. It is a matter of common observation that a 
social organisation, whether a school or a village or a factory or a 
battalion, can have a character or personality of its own, and one which 
changes in a remarkable way - much more than common sense would suggest - 
if the person at the head of it ie changed. The function of a group is 
determined by a collective will and purpose expressed by the person at 
its head. To the extent that this purpose represents a human ambition, 
even a collective one, it imposes a pattern on its members of greater 
or less compulsion. But if 3esus is at the head the pattern is not one 
of serving any human ambition, it is one of serving each other and through 
each other the Christ who is poured into others. The Holy Spirit, who 
is the esprit de corps of the body of Christ, is the interpreter of the 
whole, speaking to each member individually but integrating in wisdom 
the needs of all in mutual service.
In any human organisation the unity of the body and the freedom 
of its members are at their highest in a relatively small, face-to-face 
group where each individual is known and has his or her own unique part 
to play. The more the parts are standardised, as may be inevitable in 
a larger group, the less the real sense of freedom and unity. Groups 
may be organised hierarchically within larger groups, level by level, 
but inevitably as the scale and complexity of the organisation increase, 
there is a loss of the sense of self-determination for the individual.
The Christian however can claim to avoid these problems, for while his 
fundamental unit of organisation ie a face-to-face group, the 
congregation, he will argue that through the Eucharist the same Christ 
can be present as the head of each congregation, so that the personal 
relationship can be preserved within a universal church. Each 
individual is known for himself, not as a standardised unit. As St.
Paul made clear, there are diversities of gifts and functions, but there
340
ie one body and one Spirits ,!For just as the body is one and has many 
members* and all-the members of the body* though many* are one body* 
so it is with Christ* For by one Spirit we ware all baptised into one 
body — 3ews or Greeks* slaves or free — and all were to drink of one 
Spirit".1*
If this be the Christian doctrine, how far can it be interpreted 
in terms of ths model built up in this study? We can describe the reborn 
Christian conformed to Christ as one who has achieved, through the self- 
knowledge of confession, a true simplicity and has sloughed off his old 
Self with the elements of resentment and aggression incorporated into it* 
as he adopts the "ideal role” of Christ himself and becomes a member of 
a distinctive social group* the church. All the social organisations of 
which he ie a member will exercise some constraints upon the way in which 
his continuing Self develops by allocating to him roles* which he will 
adopt from fear or desire or a combination of the two* in relationships 
with the other members of the group, all serving together the purposes 
of the group os a whole. If tho organisation is a strong one it will 
have a strong esprit de corps leading its members to adopt theife 
individual roles and to identify themsBlves with the body as a whole in 
free positive desire and acceptance, not negatively as a matter b? prudence 
or even compulsion. Ue can describe the psychological effect of membership 
of the church and the operation of the church’s esprit de corps in 
similar terms} we can note in particular that, although the church has 
coercive doctrines of punishment for sin which can operate as negative 
reasons for membership* and these prudential considerations may 
ultimately operate to the good* they are not the voice of the Holy Spirit 
which is always the voice of freedom; no Christian is satisfied with 
Pascal’s argument of the wager a© a final reason for belonging to the 
church.
There is however a significant difference. Men are always disposed 
to admire a person who is prepared to dedicate himself freely to an 
organisation greater than himself} this is what might be called first 
order unselfishness - the devotion, for example, of a soldier to his 
regiment or the patriot to his country. But if it is a human 
organisation it will always in its self-assertion — with which tho
1. 1 Cor. 12, 12—13.
341
individual member identifies himself — be pursuing goals of human 
pride or desire, having their share of the common admixture of aggression 
and destructiveness. The person or people at the head of it will reflect 
and in some degree determine these goals and the spirit or spirits with 
which it ie imbued will correspondingly in different degrees be evil; 
sometimes exceedingly evil. But the church, insofar as she lives up 
to her own gospel vocation, becomes an organisation serving only 
positive, self-transcending, not self-assertive, goals, a servant church. 
And the fundamental role which a Christian acquires from the Holy Spirit 
through his membership of the church is that of his vocation from Christ 
himself, which is in an individual, personal calling related to his 
gifts and his situation, personal plan, not a standardised social role 
imposed by a group or dictated by a human leader.
A Christian’s vocation is the basic way of life he adopts, the 
way in which as a rule he earns his living and occupies the main part 
of his time. This is intended to be his response to the call of 3esus 
to his disciples "follow me”, the pattern by which he is conformed to 
Christ. As such it is the superordinate personal role with which all 
his other personal roles in whatever circumstances must be compatible 
if his integrity is to be maintained. We have already seen that such 
a plan should be one of free obedience to the Holy Spirit, without 
slavery to any pride or concupiscence, of complete trust in the 
providence of a loving father and of service to God and other men. 
"Whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever will lose his 
life for my sake, the same shall save it".
On the face of it this would seem to require of every Christian that 
he should sell all his goods and live a life of poverty and service. 
Indeed the earliest Christians in 3erusalem, according to the Acts of 
the Apostles, "had all things in common; and they sold their possessions 
and goods and distributed them to all, as any had need". * Throughout 
the history of Christianity some groups and individuals have lived in 
this way, but the great majority have not. Tho argument which seeks, 
rightly or wrongly to justify this is that vocation is an individual 
thing; Christ called the rich young man to sell all and follow him, 
but he did not say the same to his friend Lazarus or the sisters of
1. Acts 2, 44-45.
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Lazarus, Martha and Wary* Thera are diversities of vocations, including 
those which are concerned with carrying an the economic life of the 
community and rbib&ngi families* All occupations, it could be said, 
that are.not (like the pimp1s^ ‘ of their nature harmful to others can be 
mads the channel of dedicated service and loving and generous concern, 
and so can become vocations; but conversely if they do not lead to lives 
of dedication and love they are not true vocations* "By their fruits 
ye shall know them"; and it is regrettably clear that often the fruit 
harvest is not impressive.
3esus said "My yoke is easy and my burden is light" and we have 
seen that it is of the essence of a vocation that it should be freely 
accepted, from love, not from prudence of* fear. This implies on the 
one hand that a Christian is not morally bound by any roles which he 
has hot accepted or adopted of his awn free will; and on the other hand 
that when he does so adopt a role he is bound in responsibility for his 
own choice* The society in which he lives will have its own laws and 
customs and if he has grown up in it the very categories and concepts 
through which he understands the world will in some degree be shaped 
by them. There is no suggestion that he should do other than accept 
them in all areas where they do not conflict with his integrity as a 
Christian. The New Testament makes it clear that 3esus interpreted the 
Mosaic law - for example on keeping the Sabbath - according to the 
Spirit not the letter} but this implies no disrespect to the Mosaic 
law; the general assumption of both the gospels and the epistles is that
it is as good as any law could be* "if a law had been given w§ich could
make alive, then righteousness yould be by the |aw."^*
The stress, as we have seen, is not on the law being wrong but on
the need to transcend it and exceed the righteousness of the scribes 
and Pharisees. If there is a direct conflict between the law and the 
Spirit’s dictates then the Spfrit must be followed; but in general it is 
not envisaged that following Christ, whose commandment is that of service 
to others, will conflict with public morality ae ordinarily understood; 
indeed in St. Paul’s epistles particularly the emphasis is strongly the 
other way.
1. Gal. 3, 21
When it comes to political constraints the emphasis is again on 
acceptance - "render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s" - on the 
general basis that God’s kingdom is not of this world. But none of this 
detracts from the overriding necessity to conform to the normative plan of 
a man’s calling in Christ. The guidance of the Holy Spirit may be 
interpreted as an indication in given particular circumstances of the 
course of action which is most conformable to a person’s vocation. It 
is always easy for a man to deceive himself, but the self—deception is 
always due to the corruption of motive. It is not for the individual 
to reject off hand the laws and customs of his society, for that is to 
cast himself out of society and there is no humanity out of society; 
but in the last resort he has to judge by a higher criterion, doing so 
in freedom and accepting responsibility for what he does. In the case 
of a child the laws and customs of his family and his wider social group 
are accepted for him, but as he grows up he has to create himself as a 
free man by taking on his own roles and the obligations that go with 
them. It is important that he is not bound morally (as distinct from 
legally) by what he has not freely accepted; but conversely when he 
has accepted an obligation he cannot with integrity change his mind 
if it affects others, as by definition it must, unless the others freely 
release him from it. Apart from this he has not merely a freedom but 
a duty to try to change any laws and customs which he does not consider 
to be conformable to the will of God; but this is a strictly 
constitutional freedom, he is still not entitled in the process to 
throw overboard without agreement obligations which he has already 
accepted.
Two further things follow. First, the roles with their obligations 
need to be mutually consistent if disintegration is to be avoided (and 
the guidance of the Holy Spirit may be invoked to ensure this).
Secondly, the breaking of an obligation is the repudiation of a role 
freely accepted and therefore the amputation of part of a man’s 
personality. It inevitably means a kind of betrayal and hence a loss 
of integrity.
These principles may be clear, but there are complexities in their
interpretation. Many roles involve reciprocal obligations and if even
one of the pair breaks them the role may in some circumstances be
destroyed. But this depends on the nature and formulation of the role
itself (the importance of words in this connection hoe already been 
noted). In adopting the role of a parent, in particular, a man or 
woman accepts a one—aided and absolute obligation to love and care for 
the child, to which a reciprocal obligation on the part of the child 
is only built up gradually as it becomes able to give its own love and 
accept its own responsibilities. To accept love from someone is to be 
entrusted with part of himself or herself which cannot be given back 
unless he or she freely takes it. The obligations involved by love ara 
not specific, but take the form of a general obligation of self-giving 
to be expressed according to the situation. But in marriage, for 
example, which is under one aspect a contract, certain commitments are 
spelt out in the marriage.service;’and in the Christian case these ara 
explicitly unconditional - "for better, for worse; for richer, for 
poorer" and soi; on. Outside the family, in society, commerce, industry 
and politics, life is a tissue of roles with their obligations and 
mutual expectations, some vague, some clear, some trivial, some vital, 
some conditional, same not. Adherence to these obligations makes up 
the actual fabric of society, and it is only through such adherence that 
conditions of tolerable reliability and security can be created for 
human living. Human laws and their enforcement ara necessary in large 
societies, but coercion is incompatible with freedom and always the less 
we need to rely on formal lew the better.
Uhat happens, it may be asked, when a man, in the course of the 
process of individuation as Bung calls it, becomes aware of what has 
been repressed and buried within him and realises a possible new pattern 
of integration with, to him, wonderful new possibilities of development - 
it may be even through Christian conversion? Clearly if this can be real­
ised without breaking old obligations then, in Christian terms, there 
should be nothing but good in it. Any radical change in life must 
involve a radical change in roles, but there are usually ways and means 
of achieving this over time without any breach of faith (again the words 
matter). But there can be situations in which the transformation of 
the individual must involve the breaking of obligations which are 
unconditional or In some other way inescapable - for example because 
the others concerned are not willing to give release. In such a case 
it may be necessary to look to the hierarchy of roles and accept a less
important breach of faith to avoid a more important one. This will 
not often occur if tho pattern of the now man is a rebirth in Christ, 
since the new pattern is then by definition that of a servant to others, 
and a servant "obedient unto death". But the situation can arise, and 
it is perhaps situations of this kind that Besus had in mind when ha 
said that he was come to bring not peace but a sword* Another example 
is tho situation in which ho was told that his mother and brothers were 
standing outside, and ha said; "fcJho is my mother? end who are my brs- 
theren?" As the next versa shows, he establishes a hierarchy of 
obligations; "And he stretched forth his hand towards his disciples and 
said, Behold my mother and my bretheren!"^* Obviously in the complex 
web of human life inconsistency of obligations cannot be avoided alto­
gether. This may have been in St. Paul’s mind when he made his strange 
deep remark about Christ "who knew no sin" being made sin for our sake — 
the ultimate humiliation which he accepted for mankind* *
Sometimes the inconsistency is relatively trivial and manageable*
But the principle is always the same; whether I merely fail to turn up 
for an appointment or I run off with someone elea’s wife, the unfaith­
fulness is a wound to ray true Self. Small wounds can be healed entirely, 
but larger ones will leave a person scarred or crippled for life, and 
there is no escaping this. In Christian terms a major breach of faith 
which ia unrepented will put at risk a man’s soul; for "sin when it is
full grown brings forth death". * Faithfulness is one of the fruits
of the Spirit listed by St. Paul and its fundamental importance is 
brought home by the gospels* Betrayal of allegiance, of a role accepted, 
was thB sin of Peter three times repeated, which he repented and was 
forgiven him; it was the sin of 3udas Iscariot; it was the sin which was
put before Christ himself by the tempter but to no avail. Breaking faith
is not freedom but slavery to what Is a disintegrating compulsion, even 
though it be onB which in Bung’s words "gets smuggled in under the 
cloafe of correct ideas". Once matters have reached the point at which 
major incompatible obligations have been incurred - for example by the 
giving and taking of adulterous love - then a tragic situation is 
ineluctable. Either way integrity is broken and there is no good way 
out that does not involve desperate amputations. If the conflict Is 
irreparable then one role or the other has to be abandoned. It may
1. Matthew 12, 48. 2. 2 Cor. 5, 21. 3. Barnes 1, 15
It may oven bo necessary in some circumstances to recognise, for example, 
that a marriage is dead beyond recall. But this is not to be justified, 
it is a disaster to be repented? and only after repentance can there be 
any hope of a nsy start and the building of some new, if maimed, 
integrity.
If the importance of faithfulness in the Christian scheme of things 
needs any further emphasis, it is to be found in the fact that it was 
because he would not break faith that Besus himself was conSemned to 
death* He did not seek conflict with the authorities, but when con­
fronted with tho direct challenges nI adjure you by the living Cod tell 
us if you are the Christ, the Son of God”2, he would not deny it.
Ultimately the bitter cup which was not taken away from him was that 
of maintaining his integrity by not denying his sonship? and over the 
centuries countless Christian martyrs - witnesses - followed him In 
drinking this cup* The final sin, the sin against the Holy Ghost, is 
that of apostasy; for thoss who have actually known Christ to turn away
from him* nIf you ware blind you would have no guilt? but now that you
2
say *We see*, the guilt remains”.
This is the Christian view of man, one which lays stress on his 
freedom and responsibility? his capacity for sin? his guilt and danger 
if the sin is not repented; and his capacity for redemption, that is of 
dyring to his old Self, being born anew in the image of Christ and so finding 
his own identity and ultimately participating in the divine life. Our 
argument has suggested that it is not impossible to express these ideas 
(except the last) in terms of the model of the human personality built 
up in this study. But the question remains whether the whole Christian 
scheme of man is not entirely unrealistic and illusory. Uhat Christian 
ever lives up to the Sermon on the Mount? Uhat ground is there for 
believing that it is possible to slough off the old Self and be reborn in 
an impossibly virtuous form? Does not this pretension to impossible 
virtue lead Christians into that distasteful pious hypocrisy of which 
they have often boon accused throughout their history? Is their meek 
and mild sort of virtue, based on total humility, the true virtue any­
way? Should a man not have a proper pride and a dash of aggression?
Should he not be read to smite the evildoers hip and thigh? Should he
1, Matthew 26, 63. 2. Bohn 9, 40
not show a bit less obedience and a bit more backbone and independence? 
make something of himself instead of denying himself? develop and 
fulfil the potentialities he has? destroy Caesar instead of paying 
taxes to him? create with his own human wisdom and capacities a better 
world for humans to live in?
A Christian has to admit that the strongest argument against his 
religion is that it is impossible. Even the greatest saint remains a 
sinner. And the demands of the cross are so radical that it is only 
too easy for the Christian to seek some easier accommodation with the 
world, and to deceive himself that he is following Christ when^in feet 
ho is making no more than gestures to the faith. Yet the answer to this 
argument of impossibility is that there is no alternative. In personal 
terms one who has had the eyes of Bosus fixed upon him cannot turn 
away without destroying his own true Selfs "once you say *1110 see* the 
guilt remains”. In more objective terms any other course must be a 
compromise that retains and enshrines elements of pride and aggression, 
or surrenders control of the Self in some degree to incoherent desire, 
or does both. Arguably this is better and more honest than attempted 
adherence to an impossible ideal leading to tho condition of a "whited 
sepulchre", to use the Lord’s own description of such people. But man 
havo been pursuing such compromise in many forms for many years and tho 
general state of our alienated world hardly suggests that much wholeness 
is to be found in this fashion. Christians have not been particularly 
successful in achieving wholeness either? but they can perhaps argue 
that they are more ready to know their failure, to acknowledge their 
guilt and their need for a more radical salvation? and that in this 
humility is the beginning of wisdom? "For the very true beginning of 
her is the desire of discipline? and the care of discipline is love”. 
Cura disciplinae dllectio.
Saints and Heroes
In this section I develop the view that fundamentally 
there are two kinds of ideal roles, those of the hero 
and the saint. I analyse tho characteristics of each and 
their Implications both for the individuals who adopt 
them and for society.
1* Wisdom 6, 17.
The function of the ideal role in psychological terms, according 
to the theory develpsdin Chapter 111, is to provide an ultimate unifying 
contour for the idea of the Self, and so to define the wholeness of the 
man* * It follows that those who fill such roles are always themselves 
exemplifications of some kind of wholeness* Their roles must be of a 
certain generality, or at least capable of generalization, since if a 
role is too limited and specific it cannot provide an ultimate contour 
for the idea of the Self* Beyond this, our theory suggests that what 
holds a man together, what makes him whole, is integrity — which is the 
strength with which he adheres to the plans that build up his own
anticpatory Self. Moreover, since human beings live in society, one
of these plans will alwgys be some version of the plan Of being a man 
of good faith who sticks to his obligations to others* Further, a 
man's integrity will inevitably be flawed - and therefore weaker than 
it Would otherwise be - if he is lacking either in the sincerity which 
maintains the conscious coherence of his plans and roles or the 
authenticity Which maintains coherehce through the unconscious layers 
of his personality. Finally we have noted that integrity, when it is
under challenge, shows itself as courage.
The proper marks of the ideal role, therefore, are generality and 
integrating power? and the integrating power is reflected in good faith, 
sincerity, authenticity, courage.
It is my contention that the bearers of such roles fall into two 
distinct types, those of the hero and the saint. The Wholeness of the 
hero derives from the integrity and courage with which he asserts 
himself, that is, from his pride; whereas the wholeness of the saint 
derives from the integrity and courage with which ho renounces any 
assertion of himsslf, that is from his humility. The two are not 
in fact so direct^ contrasted as might be thought, because the idea 
of himself which a man asserts can include such features as generosity 
and kindness - for example in the conception of "noblesse oblige".
Thus in a certain sense the saint is a special case of the hero, he is
1. Here, as elsewhere in this study, I use "man" in the sense of the 
German "Flensch" to mean "human being male or female". I am not 
prepared to adopt the stylistic contortions required to make this 
explicit at every turn.
a man who does assart an idea of himself, but one which rests 
paradoxically on self-denial..
Yet this is an insufficient characterization. In Christian terms,
- /
anyway, the saint does not simply deny or put away hie^ uld Self and thus 
become a nothing; he also puts on a new Self - one conformed ,to Christ, 
the man for others. Thereby, as I have argued earlier, he does not put 
on any rigid pre-formed image, but neither does he become a shapeless 
nonentity. He becomes a man without pride, aggression or selfishness, 
but this does not mean that he is passive to all the pressures of the 
world. On the contrary he is able to be totally responsive to the 
situation in which he finds himself, just because his response is not 
made stiff by pride or distorted by fear or incoherent desire. His 
response has a positive flow and pressure of its own, which is that 
of love. To put it another way, his response is not governed by the 
multiplicity of wills $hat is generally characteristic of mankind, nor 
by the single-mindness of the self-assertive hero, but rather by one will 
only which is that of love; for love fills his life and expresses In 
him the will of God. Therein his wholeness lies.
Of course this is the description of an ideal and as such is liable
to evoke the hollow laugh. Ho doubt even the greatest saints fall 
far short of it for much of their lives (though for a Christian the same 
is by no means true of Oesus himself). The saints, however, know this 
and confess their failure when they do fall short; and a Christian 
would claim that their life in Christ is thereby constantly, renewed 
through the Holy Spirit. It is entirely possible to be sceptical as to
whether there has ever been a true saint, but this does hot exempt us
from taking note of the ideal of saintlit#ss,which, as exemplified for 
instancein St.Francis of Assisi, has had great influence in the world. 
Moreover, though I can speak with any knowledge only of Christian 
saintliness, I see no reason to deny that a Buddhist or Hindu or Moslem 
or Stoic, or an agnostic idealist, can reach towards the same ideal 
role of being perfect in humility and filled with loVe; or that 
many in fact have done so.
The heroic role is more ancient and less problematic, but also more 
protean, and to that extent more difficult to pin down. The ideal of
saintliness is hardly conceivable before the advent of what Toynbee 
called universal rjligions, or philosophies of a similarly universal 
type, which can recognize the kinship of all mankind* In the. ssaall, 
separate "known worlds" of tribal society, particularly in leas than 
paradisal conditions, when there is war and competition between 
different tribes or groups of related tribes, there is little inclination 
to sense human kinship with the enemy* The gods themselves are identified 
with tribes or nations and do biitle with the gods of the other side.
There are traces of such attitudes in some pages of the Old Testament 
itself. Perhaps at a still earlier stage, when men were organised as 
small groups of hunter-gatherers, something more like a primal 
innocence could be identified; but debate on such points is beyond 
the scope of this study. What matters here is that the hero emerges 
in battle. He is a man of strength, integrity, courage (even ferocity), 
often of suffering and sacrifice; but his sacrifice is on behalf of a 
group, reflecting what I have earlier called first-order unselfishness, 
which leaves a place for vicarious self-assertion. He is the 
protagonist of his group, formidable and courageous in the face of 
its enemies, a leader whom men can follow and with whom, as they follow 
him, they can identify themselves and their cause, indeed in putting 
on the hero's role they can have the sense of finding a true identity 
which they lacked before.
Of the Viking Age it has been said:
What was known for sure was, on the one hand, the fact of 
death - and, on the other hand, the witness of brave men 
who were famous in poems and stories. Their heroic creed 
was based on this simple correlations
Wealth dies,
Kinsmen die,
a man dies likewise himself; 
but fame 
dies naver,
for him who gets good fame.
Wealth dies, 
kinsmen die,
a man dies likewise himself;
I know one thing 
that never dies, 
the verdict on each man dead.
These famous Havamal stanzas are from the ninth century, but they 
have found no essential modification in the Christian texts of 
the Norwegian court four hundred years later.•• The standard for 
honourable conduct was ultimately set by public opinion, and 
public opinion provided the reward. The quintessence of public 
opinion resided in history and legend and maintained the ideal.
Poems like the lay of Atli not only gave models for heroic 
behaviour, they also proved the truth of the assertion that a 
man could win everlasting fame, a secular immortality, in 
keeping with the emphasis on individual human responsibility and 
self-reliance. •
Perhaps the best comment on this is that of a Christian poet, John 
Milton, who wrote, in a disillusioned parenthesis, words which show 
perhaps a truer sense of the worth of human reputations
Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise 
(That last infirmity of noble mind).
In the terms of our psychological model it is qlear that the hero's 
integrity is rooted in a stage of development at which the parent figures 
have been internalised, a simple idea of the Self has been established 
and aggression has been legitimised, wherever it has the endorsement of 
the traditional-parental ideal. The saint's integrity, by contrast, is 
rooted, much more elusively and perhaps precariously, in a recovery of 
the plan of the good child as it was developing before the stage of 
internalisation and heroic independence; it means giving up the easier 
unification which comes from first-order unselfishness on behalf of a 
group, and from placing reliance on human strength; it seeks the depper 
unification which comes from unselfishness of a second order, that 
renounces even vicarious pride and aggression and relies on a totally 
fluid obedience to the guidance and power of the Holy Spirit as it is 
renewed from moment to moment. It requires the greater sacrifice and 
ultimately the greater courage; but it is more open to the ccriticism 
that fundamentally it is unattainable and that to pursue it leads to 
self-deception and hypocrisy.
These are theoretical schemata deriving from remote times or early 
childhood, and it may be argued that they have little relevance to the 
complexities of modern life. But the argument of this study suggests 
that they represent - still and always, and particularly in the case of 
the hero - the unifying schemata by which people's identities are formed
1, P.G. Foote and D.M. Uilson "The Viking Achievement" (Sidguick
& Jackson 1970) p. 431.
today. Ill© have a multiplicity of heroes, corresponding in part to the 
multiplicity of thought communities to which we belong. There is truth 
in Carlyle's view that "society everywhere is some representation, not 
insupportablv inaccurate, of a graduated Worship of Heroes".1* Nearly 
all thought communities have their star personalities, whether they are 
scientists or footballers, teenage gang leaders or film star^ parents 
or politicians, headmasters, managing directors or union bosses. We do 
not always identify with them; indeed some may be to us demons rather 
than heroes; but it is in relation to them that our ideal roles are 
constructed, and often with a touch of heroic identification. Just as 
the thought communities are organised to some extent in loose hierarchy, 
so too we acknowledge the primacy of some heroes over bbhers, 
particularly in certain contexts. Winston Churchill, for exaiifple, 
during the Second World War became a hero with whom the British nation 
tended to identify itself above all other. In times of crisis and 
danger the hierarchy of thought communities is sharpened, and with it 
the preeminence of national rather than local or sectional heroes.
This is not a simple age. Our multiple heroic roles are by no 
means always compatible with each other when circumstances bring them 
into contact; and most of us followers vacillate in some incoherency 
between the various models that we set ourselves. But this is what the 
real heroic leader does not do. His priorities are clear and he asserts 
them with courage and without too much squeamishness about the needs or 
scruples of others. And in practice this is how we like him. It is 
precisely because of such clarity and force of mind, whether or not she 
was right, that in the eyes of many British people in 1982 Mrs.
Margaret Thatcher acquired a touch of the heroic at the time of the 
Falklands war. The leader in battle, the pugilist, the rake (as witoh 
Don Juan), the bold law enforcer (as with Wyatt Earp and his like), 
the bold criminal (as with Butch Cassidy or the "Great Train Robbers" 
and their like), even Satan himself in "Paradise Lost" all tend to acquire 
the heroic aura, because they have a singlemindedness and boldness in 
self-assertion which ordinary followers, caught in the multiplicity of 
wills, find lacking in themselves.
1. "Heroes and Hero Worship", Lecture 1.
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Correspondingly we are inclined to allow a licence to heroes which 
we do not accord to ordinary mortals* The hero ljft/es to the full and 
for a moment liberates us from our inhibitions* He appeals to the 
sentiment that:
One crowded hour of gloDiodsslife
Is worth an age without a name*
PJany a prim suburban dweller, who does not condone adultery, will look 
with indulgence on fehe sexual exploits of a Kelson or a Byron or a 
Marilyn Monroe or a Napoleon or even a Lloyd George. Sexual conquests 
indeed are often seen as a sort of perquisite or badge of heroism, while 
the humiliation or betrayal of others which may be involved counts 
little in the balance* All those who rebel against conventional rules, 
however arrogant or self-indulgent their motivation nay be, will tend to 
collect a mBed of hero-worship, as any school playground will show. And 
the playground can also show that the distance between the heroic leader 
and the bully with his gang, enforcing a new conformity, is sometimes 
very short - perhaps often a matter chiefly of your angle of view.
Ue cannot do without heroes* They help to weave the fabric of 
human society, which without them might be hopelessly disintegrated.
But the disparity between different heroes, with the groups who follow 
or admire them, are such that they cannot all flourish. HeDD4sm is 
associated with conflict, not with reconciliation. Orre^in^s hero is 
often another man*s counter-hero or demon. If, as I have suggested, 
one of the main^principles by which human personalities.arg structured 
is that of the adoption of heroic ideal roles, then it will never be 
easy, except perjjpps^ in time of mortal danger for the nation, to secure 
even the minimum of coherence in the/ organisation of society, or to 
avoid mutually destructive violence* It is the attempt to find ways 
of doing so which leads to such patterns of humanistic ideology as 
those of the species-being, the free individual and the great man, to 
which I have referred on an earlier page*
Every theory of the humane society is an attempt to reach a 
compromise between the principle of equality and the principle of 
liberty, the two central but conflicting principles of justice as most 
people conceive it. Pressing equality too far leads all too easily to
to tyranny and pressing liberty too far leads all too easily to an
unfair distribution of wealth and ultimately to anarchy* In recent
years the philosopher John Rauls, to take one example, has worked
out in his book nA Theory of Justice” a remarkably sophisticated and
intellectually compelling prescription for achieving some approach to
peace and justice* Yet it is clear that, however subtle and complex
the institutional arrangements, they will not work so long as man is
conceived humanistically as an individual motivated only by rational
self-interest, trying to maximise his potentialities. Not even what
I have called first order unselfishness, which is itself a form of
rational self-interest, insofar as the individual identifies himself
with the group, is sufficient. Rawls himself has to argue that moral
principles ought to engage our affections, and speaks with approval
of a supererogatory love of mankind - though he is hardly able to find
a logically necessary place for it in his system. It would be better,
I think, to recognise that the principles of liberty and equality cannot
be realised without a third, and even more important, principle, that
of fraternity or love. If thBre is not enough love among the people,
1.no amount of regulation can establish a just society.
This is where the saint comes in, the hero who asserts himself in 
humility. Our world is one in which, time and again, what brings good 
for some brings deprivation for others; in which life is unfair; in 
which no human institutions can create more than a rough and ready 
approximation to justice. Ideal roles based in one way or another 
on developing the individual*s human potential can never provide an 
adequate or realistic pattern for human lives, and are all too likely 
to generate conflict and destruction. The truest humanism, in the 
Christian view, is the paradoxical humanism of sacrificial love 
exemplified in a man stretched upon a cross. The only way to freedom 
and reconciliation is through sacrifice of the Self.
What Jesus told his disciples to say when they healed the sick 
was ”The Kingdom of Heaven has come near to you”; and the saint is
1. The views of Professor Rawls, for which I have great respect 
though I do not altogether agree with them, are discussed 
in detail in ray study ”An Approach to a Just Society". An 
appendix, "The Derivation of the Principles of Justice” is 
particularly relevant to the present argument.
one who by his life conveys this same message to those who come in 
contact with him (if they have eyes to see or ears to hear). In the 
process he also conveys the message that every individual's true idea 
of himself is not some patchwork of heroic or ignominious this—worldly 
roles, it is of the Self transformed through obedience and freedom as 
a citizen of the Kingdom of Heaven. The more hostile the conditions — 
as for example in the Soviet Union today - the more necessary and 
effective the message of a saintly life can be. This is why the 
saints are rightly described in the liturgy as "the lights of the 
world in their several generations".
True saintliness is excessively rare and, sad to say, it is often 
only with hindsight that we realise when we have encountered it.
Ordinary human beings can only fleetingly catch sight of such an 
ideal role potentially capable of shaping the ultimate contours of 
their true selves. Only too often those who are formally religious
are people cramped by fears, looking timidly for shelter or clinging to
a rigid legal righteousness, quicker to denounce than to accept in love. 
But if there was not, here and there in our society, soma proclamation 
of unconditional,, irrational, paradoxical, sacrificial love, if such as 
Mother Teresa of Calcutta did not exist, then the ideal role of the 
saint, the reborn citizen of heaven, would cease to lurk at the back
of people's minds, providing the remotest, shadowy contours of their
own ideas of themselves. This-worldly heroic roles would have to be 
taken at their face value, for there would be no final perspective in 
which to see and order them; and the consequences would be chaotic.
A lot of people would be a lot more nasty and more unhappy than they 
are now* And as for our society, there would literally be no health 
in it. Perhaps there is not very much health now, nor ever has been; 
but to lose the ultimate perspective altogether would be the ultimate 
disaster. The story which epitomises what happens when men trust in 
their own heroic strength is that of the tower of Babel. So at least 
the Christian view would run.
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Innocence and Day
In this section and the next I consider whether there 
is any evidence to confirm the theoretical conclusion 
reached in preceding sections that there is a true 
Self to be recovered who can be identified with the 
ideal role of the saint, a re-expression of the primary 
personal plan of being a good child. I find some 
evidence in the experience of moments of innocence and 
joy, drawing in particular on the work of Dr. Oliver '
U. Sacks with victims of post-encephalitic Parkinsonism.
My concern in this study has been to develop a theory of the Self 
within a theory of the mind. It will be evident that I am myself a 
Christian - or more precisely an attempted Christian. However the 
validation of religious truth is ultimately a matter of faith acquired 
through grace, not of belief acquired through argument. I have been 
concerned with religion in this study only in two limited contexts! 
first to establish whether the Christian view of man could be expressed 
in terms of the descriptive model worked out in its earlier sections 
(the answer is yes); and secondly to explore whether it could suggest 
a more promising solution to the problems of division and alienation 
in the mind than alternative views based in one way or another on the 
more conventional assumptions of a non-paradoxical humanism (the 
answer is perhaps). I do not propose to take this particular argument 
any further in the present framework. But in the last two sections of 
this chapter I propose, in the light of what has been said about ideal 
roles, to return once more to the perennial questions who is our true 
Self? Or, to put it in the specific terms of our analysis, what is 
the true ultimate profile of the idea of the Self as it emerges in the 
various contingencies of life, acting as a major determinant of our 
decisions.
It is one thing to suggest that the true ultimate Self is the 
paradoxical ideal role of the new Self, the man for others; but this
will not be a man's own if it represents merely the adoption of an
external image. He will not be able to make it his own unless there
is an element within him that responds, and through which he can make
it part of his own unique identity. Our theory suggests that this 
element is the plan of being a good child, which is the core of the 
continuing personality, even if it is overlaid by later plans of every 
kind. But is there any evidence to support such an idea? In attempting 
to find a clearer answer to this question I shall draw on evidence from 
two somewhat diverse witnesses, Or. Oliver W. Sacks and the late F. 
Mathias Alexander.
In his remarkable book "Awakenings"1 Dr. Sacks describes the casB 
histories of a number of his patients, victims of post-encephalitic 
Parkinsonism, who were imprisoned, oftsn over many years, by the tremors, 
rigidities and tics, the twistings and freezings, festinations and 
retardations, the speech handicaps, frenzies and catalepsies of their 
appalling disease, but who were nonetheless brought back - though often 
for a pitiably short term - to health and a sense of wellbeing by the 
drug L^Dopa. Characteristically the awakening is the emergence of a 
true natural personality which, it becomes evident, had been there''' 
throughout the whole period of the illness, buried sometimes for as 
much as half a century but not destroyed. Unfortunately the balance 
restored briefly by the drug is still precarious and tends quickly to 
be lost again, so that jbhe miraculous awakening is followed by,^ a^ pj^ iod 
of tribulation leading eventually, in the happfer cases, to some form of 
accommodation with the world and the disease, but in others to serious 
relapse:
"Miss A has split into a dozen Miss A*s - the drinker, the 
ticer, the stamper, the yeller, the swinger, the gazer, the 
sleeper, the wisher, the fearer, the lover, the hater, etc. — 
all struggling with each other to 'possess' her behaviour.
Her real interests and activities have practically vanished.
The original Miss A - so engaging and bright - has beBn dis­
possessed by a host of crude degenerate sub-selves... But 
there are still a feu things which bring her together or which 
recall her former unbroken self. Music calms her... But 
above all, she is recalled by a single relation... a favourite 
younger sister."
In another context Dr* Sacks remarks:
"This return—to—pneself, resipiscence, 'rebirth*, is an 
infinitely dramatic and moving event... it shows us with 
wonderful clarity the dynamic relation of sickness to health,
of a 'false self to the real self, of a disease-world to
1. Revised edition 1976 (Pelican Books). All italics are those of
Dr. Sacks.
the real world." Again "I believe that though one can be 
'beside oneself' or 'lose oneself' for years on end, the Self 
itself is still present, intact, entire — however withdrawn or 
buried it may be."
At the time of a patient's awakening,
"reunited with the world and himself, the entire being and 
bearing of the patient now changes*•• He now feels at ease, and 
at—one with the world... There is a great sense of spaciousness, 
of freedom of being* The instabilities and knife edges of 
disease disappear and are replaced by poise, resilience and 
■ ease." '
It is evident that health and the rediscovery of the SBlf are 
associated with balance; and initially this seems to be a matter of the 
correct balancing dose of the drug. But "after a time 'enougheess* is 
lost, and thereafter there Is no longer any correct dose to give... 
it is no longer possible to 'balance* the patient". "Unease and discord - 
in thB most general of senses - are the sign and source of returning 
disease. The forms and transforms are infinitely varied.•• individuality 
is inherent in disease as in everything." Dr. Sacks generalises his 
conclusions to apply to all dis-ease:
"Common to all worlds of disease is the sense of pressure, 
coercion and force; the loss of real spaciousness and freedom; 
the loss of poise, of infinite readiness, and the contractions, 
contortions and postures of illness." "Exorbitance is already 
a first sign of breakdown; it indicates the pressure of an 
unmeetable need. Defect, dissatisfaction, underlie exorbitance, 
a not-enoughness somewhere leads to greed and 'too-muchness*,' 
to a voracity and avidity which cannot be met."
Perhaps unexpectedly he adds:
"Ue are compelled to recognise a precise formal analogy (and 
homology) between pathological propensity and sin, and must 
rank both together as ontological peccancy." "Needs and 
demands which cannot be met by reality turn towards substitute 
or compensatory activities, for which they display an ever- 
increasing avidity... The nature of this pathological propensity 
is essentially extortionate and, if unchecked, must lead to the 
death of the real being ('The wages of sin is death')." "The 
opposite of each exorbitance is a counter-exorbitance and 
patients may be bounced between these... their extremities and 
excursions tend to increase in a frightening paradigm of 
positive feedback or 'anti-control*•"
External circumstances and relationships may also be important
contributing influences, for good or ill. In some of the worst cases
"the overall situation was pathological beyond remedy" for 
this reason: "the needs of these patients were incompossible 
with reality". Yet even in pathological states the patients* 
reactions are "imbued with a personal quality which is expressed 
in dramatic or histrionic terms; the person shows forth in ail 
his reactions in a continual disclosure or epiphany of himself; 
he io always enacting himself in the theatre of his s e l f . •'
Maria G.'s real self only showed for a few days before being 
decomposed or replaced by swarming 'eelfists* - miniature, 
pathological impersonations of herself*" "The tendency to 
exorbitance and the tendency to schism are clearly quite 
separate (though they play on each other); they represent the 
two fundamental tendencies to be seen in disease. One observes 
such splits of behaviour... in all organisms pushed beyond 
a certain limit of stress and strain." However "Ons must allow 
the possibility of an almost limitless repertoire of functional 
reorganisations and accommodations leading sometimes to 
unexpected and 'inexplicable* resolutions at times when everything 
seems lost... health goes deeper than any disease." Often patients 
can work out careful behavioural devices and procedures which help 
them achieve control of themselves." These can be remarkably 
helpful; but "radically different - the true ideal - would be 
the restoration of a 'natural* rhythm and movement - the 
•kinetic melody* (in Luria's term) natural and normal to each 
patient; something which would not be a mere scheme or diagram 
or algorithm of behaviour but a restoration of genuine spacious­
ness and freedom. We have seen, again and again, that patients* 
own kinetic melodies can be given back to them, albeit briefly, 
by the use of an appropriate flow of music."
Dr. Sacks emphasises that "the qualities of the first awakening are 
essentially thosB of innocence and joy - like an anomalous return to 
earliest childhoods the Awakened, in this sense, irrespective of their 
age, come to resemble the 'once—born* of whom bJilliam James speaks."
The ensuing period of tribulation "Is an ordeal which challenges to the 
utmost those who must face it. A number are broken and fail to survive; 
others endure and are forged by their suffering. These survivors - 
the Accommodated — are... the 'twice—born* who after bitter division, 
physiological and social, finally achieve a real reunion, a reconciliation 
of the deepest end stablest kind."
Whether or not we are prepared to follow Dr. Sacks in all his 
interpretations, we cannot fail to recognise here an account, sharpened
1. Gf. Gerard Manley Hopkins:
It is the forged feature finds me; it is the rehearsal 
Of own, of abrupt self...
through the extremity of the situations described, of the nature of human 
selves as we actually encounter them, and of the relationship between 
selfhood and health reflected in the experience of our own lives. . 
Moreover it would not seem impossible to attempt some translation of 
this account into the terms in which this study has been carried out.
Let us begin with innocence and joy. These, Dr. Sacks suggests, are 
the characteristics of the true Self as it awakens. Innocence is not a 
matter of pristine inexperience and ignorance, the word literally means 
not-harming-ness — hence, we can say, an absence of aggressive and 
destructive feelings. Ue associate innocence very much with a happy 
child. A child is capable of aggressive feelings but, as was suggested 
on an earlier page, his horizons are always of the short term; if he
• \ fis happy he is wholeheartedly so, without arriBre pensea. The simplicity 
of his true Self is not "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought".
We come back to the role of the good child, responsive to the approval 
of parent figures and indeed at the root formed by them. It has been 
argued earlier that this is the child's true Self; and by extension, 
it is implied, the adult can achieve his true selfhood only as he finds 
a new innocence in the freedom which is acceptance, obedience, service 
to the Father of Creation.
The joy that goes with innocence is the correlative of a personality 
fully at ease, without internal tensions or external frustrations, the 
true Self expressing itself. In the words of the prcfbet Micdh, "He hath 
showed thee, 0 man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee 
but to do justly, and love mercy and walk humbly with thy God?" However 
for an adult to become in any lasting way as a little child, in the way 
Jesus required of him, Is a difficult matter; it involves self-knp^sdge 
and self-reconstruction, being forged through suffering and born again 
in the manner of those of Dr. Sacks' patients who achieved a stable 
accommodation with the world and their own disease. Always moreover it 
remains fleeting and uncertain.
This is a theoretical proposition; but does it correspond to any 
reality in our experience? It is suggested that I am my true Self when 
I am innocent and joyful; but how often does that happen, to me or 
to other adult human beings? The answer unfortunately is not very often.
But not novor. Joy does not have to be riotous, it can be serene, 
and most of. us know "the moment in or out of time", rare though it may 
be, when we are aware of joy:
Hence in a season of calm weather 
Though inland far we be,
Our souls have sight of that immortal sea 
Which brought us hither,
Can in a moment travel thither.
And see the Children sport upon the shore,
And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore.
We know what Wordsworth was talking about in his great ode and elsewhere. 
We can understand what Blake meant by innocence, what Rilke meant by 
praise. The experience of beauty, whether in creation or in the works 
of man, is, as Keats implied, a ki nd of experience of truth, and it is 
a truth simultaneously about ourselves and about that in which "we live 
and move and have our being". It is not only for the victims of post­
encephalitic Parkinsonism but for Shakespeare himself that the experience
of music seems above all to be a means of ordering the Self in harmony and 
ease and truth. Such experience of the beauty of holiness - not an 
incidental beauty but that of the whole - seems to me what is meant by 
a moment of grace.
Conversely it is by grace, which is the operation of the Holy Spirit, 
that we know, if only momentarily, what it is to be joyful, to be truly 
obedient and so to be wholly free. By grace we get a glimpse or sense 
of our true selves. But there is a difference, a Christian might say, 
between grace and glory. Lasting joy is associated with heaven not
earth. The pursuit of ineffable experience for its own sake is for a
human not only self-defeating but dangerous, and the true mystics, who
may start from an experience, elnd always with a Way:
Quick now, here, now always - 
A condition of complete simplicity ^
(Costing not less than everything).
For us as human beings the experience of innocence and joy may be
our guide, but the life we can hope to lead will always have its share, 
and perhaps more than its share, of frustration, pain, injustice &nd 
sorrow, some due to our own failings but some duo to the human condition
1. T.S. Eliot: "Four Quartets" (Faber, 1944).
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itself and the earth which we inhabit. A saint may live a constantly 
recollected life* turning all things to good; but a saint does not make 
himself invulnerable, very much the opposite; and Jesus Christ himself 
is identified as the suffering figure in Isaiah, ”a man of sorrows and 
acquainted with grief”. According to St. Paul God ”has shone in our 
hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face 
of Christ. Out we have this treasure in earthen vessels... For while 
we live we are always being given up death for Jesus* sake that the life
of Jesus may bs manifested in our mortal flesh... Though our outer
nature is wasting away our inner nature is being renewed every day...
For the love of Christ controls us. * Or so we may hope.
.Style
An account, drawing on the work of F.F1. Alexander,
of the idiosyncrasy of the Self as expressed In
style, or manner of use.
As mortals we are bound to death and time. And, as we suggested on
an earlier page, the bondage to time is a bondage to discontent, for no
equilibrium can be held for more than a moment:
Uhate*er I be,
Nor I, nor any man that but man is
With nothing shall bB pleas'd, till he be eas’d
Uith being nothing.
The idea of the Self includes all that a man’s mind records of himself; 
and fSsart of this, the Self, includes all the roles and
predictabilities that affect him in the future. But whenever the man 
appears in any one context, as the determining element In any one. purposive 
cycle, we are concerned with the face of the Self, that which emerges 
as relevant in this particular situation, a face which is renewed and 
remade, like a physical human face, at every moment of our progress in 
time. Because it reflects the relevant aspect of a much greater whole 
which as a rule changes only gradually, through accretion, attrition 
and decay* there are similarities in every apperance, and particularly 
in those which are closely related in timB - again as with the 
different glimpses we have of a physical face, perhaps over a whole
1* 2 Cor. 4; 6-7, 11s 5; 14.
life from childhood to old age. When we try to pin down what is unique 
and individual about it we may find that the word which most closely 
corresponds to what we are describing is style.
A style involves certain constancies of elements and of relativities 
between elements. It will always permit some changes in their values and 
it can evolve over time, like the style of classical architecture for 
example, so that the cumulative effect of change can euentually be very 
substantial; but there must always be continuity in the steps of change^ 
and in some sense a balance between changes in different values; thus 
not only the individual values or component forms must change in a 
continuous fashion, but so too must the form as a whole, maintaining 
its coherence as it evolves. It is interesting that Dr. Sacks comes 
back to this word style when he tries to identify what is unique about 
a person. He comments that even in msntal patients with massive loss 
of brain structure and function
15one may - very suddenly and movingly - see vivid momentary 
recalls of the original lost person. Again... I have seen the 
sudden ’sobering* effect of illness, tragedy, bereavement etc. 
on profoundly deteriorated, ’burnt out*... schizophrenics; such 
patients... may come together in a moment faced with over­
whelming "‘roaiity... All of us have experienced sudden com­
posures at times of profound distraction and disorganisation...
All of these ^ examples^ indicate that... it is not a question of 
this system or that, but of a total organisation... Style,In 
short, is the deepest thing in one’s being. An extraordinary 
example of this is provided by a number of letters which I once 
saw written by Henry James when he was in a terminal, extremely 
febrile, pneumonia delirium; these letters show clear evidences 
of delirium, but end unl*|uc|y-'thafc
Senry James.”
The word style as used here appears to have much the same refetahdb as 
Luria’s phrase ’kinetic melody’ quoted by Dr. Sacks. The use of the 
word composure, moreover, is again revealing; for ultimately the sign 
manual of an individual personality is the way in which he or she is 
held together, the pattern or style of his or her coherence.
An interesting comparison can be made here with the findings of a 
men working in a very different field. The late f. Mathias Alexander 
developed a technique for identifying and influencing ths physical
1. See the discussion of continuity on paga? 17-18 above.
coordination of the human body. The core of hie method lies in two 
propositions, of which the first is that the individual physical 
reactions of the body are conditioned by e general pattern of use 
which is a function of the body as a whole. We all have characteristic 
and habitual ways of performing particular physical acts, from sitting 
down in a chair to brushing our teeth. Even the simplest act of this 
sort involves elaborate muscular coordination and we often perform a 
largo number of such acts simultaneously or in varying combinations or 
sequences. It follows that these habitual ways of doing things must be 
related and coordinated? and further that the manner in which they are 
coordinated builds up to a characteristic and habitual "manner of use” 
for the bodily organism as a whole. This is not merely a function of 
the individual patterns from which it is built up, for it has an influence 
in return on the way in which the individual acts are performed. If 
twenty different people are taught a particular physical skill - how 
to serve a tennis ball for example - they will develop twenty idio­
syncratic ways of doing it, for each has his own pattern of use to which 
the neu skill/has to be assimilated. From earliest childhood the ac­
quisition of neu particular skills or habits and the building up of 
the generalised central pattern of use proceed pari passu, through a 
process of action and reaction.
Now the differences betueen individuals in their pattern of use 
derive initially from minor physical differences betueen them and 
between the situations in which particular habits were acquired? and 
differences in situation or potentiality operating on already 
differentiated patterns of use have a cumulative effect in further 
differentiating the individuals• Nevertheless, just as for every heap 
of lumps of sugar in a bowl there is theoretically one arrangement which 
is more economical of space then any other, so for any individual there 
is theoretically one pattern of use which is eimpler and more economical 
of effort than any other.1* This pattern will change if the individual 
changes. Thus if I have a knee permanently stiffened as a result of an 
accident, a great many of my physical habits — and with them my central 
pattern of use - will have to be changed; but it remains true that for
1* To be precise this is true not generally, but at any given level 
of hierarchical analysis? for if you break up the lumps of sugar 
into grains, the most economical pattern of grains in the bowl 
will be different from the most economical pattern when only the 
lumps are being arranged. This point becomes relevant to our 
argument on a latex* page.
me, stiff leg and all, there will still be one pattern of use which is 
better* because more free and more economical of energy, than any other#
In practice people often have patterns of use which are far from 
the ideal# This can be seen from the way in which they play games#
The player with a good style is one who makes his strokes with the maximum 
of freedom and the minimum of unnecessary tension or jerkiness* For any 
given stroke in tennis, for example* there will be a "classical” method 
of performing it to which every good stroke player will conform? yet 
there will always be differences between good stroke players because 
they are physically different people# We say that a player has a bad 
style if his strokes involve more tension or effort than is necessary? 
and although a player with a bad style may yet be effective* we can 
say with confidence that he would be more effective still If his style 
were improved* What Alexander maintained was that we each have a 
characteristic style which applies not merely to the way in which we 
play games but to everything that we do with our bodies#
He went further* however# He found a way of telling subjectively 
what is the right pattern of use in a given situation* The second of 
the two propositions which lie at the root of his method is this? The 
most economical way to perform any physical act is that which ensures 
that throughout the process the head is balanced as freely as possible 
on the neck# Alexander’s technique consists in learning by means of 
this touchstone a new physical manner of use. In the ordinary way ws
are not aware of exercising any control over the extremely complex
■ * ■ . ■ coordination of our movements? but such a control must exist and must
be Intricately connected with balance# It is plausible therefore that 
it should be exerted through the mechanism by which the head is poised 
on the body end by which it moves delicately to lead or compensate the 
shifting of the body’s centre of gravity whenever physical movements of 
any kind are undertaken# (My understanding is that Alexander’s 
empirical findings in this field are comformable with what is known of 
the physiological mechanism of coordination.) Alexander’s technique is 
a form of training by physical experience (it cannot be learnt from the 
printed page) which enables an individual to become consciously aware 
of the "primary control” in himself and to use it as a means of re­
learning all his physical habits. The pupil has a strong tendency to
revert to his old ways; and the first step in applying the technique is 
a negative ones to inhibit the automatic response, to detach oneself 
from one’s old habits# Constant attention is required to keep the mind 
concentrated not on the end to be gained but on the means whereby it is 
gained# Grasping for the end always frustrates obedience to the new 
control and the need to inhibit the greedy response Is fundamental to 
the technique, in a way which recalls the precept of the mediaeval author 
of "The Cloud of Unknowing”: "Snatch not over hastily, as it were a 
greedy greyhound, hunger thee never so sore.”
When a pupil has learnt the "feel11 of the primary control, he will 
indeed never forget it altogether, any more than he will forget how to 
swim if he has once acquired the art. But this does not mean that he 
will always apply it consistently or well# In order to do this he has 
constantly to be recollected, to pay attention to the means whereby 
instead of grabbing for ends all the time, and to remember always to be
obedient to the primary control. The pressures and distra&ione of every-
>
day life tend to pull hie mind away from this; moreover, unless the 
technique is regularly renewed, preferably with a teacher, it is easy 
to lose it in some degree so that the control itself becomes corrupted 
and the pupil deceives himself that he is using the method when in fact 
he is no longer doing so#1*
It will be evident that I have described this technique at some 
length, not so much for Its own not inconsiderable interest as for the 
analogies it suggests with the way in which any individual uses his whole 
organism, mind and body together, in living his life, and thereby 
establishes the style which in Dr# Sacks’ words is "the deepest thing
1. F# Mathias Alexander died in 1955 at the age of 86. During his 
lifetime he obtained a good deal of recognition and some well 
known men, including Bernard Shau, Sir Stafford Cripps, the 
Earl of Lytton, Professor John Dewey, Sir Charles Sherrington 
and Aldous Huxley were among his pupils and admiroro. A number 
of doctors recognised the value of his technique and in 1937 
nineteen eminent medical men signed a letter in the "British
Medical Journal" drawing attention to the results he had achieved 
and urging the need for a full investigation of his work. The 
war intervened howsver and regrettably one hears little of 
Alexander today, though some of his pupils are carrying on his 
work and the recent wave of interest in "holistic" techniques 
appears to be leading to a revival of interest in what he had 
to teach#
in one*s being” "Lb style c’est l^ommo” is an old saying end our 
enquiries suggest that it is a trus on©} but it is perhaps worth 
emphasising that the style is not so much the man entire as the face 
of the man, that by which ue recognise him*, The whole idea of the 
Self in the mindMnanifold, like every great feature of a physical or 
mental landscape, embodies more than can bs grasped in any one 
perception or conception; ws can only see one aspect of it at a time*
The style however is the generalised form of thB aspects of the Self 
that emerge in the successive contingencies of life/ and thus a 
conception that ue can grasp at on© time, the nearest us can get, to 
forming an idea of ths whole man* fundemantally the face that the 
Self shows in any contingency is what the whole idea of the Selft with 
its particular composition of experience end its particular manner of 
integration in the mind* looks like from a given angle at a fjlven .time*
It may be interesting to note here that Erikson is another who 
turns to the word "style”, or more precisely "style of integrity”, when 
he comes to describe the final stage of maturity in his scheme of the 
development of man, the stage in which "gradually ripen the fruit of 
theee ^ "preceding^/ seven stages”. But Erikson is led, without I think 
realising the full implications of what ho is saying, to an ideal which 
is in effect that of the species being. He identifies style exclusively 
with culture, for him the man of "ago integrity”
"is ready to defend the dignity of his own style against 
all physical and economic threats. For hs knows that an 
individual life is the accidental coincidence of but one 
life cycle with but one segment of history} end that for 
him all human integrity stands or falls with the one style 
of integrity of which he partakes. The style of integrity 
developed by his culture or civilisation thus becomes *the 
partseimony of his soul*, the seal of his moral paternity, 
of himself. In such final consolidation, death loses its 
sting.”-***
This passage is, I believe, an object lesson in the dangers to which 
the attempt to work out any "non-paradoxical” humanism in its full 
logical consequences is liable to'lead. When otrippod of the verbiage, 
it is in effect (though I do not think Erikson intended it so) a 
justification of "my country (or culture) right or wrong”; and it could
1. "Childhood and Society”, Paladin Edition, pp. 241-2
just os easily be adapted to justify "The Communist Party, vanguard 
of the working class, right or wrong". The error lies in referring 
"style" to the pattern of culture alone. It is true that wo have to 
speak the language of our time and place, which imposes a certain style 
on us; but the individual has a style within a style - and one moreover 
which can sometimes bs revolutionary* Bach and Handel both had their 
individual styles, though both used the "baroque" style of their day 
and had little option about so doing. It was St. Paul who said "0 
death where is thy sting?"; but the consummation of which he was thinking 
was something very different from Erikson1s "consolidation" with the 
pattern of a culture; end it was different essentially because the 
Christian salvation is an Individual salvation. The full realisation 
of the individual is not to be identified os the perfect "adjustment" 
to society, which so easily becomes a temptation to the psychotherapist 
as the appropriate goal for his treatment.
To return from this slight digression, I have argued earllor that 
the dominating contours of the Self are the major long term plans and 
roles which link its choices together and maintain some consistency In 
the individual1© life; end these will tend to show up, slightly changed 
in aspect but recognisably the same, from many different angles of 
approach, like the dominating forms of the shape of a great mountain.
But the mind can integrate these aspects in a generalised conception 
of the form of the whole, just as it can create © generalised conception 
of the form of a grafct mountain, even though the senses can perceive 
only one aspect at a time. The difference in complexity is immense, 
not least because the contours of the Self are extended in time as well 
as space and so involve patterns of action and of change, but it can 
hardly be doubted that ws do identify the characteristic style of an 
individual*© personality, just as we identify the style of his hand­
writing or his face.
In principle we can also say whether hie style is a good one or 
not, just as we can with an Individual*© style at playing tennis, though 
the judgement is a much more complex and difficult one to make. The 
fundamental criterion of judgement is also the same, that of freedom 
from tension. Every individual’s style must bo different from others
and idiosyncratic to himself because his experience and circumstances 
ere different from those of all other humab beings; and his style ie 
the manner in which !he integrates his potentialities in actionV^t 
the same time every human being*s experience and circumstances are in 
somB respects similar to those of others and it is possible to identify 
a "classical" style to which every individual needs to be conformed in 
his own individual way if his performance is to be perfected. It is a 
style of obedience to the primary control, in Alexandor*© termihblogy, 
and hence of maximum balance and freedom from tension in the/parts.
The touchstone of the primary control of a person’s physical manner of 
use of any of his members is whether the lead is given from the head, 
moving freely upon the body; and a Christian may extend this idea, with 
the aid of St. Paul’s great simile, to suggest that the touchstone of 
the primary control of a person’s moral manner of lifo is whether the 
lead is given by the head of the body, who is 3esus himself; "we are 
to grow up every way Into him who is the head, into Christ, from whom 
the whole body, joined and knit together by every joint with which it 
is supplied when each pert is working properly, makes bodily growth and 
upbuilds itself in love."^*
It is not perhaps necessary however to be a Christian to recognise 
that the test of the primary control is freedom - freedom on the one 
hand from incoherent "end-gaining", the srtatching of the gready greyhound, 
which breaks up the coordination of the whole person/and on tho other 
hand from the set ambition or pride which, es it were, stiffens the 
neck and corrupts the primary control* For the price of freedom is 
always sacrifice, the willingeess to be remade at every instant, the 
humility which makes obedience possible. "Nothing is vain or without 
profit to the humble soul", wrote William Law, "like the bee it takes 
its honey even from bitter herbs. It stands always in a state of 
divine growth and everything that falls upon it is like the dow ’of 
heaven to it." It is seemingly easy to be free, for no positive, effort 
is required of us. All we have to do is to be recollected, to bring 
ourselves to a poipt of balance and to pay attention. But this 
also exceedingly difficult. Simone Ueil said; "Attention is an effort, 
the greatest of all efforts perhaps, but it is a negative effort.
1. Ephesians 4, 15-16.
There is something in our soul which has a far more violent repugnance 
to true attention than the flesh has for bodily fatigue. This is 
something far more closely connected with evil than is thB flesh.fri*
Indeed it is, for (if I may revert to Christian language) it represents 
the collective pull of our sins, which tie us to all sorts of desires 
and above all to the existing pattern of the Self. All sin is distraction. 
Attention detaches us from Immediate ties and makes passible the emergence 
of a new pattern of the Self and with it a new and batter "style".
lile may well ask with Nicoderaus "How can a man be born when he is old?" 
And of course the birth of a new Self does not alter the past, or the 
materials of experience of which the man is made; but what it does alter 
is the way in which the parts are brought together in the whole. In 
terms of our model this means change in the.threshold settings of the 
potential transitions of the mind. This reorganisation can take place 
in a relatively superficial way affecting the relationships of major 
elements in tho mind-manifold only; or it may go down to deeper 
hierarchical levels, affecting every sort of relationship in a man’s 
life and bringing with it liberation and blessing in all he does. "He 
that looketh into the perfect law, the law of liberty, and so continueth, 
being not a hearer that forgetteth but a doer that workoth, this man 
shall be blessed in his doing." V *
This man will also find his true Self. Being human he will lose 
it and have to find it again and again; for ua never succeed in 
maintaining permanently a perfect style? But if wo have looked into 
the perfect law we shall be capable of knowing at every instant of 
attention what our true Self is, conformed to Christ and yet unique.
Donne quotes and translates In one of his sermons a sentence, presumably 
from one of the early Christian fathers, which is hero to the point;
"Facies Dei est qua nobis innotesclt. that’e God's face to us by which
God manifests himself to us." Each of us is different and for each of
us his life and his Self are built of different experience, so that
each of us sees the face of the Creator from a different angle. As we
pay bettor attention and respond more completely and malleably, in free 
obedience to the will which that face expresses, so we become more 
completely conformed to him. He may not get far towards such perfection
1. Simone Ufeil "Waiting on God" (Fontana) p. 27.
2*.. ' Dames 1, 25.
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in this life but a Christian will believe that somo progress may be 
achieved even on earth. "When a man turns to the Lord the veil is 
removed. Now the Lord is that Spirit and where the Spirit of the Lord 
is there is liberty. And we all, with unveiled face, beholding the 
glory of the Lord, are being changed into his likeness from one degree 
of glory to another.
Ws could perhaps end this chapter with St. Paul’s resounding words.
But there is a footnote still to add. The starting point of Chapter II 
of this study was the suggestion that the mind is a regulator; and the 
suggestion has been made that within the mind the idea of the Self, as 
it emerges in each contingency of life, plays a crucial part in the 
regulation of the organism. From the scientific point of view, accordingly, 
the most important question to be asked about any particular idea of the 
Self is whether it is effective in regulation, otherwise whether it 
conduces to the survival of the organism (or at least of its genes). A 
Self formed on the principle that he who loseth his life shall save it 
might not eeem to offer promising results from this point of view.
However there is a counter to this argument. The advent of civilisation, 
based on the accumulation of knowledge, has led to ever larger units of 
organisation and ever more alarming possibilities of destruction, and it 
has had the effect that survival, whether of genes, of individuals or of 
social groups, has become much less a matter of competition and much more 
a matter of cooperation. For reasons I suggested in discussing the ideal 
role of the saint, the development and perpetuation of civilisation depends 
very much on there being enough sacrificial love in the world to keep 
a humane society in being. Without it man will destroy himself* And 
this is why an idea of the Self formed on the principle of sacrificial 
love is essential even from the point of view of effective regulation.
I believe that this counter-argument is a sound one so far as it 
goes. But we should not allow it to disguise the fact that it is merely 
a convenient assumption of ours that survival is desirable, or that 
evolution moves somehow in a forward direction. Science is neutral.
It may define, on certain assumptions,' what constitutes effective 
regulation, but it will not certify the initial assumptions of value, 
nor (which is thB same thing) tell us whether effective regulation is
1. 2 Cor. 3, 16-18
good or bad in itself* At the end of the day we have to look beyond 
science to some metaphysical criterion; and it is to the philosophical 
issues which arise that I turn in the last chapter of this study*
Vis THE IDEA AMD THE REALITY
What fine chisel .
Could ever yet cut breath? Shakespeare
Any study of the nature of man is likely to come up against some
of the most difficult, and currently most disputed, of the perennial
questions of philosophy* It would be far beyond my powers to deal with
them comprehensively, and would in any case take the space of a further
study on this scale* Nevertheless the analysis presented in this study
can have little purchase on real life unless it is fitted, explicitly
or implicitly, into some framework of philosophical judgement*
Accordingly in this final chapter I turn my attention to a feu of these
perennial questions - What constitutes the identity of an individual?
What is human knowledge? What is the relationship of brain and mind?
How are us to understand freedom? What freedom, if any, do ws have in
our lives? Do ue bear responsibility for the lives we live? My aim
is not to treat them in any comprehensive way, reviewing, analysing
and comparing different approaches to them, but rather to look qt them
I
partially and one-sidedly in the light of the analysis of human 
personality and the human mind which has been worked out in preceding 
chapters* In this way I hope to bring the issues discussed pn earlier 
pages into a final perspective, and at the same time to make some 
points which are not entirely unconstructive about the philosophical 
questions themselves*
Identity
In this section I discuss the question of what gives 
the Self identity, with reference in particular to the 
ideas of the philosopher, Robert Nozick.
In'.the opening section of Chapter III, I described three different 
perspectives in which we could view the idea of the Self, those of 
biological man, behavioural man and psychological man* This study has 
been concerned in the main with psychological man, the creature of 
plans and purposes who emerges in the successive contingencies of life 
In the aspect of the nanticipatory SeXfM to act as a major determinant 
of the man’s actions* Yet who, in the event, takes these actions? Who
is the true Self? Who am I? In thedpreceding chapter wo have been 
considering what defines the true idea of the Self* But if the idea 
of the Self es it emerges in a given contingency can be true or false, 
this suggests that there is some reality to which it can be true* What
is that reality? One suggestion which ws considered was that the more
closely ws can approximate to the ideal role of the man for others, 
epitomised in Jesus Christ, the more closely we can approximate to 
our true selves* But even if this is accepted, ws are still left with 
the question of what this true Self - who is surely not identical with 
the original bearer of any ideal role - can be* What is our own identity?
This, ws remember, was a problem that obsessed Shakespeare’s King 
Richard II* Here he is at the moment of his abdication and final 
humiliations
Give me that glass and therein will I read***
Was this the face 
That like the sun did make beholders wink?***
A brittle glory shinath in this face;
As brittle as ths glor^ is the face '•
/[Dashes the glass against the ground/
For there it is, crack’d in a hundred shivers,
Mark, silent king, the moral of this sport -
How soon my sorrow hath destroy’d my face*
Bolingbrokes
The shadow of your sorrow hath destroy’d 
The shadow of your face.
King Richards Say that again*
The shadow of my sorrow? HeS Let’s see*
•Tie very trues my grief lies all within; * ■
And these external manners of lament 
Are merely shadows to ths unseen grief 
That swells with silence in the tortur’d soul* 
r-. There liss the substance*
King Richard is struggling with his impersonations, the faces^ JJjat he 
wears jin particular situations* These faces may be incompatible with 
each other, and in any case they are but shadows of the suffering in 
the inarticulate, faceless SJoouln uithin* There within lies the 
substance, the incarnation, the real man. Yet whet identity does the 
real man have?
In trying to answer this question I will first deal briefly with
the suggestion that our true identity is that of behavioural man, the
sum of the roles we play and thus the pattern by which ws fit into the
world* I will borrow an answer by quoting some words from Martin 
Hollis* book "Models of Man"***:
"Structural role theory sees the individual as essentially the 
incumbent of social positions which by definition can have more 
than one incumbent* There cannot be a position which only I 
can fill... Hence I am the sum of my roles only on further 
assumptions about the relation of identity to roles.,* A 
proposal (which would surely delight Leibniz) to define a 
person in terms of reflections In the eyes of others will 
merely raise unanswerable doubts about the identity of the 
others. It may suit R*S* /sic7 Laing not to know who anyone 
is, but the philosopher protests that such monads cannot be 
logically unique. Ths philosopher *•* demands that there 
cannot be two persons who satisfy whatever makes me the 
particular person I am, and the sociologist supplies a notion
of who I_am too lax to count as an identity at.all.•* What
£ a man_/ essentially is depends partly on what is essential 
to his being any person and partly on what is essential to his 
being that particular person... The problem is to make 
personal identity personal and social identity identity. Our 
final conjecture is that the strict identity is that of bodies, 
which in turn secures that of parsons who perform individuating 
actions; their identity !ai persons is secured by their tiaviog 
rationally become occupants of social positions... 
does at least explain what a crisis of identity is a crisis of.
The affliction strikes iben what I am no longer accounts for 
who I am, because what I do is no longer the rational acting 
out of what I have chosen to become."
This seems to ms a valuable piece of clear thinking. I will take
up two paints, beginning with the argument about a crisis of identity.
We can link this to the theory of the idea of the Self built up in
preceding chapters. For a crisis of identity arises In two types of
contingency: first when the structure of a men’s idea of himself is
such that in given circumstances it gives out an uncertain sound,
because in some way he lacks sincerity or authenticity; and secondly
when the structure of his environment is changed in such a way that the
scenarios necessary for the roles he would wish to play can no longer be
2.
realised - in other words when he has suffered bereavement. In both 
cases, though in different ways, he needs in our terms to be reborn; his
1. Cambridge 1977. Quotations from pages 94, 95 and 100.
2. See in this connection the chapter "Gaining a new Identity" in 
Colin Murray Parkes "Bereavement" (1972, Pelican Edition 1975).
idea of himself needs to be reconstituted from the foundations. In this 
context however we are still dealing with the problem of the true idea 
of the Self, not with the Self’s ultimate identity. W& come back to the 
second point, which is Hollis* "final conjecture that the strict identity 
is that of bodies, which in turn secures that of persons."
In our terms this is the argument already briefly developed-in 
Chapter III that the ultimate Self is biological man, the man uniquely 
located through his body in space and time. It is to be stressed however 
that biological man is not merely the body as a measurable, ponderable 
bag of flesh and bones which we may recognise in a given contingency} 
but what is better called the creature, a trajectory across space and 
time, the world and history, a four-dimensional form extending from 
conception to dissolution and identified essentially, as anything is 
ultimately identified, by its continuity.^8 It may be recalled that 
C.G. Jung described an experience which he underwent while in a coma 
and close to death after a heart attack in the following terms:
I had the feeling that everything was being sloughed away; 
everything I aimed at or wished for or thought, the whole 
phantasmagoria of earthly existence fell sway or was 
stripped from me - an extremely painful process. Neverthe­
less something remained; it was as if I now carried along with 
me everything I had ever experienced or done, everything that 
had happened around me. I might also say: it was with me and 
I was it. I consisted of all that, so to speak. I consisted 
of my own history, and I felt with great certainty: this is 
what I am. "I am this bundle of what has been, and what has 
been accomplished."2*
This is no more than anecdotal evidence, but there have been many similar 
reports from others who have been very close to death and it is fair to 
take the anecdotes as at least supporting testimony.
The idea that the identity of a whole is determined by its 
continuity has been elaborated by Robert Nozick in his book "Philo­
sophical Explanations"^* Without attempting to go into this issue in 
technical detail, it may be useful here to quote some passages which 
will indicate the tKrtust of Nozick’s argument. Before doing so, however,
1. See the discussion of continuity in the sections on "Regulation 
and Self-Regulation" and "Trajectories" in Chapter I above.
2. "Memories, Dreams, Reflections", 1961. Fontana Edition p.321.
3. Harvard 1981.
it is necessary to go back a step to Nozick’s theory of ths synthesis 
of the Self, which grows out of his discussion of the;problem of 
reflexive self-awareness. To quote him directly:
"With a pre-existing I therB is always roam for a mistake 
/[about whom one is talking about in a first—person statementT? 
also there remains the question of what constitutes the 
knowledge, when that pre-existing thing is referred to, that 
what is referred to is oneself. However if the self is 
synthesised around the reflexive act there is no room for the 
act to refer to something other than it. The self is 
synthesised as the object referred to in the reflexive 
!tod<ening of I... The reflexive act refers to the thing of 
greatest organic unity that includes it; and that thing is 
synthesised for the purpose of being referred to, by the 
very act of referring to it. Thus there cannot be any error 
due to misidentification." (p.90).
For Nozick the criterion of selfhood is the capacity for reflexive self- 
reference; thus "we can understand why this is so if the self is syn­
thesised... by an act of self-referring and... around an act of reflexive 
self-referring." This, he argues (though perhaps with a touch of 
circularity^ explains "how reflexive self-awareness is possible and why 
a self is essentially a self", (p. 91) He continues:
"The self synthesises itself not only transversely, among 
things existing only at that time, but also longitudinally so 
as to include past entities, including past selves, which 
were synthesised... Could some pre-existing entity be identical 
with the self bhat is synthesised..? If so, wouldn’t it turn 
out that this pre-existing thing was what was synthesised, that 
is, newly delineated though already existing independently..?.. 
Certainly I can think I existed before this moment and ibbaij it 
is a later stage of my earlier self who now refers to.himself.
Yet all this holds true in virtue of the current act Cfsself- 
synthesis, not independently of it." (p.92).
It is not my intention to discuss the strength of this argument in 
philosophical terms; but the point which emerges strongly in the present 
context is that Nozick*s philosophical argument seems to converge 
remarkably with our own account in psychological terms of the process of 
thought. The self which is, to use his words, "synthesised, that is, 
newly delineated though already existing independently" corresponds to 
what I have called the "evoked" idea of the Self as distinct from the 
"stored idea" which exists independently in the mind-manifold. We are 
not surprised to find also ,a correlative of the "anticipatory Self":
"The I * s self-synthesis includes e self—conception which projects into 
the future." (p. 105 of Nozick’s book). Concerned as he is with 
highly abstract philosophical issues* Nozick has nothing corresponding 
to the detailed model built up in Chapter III* but his very general 
model nonetheless corresponds at several crucial points with ours* And 
his line of thought leads him directly to the problem with which we are 
familiar of the relationship between psychological man and biological 
man* which can also present itself as that of the relationship between 
the successive "faces” evoked from the stored idea of the Self in the 
successive contingencies of life*
Nozick finds his solution to this problem in a theory of identity 
over time which he describes as the "closest continuer" theory end which 
in turn rests upon a theory of the nature of wholeness?
"Ue care about our closest continuer because we care about our 
identity, and that is what continued identity comes to*" (p.67)
"The closest continuer theory of identity ^ has/ three components? 
that the next day’s parson somehow arise from today’s you; that 
it be close enough (according to a weighted sum of characteristics) 
to be you, if there existed no other continuer as close as you; 
and that there be no other as close*," (p.360),
"The closest continuer view is that y at t2 is the same person 
as x at t^  only if, first, y’s properties at t2 stem from, grow 
out of, are causally dependent on x’s properties at t^ and, 
second, there is no other z at that stands in a closer (or 
as close) relationship to x at t^." (p.36-7).
"The closest continuer of a;whole is not the sum of the closest 
continuers of its parts* Consider the sum of the cells of your 
body plus the other non-cellular material of the body* Cells 
are continually being sloughed off, while new ones are mads; 
also there are sometimes more drastic happenings, for example, 
removal of an organ or dismemberment* The closest continuer of 
this sum of cells plus stuff is the sum of the closest 
continuers of the parts, including the closest continuers of 
your sloughed off cells and your removed appendix, but not 
including the newly made cells. The closest continuer of the 
whole body, on the other hand, does not include as parts the 
continuers of the sloughed off colls, removed appendix and 
lost eye, while it does include new cells, newly generated 
tissue, and perhaps an artificial heart valve. There is no 
division of the body into parts so that the body’s identity 
over time is simply the sum of these parts’ identities over 
time. Since the body and the sum of its ports differ in their 
properties — one,is the same as some later entity but the other 
is not - they are not the same. Thus we have reached the 
result that some things are different from the sum of their 
parts; we may call those things wholes (Note that we have given 
a sense to the difference between wholes and a sum of parts only
for things which continue over time.)" (pp.99-100).
"A whole need not involve any significant organic unity...
^ But J  an organic unity does something to maintaining the 
integrity and continuance of the whole, unlike a.heap...
The unity of 1 consists of X’s integrity at its own level.
It has this integrity provided its identity is not reducible 
to that of its parts." (p.100). "The I synthesises itselfas 
: a unified whole - it does not specify its identity over future 
times as "whatever is the sum of fSshe continuers of my current 
constituents". It construes itself as able to lose bodily 
parts, perhaps even a body, to lose memories, perhaps even 
memory. The I synthesises itself as having the identity 
through time of a unified whole." (p.104). v
Now the closest continuer theory of identity is applicable to anything 
has an existence in time - a stone, a cloud, a building, an insect, as 
well as a man. If wa accept (as I do) that the identity of the Self is 
that of a whole existing in space and time, and including the various 
changing features of a whole body and its behaviour, we may have 
settled to our satisfaction the question of identity; but we have not 
settled the question of what is the distinguishing criterion of a Self.
Here again Nozick gives us a pointer. "What is special about people, 
about selves", he says, "is that what constitutes their identity through 
time is partially determined by their own conception of themselves."
(p. 69) It is not a matter of indifference to the individual’s final 
identity, the four-dimensional form that he carves out through the world 
and history, that at frequent intervals he synthesises himself, that is, 
he evokes a synchronic idea of himself; for, as we have argued, this 
evoked idea (psychological man) affects the decisions that he takes, 
and consequently what he does and what happens to him; thus it affects 
the form and identity of biological man.
In earlier chapters we have discussed at some length the mechanisms 
through which this happens. They involve consciousness and the knowledge 
we gain in consciousness. But how, in an apparently deterministic world, 
can we in fact ascribe any ultimate importance to this procesq? How 
can we say that the individual determines anything at all if everything 
he does is apparently the outcome of the interaction of his heredity 
and his environment? I shall be taking up this issue in the later sections 
of this chapter; but in the meantime we have to face certain prior 
questions, which relate in particular to the nature and status of our 
knowledge of anything.
Ways of Knowing
A classification of six ways of knowing, which grows out 
of the quasi-Kantian view of knowledge developed in 
earlier chapters.
I have already suggested that our knowledge is always only of facts 
about things, while the things in themselves are for ever beyond our 
grasp. Nozick expresses in effect a similar quasi-Kantian view of 
knowledge in his own terminology?
"Knowledge is a particular way of being connected to the world, 
having a specified factual connection to the world, tracking it...
To know is to have a belief that tracks truth... A person’s belief 
that £ is knowledge which is subjunctively connected in a 
specified way to the fact that £? he knows that £ when hi's 
belief that £ tracks the fact that £... A belief’s being 
causally determined does not undercut the desirability of the 
tracking connection and might well underlie that connection... 
Beliefs track facts as truths.
I do not think Nozick defines anywhere what he means by a fact, but the 
implication is that he means a true proposition, or what we understand 
when we understand a true proposition; and this is reconcilable, if not
identical, with my view of a fact as a factum, a "made thing", a model
of reality which is a semantic structure with its own form-as-a-whole, 
built of logical forms that convey moaning. His image of belief as 
"tracking" truth recalls a remark by Einstein, as reported by Martin 
Buber? "Uhat we (the physicists) strive for fes just to draw lines after 
him, to draw after - as one retraces a geometrical figure.
On this basis I would argue that we are concerned with two worlds, 
that of consciousness which we can know and that of nature or reality 
. or things-in-themselves, which we cannot know, but which in our conscious 
perceiving and thinking we can attempt in a partial way to model or 
track. The test of successful modelling is causal prediction, getting 
things right. Sir Alfred Ayer brings against this type of argument th8 
objection that "these imperceptible objects, having been moved into the 
territory which the perceptible objects have been forced to abandon, are
1. "Philosophical Explanations", pp. 178, 317, 318.
2. Quoted by Alan Ecclestone in "The Night Sky of the Lord"
(DLT 1980).
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located in perceptible space, and itis Bot easy to understand how 
spatial relations can be thought to persist when their terms have been 
taken away from them."^* This objection is in my view based on a mis­
conception insofar as it assumes that the unreachable reality of things 
in themselves exists in perceptible space* On the contrary we have no 
reason to say that they exist in perceptible space; it is misleading 
(though in practice we have no alternative) even to apply the categories 
of singular and plural to reality as it is in itself* I have indeed 
argued that we recognise ideas in a quasi-topological, non-perceptual 
space* But ideas are still codings of a reality we cannot directly 
grasp. The comments of a notable physicist, Erwin Schrodinger, on this 
point seem to me to be apt? "If we spoke ... of the world’s process 
being mirrored in the perceiving mind, this was a stereotype, a phrase, 
a metaphor. The world is.given only once. Nothing is mirrored... The 
world extended in space*and time is our idea..." *
Thus in effect we can distinguish six ways of knowing, six:, 
types of experience of the known in the world of consciousness:
a. True Perceptual Thoughts (i.e. perceptions or observations)
in which the interpreting schemata of consciousness are infused 
with sensory values which seem to us to certify their reality, 
that is, to certify that they "track" the truth. These sensory 
values are "primitives" in registers of possibility established 
in the ultimate categories of sensory quality and intensity — 
colour, loudness, cold and so on; while the schemata are forms 
built of equally "primitive" values emerging in ultimate 
ranges of possibility established by various kinds of spatial 
or spatio-temporal continuum.
b. Untrue Perceptual Thoughts. The assurance given by the sensory 
values that we experience in perception is not quite absolute, 
since we cannot perceive without interpreting schemata or forms
1. "Construction of our Theory of the Physical World", 1973,
reprinted in Honderich and Burnyeat ed. "Philosophy as It Is" 
(Penguin 1979).
2. "On the Peculiarity of the Scientific World View" in "What is 
Life? and Other Scientific Essays" (Doubleday Anchor 1956).
and sometimes the interpretation proves wrong — as it may when 
we look at a trompe l’osil balcony painted on a wall. Even then 
however a correct interpretation does not involve recognising new 
sensory values, only fitting the same sensory values into alternative 
schemata.
True Thoughts about the Natural World. Here the object of our 
experience is a mental model, a structure of logical forms, 
without sensory values, but one which has a high causal probability 
and consequently a high conductivity to purposive thought. Such a 
model has high causal probability if it is based on closely similar 
models Which have been critically tested in similar conditions and 
not falsified by*bb^ceptual observations (our own arbthar trust­
worthy people’s). The logical forms are again values in an 
ultimate category of logical forms emerging in the logical space of 
consciousness, on which all other forms and spaces have to be 
mapped before wa can become conscious of them.
The range of possibilities in the categories of sensory quality, 
intensity and form are relatively restricted, but I have argued 
elsewhere (in my studies of the grammar of perception, thought and 
language) that on a given occasion a limited register of possibility is 
established within the appropriate categories of experience and then 
resolved into actuality as information is passed. In the caso of 
logical forms thB ultimate range of possibility is very much 
greater, but a similar procedure is followed; the process of conscious 
thought involves the continual opening up and resolution of 
successive ranges of possibility within the category* (This 
process is analysed in detail in the discussion in ”T.hs Grammar 
of Language" of the process by which a sentence is understood, as 
well as in the appendix on the grammar of music).
So far as causal probability is concerned, the degree of 
similarity in the model (and the environmental conditions) with 
those of previous successful experience, together with the extent 
of previous testing, should theoretically determine the degree of 
credibility of ideas currently entertained, though in practice the
subjective preconceptions of the thinker, the patterns of his 
•bnticipatory Self”, may also have some effect upon it - usually 
by affecting his judgements of similarity and hence his classi­
fications * Because it has a high conductivity to purposive 
thought the model can be used as a plan or built as an element 
into a wider model which is used as a plan*
d® Untrue Thoughts about the Natural World. These can be distinguished 
from the thoughts in c. only when they are put to the test of 
observation or of coherence with more securely established thoughts - 
and fail the test. When recognised to be untrue, they become equiva­
lent to fictions.
e* fictions. These are forms or models which appear to track the
truth of the natural world but in fact do not. By definition they 
have no conductivity to purposive thought and so cannot be fitted 
as elements into models which are to be used as plans*
f® Thoughts Not Even Apparently about thB Natural World® These are 
thoughts about (i) classifications of the natural world (that is, 
about phenomena in general); (ii) relationships between classifications; 
and (iii) the logical implications of given constructions of ideas 
(that is constructions of instances of classifications)* 
Characteristically they are in no case anchored by values locating 
them in natural space and time.
Although, as we have noted, the assurance of the truth of perceptual 
observations which is given by their being infused with sensory values is 
not quite absolute, sinse the interpreting schemata may prove to be wrong, 
in the last resort the only guarantee we can have that we are in touch 
(significant word) with the world of nature is the experimental guarantee 
of perceptual observation* Correspondingly, just as observations seem to 
be certified as referring to reality by the sensory values which infuse them, 
ao untrue throughts or fictions or thoughts not about the natural world 
are certified as real in experience (if not in reference) by the "feeling 
tone" of mood or emotion which infuses our consciousness of them, and so 
locates them Here Now. Without this link to Me Here Now we could not be 
conscious of them, as there would be nothing to be conscious of: there might
be a magic lantern, but it would have no light source
Our Idea of the Natural World
An account of our idea of the natural world as a model 
constructed in a unified space-time continuum*
Having made this classification of the different ways of knowing 
available to us, let us now consider more closely the way in which we 
build upeout of elements of this knowledge our picture or model of the 
world of nature, bearing in mind that in our world of consciousness we can 
only know the model, not the reality as it is in itself*
The physical world as we know it is in the first instance the 
immediate limited volume of three-dimensional space Here, in which we 
perceive objects and events in the passing moment of time Now* The 
knowledge that we acquire through our senses is already coded in terms 
of values in the limited categories of sensation and form* Our 
perceptions are of a great variety of things, but they are all expressed 
through this limited range of sorts of value* We apprehend a large number 
of sensory point values simultaneously, but the mind makes coherent sense of 
them by construing them in a space - whether the three-dimensional space 
of visual and tactile impressions or the analogical spaces in which we 
recognise forms with a time dimension. In the process the mind organises 
them as cells enclosed by extended forms in two or more dimensions, and the 
cells &ay themselves be organised further in extended composite patterns 
or disposite structures* The extended forms, patterns or. structures 
represent values recognised in further limited registers of discriminabls 
form which emerge as the ranges of possibility - the categories of 
perception - implied by synchronic extension in space. These forms are 
not defined by sensory values as such, but by difference in sensory 
values in extension.
In construing coherently the messages received simultaneously through 
so many different channels, the mind constructs a model of;,;tjm: real world 
Here Now. I call it a model because, as we have seen, it is not a direct 
intimation of reality, it is a construction made of elements drawn from 
a limited number of registers of possible value already inherent in the
mind* It is not self-generated because the messages which it unifies are 
not stimulated by itself; that is to say, it refers to a reality outside 
itself which i3 beyond direct comprehension* Yet is is a construction 
of the mind, depending on a process of selection and arrangement which 
the mind itself appears to undertake. Crucial to this process is the 
creation, as it were, of the space in which extended forms can be 
apprehended; and ue may note that whereas our impressions of sensory 
quality and intensity appear in disparate categories which are linked 
to specific bodily organs, we recognise values of form in a space-tim© 
which is common to all the sensory categories and is not associated with 
any specific sensory organ, but seems rather to be an internal creation 
of the mind or brain* ,(It is true that we may hear sounds, for example, 
as extended in an analogical space with dimensions of pitch, loudness 
end synchronic time; but this space is an interpretative expension, as it 
were, of a sound which has first of all a location Here (or There) in 
normal three-dimensional space and is happening Now in diachronic timef 
a particular stretch of diachronic time is extracted and laid out syn- 
chronically to moke possible a quasi-spatial analysis of the sound giving 
it a form in time; but its location in the diachronic stream is not 
lost.)
Our impression of the world Here Now may be a constructed model 
of what is in itself beyond knowledge; but it is an extremely vivid 
model, and one that does seem to transmit reality to us. The trouble 
with it is, however, that it is limited and transient. The world Here 
of which we can become perceptually aware is of very restricted pxtent; 
and the moment Now of any one fixation of consciousness lasts for 
only a fraction of a second and is then gons for ever. These . 
difficulties ws are able nevertheless to transcend in some degree 
with the aid of memory, abstraction and imagination. First we are 
able to divert our attention away from what may for convenience be 
called real space and focus it on an imagined space in which, as we 
have already noted, images of past perception may be reproduced*
These images are expressed in the same perceptual categories as those 
of real space, but they are of much weaker intensity; they occur in a 
notional space which is enclosed within o real space that is still
there and ie only temporarily transparent to our attention; and we can 
always (except perhaps in pathological states) distinguish the 
remembered from the immediately real without difficulty* Through 
the use of images we are able to juxtapose the remembered with the 
immediate, or else one memory with another.
It is important however to note that in the process we are not 
juxtaposing one complete perception or the memory of it with the 
memory of another complete perception incorporating all the sensory 
values available at the time of perception* We are paying attention to 
a limited number of cells or patterns or individual values for comparison 
with others* Even when we compare wholes we concentrate on a few 
values for the whole, omitting a great deal of perceptual detail*
Uith the aid of generalisation in a further logical space we can 
establish likenesses, identities, classifications, and ue are then 
able to generate in our imagined space images of instances of these 
classifications which are created rather than explicitly remembered; 
end we can put thorn together in new imagined ways to form new complex 
images, which are imaginary models, not memories at all*
Memory enables us to recognise that there is continuity between 
our perceptions* There are switches of attention which break this 
continuity, but the vast majority of our perceptions form part of what 
I have called progressions, within each of which there is s continuity 
of both space and time bstwsen ons perception and the next, and con­
sequently over the progression as a whole. We note the continuity 
because we recognise the same forms in adjacent perceptions. The 
result is to establish a continuous volume of space and a continuous 
span of time for the whole progression - as for example when I watch a 
cavalcade moving down the street and across the square.
bJe can only actually see ons part of the continuum in any one 
perception. Moreover we cannot bring the whole of this region of space- 
time within the frame of a single imago even, strictly, in imagination* 
Yet we reconstruct an idea of the whole and we assign physical reality 
^  as if we could perceive or fully imagine it. I say an idea of 
the wholB rather than an image of the whole because a visual image
would be in Euclidean ©pace and it would often be impossible for us 
to frame the whole in one such perspective* Our realisation may be 
associated with located images of certain parts, as a tourist map of 
Britain may include little pictures of castles or cathedrals here and 
there; but the idea itself is much more generalised and flexible, a 
logical form in logical space, on which the images are mapped. This 
idea of the whole is a model of physical reality. Although it is 
realised in a flexible and generalised way, we conceive the reality 
as possessing the fixed distances and forms of a metric space? but we 
conceive this abstractly by the superimposition of generalised 
quantitative values, together with the use of images of parts of the 
wholes the images being in an Euclidean rather than a metric space do 
not need to be all strictly in scale with each other.
Such a model of physical reality is restricted to the region 
covered by a single continuous progression of perceptions, and it is 
based on memory rather then creative Imagination* Two further steps 
however - and they must originally have been significant steps in 
the evolution of human ^consciousness - enable us to transcend these 
limitations*. The first is to make the assumption that the regions 
covered by different remembered perceptual progressions, even though 
apparently discrete, are in fact connected in a single continuous 
physical reality extended in a unified infinite region of universal 
space and absolute time. There are spatial gaps between different 
progressions caused by our own switches of attention and there are 
temporal gaps caused by intervals of sleep oBdunconsciousness. But we 
fill the gaps with stretches of space and time realised in the most 
vague, flexible and generalised way, yet specifically enough to enable 
us to establish the necessary continuity. The consequence is that we 
assume that there is one physical world , not many? and in order to do 
this we have to be able to distinguish between what we regard as * 
genuine perceptions and memories and delusive ones, such as dreams 
or memories of dreams.
1. The theory of relativity has complicated the way in which a
physicist would conceive all this, but tho fact that the physicist 
can think in terms of a single ”big bang” implies that he has 
not altogether parted company with the common sense assumption 
that we are dealing with one space—time in which locations can 
be unique.
The second step is connected with the recognition of cause and 
effect* Us identify, or think we Identify, classes of sequences of classes 
of events, which are liable to recur. Such an identification is the 
establishment of a causal model, the recognition of a causal form. 
Thereafter if we identify what seems like the first part of an instance 
of the class of sequences of events of which our form or model is the 
paradigm, we may predict, and thereby imagine, the sec nd part*
Conversely if we identify the second part we may Infer that it was 
preceded by the first and imagine that* Subsequent experience may 
appeer to confirm that we were right and so strengthen our belief in 
the model that we have constructed, or it may do the reverse. The 
'effect is that ws can proceed by means of creative imagination to build 
models of parts of the physical universe which are altogether inaccessible 
to our own perceptions, out of elements which may go back ultimately 
to perceptual experience but which after a few stages of abstract 
construction and re-generalisation may already b© far removed from 
sensory events* Moreover by means of communication through speech or 
other codes wa can gain access to ideas and images of many actualities 
and models acquired by other people, which we can then add to our own 
store* In this way over the years, particularly after the invention 
(through such creative imagination) of writing and mathematical codes, 
it has become passible for on individual to build up a remarkably 
elaborate idea of physical reality, and moreover one held in common 
with other members of his civilisation.
Now such on Idea of the world is far too complicated to be grasped 
in detail in any one predicative step of consciousness. But of its 
nature we regard the reality as having a continuous real existence 
outside the span of any one conscious predication* this is where the 
assumption of universal space and absolute time comes in. It is there 
even when we are not thinking of it. And there is something there even 
if ws don*t quite know what it is, or if some idea which we did form 
of it has had to be abandoned. In other words nature is there for our 
discovery; and discovery, when it occurs, takes the form of a model 
which, like the map made by an explorer, seems to prove itself valid
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tor prediction end inference, at least within the conditions that tie 
can test* It must be stressed that what w© can know through these 
processes of thought and imagination is no more than a provisional 
modal* not the thing in itself? and the elements of the model are 
derived* though perhaps through many stages* from past perceptions 
which are ©till not direct parceptiona M  ultimate physical reality* 
but msseages conveyed through the codes providad by the given batagorias 
of sensation and construed together by the mind in further given 
categories of space and time.
The Status of our Idea of the Natural World
An account of our idea of the natural world as a kind 
of public knowledge distinguishable from our transitory 
private knowledge of the predications of consciousness 
and existing independently of consciousness*
The question which now forces itself upon us is that of the status 
of our idea or model of the natural world* do can perceive* or even 
think, only a minute fraction of this immense whole at any time* Yet 
it ia constantly there, itorad and available to us for reference* It 
is represented in the model developed in this study so the complex terrain 
of the mind-manifold* constituting a form which somehow "tracks11 dr 
encodes the unreachable reality of things in themselves* I# can evoke 
a copy of a part of it at will, or more or less at will? but our actual 
experience can never embrace more than a detailed copy or representation 
of a small fragment of th© whole, or else a more generalised copy or 
representation of some larger excerpt* In addition the model itself can 
direct im to things in the natural world *• books, maps, picturesor 
people, for example - from which through perception further encoded 
information about the world con reach us* But the fact remains that 
what we can recognise are evocations from the mind-manifold* not the 
manifold itself* The process of evocation in all likelihood involves 
some kind of recoding* Moreover the manifold, which wo cannot reach 
directly* is in turn only a coded representation of the eventual truth* 
a message about the world* We cannot escape from codes*
It is no doubt because of this that the mind-manifold does not 
merely contain information about the natural world, it also contains 
information about signs and symbols# These are perceptual forms, or 
classes thereof, which under certain conditions stand not for them­
selves but for certain logical forms, otherwise ideas or classifications# 
These they recall in such a way that by means of grammatical rules (also 
stored in the manifold) they can be manipulated to build up and transmit 
complex logical forms created ad hoc for each occasion* The combination 
of a set of related signs and symbols with an appropriate set of 
grammatical rules constitutes a Code or language. We can distinguish 
however between man-made codes and languages which individuals or 
particular cultural groups create or learn, and the codes of perception 
and thought which are the universal given languages of the mind, 
embodying rules which are the inescapable given constraints of logical 
necessity - the codes which constitute the category walls of human 
consciousness#
We noted earlier that our impressions of sensory quality and 
intensity appear in disparate categories linked to specific bodily x\p 
organs, which are, as it were, transducers of external reality, while 
values of form, together with the space-time continuum in which tbby 
emerge, are oommon to all the sensory categories, and seem to be internally 
generated# They seem to represent the schemata and the relationships 
between schemata through which we construe the data of perception and 
create, as it were, the cone of consciousness that unites a variety of 
data in synchronic separation and relationship, grasped in successive 
steps of diachronic time# The arena of space and time thus created 
represents a sort of public area in which values from different sensory 
organs are brought together# The process of bringing them together 
involves construing them into forms, but it seems fair to say that it 
is the sensory qualities and intensities which are the primary data, 
the messengers of reality, while ths forms, which are themselves 
defined by differences in sensory value, are secondary - the vehicles 
of the reality that shines through them to become accessible to 
consciousness#
All our consciousness of perceptions involves e feeling tone of 
mood or emotion in addition to strictly sensory values/ and I have argued 
that it also involves the recognition of logical forms in a logical 
space which is the true arena of consciousness} perceptual forme and 
sensory values are apprehended not directly but only os mapped On to 
the forme and values of thought* Correspondingly we con think abstract 
thoughts, which are constructions of logical forms In relationship, 
without paying any attention to the physical world around us, though 
a feeling tone ia required to give reality to these thoughts, locating 
them in'Me Here Now#
Let us now consider what happens when you and X both look at the 
same scene* Ue each recognise a space with forme in it and in each case 
what we see is certified as tracking reality because of the sensory 
values infusing it. Experimentally,,, moreover, we find that we are, 
looking at a common reality, a part of the world of nature to which we 
both belong, because suppositions based on that hypothesis are confirmed* 
Xf X brand!eh a club, you duck away* If we see a fallen tree trunk in 
the way, we can successfully cooperate together to move it when neither 
of us could do so alone* On the assumption that we are similar beings 
inhabiting a common world ws can develop means of symbolic communication - 
words, diagrams and so on - which enable me to describe a part of the 
world to you, and vice versa*
Uhat I can not do, however, is to transmit to you one of my own 
perceptions, either when I experience it or subsequently* All I can 
transmit is an image, comparable at best to a memory image, or else a 
construction of logical forms - a complex idea* This image or idea in 
turn may be registered in your mind-manifold and may be evoked by you 
on a subsequent occasion as part of a scenario and consequently as a 
basis for action* (If X do transmit an image, it will, according, to 
the theory developed in this study, in any case also be mopped, projected, 
on to a corresponding idea*) In spite of its limitations this capacity 
takes us a long way* By means of processes identical or analogous to 
this I con acquire a great deal of valid information from you about 
the real world we share in common* Ua can only know the world through 
perceptions or ideas which refer to it* These are constructions out of
elements derived from the given categories of our own minds? but all 
our peceptual experiences refer to physical reality or filature, and so 
do all those abstract ideas which contribute to the model of physical 
reality that we have already discussed* Nature invades our minds as 
it were through the senses; and the impressions of our own senses and 
those of other people are interpreted through the abstract model of 
the natural world which is built up cooperatively in each civilisation 
and communicated in a more or less fragmented and imperfect form to 
each of its members* The members add their own interpretations to what 
they learn, and some, of course, learn very much more than others; but 
fundamentally what we know about Nature, as distinct foam what we 
directly perceive of Nature, is a collective effort*
This is a fact of great practical importance* But we have to 
remember the limitations of our consciousness of Nature* The knowledge 
is available because it is stabilised in some fashion in more or less 
accurate copies in each person*s mind-manifold, as well as in booWs 
and other artefacts located in space-time* These similar forms, according 
to our theory of similarity, build up a class of forms, unified, like 
any dass, by the fact that on generalisation they coincide with the 
same putative paradigm form* From our mental repositories representations 
of small bits and pieces can be evoked by each individual for use on 
particular occasions in the predications which build up the regulating 
purposive cycles of his existence* But what is evoked in this manner, 
and thus what is held in common, is the similarity of form between a 
large number of different mind-manifolds independently tracking the 
same reality along diffeesnt pathsijbhe information consists essentially 
of forms, not of sensory or emotional values*
This assertion has to be qualified by the fact that in a very broad 
way values like red or loud or melancholy can be encoded as logical 
forms; but the idea of something red is an instance of a classification, 
not a physical perception. I can (though I need not) infuse my 
realisation of it with an image of redness, but such an imago,is a far 
cry from an actual perception of red* I can also in certain circumstances 
establish some measurement on a scale of degrees of redness or loudness; 
but this formal quantification - a "pointer reading** - is equally far from
the original perception.
Now I have argued that me cannot recognise a perceptual form without 
sensory values, nor a logical form without feeling tone, i.e. emotional 
values# But I am pointing out now that the world of nature, as known 
to science and common to men, is a world without such values, When we 
recognise some fact or image we infuse it with values of quality and 
intensity - or, perhaps more correctly, create values of quality and 
intensity from which it can be realised - but these do not come from 
the same source as the logical form; and, more importantly, they vary 
from individual to individual and from occasion to occasion as the forms 
themselves do not.
This can be illustrated straightforwardly from our understanding of 
poetry. As I have suggested elsewhere, the poet is one who manipulates 
not only the direct meaning of his sentences - the logical forms which 
they build up - but also the quality and intensity of our realisation 
of this meaning* He does so by tuning the associations and images which 
the words call to mind, using devices of imagery, rhythm, rhyme and 
assonance (all forms of repetition and reinforcement) sb well as other 
less tangible links within the language to evoke and particularise a 
mass of simultaneous associations which work, like the simultaneous, 
individually unheard overtones of a musical note, to determine the 
emotional quality and intesnity of the realising experience* But even 
so, while the meaning is (or can be) clear and unchanging from one 
occasion to another, this evocation of emotion tends to work very 
differently from one reader to another and from ope occasion to another. 
Skilled readers may be in agreement that certain lines constitute good 
poetry, but even when they agree on this, they will differ in detail in 
the way in whibh they make these lines their own - not in the way they 
understand them, but in the way they feel them. The faot that the
l
lines have acknowledged poetic power means that in a normal reader they 
will evoke and order a great mass of associational overtones; but it 
does not exclude considerable variation in the quality and intensity of 
the evocation on different occasions, according to the individual con­
cerned or to circumstances, which may alter the way in which the same 
individual reacts at different times*
The upshot of this long argument is that we have to distinguish 
the knowledge which is, or can be* a public knowledge held in common and 
the private knowledge which is associated with consciousness# This is 
because conscious knowledge contains some elements which can be made
i
public and some which cannot# * All our public knowledge of the world* 
including the whole of science* is derived ultimately from transitory 
private experiences* But it exists independently of consciousness and 
independently of the limitations on what can be integrated into a single 
predication at the focus of attention - though it is still only a model 
of reality* not the reality itself# Our conscious experience draws 
Upon it, but can do so only under certain quantitative restrictions as 
to what the mind can take in at one time, and only when it infuses the 
forms of scientific knowledge with the feeling tone of life Here Now.
Popper's Theory of Worlds 1, 2 and 3
A discussion of Popper's categorisation of the worlds 
of experience* which suggests that his World 3 can be 
assimilated to his World 1#
The distinction just drawn between public, or potentially public, 
knowledge of this world and the private knowledge experienced in states 
of consciousness clearly has some correspondence to the distinction 
drawn by Sir Karl Popper between the world of "thoughts in the sense of 
contents or statements in themselves" (what he calls World 3) and thfat 
of "thoughts in the sense of thought processes" (what he calls World 2) * 
Both of these are distinguished by Popper from World 1, that of things 
or physical objects, which corresponds to what I call the world of 
nature (which he seems to regard as more directly accessible than I do)#
The lasting stabilisations of the transient experience of conscious­
ness which exist outside consciousness but can be encoded in physical
objects like books or diagrams are for Popper World 3 objects which can 
be embodied in World 1 objects; but he stresses that "it is solely
1# I should make it clear that I am not re-inventing Locke's discredited
distinction between primary qualities, like shape, which are "copies"
or "resemblances” of physical reality and secondary qualities, 
like colour, which exist only "in the mind”. I am stating a 
significantly different distinction which is the one I think 
LockB should have drawn#
through World 2 as an intermediary between World 1 and World 3 that 
World 1 and World 3 can interact11; books do not write themselves without 
human agency# In fact he regards the objects of World 3 not as time­
less or pre-existent Platonic forms* but on the contrary as being 
essentially the products of the human mind# More precisely he regards 
the World 3 of problems* theories and critical arguments as one of the 
results of the evolution of human language# "This is perfectly 
compatible”, he argues, "with theetimelessness of truth and of logical 
relations”; the fact that World 3 objects "have their own inherent or 
autonomous laws which create unintended and unforeseeable consequences 
is only an instance (though a very interesting one) of a more general
■. - ■ i
rule* the rule that all our actions have such consequences.” *
Popper admits that it is possible to.Idescribe the process by which
World 3 objects demonstrate their reality by acting on World 2* and
through World 2 on World 1, without in fact mentioning World 3# "Thus
we may say that, incited by their knowledge of World 1* certain
physicists#.* suspected the physical possibility of making a nuclear
bomb* and that these World 2 thoughts brought about the realisation of
their consequences.” But such descriptions, he says, ”hide the fact
that by their ’knowledge of World 1* are meant theories which can be
objectively investigated from a logical os well as an empirical point
of view, and that these are World 3 objects rather than World 2 objects
2#
(though they can be grasped and therefore have World 2 correlates)."
Popper accepts that they are man-made, and therefore products of World 2; 
moreover he argues that the process of grasping a World 3 object is to 
be understood in terms of making or remaking it* His view “assumes no 
•eye of the mind1, no mental organ of perception# It assumes only our 
ability to produce certain World 3 objects, especially linguistic ones### 
There are many similarities between optical vision and the understanding 
of World 3 objects; we can conjecture that a baby learns to see by 
actively exploring things and by handling things by trial and error*”
He goes on to imply a distinction between theories, or the logical
1# Quotations from ”Unended Quest” 1974 (Fontana edition 1976) section 38*
2. Popper and Eccles "The Self and its Brain" (Springer International 
1977) p* 47.
3. "The Self and its Brain", pp. 44-5.
relations between theories, and "our World 2 grasp of them11. I would 
agree that we grasp theories, as we understand sentences, by making 
or remaking them and that there are close analogies here with the way 
in which we perceive objects; but I think this should lead us, not to 
postulate a separate World 3, rather to assimilate World 3 to World 1*
According to Br^an Magee, Popper "insists that all observation must 
be theory-soaked" and one reason for this is that "our sensory organs 
themselves, representing as they do sophisticated attempts to .adapt to 
our environment incorporate theories*" * nevertheless his writing seems 
to imply that we have direct knowledge of the objects of World 1 in a 
way which would conflict with the view I have been supporting. However 
that may be, it seems to me that the objects of Popper’s World 3, lasting 
stabilisations derived from transient states of consciousness, are not 
themselves directly accessible to consciousness any more than an 
individual's own mind-manifold. When I read a book I do#sentence by 
sentence; and with each sentence (or subordinate predication or wider 
predication) I recognise a construction of my own mind made on the 
spot, the translation of a model or message expressed in a perceptual 
code of marks on paper into a model expressed in a non-perceptual code 
of logical forms, an evoked idea as distinct from the stared idea.
But the same applies when I recall from memory the proof of a theorem 
in geometry or the tune I heard last night. For the mind-manifold is 
not directly accessible. What we recognise are recoded copies of 
extracts from the inaccessible memory. The status of the appropriate 
part of the mind-manifold is thus the same as the status of the table 
before me, a real physical object. In the case of the memory I recognise 
a message expressed in a logical code and infused with a mood value, on to 
which a supporting model expressed in the quasi-perceptual code of an 
image may be mapped. In the case of the table I also recognise a model 
expressed in a logical code and infused with a mood value, but one 
which construes a model expressed in a sensory-perceptual code infused 
with sensory values.
1. ’Popper" (Fontana 1973) p. 57.
The criterion by which we identify e physical object, according to 
the theory developed in this study, is that it has a location in space 
and time, whether it is a cerebral cortex or a thing made of wood; and 
I have suggested that we have no reason not to identify the mind- 
manifold with some part of the physical brain. But the attempt to 
apply this criterion is liable to bring us up against some difficult 
cases. Let us consider a few examples, life may distinguish Dr. Bohnson’s 
cat HodgB, who had a physical existence and thus an independent location 
in space time, from Lewis Carroll’s Cheshire Cat who did not exist and 
so has no independent location on our world map. As a fiction the 
Cheshire Cat had, and has, an existence in certain transient experiences 
of Carroll and his readers and the memories of these experiences recorded 
in physical form in books and pictures. Is this his only existence? I 
think the answer is yes. He is an object in the World of Nature, but 
only as expressed in other physical objects; he is not an independent 
physical object. And that, I suggest, is how we distinguish fiction from 
fact. '■
What, then, of the lost plays of Sophocles? This question raises 
the interesting question of the existence of historical reality as 
part of the world of nature, distinct from possible physical records of 
such reality# It seems to me that the world of nature extends in time 
as Well as spacs. Nothing is more inaccessible to direct perception 
than the reality of the table in front of me five minutes ago; but I 4 
do not doubt that reality. As Heraclitus (by implication) pointed out, 
if I look at it now it is a different table. To establish its identity 
over time I have to form art abstract idea of it and grasp that* But 
the idea can be either true or false; it can "track" reality or fail to 
do so. I do not see how we can deny the reality of the historical past 
even when we have no information about it; otherwise the possibility of 
historical truth, evert approximate historical truth, goes out of the 
WindoW. And so the lost plays of Sophocles, if our limited information 
about their past existence is correct, are there for discovery (even^if^' 
We can’t discover them) in all their original detail as part of the 
World of nature; correspondingly if our information about them is 
incorrect, then they are nfet there. Anyway there ia an inconceivably
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vast amount of historical truth which is there but which no man will 
ever know, going back through geological time to the origin of the 
universe. I do not see how we can escape this conclusion or deny that 
the world of nature, in its historical as well as its spatial extension, 
is continuous with the world which 1 perceive Here Now, and just as 
real. Any alternative thesis would seem to land us in extreme 
contradictions.
What, then, of mathematical concepts? Popper refers to the 
problem, which was solved by Euclid, of whether the sequence of prime 
numbers is finite or infinite. Was the solution there for discovery 
long before Euclid was born - before it had taken shape In any man’s 
mind? This is more difficult. On reflection I believe the answer to 
such questions Is that mathematical and logical truths are properties 
of the given categories (and consequent constraints) of thought and 
perception through which our consciousness is mediated and in terms of 
which our models and messages of reality are constructed. They are 
Implications of putting elements drawn from these categories together 
in various kinds of perceptual or logical space which are themselves ,
given categories of knowledge, ranges of possibility. The truths of
geometry are ultimately aspects of the various kinds of space in which 
the subjects of our perceiving, imagining and thinking activities 
emerge. The relationships of logic and number (as explored in "The 
Grammar of Language") are fundamentally processes of classification 
and reclassification, which in turn rest on the mind’s capacity to 
generalise, compare and equate logical forms. We cannot conceive these
relationships apart from the elements between which they hold. They 
are aspects, implications, of our own grammatically constructed models 
or messages.
I remain therefore with the conclusion that we need only to 
postulate two "worlds", a world of nature and a world of transitory 
consciousness, World 1 and World 2«. If that is accepted however we 
hove now to face more directly the problem of the relationship between 
the two.
The Interactionist Hypothesis
A discussion of the hypothesis that there is interaction 
between a separate brain and mind, a suggestion which 
leads to great conceptual difficulties.
The conscious processes of perceiving and thinking take the form, 
as I have suggested, of a succession of predicative constructions, 
continuous so long as the individual is awake. These predications 
build up the transient models and messages of World 2. They are 
accompanied by complex brain processes - World 1 processes - which we 
cannot perceive or recognise directly but of which, in World 2 awareness, 
we can construct partial scientific models.
It would seem natural to conceive of these two sets of processes 
as the inner and outer aspects of the same occurrence; but this image 
is difficult to sustain. The difficulty arises chiefly because it , 
seems to be impossible to suggest how the brain can reconstitute out 
of the jjngle of simultaneous discrete one-dimensional sequences of 
neurone firings any unified spatial orFeeudo-spetial display. I use 
the word spatial because a space, as I would define it, is a continuum 
in which values in two or more dimensions can be unified to create a 
different "emergent" value in a new range of possibility - a shape as 
distinct from a coordinate, a three-dimensional shape as distinct 
a two-dimensional one. The shapes thus created become container forms 
infused with specific sensory qualities and Inteosities and so make it 
possible for a whole variety of sensory values to be recognised 
simultaneously, yet in order. Space permits order and order permits 
integration. Integration is the key to conscious experience and 
grammar is the mechanism of integration, and hence of consciousness.
The grammatical subject of our consciousness is always a whole, 
which is linked to another whole, the predicate, in a transition in 
time forming a unified predication. If we receive a fragmentary or
1, Strictly two-dimensional in an analogical space with time as 
one dimension and some measure of electrical intensity as the 
other; but to call it two-dimensional without explanation 
could be misleading: effectively we need a three-dimensional 
space, including a "distancing" dimension, in order to 
recognise in consciousness a two-dimensional shape.
grammatically imperfect communication we have to complete the predication 
somehow ourselves before we can guess at the meaning. We are never 
conscious of anything which is not integrated into a predication. 
Something may be there — indeed our sensory apparatus may be recording 
it — but we are oblivious of it. (bie have admittedly a very limited 
power of belatedly retrieving something that was just beyond the 
periphery of attention when it actually happened - for instance the 
distant ringing of a door bell while we are absorbed in writing a 
letter - but unless it is so retrieved within a minimal period of 
time, it is lost to consciousness for ever.) The problem before us 
is accordingly to identify some neural equivalent of the grammatical 
process of integration.
There are certain clues. The sensory organs, to quote Sir Bohn 
Eccles,
"signal to the central nervous system by the firing of 
impulses or messages that in the manner of a code transmit 
to the brain the place and intensity of the stimulus. The 
transmission is never direct but by spnaptic relays which act 
to modify the message so that in fact the central nervous system 
is given a very distorted ’coded image* of the peripheral 
stimulus. It can be thought that these transmission lines are 
concerned in the conversion of the original stimulus into 
neuronal events which can be handled and interpreted in the 
cerebral cortex. Each sense has the primary receiving area 
laid out as a map in the cortex in the appropriate Brodmann 
areas. For example cutaneous sense is laid out with the 
surface of the body arranged as a strip map from toes to 
tongue.
Similarly the stimulation of particular areas of the retina leads to 
the stimulation of specific corresponding areas of the visual cortex, 
though the resulting cortical map shows considerable topographic 
distortion and in particular allocates a disproportionately large area 
to the central part of the visual field. Much of the brain’s 
processing of incoming messages appears to be a matter of the selection 
and sharpening up of particular features of likely interest, especially 
outlines.
1* "The Self and its Brain", p. 250.
We may surmise that the results of such feature recognition 
processes are in some way superimposed on the mop, leading to the 
relative accentuation of certain elements and the relative depression 
or even masking of others. All this involves the identification of 
elements on a larger scale than that of the single neurone and thus 
represents a contribution, though a limited one, touards the inte­
gration of a simplified and coherent whole from the multitudinous input. 
But the suggestion that there is anything like an integrated recon­
struction within the brain of images such as we recognise in conscious 
perception appears to be emphatically rejected by neurophysiologists^; 
end, as Sir Bohn Eccles emphasises, even if there were some such model 
within the brain? the daunting problem of how the model could be read 
into consciousness would still remain.
A good deal of the brain's activity, with its combination of, 
excitation and inhibition and with thet partly competitive interaction 
of columnar "modules" of neurones, is compatible with a process of 
integration through grouping and mutual reinforcement or elimination 
which would help to simplify and concentrate fehe input. But this 
takes us only a little distance. What then? Eccles and Popper go , 
forward to the interactionist hypothesis that the process of integration 
is not completed by the brain at all, but by a conscious mind which is 
not part of the physical world, yet interacts with it.
Eccles suggests that the conscious mind scans the modules of the 
brain spread out over the cortex, the "modular array" of the "liaison
areas", some of which are open to scrutiny and some not, and that the
mind derives from them in their spatio-temporal patterns the images and
ideas of consciousness. * Popper suggests at one point that the end
product of the brain's process of integration may be a single one- 
dimensional series of electrical pulses in time, comparable to the 
input to a television receiver. This would however presumably have to 
be spread out later in some kind of synchronic display and made conscious 
in successive chunks in the arena of the mind; for we cannot observe a
1. "The Self and tbs Brain" pp. 365, 477. If there was such a 
reconstruction it would need to have a spatial extension 
within the brain at least topologically equivalent to that 
of the perceptual space observed.
2. "The Self and its Brain" pp. 366-70. 3. Ibid. p. 479
' 402 #
flow if we are immersed in it and we cannot stand aside from it unless 
there is a synchronic dimension other than that of the flow.
Popper argues that there is "at the same time a kind of gulf and 
a kind of dependence between the self-conscious mind and the brain".
"The main point here that shows the gulf is that we can be highly 
critical of an optical illusion. And it is a kind of lower level of
the self which experiences it in conformity with what the brain delivers
to it." This,split between a critical apparatus and a non-critical 
part of the self "may have some basis in the brain, but I do not think 
it can be fully reduced to the sifting mechanisms of the brain."'L*
The great difficulty with theories of this type is that of 
identifying what form any observing pilot Self or Mind outside the 
brain could take. I ascribe physical reality as part of Nature to
anything which is located uniquely in universal space and time. Our
idea of such *~an object cannot strictly be duplicated (though it can be 
copied or modelled) since it is itself anchored in the idea of a 
particular unique trajectory in space and time; the object cannot be 
in two places at once. Now if it proves necessary, in order to account 
for the^actlvities of^perception and^thought,—tQ-postulate^aMSonscious 
mind outside what we know as physical reality, operating with properties 
and forms not at present conceivable, this will in my terms still 
remain part of Nature so long as it still has a unique trajectory in 
space and time; the object cannot be in two places at once. ■ 
proves necessary, in order to account for the activities of 
perception and thought, to postulate a conscious mind outside What 
we know as physical reality, operating with properties and forms not at 
present conceivable, this will in my terms still remain part of Nature 
so long as it still has a unique trajectory in space and time linked 
to that of a physical body and interacts with that body* (This recalls 
St. Augustine's dictum: "The miracle occurs not in contradiction to 
Nature but in contradiction to what we know of Nature*") It is 
exceedingly difficult to conceive how anything that has no trajectory 
can have any^identity — that is, can be one thing at all. Even if,
1. "The Self and its Brain", p. 515.
in trying to model it, we have to say that it has location but no 
extension* or resort to some other descriptive paradox, this does 
not necessarily disqualify it from forming part of a scientific model 
of physical reality which has aloays had paradoxical features (such 
as infinite extensions) and has developed a great many more since the 
advent of Einstein,
If we go beyond this however and postulate a separate world, we 
must, I think, in some sense be imagining a separate space and time 
or at least a separate space. Yet if there is interaction between our 
two worlds of Mature and Supernature they must presumably be unified 
by sharing the same i^me. Are they perhaps unified in some third 
space or superspace, in time? My mind begins to go blank, I cease 
to have any sense of knowing what I am talking about, tie have to 
remember that, on the arguments of this study, the objects of our 
knowledge, including the scientific account of Mature, are models 
constructed out of values in the given categories of consciousness, 
and they have the limitations of models. The reality transcends them 
and so, ultimately, transcends and must transcend our powers of 
comprehension. In effect I do not rejeot the interactionist theory; 
-rather I find great—di-f-fiaulty in grasping-4t-ia-any-form-suf^lGientlJ 
precise to be useful.
The Identity Hypothesis
A discussion of the hypothesis of an identity between 
mind and brain, which suggests that it involves as 
many conceptual difficulties as that of interaction 
between brain and mind.
Popper says in his intellectual autobiography ’’Unended Quest”;
I should think that I was always a Cartesian dualist (although 
I never thought that we should talk about ’’substances”); and 
if not a dualist, I was certainly more inclined to pluralism 
than to monism. I think it silly or at least high-handed to 
deny the existence of mental experiences or mental states or 
states of consciousness; or to deny that mental states are as 
a rule closely related to states of the body, especially 
physiological states. But it also seems clear that mental 
states are products of the evolution of life, and that little
can bo gained by linking them to physics rather than to
biology.”-*-*
Such frank dualism is nowadays much less fashionable than one form or 
another of the theory that states of consciousness are nothing but 
states of the brain. If a computer is capable of logical processes 
comparable to those of the human brain, then the computer is capable of 
thought. Again here I find great difficulty in effectively grasping 
such a theory. The reason, no doubt, lies partly in my prior 
assumptions about the nature of reality and the nature of thought 
processes, to which expression has been gieen in the earlier chapters 
of this study. I would have to be converted to alternative assumptions^ ' 
before I could make much sense of this idea. In particular I should 
have to accept the view that our knowledge in scientific terms of 
physical objects is somehow a direct knowledge of reality itself* I 
have already given reasons why I believe the opposite. I do not indeed 
reject the possibility of some kind of unitive knowledge of reality, 
but that is by definition a knowledge that is beyond words and codes, 
beyond models that can be consciously grasped in predications. It is 
the experience with which mystical poets like Rilke or Blake or Valery 
are on occasion concerned, moments when:
Le temps scintille et le songe est savoir.
Having said this, I still find it hard to express where the 
difficulty specifically lies. I would begin by taking up again a 
point I have mads before, namely that although the intellectual models 
which we make of the natural world, including our models of the brain, 
are forms which us can grasp in consciousness (piecemeal in small or 
very generalised packets), the conscious predications through which w© 
grasp them are not identical with them and include essential elements 
of quality and intensity which are not present in the model. I argued 
a few pages back that, while we can encode such values as ’’red” or 
”loud” or "angry” as logical forms, those forms represent only crude 
classifications of the experiences to which they refer. They do not 
replicate the experiences, and in any case they have to be realised 
anew in consciousness on every occasion with some new quality and
1. "Unended Quest”, 1974, Fontana Edition (revised) 1976, p. 187.
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intensity of sense imagery or emotional feeling tone to give them life* 
Values like colour and timbre do not exist in the scientific account 
of light waves or sound waves* There is no step transition in the 
gradient of wavelengths between red and yellow* The proportionate mix 
of overtone values which characterises the timbre of an oboe can be 
specified in mathematical terms but not in any way which catches the 
difference of kind rather than merely of degree or blend bdtween one 
sound timbre and another.
In other words our conscious experiences include elements that 
are not present in our scientific models. The forms that we grasp are 
present, appropriately coded! but the sensations and emotions that 
sustain them are not. Only in poems and works of art is this 
limitation transcended! but even then, as we have seen, only in a 
partial and variable way, and essentially through complex simultaneous 
evocations which may be derived from the superposition of many forms, .A.; . 
but are not recognised as forms at all* The implication is that the 
lenguage of consciousness includes sub-codes which are lacking in the 
language of science* and so cannot adequately be translated into 
scientific terms. (The converse translation from science into ,
consciousness offers-no-difficulty, since-science-is-Ultimately-derived—  
from consciuoeseess.) The discrepancy means however that it is hardly 
possible to identify directly the processes of the brain, as these are 
scientifically understood, with those of the mind*
An identity theorist might make the rejoinder that the asymmetry 
between the two is only temporary and is bound to be remedied by the^ ;^— ,, 
further advance of sMencei and in these terms I cannot prove him 
wrong, however sceptical I may be. But there are further and deeper 
difficulties which arise in connection with the concept of space*
It seems to me inescapable that we think in extension. We cannot 
think without identifying separate entities and recognising relation­
ships between them! and both separation and relation are essentially 
spatial, or temporal, or spatio-temporal concepts. If we identify 
onB thing in the natural world — say the Morning Star, to take a 
famous example - we locate it uniquely in relation to other things in
space over time. If we have separately located two such identified 
things - say the Morning Star and the Evening Star - and we then decide 
that they ere in fact the same thing, we can only do so by envisaging 
a third space on which both the other spaces can be mapped or 
projected, so that their two locations coincide in a third. No map on 
any projection, however, is adequate to all cases. If we assert that 
it is the Evening Star we see but not the Morning Star, then we are 
implying that our identification of the Morning Star in the morning sky 
was false. But that is not what we mean. It was a correct location on 
the first map, but the map itself was limited! and so was the second map# 
The third map, though it has its own limitations, brings the other two 
into relation with each other.
This account may not seem far from that of Professor Herbert Feigl, 
for example, when he says: "Instead of conceiving two realms or two con­
comitant types of events, we have only one reality which is represented 
in two different conceptual systems - on the one hand that of physics 
and on the other hand, where applicable (in my opinion only to an extremely 
small part of the world), that of phenomenological psychology." * But 
the point I would emphasise is that in order to unify the two conceptual 
systems we need to be able to bring them together in a third conceptual 
system; and this third systemris not easy to construct. Merely to 
reduce the second system to the first - conscious experience, for 
example, to brain processes - in effect denies the validity of the 
eliminated system, which here would be ridiculous, since the second is 
ultimately derived from the first. Conversely to ergue that the processes 
of a computer, analysable in physical terms only, are at least potentially 
equivalent to those of thought is to deny the validity of conscious 
thought. A third conceptual system is needed to unify £he two, and I 
do not think anyone has yet been able to suggest what form such a systifft 
might take.
This dilemma is expressed by Schrodinger when he says: "One of the 
two thus seems irrevocably doomed to a ghostlike existence, either the 
objective external world of the scientist, or the self of consciousness 
which by thinking constructs the former, withdrawing from it in the
1. From "Mind-Body, not a pseudo-problem", reprinted in C.V. Borst
ed* "The Mind-Brain Identity Theory" (Macmillan I97Q).
process." As he puts it again at another point in the same essay, 
"comprehensibility is bought at the price of letting the subject 
recede, which makes objectivation possible."1* However it seems 
possible that at some stage a new generation of physicists will be 
able to throw light on this problem, at least for those who have 
enough mathematics to understand them. According to Fritjof Capra, a 
theory has been developed by David Bohm to express the nature of 
"implicate order" at the sub-atomic level.
"To understand the implicate order Bohm has found it necessary 
to regard consciousness as an essential feature of the 
’holomovement*and to take it into account explicitly in his 
theory. He sees mind and matter as being interdpandent and 
correlated, but not causally connected. They are mutually f 
enfolding projections of a higher reality which is neither • 
matter nor consciousness."^*
Whatever we make of this, we should perhaps note that Professor 
Fei §1*8 tow estimation of the world of phenomenological psychology (in 
effect the world of all direct human experience) is shared by Sir Alfreds. 
Ayer, who remarks that
"The percepts out of which the theory £ of the physical worldJ  
grew are reinterpreted into it, and given a subordinate status... 
once the theory of the physical world has been developed, 
whether or not it has to allow room for objects or properties 
which are not classified as physical, we are entitled to let it 
take command in the sense that it determines what there is.
The fact that in doing so it downgrades its own starting point, 
in much the same way as a self-made man may repudiate his 3 
humble origins, is not a logical objection to the procedure."
To this I would reply that (i) you can’t reinterpret "percepts" 
accurately back into the intellectual model of the phygiSal world (for 
reasons which I have already indicated); and (ii) even if you could, 
success could be measured only by the extent to which the direct 
impression of reality conveyed by the "percept" could sbmehow be brought
1. "On the Peculiarity of the Scientific World View" reprinted 
in "What is Life? and Other Scientific Essays" (Doubleday 
Anchor 1956) pp. 214, 184.
2. "The Turning Point", Wildwood House, 1982, p. 88.
3. "Construction of our Theory of the Physical World", 1973, 
reprinted in Honderich and Burnyeat ed. "Philosophy as It 
Is" (Penguin 1979).
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to pervade the whole abstract structure of the theory of the physical 
world - not by any reverse takeover which would deprive even the : 
"percepts” of their roots in life. (I am tempted to wonder what 
William Blake would have said about such arguments as Ayer*s at this 
point.)
To look in another direction* Professor Ooseph Hargolis has 
argued ingeniously^ for a "non-reductive materialism", in which 
"persons" (who are identified in particular by their linguistic 
competence) are "culturally emergent entities" embodied in physical 
bodies or sentient organisms. The emergent entities are "physically 
or biologically embodied and distinguished only functionally." 
"Intentionality of the cultural sort may be said to be bifocal, exhibited 
both in the rule-following capacities of persons and in the rule-governed 
or rulelike properties of what persons produce or do." Within my 
scheme of things I would interpret Professor Hargolis as saying that 
persons are identified by patterns of behaviour, like language, which 
are part of the creature as extended in tims, but are held in common 
with other creatures. I would accept this as a description which 
corresponds to my own account of ideas held in common; but it '
take us any further in relation to the present difficulty. Nor for that 
matter does such a hollow conclusion as that of D.H. Armstrong when he 
says; "And so consciousness of our awn mental states becomes simply 
the scanning of one part of our nervous system by another.
Consciousness is a seJf-scanning mechanism in the central nervous 
system." * That simply "explains" consciousness by ignoring what is 
different about it. Hargolis, for his part, explicitly rejects the 
identity theory, but seeks to preserve monism through the concept of 
emergence; "The admission of persons as culturally emergent does not in 
the least entail the admission of a substance other than matter out 
of which, dualistically, persons are composed." His culturally emergent 
persons and their products, distinguishable by their functional, not 
their physical attributes, build up what is very like Popper*s World 3.
1. In "Persons and Hinds" (Dordrecht; Reidel, 1978) p. 19ff.
2. From "The Nature of Hind" in C.U. Borst ed. "The Hind-Brain
Identity Theory" (Hacmillan 1970).
With the concepts of embodiment and emergence he ie asserting in 
effect that there is a third conceptual system which unifies the 
physical and the mental worlds, but he is hardly able to go beyond 
assertion to any clear description of what it is.
Hargolis* emphasis on function is nevertheless important. What 
we are concerned with is a proposed identity, not between the brain 
and anything else, but between the throughput of the brain, that is, 
the messages, the patterns of difference over time, which pass through 
it and the predications, perceptual or intellectual, to which we pay 
attention in consciousness.'*'* To examine what is involved let us 
consider what happens when I think of myself thinking about my own 
current brain processes. To think of them I have to conceive them 
as happening in space over time. In doing so I am construing together 
logical forms in a non~perceptual logical space (though some vague image 
may be mapped on to it to support my thinking). As with any space, this 
one has to be.recognised from a point of view, an origin where the 
observing I (whatever that may be) is located. It is a notional space 
within a perceptual space on which I can look out Here Now, again from 
a particular point of view, a space filled with of walls and windows, 
tables, chairs and the apparatus of a room. This perceptual space is 
made transparent, as it wore, when my attention is concentrated on the 
notional space of the brain processes, and there is no connection between
1. The views of Professor Bohn Searle have some affinity with those
of Professor Hargolis. On his account - as given in a recent 
television discussion with Sir Bohn Eccles - the conscious mind, 
with all its capacities for perception, thought and moral judgement, 
is an emergent property of the neurones of the brain, in the 
same "quite banal" way as liquidity is an emergent property of
H2O molecules. But is this emergence, even at the level of
water molecules, "quite banal"? It can perhaps be described in 
terms of behaviour or function,'as Professor Hargolis has suggested 
in a similar context. But this does not take you beyond saying 
that liquidity represents the behaviour of a quantity of water 
molecules within certain temperature limits, or that brain 
processes represent the characteristic processes of a living brain. 
Neither the behaviour of water molecules nor the behaviour of 
neurones can provide any real explanation of my perception of wetness 
when I put my hand into water. In particular the concept of 
emergence contributes in no way to any solution of the problem 
of the creation in consciousness of a synchronic "space" in which 
the thinking or perceiving I can be distanced from the bodily He.
the two, apart from the supposition - the subjective certainty « that 
the two Is, the two points of origin, concerned are to be identified 
as the same, representing He~Here~Now.
In order to see how these two points of origin could be the same, 
let me now try to think of myself thinking of the brain processes. To 
do this I have to distance my point of view in some way from my physical 
body, as I think of myself thinking. This feat is not difficult, I 
can easily think or imagine myself from some notional point outside my 
body. But I find difficulty over fitting this view of myself in 
perspective, as it were, on to the preceding experiences. If I try 
simultaneously to imagine myself from outside and to imagine myself 
imagining the brain processes, I end up with a sort of cartoon image of 
myself in my room with a bubble sprouting out of my head in which there 
is a screen on which brain processes are displayed. I cannot relate the 
space within the bubble, let alons the space depicted on the screen, 
to the space outside, or to the space in which the ultimate observing I 
is looking at He.
Given the Euclidean space of imagination, the I which seBB myself 
cannot be in the same place as the I thinking about brain processes, 
but the feat of unifying the two somehow does not seem so difficult in 
the more flexible, nan-perceptual space of thought. Nevertheless this 
new experience does not strictly, include the earlier, brainwatching 
experience, or any successor to it. I can only think of one thing at 
a time - that is, construe one predication with one subject (singular 
or plural) at a time, When I am thinking about myself, my own thoughts 
about the brain processes can figure only as a subsystem within the 
wider predication; it is no longer at the focus of attention, and it 
is grasped only in a vague and indeterminate way.
Where am I, then, when I do all this? It is possible for me to 
move on to a further "enclosing" conception of myself, in which I 
recognise He-Here-Now (thinking of myself thinking of my own brain 
processes) as the momentary face of an incarnate Life, extending as a 
four-dimensional form in world space and historic time from conception
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till the present moment and on till my future death and dissolution.
But even this conception requires some kind of notional point of view 
to act as the origin of the projection of the space in which forms are 
recognised. The truth seems to be that no forms we can recognise in 
any space that we can project can be identified with reality in any 
absolute sense (i.e. presumably with ^matter" as Margolis conceives it).
I have stressed the importance of the concept of an underlying absolute 
space and time as making passible the notion of unique identity, end of 
the consequent rule that the same thing cannot be in two places at once. 
(I think it is probably also a condition of our being able to hold a 
world in common.) But even this absolute space-time has to be projected 
from a point of view in order to be realised and, like a map on 
Mercator*s projection, it runs into nonsense and infinity at the edges. 
Even the scientific account of the natural world or a relevant part of 
it - knowledge which is public and held in common - can only be realised 
on a particular occasion in a particular context, which means a 
particular perspective deriving from a particular point of origin; 
and the perspectives are not all ultimately reconcilable. This is one 
aspect, I suppose, of the relativity of all knowledge.
A further complication which should perhaps be mentioned is the 
point discussed in Chapter III that to pass information it is necessary 
to establish first a limited range of possibility and then to resolve 
that particular range into actuality. The understanding of a sentence 
involves a progressive process of opening up ranges of possibility, 
resolving them and thereby opening up new ranges (a process analysed 
in detail in nThe Grammar of Language")• A computer that thought would 
have to be able to do this and not merely to follow programs. Questions, 
are immediately raised about the difference between transmitting or 
processing information and actually understanding it, questions which 
have deep ramifications that I shall not attempt to pursue here.
In the upshot I do not think we can at present offer any 
satisfactory explanation of the relationship between brain and mind, or - 
to put the issue more usefully — between the world of nature and the 
world of consciousness. After 300 years wb are hardly in a position 
to improve much on the admirably precise statement of the problem by
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Thomas Traherne in hie poem "Ply Spirit"*
It acts not from a centre to 
Its object ae remote,
But present is when it doth view.
Being with the Being it doth note 
Whatever it doth do.
It doth not by another engine work
But by itself; which in the act doth lurk.
Its essence is transformed into a true 
And perfect act.
And so exact 
Hath God appeared in this mysterious fact
That *tis all eye, all act, all sight,
And what it please can be,
Hot only see 
Or do; for *tis more voluble than light,
Which can put on ten thousand forms,
Being cloth*d with what itself adorns.
The most important conclusion to draw at this stage, in my view, is 
that we should preserve our humility and a/oid delusions about what our 
human minds are capable of understanding. ; This in no way is to suggest 
that we should cease to work on these questions, only that we should not 
underfcate what we are up against.
The Knower of the Known
An approach to the problem of how the Self combines 
being the point of origin of perceived space-time, the . —  
conscious knower, the Decider and the Actor.
Popper remarks that fur many years he felt that the body-mind problem 
was a hopeless one and he goes on to say (for all his professed adherence 
to interactionism) that he still doubts whether discussion of the 
relationship between states of consciousness and bodily states is worth 
while. He suggests that the mind is ”an organ that produces objects 
of the human world 3... and interacts with them”. We should look upon 
it "as the producer of human language, for which our basic aptitudes are 
inborn... and as the producer of theories, of critical arguments and many 
other things such as mistakes, myths, stories, witticisms, tools and 
works of art.”1* Animals may be conscious, but full consciousness of
1. "Unended Quest" (Fontana Edition 1976) pp. 187—193.
Self can emerge only through language* and only after we have developed 
a theory (a World 3 object) of the continuity of our bodies through sleep* 
The consciousness of the Self involves a distinction between living and 
non-living bodies* a distinction between conscious and unconscious bodies* 
the projection of the Self into the future* the more or less conscious 
expectation of the child growing up into the adult, and a consciousness 
of having existed for some time in the past - thus the possession of a 
theory of birth and perhaps even of death. All this becomes possible 
only through a highly developed language producing a World 3 and modified 
by feedback from this World 3. The achievements of the mind require an 
organ with peculiar powers of concentrating on a problem, with linguistics 
power, powers of anticipation, inventiveness and imagination, and with 
powers of tentative acceptance and rejection. "There does not seem to-»= 
be a physical organ which can do all this.”
Popper is here marking out a field for exploration rather than 
exploring it himself. X have already given reasons why I think his 
World 3 can be assimilated to his World 1, as part of Mature. Subject 
to changes of terminology which this involves, I would accept, so far 
as it goes, his broad account of the nature and functions of the mind; 
more than that, I would claim that the earlier chapters of this study
go a long way towards realising the project which he implicitly proposes.
But we still face teasing problems about the nature of the Self, oven 
if we leave aside any further discussion of the body-mind relationship. 
Having considered what we know of the world, and up to a point the 
relationship of the mind as the organ of knowing with the brain as part 
of what is known, we have now to consider more closely what it is that 
knows - and decides, and acts.
Let us begin with Piaget’s "subject”, the Self which is identified r 
by Isidor Chein as the origin of perceived space-time. This Self-as- 
subject, as Chein says in words I have quoted earlier, "is never an 
object of experience and therefore has no proper image”, and "has no 
observable properties other than being the origin of space-time."
It is always associated with the body, yet not precisely located within 
it. At the same time, although it has no observable properties, this 
Self seems to be a centre of functioning, as Piaget calls it; somehow 
it seems to be the source of decision, the origin of action.
1. "The Science of Behaviour and the Image of Ran" (Tavistock 1973)
p. 201.
This is an elusive concept. Can ue find any way to develop our 
ideas about it? To begin with, we may be reminded of the analogy of 
the eye. The centre of my eye is the point of origin of the perspective
which my eye offers upon the world. It has no properties of its own
except location, tie can imagine it however as the point at which rays
of light from objects in my field of view meet together; and we may be
led on to note that these rays are not brought to a halt at this point.
They cross over and go on to form a reverse image on the retina, a sort 
of reflection of a bit of the world. This is a reflexive act and we 
may recall Nozick’s argument that "the Self is synthesised as the object 
referred to in the reflexive tokening of I... The reflexive act refers 
to the thing of greatest organic unity that includes it; and that thing 
is synthesised for the purpose of being referred to by the very act 
of referring to it."
Let us develop the.analogy. Consciousness is a perspective on the 
world, always an intellectual perspective, somatimss a perceptual one as 
well. Because it is a perspective, it starts from a point of view, but 
the view it reveals is of a flexible, non-perceptual space of logical 
forms on to which, from time to time, a metric perceptual space or a 
Euclidean space of memory or imagination may be mapped. The lens of 
consciousness is a point located in the world of Nature in somewhat 
approximate association with the location of a given body. It reflects 
the ideas which build up the world of consciousness on to a sort of inner 
retina, the arena of consciousness. The space of this arena is quasi— 
topological. Since the ideas include thoughts as well as observations, 
the eye of consciousness can range over the natural world in all imaginable 
space and time, as well as over fictions and classifications or logical" 
reclassifications which have no location in the natural world. It can 
even direct attention at its own point of origin.and when it does so 
it synthesises a relevant Self round this point of origin.
This Self is in effect what we have called the evoked idea of the 
Self, an aspect of the complex of the Self stored in the mind-manifold; 
but when the Self directs its attention at itself there is always a 
certain time discrepancy between the two representations. From one 
location in space-time it is looking at Itself at another location,
whether past or future. ThB Self experienced is thus never identical 
with the experiencing Self. What, then, can unify this multitude of 
successive impersonations? Only the creature in its continuous 
trajectory through space—time, our bodily four-dimensional worm, our 
incarnation. Consciousness can thus be described as the eye of the 
creature. It makes possible the perspective through which, reflexively, 
the creature can locate itself in the world.
In these terms, who is the Self? It is the creature over its whole 
life. What is consciousness? It is the view of the world through the 
eye of the creature at a particular point in its trajectory; and it may 
include itself in the view. Nevertheless there is still something,
mysterious and intangible about this creature, uhich has a multitude
of faces in successive contingencies but no one face. It is identified
in a sense by a specific gene pattern which is created at its conception
and disappears at its dissolution. But we cannot recognise the gene 
pattern, even if we know that it exists. The creature is also identified 
by its trajectory; but at any given time in life this form is still being 
worked out; the incarnation is still going on. But then who is being 
incarnated? Flore brutally, who am I?
I am what is behind my headlights. I am what decides in my think—
space Here Now and operates in my world-space Here Now. What, then, id
behind my headlights? A vehicle. Am I a vehicle operating automatically 
Or am l a  driver within the vehicle? If the latter, how can I avoid an 
endless regress? Do I not need a small driver sitting on my shoulder
to drive the driver; and so on ad infinitum?
As already suggested, the answer I would give to this conundrum 
is that I am the vehicle - but not a vehicle operating automatically; 
consciousness represents not my headlights but my eyes; the real I, so 
far as we can know it, is the incarnate creature. The form which the 
idea of the Self yields in a given situation and which affects any 
decision taken in that situation is not the creature, but represents it. 
It may therefore be called a person (a word derived from persona, a 
mask). The stored idea-complex of the anticipatory Self in the mind- 
msnifold from which this momentary idea is evoked we may call the 
personality. If and when a decision is taken, this means the adoption
of a new plan which is then drawn over the personality like a new mask 
modifying the existing stored idea-complex. Thus each new decision 
represents a new impersonation and a development in the personality. In 
the last resort, however, what is personified or represented is not 
the personality, but the creature itself to which the mind-manifold 
belongs, otherwise the incarnation. At the same time we have to bear 
in mind that we can never know the incarnate creature, which is part of 
nature } as it is in itself; we can only grasp facts about it, that is 
models, which are ideas constructed out of other ideas.
Consider a situation in which I decide to go to Trafalgar Square 
to take part in a political rally, but as I step outside my front door 
my foot slips and I fall and break my leg. Which, then, after the 
event, is the real man, the political demonstrator or the hospital 
patient? Clearly the latter. The position is that when a man takes a 
self-regulative decision the idea of the Self puts on a new impersonation 
which is a relatively generalised plan or synchronic model. Thereafter, 
as his body acts out the new plan he re-expresses the generalised model 
in a different and vastly more particularised form as he incarnates it 
in bodily behaviour over space and time.
This brings out the distinction between the impersonation and the 
incarnation, between psychological man and biological man - though there 
is also a complex relationship between the two. Clearly the incarnation — 
the actual trajectory of the man’s body in space and time in the continuity 
of its development between conception and death - derives in great part 
from the personal plans adopted in particular impersonations of the idea 
of the Self in particular situations. But the plan as acted out in the 
world is often not merely much more detailed than any prior imagination 
of it could be, but also significantly different; for we imagine not 
only the plans we adopt but also the scenarios within which they are enacted 
and when the hpenario uorks out differently from what had been foreseen-
(as in the hypothetical case where I slipped and broke my leg) the plan
may have to be altered too; moreover in imagining possible plans we often 
make assumptions about our own future desires and capabilities which 
may not be borne out in.the event. On the other hand the idea of the
Self (and hence the personality of which aspects are reflected by the
person in different situations) is not simply a palimpsest of successive
imagined plans, it is constantly being adjusted in retrospect to take 
account of what actually happened, as,distinct from what was hoped or 
foreseen. This is what the fifth phase of the purposive cycle is for.
Every new plan contributes from the original moment of impersonation 
onwards to the aspect of the idea of the Self which emerges in situations 
relevant to it; but as time passes and ths plan is acted out, what at 
first was imagined is steadily replaced by the record of actuality.
It may be argued that whan one man encounters another in a situation 
it is often the proposer whom he encounters, not the doer, the impersonation 
not the eventual incarnation of what is proposed. This is true enough, 
but the implication is that he often has to be careful not to take the 
other at. face value (a significant phrase). Without necessarily 
ascribing hypocrisy or deceit to the other, he will often wish to form 
his own assessment of how the real other will turn out in practice, 
rather than accept the man’s intentions as sufficient earnest of what is 
to come.
The moral to be drawn would seem to be that the eventual truth about 
us in any ordinary human context consists essentially of uhat we do 
and hence of the trajectory that we perform, for better or worse, 
across space and history. As we concluded earlier, it Is the incarnate 
biological man who is the substantive reality. But it can nonetheless 
be argued that an essential attribute of the Self is moral freedom and 
it is the chosen impersonation whidn reflects the exercise of free will, 
whether or not circumstances allow the man to carry out his intention in 
practice. Here we meet the problem of freB will which we shall need 
to consider before we can make any further progress.
Existential Freedom
The existential account of freedom and its relation 
to the distinction drawn in the preceding section 
between the impersonation and the incarnation of the 
Self.
The distinction we have been drawing between the impersonation and 
the incarnation, psychological and biological man, is one which has 
also been drawn, in a somewhat different framework of ideas, by the
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philosophers of existentialism. 3-P. Sartre is quoted as saying in
"Being and Nothingness”: nI am the self I uill be in the mode of not
being it”, although "the decisive conduct uill emanata from a self
1*uhich I am not■yet”.* Explicated in our terms: ”1 am an impersonation 
uhich I uill later incarnate in bodily behaviour; but while I am in 
the mode of impersonation, uhich is a synchronic coding* I am not in 
the mode of incarnation, uhich is a diachronic coding, that of the body’s 
trajectory through life. It is not my present self in the impersonating 
mode uhich uill perform decisive bodily actions, but my future self in 
the incarnate mode.” I believe that Sartre’s statement is correct, even 
in the simplest case where the decision is taken to execute a simple 
physical movement, such as picking a pencil up from the floor; for even 
in a case of this kind, by the time action is in train the decision is 
a thing of the past; our consciousness moves directly from the third 
phase of the purposive cycle ("I am choosing”, ”1 am thinking about 
doing something”) to the fourth ("I am acting”, "my body is behaving and 
I am monitoring its behaviour”); there is no intervening phase of 
decision - or, if there is, it has no duration and ue can have no 
awareness of it. Decision is when the body takes over. For SartrG 
this situation is the root both of our freedom and of the anguish uhich 
is inseparable from it. In Arthur C.' Danto’s exegesis "Nothing I now do
can possibly foreclose uhat I uill do a moment hence. So, in a -curious*;
metaphysical way, and due to the fact that I cannot occupy two times at 
once, because instantaneity is my mode of temporal being, I am helpless 
before the future.” * In Satire’s oun words "anguish in its essential 
structure is freedom”.
In the existentialist sense I am free because, as I stand on the
pinnacle of the present moment, I can step off in any direction. The
transient predication of the present moment Here Now is real as nothing
else is, past or future, near or for, because it is that of which ue
are directly conscious. ”It is the emergence of the pour-soi”, according
3 .to Sartre, "which brings it about that there is a world." * And the 
reality of the present moment includes the reality of freedom In the 
present moment. I can choose uhat I do and thereby create myself.
1. "Sartre” by Arthur C. Danto (Fontana 1975) p. 76. 2. Ibid. p. 76.
3. Ibid. p. 70.
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"The essence of the human being is in suspense in his liberty.”1*/
Ue have a duty to choose, freely and authentically, and Sartre insists ^
on the arbitrary, absolute, unmotivated nature of the liberty uhich
- ■ o
us exercise; "it is absurd insofar as it goes beyond all reasons" ; "all
3
reason comes into the uorld through liberty" „ Ue choose our oun normal 
and values as well as our actions; but with our choice goes responsibility, 
and with responsibility anguish. "Wan is constrained to decide about’^ S 
the meaning of being, in himself and everywhere outside himself."^*
"Ever£ choice moreover is valid only for the moment in which it is made*
I have to face "the necessity of choosing myself perpetually"* * "If man 
is not but makes himself and if in making himself he assumes the 
responsibility of the whole species9 if there is no value or morality
which is given a priori but if, in each case, ue have to decide alone,
without any point of support/without guides and yet for everyone,'^ hma/fo 
could ue do otherwise than feel anxious when we have to act? Each of 
our actions puts into play the meaning of the world and the place of 
in the universe."6*
There is a true insight in all this, but it does not take us very 
far. In rational terms it amounts to little more than the assertion 
that freedom is real but absurd; ue have to make use of it and this 
involves us in responsibility and anguish, but there is nothing exterior 
to ourselves by which we can make sense of uhat ue are doing. So 
blank a theory is dissatisfying. I suggest that without losing sight
of the reality of existential freedom, ue may be able to find some
firmer ground for judgement through an entirely different approach.
Four Stages of Freedom
An account of freedom as the self-detarmination of a 
unique body, distinguishing four stages of self deter­
mination from that of the stone to that of the self- 
conscious and self-creating human.
Let us begin with the hypothesis that freedom is the delf-dotermination 
or self-definition of a unique body in time and space and see where this
1. From "Being and Nothingness", quoted in "L*Existentialisma"
(Presses Universitaires de France) by Paul FoulquiS, p. 56.
2. Ibid.p. 63. 3. Ibid. p. 62. 4. Ibid. p. 66.
5. Ibid. p. 67*
6. Quoted from "Being and Nothingness" by Foulquio, op.cit. p.67*
tbkes us. A stone is a unique body but it does not determine itself in 
any way. Any changes that take place in it are the direct effect of 
external forces. The original zygote cell of a primitive plant or 
animal is a somewhat different case, for the information expressed 
synchronically in its gene pattern is re-expressed in a different form 
across time as well as space in the eventual plant or animal body - in 
effect by or through the cell body as it grows and divides. The gene,., 
pattern, however, is given from the outset, it is not in any ;way 
determined by the body itself; and the same applies in all but the 
most trivial detail to its re-expression in the eventual plant or ,r 
animal body (excluding perhaps the brain of a highly developed animal). 
The form this takes anc* the behaviour, if any, uhich it exhibits are 
determined within most narrow limits by thecgoneapattern, although as 
each plant or animal lives in different circumstances each will have’' 
a unique life trajectory. Circumstances such as, for example, the 
absence of appropriate nutrients in the environment may lead to 
defects in the product; but they will not lead (except conceivably 
through the operation of certain healing processes like scarring on 
damaged parts) to a product which is different in self-determined ways.
When ue consider the case of an animal capable of learning, 
however, we find a different situation again. I have referred earlier 
to Dr. Ross Ashby’s argument1 that in mammals the gene pattern is used 
to develop indirectly in the cerebral cortex a vastly greater capacity 
for regulation than could have been produced by the gene pattern 
directly. The supplementation is derived from the environment itself; 
"the quantity of design supplied by the gene pattern is supplemented 
by design (as variety and information) coming from the environment."
In such animals the form of the body in the narrow sense remains, as 
we have seen, very strictly determined by the gene pattern and this 
applies to all kinds of automatic behaviour performed by the body, 
from digesting to blinking; but it does not apply to a large part of 
the brain whose precise form is determined, though in ways not yet 
properly understood, by the life experience of the individual. Each ■ 
individual hs a unique trajectory through time and space and to this 
extent the form of his brain - and consequently of his mind if the 
two are distinguished - is determined in a way which is unique to
1. "An Introduction to Cybernetics” 1956 (Methuen reprint 1965,
p. 271).
himself. It might still be stretching the sense of words to say 
that it is self-determined; but? it is certainly a product of the unique 
interaction of his own gene pattern and his own unique circumstances; 
and this is an interaction producing' not merely a uniquely new form 
of body (though arguably it does produce this insofar as the brain 
is part of the body), nor merely instances of unique behaviour in . 
unique contingencies, but a new synchronic pattern which itself may 
be re-expressed diachronically in behaviour and thus itself determines 
behaviour.
To recapitulate, ue have first the stone which is simply determined; 
secondlywe have the living body which is a unique but closs re­
expression in contingent circumstances of the determined gene pattern; 
thirdly we have the intelligent creature which, in much at least of its 
behaviour, represents a re-expression over time in contingent 
circumstances not of the gene pattern itself, but of the body’s own 
synchronic re-expression of the gene pattern, a re-expression which 
includes a vast amplication of the pattern through variety drawn 
from the unique environmental circumstances encountered in the body’s 
life trajectory up to this point. These three stages can be regarded 
as stages of freedom. The third is much fdeer than the second or the 
first because in this case the body’s behaviour is determined to 
so great an extent by what is unique to itself - its own life trajectory 
as a whole - in interaction with the gene pattern which is inherited 
as its own, though it may be shared with a clone or an identical twin.
It is not determined to any great extent either directly by the gene 
pattern or directly by the force of immediate environmental 
circumstances.
Beyond this however there can be yet a fourth stage, applying to 
humans only, that of conscious self-creation. To profit from the 
freedom of the third stage I have suggested that a creature has to 
proceed by means of purposive cycles of thought, in uhich possible 
personal plans are matched against the appropriate contours of the 
anticipatory Self, a structure made up of personal plans of varying 
time span and generality which are organised (though imperfectly) in 
a hierarchical fashion, with the more general plans of longer span
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overlapping and constraining the shorter and more particular. A man 
may not always or even often live up to his own anticipatory Self,/ 
but there is no other defining idea of himself in his mind; his 
idea of himself cannot be defined by a negative, by his defections 
from this ideal; though his defections may be many, they do not build 
up any counter-ideal and the more and the greater they are the less 
can the man be said to achieve any coherence in his afctual life at all. 
Often these long term plans are culturally derived and they are 
sometimes far from clearly or consciously recognised; but insofar as 
a man consciously creates and chooses his own long term plans he is 
consciously creating himself and so reaching the fourth stage of 
freedom.
At any time the only reason for adopitng a personal plan as part 
of the idea of the Self is that ue hope to carry it out in actuality 
and so turn the impersonation into an incarnation; we cannot always 
tell what we shall be able to achieve in practice, but it is useless 
and destructive to adopt plans which ue know cannot be achieved. In 
one sense, as Sartre stresses, a man is creating himself with every 
decision he takes; but the vast majority of such decisions are not 
in fact taken in relation to a man’s life trajectory, the figure he 
is going to cut in eternity, but rather in relation to already existing 
major plans uhich do not themselves have to be called in question 
every time. (I cannot accept that it is a matter of "bad faith" for a 
man to take everyday decisions without digging up and putting "on jeu" 
the whole of his personality each time.) On the other hand it certainly 
is important for a man to choose consciously what his fundamental life 
plans are; and this is especially important for a modern man who no 
longer lives, like a remote tribesman or an ancient Sumerian, in a 
relatively unchanging social environment in which all major roles and 
values are determined, almost inescapably, by existing horizons of 
knowledge and patterns of custom.
Our freedom of choice, if we look at it in this light, is real 
enough. But the difficulty is to find out what fare the right choices 
to take. The existentialists, or at least many of them, assert that 
there is no exterior criterion of what is right. "Every reason comes
into the world through liberty.” In Florleau-Ponty’s words ”1 am the
absolute source, fly existence does not come from my antecedents, my .
physical or social environment; it goes out towards them and supports
them for it is I who cause to be for me (and so to be in the only
sense that the word can have for me) this tradition that I choose
to take up again or this horizon whose distance from me would melt
away - since it does not belong to it as a property - if I was not
1.there to scan it with my glance.” * There are no landmarks. It is 
all up to me. Hence the absurdity and anguish of the human predicament. 
What is the good of freedom if we can have no idea what to do with it?
Steering by Grace
A discussion of freedom as an internal reconciliation or 
harmony, suggesting that we can steer our lives by
reference to such a concord instead of pursuing "dominant
ends”.
I do not think we need to accept this pessimistic view. I wish 
to suggest an alternative which draws on an understanding of freedom 
in yet another sense. Men are capable of anguish but they are also 
capable of moments of grace and joy. Ue cannot set any course by 
anguish, which is a kind of chaos and has no direction in it; but it 
is not, I believe, beyond us to set our course by grace.
Let ms begin by going back a step. In the third stage of freedom, 
as described in the preceding section, a man makes his choices by 
reference to an idea of himself in which the most basic long term plans 
are largely determined by his upbringing and social environment, 
including the knowledge uhich is current in.his society about the 
physical world and the terms in uhich that knowledge is expressed.
In a relatively unchanging society the ideas inculcated by his up­
bringing and through his relations with his parents uill normally 
reinforce rather than conflict with those expressed in the custom, 
convention, sfcience and religion of his society. Ho is likely to 
take his basic plans and roles for granted rather than challenge or
question them, not least because there is no evident alternative to
. ■
1* Quoted foom "Phenomenologie de la Perception” in Foulquie op. 
cit* p. 70i
thorn* He mill see himself as being, or at least as trying to be, 
brave, kind, honourable, truthful and correct in the terms approved 
by his society or sub-culture, looking up to the approved gods, heroes 
or leaders and looking down upon, fearing or hating the approved 
demons, enemies or scapegoats. Because they are taken for granted the 
man uill not ordinarily look beyond these basic contours of his idea 
of himself as they present themselves in relevant situations of decision* 
But once the tribal cocoon is broken, men of various nations and gods 
are thrown together; consequently the values of society become 
pluralist and may evolve rapidly with shifts in economic and political 
power. This will be so especially if men’s understanding of the world 
about them and their technical power to deal with the environment are 
also rapidly evolving* In such circumstances the individual is forced 
to recognise himself not in a settled framework of meaning which makes 
it clear who he is, but in a kind of wilderness of conflicting ideas. . 
Instead of taking his basic plans and roles for granted he has to 
see himself os a whole, a person defined by these plans and roles, in the 
much wider perspective of the universe and of death - both of them no 
longer comfortably framed and understood blit taking on the aspect of 
unfathomable mystery and darkness. He finds himself in the existential 
predicament, a free individual in a meaningless universe, able to create 
himself but not knowing in what image to do so.
This process involves a fuller self-consciousness than before, a 
distancing of the viewpoint of consciousness from the whole trajectory 
of the man’s life in time and space. In that perspective, if the basic 
plans of his existing Self appear no longer to have any intrinsic 
validity or even coherence, the question arises whether there is any 
way in which he can identify a truer idea of himself to which he should 
try to approximate his actual behaviour, a truer impersonation to which 
he should try to give incarnate reality. It is a hard question for 
we can know one thing only in terms of other things, we are never 
able to roach the firm ground of absolute knowledge; and without such 
knowledge there is no intellectual criterion by which we can decide 
which are the true basic plans that a man should adopt. Ue are reduced 
to making assumptions, like the humanist assumption about the value
of the fullest possible development of human potentialities; but there 
is no assurance in such ideas. Where then can we find assurance? Our 
analysis has suggested that the answer is to be found not in any , 
identification of desirable ends towards which personal plans should be 
directed, and in terms of which they can.be defined; but rather in 
identifying the condition of grace or joy and choosing or adjusting 
our plans, whatever they may be, in such a way that we are enabled 
to maintain this condition, which is a kind of freedom, a moving 
equilibrium or harmony. This is an emotional not an intellectual 
criterion. It means that we do not make our decisions primarily in't.^ ', 
order to achieve particular ends.of any kind, but rather that we 
subordinate our choice of ends at.all times to the maintenance of a 
certain kind of harmony between them*
The possibility of this proposition depends on the prior assumption 
that we are able to recognise such a state of grace and orientate our 
whole lives towards it. I believe that we can. When we are in such a 
state we are more truly free and so more truly ourselves than at any 
other time, because the impersonation of the moment is informed and 
determined by the whole personality, vibrating as it were in full 
concord, not by isolated dominant plans to which others are subordinated* 
In ahhtearlier section of this study I have referred to the fact that.^ 
every physical action ue take is referred to our sense of balance, which 
in turn depends on our sense of the direction and force of gravity* Our 
sense of balance does not determine uhat the action is, but it determines 
how ue take it - and it may rule out some proposed actions altogether 
as well, as adjusting others. What I have suggested is that there may be 
some analogous process in’.the moral life. If we are governed simply by 
our desires, fears and ambitions there is no way in which we can find,.. 
a satisfactory method of coordination. We are the slaves of the carrot 
and the stick, not free men. Even if ue develop ingeniously rationalised 
means of maximising the carrot intake and keeping the stick to a 
mini.mum, ue are still operating as'behavioural machines; and we still 
finish up in confusion. To achieve freedom ue have first to detach 
ourselves from the domination of any human end whatever; we have to 
subordinate all that ue do to the pull of some moral equivalent of 
the sense of balance through which ue can order and adjust our different
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natural purposes.
In Chapter IV of this study I developed at some length the theory 
that the core of the personality lies in the small child*s moments 
of glad obedience, in innocence and joy, and that throughout bur lives 
it is only when we recapture this obedience that ue most truly 
recapture ourselves. These I suggest, are our moments of grace! 
sensitivity to such moments in which the whole personality is in balance, 
alert but reconciled and without tension, gives us a kind of touchstone 
of the moral life by which we can know when we are leading it right - 
or, more often, when we are leading it wrong* If this is accepted as 
an initial hypothesis, it brings with it the corollary that once we 
follow this method we are no longer steering positively by the ends 
to uhich various roles that we have adopted are directed, but rather 
ue are steering by means of the negative feedback which tells us all 
too clearly when there is tension and frustration within ourselves* < 
The trouble then is that while we do not find it difficult to 
recognise the symptoms of unease within ourselves, to know that we 
are unreconciled does not mean that we know what to do in order to 
make.things better. Fear and aggression lurk deep within us and we 
cannot release them without creating havoc of one sort or another*
The guide we need at this point is, I believe, a true conscience, 
uhich however is ths same as a true consciousness of ourselves. It 
has to be a purified conscience reflecting ’’authenticity'1, from which 
bauied, inappropriate motivation, deriving from past traumas, whether 
of childhood or otherwise, have been removed. This is what is meant 
by purity of heart, and ’’blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall 
see God”. The true conscience does not so much tell us uhat to do as 
warn us of the implications of the plans we consider, so that we can 
bear in mind the need for reconciliation and freedom in the way they 
are pursued. For it is the way in which we live that matters, not in 
themselves any particular ambitions that we may pursue (though some 
ambitions will be incompatible with the reconcilation of mind). As 
I have suggested in an earlier chapter, mystics often set out in pursuit 
of the ineffable experience, but what the true ones find is not an 
experience but a Uay. Remarkable experiences there may be along the
Way, but these are to be interpreted as signs, or signposts, not as ends 
in themselves.
I believe such a prescription as this makes sense as a matter of 
psychology and as a theory, in some sense, of natural religion. It is 
probably fair to say that the moral teaching of all higher religions is 
to a greater or lesser extent compatible with the psychological pre­
scription here set forth; and it is perhaps significant that most of 
them include traditions in which value is attached to physical and 
ascetic disciplines, especially disciplines of breathing and the 
relaxation of tension,which through promoting the harmony.of the body 
encourage the harmony of the mind. It is interesting, too, that
Professor Rawls has developed a theory of value which rejects the adoption
2of "dominant ends” of any kind*
The great difficulty however is that of bringing about so 
fundamental a reorientation in a creature whose nature is to live in the 
pursuit of purposes. The Christian doctrcine ibsfchatithis requires 
nothing less than a death-and rebirth. The Christian in following 
Christ adopts a new ideal role that is to be the keelplate of all his 
pxans,tinat or tne man "who emptied himself, taking the form of a servant”, 
into whose death he is baptised. In losing his life he gains it. In 
giving up the Old Self and its ends he regains his freedom from the 
domination of his desires and (still more) his fears. To the extent ;i 
that he is conformed to Christ, humble, free and forgiven, he becomes 
sensitive to the grace and guidance of the Holy Spirit* He is shaped 
under the shadow of the Cross as iron filings are drawn into pattern by 
a magnetic field. He is enabled to love and trust the transcendent God ' 
in whom he lives and moves and has his being, because he can know God 
in Christ and obey him in the Holy Spirit. Loving God, he can love his 
neighbour in whom God dwells. In freedom he chooses the good, and m  
the process he begins to create his true Self, formed in the image and 
obedience of God. !
1. Cf. Romans 2. 14-15; "When the Gentiles who have no law do by 
nature uhat the Law prescribes, these having no law are a law 
unto themselves; they show the work of the Law written in their 
hearts, their conscience bears witness to them.”
2. "A Theory of Justice" pp. 548-554. These ideas are critically 
discussed in an appendix to my study "An Approach to a Just 
Society”.
The point is made with precision by Gerard Manley Hopkins:
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;
Selves - goes itself; myself it speaks and spells.
Crying,What I do is me; for that I came.
I say more; the just man justices;
Keeps grace; that keeps all his goings graces;
Acts in God’s eye what in God’s eye he is -
Christ - for Christ plays in ten thousand places,
Lovely in limbs and lovely in eyes not his
To the Father through the features of men’s faces.
Such, at least, is the aspiration. Every Christian falls very
far short. Moreover, the question may still be asked whether this
putative freedom is not a delusion. To act in a fully reconciled way, 
free from internal tensions, is not necessarily to act with free will* 
Assuming that the account given earlier of the mechanisms of decision is 
correct, is the individual not still clamped in the vice of determinism?
Is what he does not still the result of the interaction of his genes 
and his environment, for neither of which he is responsible? To these 
questions we now turn.
Determinism and Free Will
An argument to suggest that steering our lives by 
reference to’the concord of our state and time” 
represents an obedience which is the only true freedom - 
an attunement to Creation and a sharing in it.
The key to an answer to these questions lies, I believe, in the 
distinction already drawn between the self-validating reality of the 
transient predications of consciousness Here Now and the derived reality 
of the model of the natural world that we construct with the aid of such 
processes as memory, generalisation, comparison and equation. The first, 
is prior and inexplicable and it includes the reality of free will. The 
second provides explanations, but only in terms of models built out 
of elements from the categories of conscious perception and thought, which 
are themselves not ultimate truths but the given, arbitrary registers of 
our minds. It builds up a model which can include models of ourselves;
but such models, as models, can have no free will. Causality is one 
of the categories of our experience, like extension, and we can no more 
easily conceive of an event which is not ultimately a consequence of 
natural law (though it may be statistical rather than mechanical law) than 
we can conceive of a body without extension. As I have argued earlier, 
we cannot circumvent this conclusion by imagining a supernatural world 
surrounding this one, because this lets us in for an infinite regression 
of worlds. But we must not let ourselves be mesmerised by the limitations 
of our natural understanding. If the subject of our natural understanding 
is inevitably always a limited model of reality, not reality itself, 
then it is perhaps not surprising that it exhibits the determinism of 
the model, not the creativity of the modeller*
In consciousness the modeller is always present with the model* 
Consciousness always includes the knowertfas well as the known, the I 
as well as the not-I, the agent as well as the things he does. By 
definition we cannot directly know the knower. Nor, as Chein has pointed 
out, can we say much about him. But one attribute we know he does have, 
that of location Here-Now, at the growing point of time, where actuality 
emerges out of possibility, where creation takes place.
We may recall Nozick’s point that ’’.the Self is synthesised as 
the object referred tfij in the reflexive tokening of I... The Reflexive 
act refers to the thing of greatest organic unity that includes it*”
This thing of greatest organic unity.is, on the face of it, biological 
man, the creature with its life trajectory. But is this a sufficient 
conception? The emergence of the reflexive Self can be equated with 
what I called in the preceding section of this study the process of self- 
determination, a process in which the determining organic unity moves 
through stages of increasing comprehensiveness; first that of the gene 
pattern, then that of the body’s re-expression of the gene pattern in 
space across time, and finally the stage in which the individual chooses 
for himself the long term patterns of his own anticipatory Self. I 
argued that the final stage involved a fuller self-consciousness because 
it required a distancing of the viewpoint of consciousness from the 
whole trajectory of the individual’s life; and what this implies is 
that the reflexive Self is reflecting an organic unity wider even than
1. Cf. the passage from Traherne quoted on p.412 above.
that of the creature*
Indeed it is evident that a human creature is meaningless in 
isolation. In great measure I am constituted by the wider wholes of 
family and society, language and civilisation, to which I belong.
But tan there be a limit to this process? If I. am finally governed 
by the "dominant ends" of my nation or class, I am still a slave, 
just as I may be the slave of my own pride or passion so long as I make 
them my dominant ends. The logical conclusion is that I am not fully 
free until I identify myself with all creation —.or rather with the 
Creator himself in whom.the creation grows, and in whom all conflicts s 
are ultimately to be reconciled. Identification is the litmus test 
for love. And the fruit of the love of the Creator is participation 
in his life, a sharing in the continual act of creation itself.
This may seem an odd, mystical line of argument to follow? but. 
it is far from new? it is no more than Christian orthodoxy, as 
expressed, for example, in the famous last lines of Dante*s"ParadisaM:
High phantasy lost power and here broke off;
Yet, as a wheel moves smoothly,, free from jars,
'..My will and my desire were turned by love, ^
The love that moves the sun and the other stars.
Howeverhthdoquebfcibnfnimposes itself: how can we know such things? How
can we identify ourselves with a Creator who is totally beyond
conception? How can we sense the pull of the whole, as distinct from 
the attraction of partial ends?
My answer has been that there is a grace poured out on mankind 
which is the moral equivalent of the all-pervasive force of gravity.
It is not measurable at present by any human instrument, nor perhaps
will it ever be; but as some sort of shaping power or "rnorphic 
resonance" I believe it exists. It represents the spirit of wholeness 
and love to which us can somehow become attuned, even though with 
difficulty and with a constant tendency to lose our sensitivity and to 
have to go seeking it again and again. It is essentially a sensitivity
1, Translation by Dorothy L. Sayers and Barbara Reynolds (Penguin
1962). The original words are:
All* alta fantasia qui manco possa;
ma gia volgeva il mio disiro e il veils,
si come.rota ch*egualmente e mossa,
l*amor che move il sole e l*altre stelle.
to the possibilities of harmony, a feeling for freedom as a state 
of internal reconciliation in which the roles of the continuing Self 
are so organised that their discords are tuned out and they find them­
selves in concord with the "proper vibrations" of the whole complex of 
the idea of the Self in the mind-manifold - and ultimately with the. 
proper vibrations of the manifold as a whole, reflecting a lifetime and 
a world* This is no doubt an imaginative vision rather than a testable 
hypothesis ; but the idea of harmony in obedience to the'musie^of^the ' 
spheres as the true end of man is one of the most ancient of human 
themes:
Music do I hear?
Ha, Hal Keep time* Hou sour sweet music is 
When time is broke and no proportion kept!
So is it in the music of men’s lives*
And here have I the daintiness of. ear 
To check time broke in a disorder’d string;
But for the concord of my state and time 2
Had not an ear to hear my true time broke.
hie need to have an ear for the concord of our state and time, to
check our disordered strings and make of our lives sweet music. This
task is essentially one of obedience* Us have to heed the concord - 
which is given to us, not invented by ourselves - arid bring our minds 
into reconciliation with it. Such reconciliation is still only the 
tuning of the strings; but once tuned, nevertheless, we are free. We 
ring with the muses of creation, "Thou hearest the sound thereof, but 
canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth; so is every 
one that is born of the Spirit." This music is not our own but through 
the tuning we become the m u s i c . O u r  new freedom is an adoptive 
freedom. In religious terms it is a putting on of what St. Paul called
1. Dr. RUpert Sheldrake’s theory of "rnorphic resonance" suggests 
that possibly this may not always be the case. See "A Hew 
Science of Life" (Blond & Briggs 1981).
2. Shakespeare "Richard II" Act \I Sc.U. See also in this connection 
the later pages of Sir Isaiah Berlin’s well-known essay on Tolstoy 
"The Hedgehog and the Fox" (Reprinted in "Russian Thinkers" by 
Sir Isaiah Berlin, Penguin 1979),
3. This theme is one which constantly recurs with the poets; for 
example T*S. Eliot in "The Dry Salvages":
music heard so deeply 
That it is not heard at all, but you are the music 
While the music lasts
(footnote continued on next page)
"the glorious liberty of the sons of God".
Rhetoric, it may be said, not argument. But my starting point 
has been that freedom is not to be expressed in the logical categories 
of the natural world, because freedom is creation and therefore prior 
to nature. When we look at the world our grasp is only of models, not 
of things in themselves; and similarly when we try to look beyond the 
world our grasp is only of the category walls of our existence. Yet 
just as it is possible for us to find our frail models of the world 
penetrated with reality, with a life which I believe we should be bold 
enough to recognise as that of the immanent godhead, so when we turn 
outwards, though our gaze is blocked everywhere by the blank symbols of 
paradox - infinity, eternity, creation, freedom - nevertheless it is 
possible for us to recognise, like a fire glowing through these symbols, 
reality once more, which I believe we should recognise as the trans­
cendent divine, the great I AM, God himself.
All the traditional theological attributes of God are mysteries, 
self-contradictory and thus meaningless as rational constructions, yet 
making sense, God-bearing, for those who approach them with humility, 
symbols through which we can become the free instruments of God’s 
freedom. When we speak of the free will of God we are thinking of him 
as the author of the created world, the reason why things exist and why 
they' are as they are, not otherwise; and admittedly in doing so we are 
using an anthropomorphic image, because purposeful thought, decision 
and action related to an identified final cause are pre-eminently chara­
cteristic of human nature. We have no alternative to using such an 
image, but we need constantly to remind ourselves that God’s will is 
not like a human will, it is,.as Bob and Isaiah learnt, a mystery 
beyond conception. "For my thoughts are not. your thoughts, neither are
*; Or George Herbert in "Church Mucick":
Now I in you without a bodie move,
Rising and falling with your wings
Or George Herbert again in "The Thanksgiving":
My musick shall finde Thee, and ev’ry string 
Shall have his attribute to sing;
That all together may accord in Thoe,
And prove one God, one harmonie.
Or Donne in his "Hymns to God":
I shall be thy Musiquo.*.
Or Rilke in his "Sonnets to Orpheus" with their theme that 
"Gesang ist Dasein".
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your ways my ways, saith the Lord. For as tha heavens are higher than 
tho earth so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts higher 
than your thoughts.**^  Yet insofar as man i§ freB he is like God, he 
shares the very nature of God.
The important point here is that when a man exercises free will, he 
is not exercising his own free will. For a man is not set free by 
doing what he wants, he can be tyrannised by his own greed, infatuation, 
ambition, pride. A Christian sees in Christ himself the type of 
perfect obedience to God*s will, expressed in everything he did, but 
perhaps above all in the agony of the Garden of Gethsemane. The Hife^S 
of Christ reflects a constant attention to his Father*s word, hence 
total detachment from sin, hence total sacrifice of ,!own will”, hence 
total humility, hence total love and fearlessness, hence total obedience 
even to death, hence total freedom. The obedience of Christ was not 
to an external law but.to the will of his Father made known to him 
directly “ and in the power of the Holy Spirit made known directly, as 
a Christina will believe, to anyone who has the humility and commitment 
to follow in his footsteps.
Yet if this is accepted, we find ourselves faced with a new problem. 
If a man is only free and only creating his own true Self when he is 
doing God*s will, does it not follow that he has o? identity of his own?
He may become part of the breath of God or he may remain a collection of 
disordered strings as part of the natural worldj but can he ever be a 
distinguishable free Self in his own right? In particular can we ever 
say that he exercises a choice of his own for which he ought to be held 
responsible (and without responsibility what is freedom)?
Responsibility
Ulhy should it matter what we do with our lives?
Calculations of prudence and of necessity.
Consciousness and decision, I have argued, belong to the creature. 
But in what sense can we regard the creature as responsible for his 
decisions and what are the implications of this responsibility?
1. Isaiah 55, 8-9.
The first part of this question we have answered after a fashion in 
our analysis of the four stages of freedom. This suggests that in the 
fourth stage of freedom feelf-conscious man, created largely by his own 
choices over the whole trajectory of his life up till the given moment 
of a new decision, is in a sense responsible for the decision which he 
now takes in a newly given contingency; this is true at least to the 
extent that he is the unique causal agent involved, that by his own 
choices he is in part responsible for the nature of this causal agent, 
and that he is conscious of what hB is doing.
At this stage, as our earlier line of argument has suggested, his 
choice may be formed,- not merely by the interplay of desires and fears, 
linked to particular purposes and tG thep^ ine^ } that serve them, but 
alternatively by his ear for ,!the concord of his state and time”, hfe sense 
of the reconciliation of his roles in the whole sounding body of his 
idea of himself within his idea of the world. Thus man is emancipated 
to a point at which he has a new kind of choice; he has not merely the 
alternative of obedience, in however sophisticated a manner, to the 
pleasure-pain principle as Freud envisaged it, but also that of obedience 
to the spirit of wholeness within him. This transforms fundamentally 
the nature of his decisions? he is choosing ultimately between coherence 
and disruption (or, more theologically, corruption), between steering by 
grace and steering by pleasure or pain, between freedom and slavery.
To put it still more theologically, as humans we do not have any 
independent creativity, but in becoming conscious;of ourselves, we do 
acquire the possibility of choice between sharing, under the guidance 
of the Holy Spirit, in the creativity of God, and being governed by the 
mere interplay of natural drives such as greed, fear, ambition and pride. 
Through the first we can share by adoption in God's freedom, while the 
second is a form of slavery. The first is obedience to the one will of 
God. The second is obedience to the multiple wills which inhabit ^ h ^ ^  
old Self. There is no intermediate course representing the specific 
choice of the free individual because, as we have seen, an act in the 
natural world which is not under the compulsion of law (even the law 
Df randomness) is inconceivable. Uo can give no meaning to any such 
idea of freedom. As William Law put it 200 years ago in idiosyncratic
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but admirable terms: "The will of the creature is the only opener of all 
evil or good in the creature; the will stands between God and nature 
and must in all its workings unite either with God or nature. The will 
totally resigned and given up to God is one spirit with God and God 
dwelleth in it; the will turned from God is taken prisoner in the wrfeth, 
fire and darkness of nature... The four elements of this dark, fiery 
soul or fallen nature ars: a resfilass selfishness* a restless envy, a 
restless pride, and a restless wrath or anger... A will given up to 
earthly goods is at grass with Nebuchadnezzar and has one life with the 
beasts of the field."1*
There is something alarming about this emancipation; for suddenly ,
there is much more at stake than there ever was before. "If you were
blind", said Desus, "you would have no guilt; but now that you say *Wq
2 .
see1, your guilt remains." * Once we become self-conscious, knowing 
good and evil, we havs a vocation to the obedience in which true freedom 
*£&i tiicne Lo fotm&r ';Bu£-$h©-price of this freedom is the sacrifice of 
our personal ends. Moreover - perhaps hardest of all - the sacrifice 
itself must be free; it is not a true one unless it is made for love . v 
rather than fear or prudent calculation. This in turn means that a 
virtuous determination, what Simone Weil called the "muscular will", 
is not enough; it is necessary first for a man to go back and be trans­
formed into a state of humble trust in the providence and goodness of 
the Creator, however he may be conceived; for without this he will 
never be rid of fear, and so will never be able to commit himself 
completely to love. To put it in a more traditional way, he must love 
God. and know GodVs love before he can love his neighbour. There is a 
worrying circularity here: if we do not love we cannot be free and if 
we are not free we cannot love. The circle can be broken but only by 
sacrifice and trust, the offering ofl our lives met by the grace of God.
What in the end does it matter? What difference does it make what 
lives we lead? "In the long run we are all dead." This is not a work 
of theology and I am trying to approach these questions from the stand­
point of rationality not revelation. What then can I say about them, 
given that death is still "an undiscover'd country"? First of all I 
suggest that it matters what we do with our lives because we are
1. "The Spirit of Prayer; or, The Soul rising out of the Vanity of 
Time into the Riches of Eternity" (1749) Part II. Reprinted by 
Dames Clarke & Co. Ltd. 1969.
2. 3ohn 9. 41.
responsible for them not only ae causal agents but also in the sense that 
we are answerable for them, bie are answerable to our colling and our 
calling is to wholeness. The circumstances of our lives differ widely,, 
but we have the opportunity to turn any life whatever into gold'L - 
though, as Gesus said, it may be particularly difficult for those who 
are rich in worldly goods to do this. The simplest, most unsophisticated 
and most unselfconscious followers of religious precepts can be among 
those who most successfully and straightforwardly obey their true calling. 
Certainly, insofar as we are answerable, when we take decisions, to. 
our own selves in future days, we ought to choose freedom and wholeness, 
for it is a prescription over the long term for happiness on earth, 
though not for escaping earthly disaster or oppression.
In making comparative judgements about this we have to remember to 
compare ourselves with ourselves in different circumstances, not with 
other people; for everyone begins from a different point and with a 
different freight of possibility. Conversely the man who hears the call 
and then stifles or disobeys it brings himself without fail into a kind 
of hell upon earth. Thus we need for our own sakes to be reborn. Such 
a rebirth does not alter the experience of our own past or free us from 
the limitations of the ideas of our own generation and our own society.
But it helps to liberate us from the pressures and distortions of our 
own sin. It helps us to see straight and to think straight. It frees 
us for love and helps us thereby to choose the good, and, in St. 3ohn*s 
words, to do truth.
Beyond the limited calculations of early prudence, however, which 
can indeed turn us towards the choice of freedom, I suggest that there 
is a deeper and more frightening sense in which we are answerable for 
what we do with our lives. The truth about us consists essentially of 
what we do with ourselves and hence of the trajectory that we perform, 
for better or worse, across space and history. Our actions are adaptation 
to the world as we encounter it, and since our trajectories are unique, 
each of us encounters a unique world. In adapting to it we help to change 
it, leaving it different from what it otherwise would have been; and in
1. Cf. George Herbert "The Elixir11!
For that which God doth touch and own 
Cannot for lesse be told.
and in helping to change it we help to create it, and also to change and 
to create ourselves. I have referred in a previous chapter to Donne’s 
quotation: tfFacies Dei est qua nobis innotescit. that’s God’s face to us 
by which God manifests himself to us.” Each of us sees the face of the 
Creator in his Creation from a different angle and our living is a 
process of responding to it. As we respond more truly in perception 
and in action to that face and to the will it expresses, so the 
trajectory of our own lives becomes more effectively conformed to God 
as Truth, and we begin to share his life, to be the means of his creation, 
”to be changed into his likeness from one degree of glory to another.”
To the extent that we fail to respond truly to him, we begin to lose our 
freedom and wholeness, we are disintegrated, given up to corruption and 
death. There is no distinction here of mind (or soul) and body, there 
is rather the distinction between man and God, If man acts truly he 
begins to share in the life and freedom of God; if he does not, he 
becomes separated from God and begins to share in death.
In the end we are all of us desperately imperfect as seers and doers 
of the truth; and we all come finally to corruption and death. Yet we 
leave our lives behind us; the trajectories of our bddies and their actions 
are part of creation and history and thus of eternal truth. If there 
is any resurrection, if our lives have any meaning, if we do hate any 
eternal life, then these trajectories represent the real people to whom 
the resurrection happens; there is no homunculus inside who can be floated 
off from the rest; nor is the resurrection just of some bag of flesh and 
bonBs representing the person at 30ms specific moment.
So far as the traditional distinction of body, mind and spirit is 
concerned, I would identify the body with the trajectory across space 
and time which I have here called the creature. I would identify the 
mind with the structuring consciousness, which extends and organises the 
world before us. This I have called the eye of the creature, which looks 
into the arena of consciousness; perhaps we can also identify it with what 
the Athanasian creed calls the ’’reasonable soul” which, with the flesh, 
makes one man. In regard to the spirit, I would argue that it is not my 
independent possession. What is resurrected, as St. Paul says, is a
"spiritual body”, created by such of my trajectory through life as has 
been governed by obedience and grace; and grace is the operation of 
God's Holy Spirit* When I have been disobedient, when I have not had an 
ear for ”the concord of myDstate and time” expressing the spirit of the 
wholeness of creation, I have made but ’feour music”, in which ”time is 
broke and no proportion kept”. And just as the Holy Spirit expresses 
the will of God, so when I ignore the Holy Spirit and dedicate myself to 
human pride or fear or greed, or, worse, when I sell my obedience to some 
other person or collectivity or myth, then I am being governed;by evil 
spirits - for evil is the privatio boni. Such an interpretation would 
seem to relate the analysis of this study in a reasonable way to these 
traditional categories of Christian theology.
It may be worth making the point here that the account of identity 
given in this study is decidedly inhospitable to Oriental theories of 
reincarnation. The obvious logical difficulty with ideas of reincarnation 
has always been to define what it is that is reincarnated. People some­
times claim to have memories of past lives in remote countries. I am a 
sceptic about this; if such claims were true, one would expect that by this 
time so much evidence would have accumulated that there would be no 
doubt about the fact. But even if, for argument's sake, it is accepted 
that details of past events have sometimes been recalled in this fashion 
which have later been independently corroborated as accurate, it still 
does not follow that reincarnation is the most likely explanation. I 
have argued earlier for the continuing reality in some sense of the 
events of past history, even when we have no means of knowing what 
they were. But if that is accepted, it is easier and more economical 
to postulate some inexplicable form of transfer from the past 
experience of another mind than to postulate the reincarnation of some 
unspecifiable homunculus who continues from one life to another.
But is there a true resurrection? And if so what form does it take? 
What about salvation and damnation? These are questions which are 
strictly unanswerable within the framework of our understanding. If 
we try to imagine a resurrection life, we have to imagine it in some 
kind of space and in a continuation of time. Yet, whatever eternity is, 
it is not time without end. We may think of it perhaps best as divine 
life transcending all worlds. For a Christian the hope of resurrection
lies in the resurrection of Christ himself. What 3esus offered was 
eternal life; but he offered it through the offering of himself, the 
bread of life; in him was life and the life was the tight of the world. 
The Christian believes that if we are sufficiently obedient to the 
Holy Spirit of truth and freedom, we may share ultimately in the risen 
life of Christ in God. This is glory. In moments of grace we have 
perhaps an intimation of glory, end we may dare to put on the hope of 
being eventually perfected in God's likeness. But if we turn from 
obedience we lose not only the present grace but also the future hops.
We become irresponsive and thus irresponsible. We are given over to dust 
and death. What this means we cannot say, any more than we can say what 
glory is. But there is reality in this antithesis, even though it is 
beyond our understanding. "As was the man of dust so are those who 
are of the dust, and as is the man of heaven so are those who ere of 
heaven. 3ust as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we shall 
also bear the image of the man of heaven.". * It might be possible to 
conceive of some further and final re-expression of man in a fifth stage, 
as it were, of freedom - one in which that part of his life which has 
been transmuted by obedience and freedom comes to a full re-expression 
in glory, and all the rest falls aways
Soul clap its hands and sing...
Perhaps the teachings of religion on the last judgement and the future 
life can best be seen as formulations, inevitably in human, spatial, 
temporal and thus symbolical terms of a general truth which we have to 
face, though it is beyond human understanding - not only that we are 
free, but that it matters metaphysically, fundamentally, what we do 
with our lives;
F’lensch worde wesentlich; denn uann die Welt vergeht,
So flallt der Zufoll weg, das Wesen, das besteht. •
Our life is a continual dying from one day to another; yet, as George 
Herbert says (with an echo of St. Paul);
Yet, Lord/‘ instruct us so to die 3
That all these dyings may be LIFE IN DEATH.
1. 1 Corinthians 15, 48-49.
2. Man live essentially; for when the world decays
The chance doth fall away, the essence stays. (Angelus Silosius)
3. From "Mortification".
APPENDIX 1: ISIDOR CHEIN'S ACCOUNT OF THE IMAGE OF MAN 1.
In Chapter II of this study I quoted Isidor Chein's definition 
of the self as "that which is at the origin of perceived space-time".
This self, he makes clear, "is never an object of experience and therefore
has no proper image". But if the self-as-subject, he says, "has no
> observable properties other than being the origin of space-time, the , 
situation is quite different for the self-as-object". (p.201.)
The subject lives only in the immediate present, but when in the present 
I turn round and look at iayself as an object, it is in effect always 
a past or future object self that I see - and one that is always 
embodied as every object is. What links and identifies observed past 
and future object selves is precisely that "they involve (or are 
expected to involve) actions emanating from or received at a primal 
origin of space-time)*; and in ordinary thought and parlance we 
assimilate subject and object. "The object self which temporally 
surrounds and phenomenally is continuous through the subject self is
apprehended as embodied in its own body. What more natural than to
make the same attribution to the subject self? So the self, object 
and subject, which clearly is not the body, is nevertheless garbed in 
the body image." (p.206.) The self is "a something that in various 
perspectives appears as a particular body, as resident in that b o d y . , 
as utilizer of that body, and as receiving pleasure and pain from that 
body. These various aspects of the self are not mutually contradictory. • 
The 'substantiality' of any object requires that it have different 
projections in different perspectives." (p.208.)
Although in Chein's view the body image is not a constitutive 
part of the self, it is a component of the self-concept. A multitude 
of observations in great variety all referable to a continuing self- 
identity become ingredients in a complex self-concept, which is largely 
unconscious, "comprising an implicative structure the various facets of 
which do not become explicit or the objects of scrutiny save under 
appropriate special conditions"• This concept "is not different in any 
essential respects (save those that have to do with direct access to 
one's experience) from one's concept of other persons". "The self 
concept construes a person who is the subject of our actions."
In "The Science of Behaviour and the Image of Man" (Tavistock 1973).
(pp.215, 216, 217.) This implies that the self-concept is in some 
sense a representation of the person, the actor, but is not identical 
with him or her.
The main component of the person (and one which is presumably 
represented in or through the self-concept though not identical with 
it or any part of it) is the ego-structure, which is built up from 
"imbricated, perpetuated" motives or concerns. The self, Chein says,
"is the object of many enduring, interrelated and interdependent 
concerns. Now, I submit, enduring interdependencies constitute the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the definition of a structure - 
to be sure, not a physical structure, but nevertheless a structure...
So with the ego structure. The perpetuation of concerns provides 
the enduring components of the structure and their imbrication provides 
the systematic interactive basis for preserving the structure that 
justifies the application to it of the term 'ego'." (p.221.)
"Engineered structures", Chein notes, "are built to withstand 
considerable sway, differential expansion*.• and so on; and of course 
the introduction of feedback mechanisms increases the range and effective­
ness of counteractive forces." (p.224.) "The dynamics of the ego", 
he says, "that is, the interplay of motivational forces in the ego 
structure, is... one of counterbalancing relevant considerations and 
finding paths of action that maximize the potential gain for the entire 
system of interlocking concerns. This... is... the controlling 
function of the ego... We develop a motive to scan our contingency 
maps and predicate our actions (and inhibition of action possibilities) 
accordingly... The implementation of this motivation may be referred 
to as ego strength... The diversity of the derived-perpetuated 
motives that make up the ego structure and the articulation, elaboration 
and comprehensiveness of the associated contingency map constitute... 
the maturity of the ego." (p.228.)
The ego so defined, however, is not to be identified with the actor. 
"For not only are there impersonal factors outside the dominion of the 
ego, but there are also motives that are not contained within its
dominion." (p.229.) By these Chein means superego motives and
id motives. The ego-strueture, in coping with the world, develops an 
"empirical-practical" system of morality, or priorities. But the 
mind includes also a more or less separate superego structure, built 
up from the introjection of authority figures in the child's early 
years, and "the ego has to respond to the demands of the image of the 
authority, just as it does to other features of the environment... 
Inevitably perpetuated motives develop with respect to the requirements 
of the superego and these motives are incorporated into the ego system.
The requirements of superego morality thus enter as relevant considerations 
in the balancing of ego motivation." (p.243.)
The id, by contrast, is the aggregate of three kinds of motivation,
(i) motives related to unfinished business, the unresolved tensions 
of childhood, (ii)appetitive drives, which are essentially the impulses 
of the immediate present, and (iii) impulsive acts dominated by ego 
motives which escape from ego balance and control. But it is emphasized 
that the id is an aggregate, not in any sense an ordered structure.
(p.258.)
"Affects are the qualities of what one observes when one regards 
one's own motivational state: feelings when the focus is on the
condition of the doer or the course of the action; emotions when the 
focus is on the relation of the ©ear to the object of the action.
When the focus is on the mission per se the motivation is effectless. 
Because of what they connote, some affects come to be positively 
valued, so that their achievement becomes afmotivc; others negatively 
valued so that their avoidance becomes a motive." (p.272.)
In the upshot the self, "which as object is at the core of the 
system, is as subject the common apprehended responsible agent of ego, 
superego and id behaviours. It is inescapable therefore that ego, 
superego and id, along with the self and the body, constitute one system 
that is the person, the actor, whose nature and character we have 
been seeking." (p.280.)
Beyond this, "if we choose to ignore the dependent relationship
of the other components of the person on the body, then we are dealing 
with the personality in the sense that psychologists use the term,
"that is, an aggregate of traits. "Traits however are patterns of 
behaviour across time. By this usage therefore personality does not 
exist at any given moment..." /_ Trait theorists _/ however "try 
to save themselves by assuming that the trait is not the pattern as 
such but rather a continuing disposition; but they have nothing to 
say about the nature of the disposition save that it manifests itself 
in the pattern.•• The disposition is defined by the pattern and is 
therefore a synonym for it." (p.281.) Chein accepts that "we shall... 
doubtless go on talking about traits and measuring them because in 
the conduct of our daily affairs stereotyping can be quite functional"; 
but he argues that the consistency of traits is grossly exaggerated.
"The point is that trait consistencies appear in very narrow bands and 
the narrowness of the bands entails narrowness of the range of observation­
al situations as well as of relevant motivations." (p.284.)
The final emphasis of the book is on motivation. "The crucial 
discrimination is not the shape of the living body but the commitment 
to enduring, ongoing and, to us, comprehensible projects." And in 
the end "the operation of motives and motivational structures is what 
people experience when they experience their own freedom and ascribe 
freedom to others." (p.291.)
Chein's is a complicated and ambitious model which attempts, as 
relatively few do, to bring all aspects of the individual coherently 
within its scope. He takes full cognizance of the difficult problems 
of self-as-subject and self-as-object, and although I do not think he 
provides an entirely satisfactory solution, X doubt whether anyone 
else has yet done so either. He recognizes the central importance of 
motivation and his concept of the ego structure with its "imbricated" 
motives is related to my concept of the anticipatory Self built up 
from overlapping plans. What he calls the self-concept corresponds in 
many ways to what X call the idea of the Self. Nevertheless, although 
I can agree with a great deal of His argument on particular topics, I 
cannot say that I find the total structure convincing. In particular 
the nature of the elements and the relationships between them are not
always clearly established, nor are the dynamics of the model by any 
means made clear.
As evidence for the first criticism X would refer to the 
relationship between the self-concept, the ego structure and the person. 
The self-concept is said to "construe" the person, and it is also said 
to play a central role in shaping the ego. But it is never clearly 
explained how this latter process in particular takes place. The 
self (presumably the self-as-object) is described as a something that 
appears differently in different perspectives, but there is nothing 
that corresponds to my distinction between the idea-complex in the mind- 
manifold and the "evoked idea".
As evidence for the second criticism I would refer to the absence 
of any reference to plans or purposive cycles or the like. There is 
frequent mention of motives and concerns as somehow reified objects 
which can be "imbricated" and can form structures. But what are they? 
In what space are these structures established and how are they built 
up? How do the elements and structures compare with the elements and 
structures of the self concept? There is nothing here that corresponds 
to the theory of logical forms in logical space and of the mechanism of 
mind worked out in the first two chapters of this study as a basis for
the elaboration of a theory of the self.
Early in his book Chein scornfully rejects Miller, Galanter and 
PribzidU account of plans and purposes; but his argument on this point 
I find extremely hard to follow - unexpectedly so, as I am in sympathy 
with him over his principal assertion, namely that "the behaver is an 
active agent in the universe. • • not merely a passive medium for the 
interplay of constitution and environment". (p.29.) The crux of 
his account of motivation is that "a behaviour is a motive of the 
behaviour it includes. My writing behaviour is a motive for my holding 
a pen... The including behaviour is not per se a motive; it becomes 
a motive only if some subsidiary behaviour is necessary to it." ($.23.) 
Thus "a motive is any directed act that requires a subordinate 
expediting act to be included in it." (p.79.) "The purpose of a
behaviour is the completion of the action of the superordinate behaviour 
in which it is included. The difference between motive and purpose is
one of focus. Purpose emphasizes the service or function of the
subordinate act with respect to the superordinate act." (p.81.)
Furthermore "I do not regard a deficit state as a motive..• It (or 
more precisely its elimination or replacement) is an object of 
activity... The elimination of the distress associated with the 
deficit state is a motive. We do things in order to eliminate the 
distress... Though the elimination... may itself be a motive it is 
unmotivated because it is not a subordinate phase of some superordinate 
event." (p.80.) In contrast to the view that a wish or desire is 
a motivational antecedent to behaviour Chein takes "such terms as 
referring to behaviour at an early stage of execution." (p.24.)
I shall not attempt here a close examination and critique of these 
views on motivation. I will only say that I think Chein rejects the 
natural language of plans and purposes because he identifies it - 
unnecessarily as I believe - with a mechanistic view of human beings; 
and that he adopts instead a language of his own, defining motives as 
including behaviours, which seems to me highly artificial and difficult 
to use. Even in these terms it is far from clear how the imbricated 
motives actually work. What is lacking in particular is any elaborated 
description of the mechanisms and processes of what happens from moment 
to moment during consciousness. I do not think it would necessarily 
be impossible to elaborate Chein's system in such a way as to meet 
these criticisms. But I suspect one would then end up with something 
much more akin to the model which I have developed in this study - 
a model which would establish a distinction corresponding to the one 
which I draw between the evoked idea and the idea-complex, and which 
would also find a place in some form for the purposive cycle.
APPENDIX IIs GEORGE HERBERT MEAD ON THE SELF
The purpose of this note is to discuss the relationship of the views 
of George Herbert Meed on the Self to the enquiry pursued in this study.
I will begin by summarising, as far as possible in Mead's own words, the 
essay on ’’Self” from Mead's ’’Mind, Self and Society” (1934) as reprinted 
in ’’George Herbert Mead on Social Psychology!? edited by Anselm Strauss 
(University of Chicago Press, revised edition 1964).
Mead's central thesis is that ”in giving a behaviouristic 
statement of consciousness we have to look for some sort of 
experience in which the physical organism can become an 
object to itself.” An individual ’’would not be self-conscious 
or have a self at all” unless he had first ’’become an object to 
himself”; and this he could do ’’only by taking in the attitudes 
of others towards himself within a social environment.”
This process, Mead continues, is only mads possible by means of 
communication. The individual's communication is directed not 
only to others but also to himself. "Ue find out what wo are 
going to say, what we are going to do, by saying and doing it.”
”He says something and that calls out a certain reply in him­
self which makes him change what he was going to say.”
Significant speech affects the speaker and this effect on 
himself is part of the conversation with others. Communication 
relies upon the use of symbols and what is essential to it "is 
that the symbolsshould arouse in one's self what it arouses in 
the other individual." This enables one to "get what wo term 
a mental content, a self”.
When a child learns to play a game, "he must know what everyone 
else is going to do in order to carry out his own play.” "The 
attitudes of the other players which the participant assumes 
organise into a sort of unit, and it is that organisation which 
controls the response of the individual.” Correspondingly on a 
uider stage "The organised community or social group which gives 
to the individual his unity of self can be called the generalised 
other... by taking the attitudes of which towards himself he 
becomes conscious of himself as an object or individual, and 
thus develops a self or personality." "Only by taking the 
attitude of the generalised other towards himself... can he 
think at all."
According to Mead "the self reaches its full development by 
organising the individual attitudes of others into the 
organised social or group attitudes and by thus becoming an 
individual reflection of the general system, the patterns of 
social or group behaviour, in which it and the others are all 
involved." "A person is a personality because he belongs to a
community, because he takes over the. institutions-of that 
community into his own conduct." "What we mean by self- 
consciousnoss is an awakening in ourselves of the group of 
attitudes which we are arousing in others." It is therefore 
a cognitive rather than an emotional phenomenon. "The essence 
of the self... lies in the internalised conversation of 
gestures which constitutes thinking... And hence the origins 
and foundations of ths self, like those of thinking, are 
sociol."
Head discusses the nature of the "I" which is aware of the 
social "me". 1 "The "I":’ of this moment is present in the "me" 
of the next moment. I cannot turn around quick enough to 
catch myself... I become a "me" insofar as I remember what 
I said." "The "I" is the response of the organism to the 
attitudes of others, the "me" is the organised set of attitudes 
of others which ^ the individual/ assumes." The "I" gets into a 
man's experience only after he has carried out the act. "He 
had in him all the attitudes of the others calling for a 
certain response; that was the "me" of the situation and the l; 
response is the "I"*.. This response of the "I" is something 
that is more or less uncertain... These individuals ^ in a ' 
social situation/ give him a certain self* Well what is he 
going to do? He does not know and nobody else knows... When 
mar/ says he knows what he is going to do even there he can 
bo mistaken... The movement into the future is the step, so to 
speak, of the ego, of the "I", It is something that is not 
given in the "m§". The "I" both calls out to the "mo" and 
responds to it* Taken together they constitute a person as it 
appears in social experience."
"The fact that all selves are constituted by or in terms of the 
social process.•• is not in the least incompatible with the fact 
that every individual self has its own peculiar individuality." 
For each "reflects the behaviour pattern of that process from 
its own particular and unique standpoint." The individual is 
continually reacting back against society and the cumulative 
effect of such changes "which are not simply those of a "me" 
but of an "I"" can be profound. "We can state what is going 
to happen and take responsibility for the thing we are going 
to do, and yet the real self that appears in that act awaits 
the completion of the act itself. Now it is this living act 
which never gets directly into roflectivo experience... It is 
there ^ in the possibilities of the "I"/ that novelty arises and 
it is there that our most important values are located."
"Social control is the expression of the "me" against the 
expression of the But the latter "is aresponse with
which the self is identified... Values definitely attach to 
this expression of the self which is peculiar to the self" - 
provided however it is one which "unselfishly" relates to the 
whole social group of which it is part, and is not a "narrow 
self", "taking advantage of the whole group in satisfying 
itself." Uhat is ideal is a social situation "such that it 
opens the door to impulsive expression and so provides a pe­
culiar satisfaction..• the source of which is the value that 
attaches to the expression of the "I" in the social process."
APPENDIX IIs GEORGE HERBERT MEAD ON THE SELF
The purpose of this note is to discuss the relationship of the views
of George Herbert Mead on the Self to the enquiry pursued in this study.
I will begin by summarising, as far as possible in Mead's own words, the 
essay on "Self" from Mead's "Mind, Self and Society" (1934) as reprinted 
in "George Herbert Mead on Social Psychology/ edited by Anselm Strauss 
(University of Chicago Press, revised edition 1964).
Mead's central thesis is that "in giving a behaviouristic
statement of consciousness we have to look for some sort of 
experience in which the physical organism can become an 
object to itself." An individual "would not be self-conscious 
or have a sslf at all" unless he had first "become an object to 
himself"; and this he could do "only by taking in the attitudes 
of others towards himself within a social environment."
This process, Mead continues, is only made possible by means of 
communication. The individual's communication is directed not 
only to others but also to himself. "liJe find out what we are 
going to say, what we are going to do, by saying and doing it."
"He says something and that calls out a certain reply in him­
self which makes him changs what he was going to say."
Significant speech affects the speaker and this effect on 
himself is part of the conversation with others. Communication 
relies upon the use of symbols and what is essential to it "is 
that the symboldshould arouse in one's self what it arouses in 
the other individual." This enables one to "get what we term 
a mental content, a self".
Uhen a child learns to play a game, "he must know what everyone 
else is going to do in order to carry out his own play." "The 
attitudes of the other players which the participant assumes 
organise into a sort of unit, and it is that organisation which 
controls the response of the individual." Correspondingly on a 
wider stage "The organised community or social group which gives 
to the individual his unity of self can be called the generalised 
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”The fact that all selves are constituted by or in terms of the 
social process... is not in the least incompatible with the fact 
that every individual self has its own peculiar individuality." 
For each "reflects the behaviour pattern of that process from 
its own particular and unique standpoint.” The individual is 
continually reacting back against society and the cumulative 
effect of such changes "which are not simply those of a ”me” 
but of an ”1"^ can be profound. ”We can state what is going 
to happen and take responsibility for the thing we are going 
to do, and yet the real self that appears in that act awaits 
the completion of the act itself. How it is this living act 
which never gets directly into reflective experience... It is 
there ^ in the possibilities of the "IJ|/ that novelty arises and 
it is there that our most important values are located.”
"Social control is the expression of the ”me" against the 
expression of the ”1".” But the latter ”is aresponse with 
which the self is identified... Values definitely attach to 
this expression of the self which is peculiar to the self” - 
provided however it is one which "unselfishly” relates to the 
whole social group of which it is part, and is not a "narrow 
self", "taking advantage of the whole group in satisfying 
itself." What is ideal is a social situation "such that it 
opens the door to impulsive expression and so provides a pe­
culiar satisfaction... the source of which is the value that 
attaches to the expression of the "I" in the social process."
Mead argues in conclusion that social process is a pre­
requisite of mind and not vice versa. “The social process*«» 
does not depend for its origin or initial existence upon the 
existence and interactions of selves, though it does depend 
upon the latter for the higher stages of complexity and 
organisation which it reaches after selves have arisen within 
it.”
I have tried to use Mead*s own words in order to be fair to a writer 
with whose thinking and style of expression I do not find myself naturally 
in sympathy* Mead has got his teeth here into two or three interesting 
ideas; but the exercise of summarising makes one acutely aware that he 
proceeds by a sort of dogged, involved reiteration of assertions, 
rather than by the development of a coherent, consecutive argument or 
t$e presentation of evidence. Correspondingly he does not build up any 
kind of systematic model of the mind and its working, nor any detailed 
account of the nature or function of the self. He says in a footnote 
that in defending a social theory of mind he is “defending a functional 
as opposed to any form of substantive or entire view as to its nature.“
But what does this purported distinction mean? How can a thing have a 
function if it is not a thing? How can you describe a function without 
identifying what it is that functions?
Mead says again and again that it is only by “taking in the 
attitudes of others towards himself” that an individual can become a 
self. But what kind,of entities are these attitudes of which he speaks?
By what process are they taken into the self? What is the structure 
they are taken into? How can they be taken into the self if the self 
cannot exist until they are taken in? These may seem tiresome questions; 
but they imply, I believe, a justified criticism of the vagueness of tis 
ideas, of the lack of any working out in detail of what they mean. He 
simply asserts (again and again) that thinking is an inner conversation, 
but he provides no real argument for this, nor does he offer any 
detailed analysis of what speech or language or dialogue or conversation 
actually consist of. He says that self-consciousness is an awakening 
in ourselves of the group of attitudes which we are arousing in others.
But this totally begs the question. How does a group of attitudes awake? 
What do we mean by being awake? Who or what is awake?
According to Mead “the unity and structure of the complete self 
reflects the unity and structure of the social process as a whole; and 
each of the elementary selves of which it is composed reflects the unity 
and structure of one of the various aspects of the process in which the 
individual is implicated." This of course makes the individual a total 
robot and denies him any independent purposes or plans. As a result 
one might expect the whole social process to be locked solid; but Mead 
avoids this by introducing the “I" as another "phase" of the self (though 
without discussing what the word phase means here or how one phase is 
related to another). The "me" represents the controlling, censoring 
reality of the social process; but in "impulsive conduct" "the structure 
of the "me" does not determine the expression of the "I"," Although 
this "I" does not have plans or purposes, it represents what we actually 
do - which is often unforeseen, taking the "me" by surprise.
The discussion of the "I" is perhaps the most interesting part of 
the essay, a parallel in some respects to the existentialists* 
distinction between the "pour-soi" and the "en-soi" (see in this 
connection the section of ’Existentialist Freedoni* on p. 417 of this 
study). But it is striking how sharp the contrast is here between Mead*s 
matter-of-fact acceptance of rule by the "generalised other" and Sartre*s 
reaction: "hell is other people". As Foulquid expounds Sartre'1': "For the 
other I reduce myself to a "me" who is only what he was, since in the 
idea which the other has of me, what I want to be - which constitutes for 
me my veritable being — does not come into consideration at all."
Mead refers in passing to the possibility for the individual of 
making plans and accepting responsibilities, but he does not talk about 
wants or desires. Moreover he only mentions "subjective contents" 
(unspecified except that they include kinaesthetic experience) in order 
to assert that their existence does not alter the fact that self- 
consciousness involves the individual in becoming an object to himself.
The contribution of the "X" in Mead*s concept seems to be by 
definition unforeseeable and gratuitous. Although he refers to the
1. L*Existentialisms" (P.U.F., 1947) p. 73.
"more or less fantastic psychology of the Freudian group", he does not 
consider whether the "X" could have an unconscious motivation which 
might be open to study* He gives no account of mechanisms of purpose, 
planning and choice, and virtually no explanation of what must be for 
him the crucial process of confrontation between "I" motivations and 
"me" motivations* The "mo" represents "a definite organisation of the 
community there in our own attitudes", it stands for social control and 
censorship, while the "I" stands for unpredictable, impulsive conduct*
In an actual situation, the novelty, he says, "comes in the action of 
the "I", but the structure, the form of the self'JJa concept which he leaves 
unexplained/ is one which is conventional." "The "me" sets the limits 
that enable the "X", so to speak, to use the "me" as the means of 
carrying out what is the undertaking that all ^i.e, presumably an 
idealised coherent social community/ are interested in.”
This suggestion might lead to some thoughts on possibility and 
actuality, on schemata and equilibration (to use Piaget’s term); but 
with Mead it does not seem to lead anywhere* Mead is positively wistful 
about social situations in which "the structure of the "me" for the time 
being is one in which the individual gets an opportunity for that sort 
of expression of the self", (i.e. expression of the self which is 
"peculiarly its own"), otherwise situations in which "the very structure 
of the "me" opens the door to the "I"." But he cannot relinquish his 
social determinism and such situations seem to be regarded as rare 
uncovenanted mercies, almost superfluous to the serious business of the 
socially determined self* He does not seem to notice that if the "me" 
is built up, at least in part, by successive unpredictable responses of 
the "I", it can arguably no longer be said to be entirely shaped by the 
generalised other.
I have to conclude, as the outcome of this brief review, that while 
Mead’s ideas often strike a chord of interest, they are not sufficiently 
clear-cut or coherently enough developed to be of much practical 
relevance to my own concerns. Moreover I think it should be said that his 
central concept of the self as essentially a reflection of the patterns 
established by the "generalised other" is not merely wrong, it represents 
the advocacy as normality of what can only exist as a highly pathological
state. In the schizophrenic, according to R.D. Laing,
the individual’s being is cleft in two, producing a dis­
embodied self and a body that is a thing the self looks at, 
regarding it at times as though it were just another thing in 
the world. The total body and many ’mental* processes are 
severed from the self, which may continue to operate in a 
very restricted enclave (phantasying and observing), or it 
may appear to cease to function altogether (i.e. be dead, 
murdered or stolen)^*
- like, one might suggest, Head’s unfortunate ”1” trying to express what 
is ’’peculiarly its own”.
Jung too has recognised the problem. We have, he says, to take the 
expectations of society into account. But
obviously no one could completely submerge his individuality 
in these expectations; hence the construction of an artificial 
personality becomes an unavoidable .'necessity... This... is 
bound to have repercussions in the unconscious... The con­
struction of a collectively suitable persona means a 
formidable concession to the external world, a genuine self- 
sacrifice which drives the ego straight into identification 
with the persona, so that people really do exist who believe 
they are what they pretend to be... When we examine such 
cases critically, we find that the excellence of the mask is 
compensated by the ’’private life” going on behind it...
These identifications with a social role are a very fruitful 
source of neuroses. A man cannot get rid of himself in 
favour of an artificial personality without punishment.2*
One does not have to be a wholehearted Jungian to recognise where the 
balance of realism and common sense lies on this issue.
1. ’’The Divided Self" (Penguin 1965) p. 162.
2. From ’’The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious”*"Jungi 
Selected Writings” ed. Anthony Storr (Fontana 1983) pp.94-5,
